Even allowing for the heated rhetoric and behavior of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), it was ominous to see a March 7 statement warning Azerbaijan it would face attack if links with Israel were not severed.
The statement followed the March 5 drone strike on Azerbaijan’s Nakhchivan exclave. One hit the terminal of Nakhchivan airport, another injured a village nearby, while the Azerbaijani air defenses shot down a third.
In response, Azerbaijan closed parts of its airspace and limited border crossings for cargo trucks with Iran. The threat to Azeri airspace has global implications — with Iran and Russia closed to air traffic, Azerbaijan and Georgia to its west provide a narrow channel for planes flying east-west between Europe and Asia.
The country’s President Ilham Aliyev ordered the armed forces to prepare countermeasures while simultaneously stressing that Azerbaijan itself had not participated in the broader military operations targeting Iran.
The sudden increase in tension was all the more surprising as it followed Aliyev’s unprecedented visit to the Iranian embassy to personally convey condolences over the assassination of Iran’s supreme leader, Ali Khamenei, on February 28. Relations between the two countries had been improving over the past year following the deadly attack on the Azerbaijani embassy in Tehran in early 2023. Iran and Azerbaijan share a long border, are linked through key infrastructure projects, and have witnessed a steadily growing level of bilateral trade of some $650 million in 2025.
And yet, Iran has its reasons. It has watched with concern the growth in US influence, in particular the planned east-west trade corridor that will ultimately link Azerbaijan’s capital, Baku, on the Caspian Sea, with its Nakhchivan exclave and then onto Turkey and European markets to the west.
Indeed, the drones hit at the place which is set to play a pivotal role in the planned Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), as the US-backed infrastructure concept is known. The project will also cross Armenia’s southern Syunik region, and will link Central Asia to Europe while bypassing both Russia and Iran.
From Tehran’s perspective, the corridor represents more than a simple transportation initiative. Its officials have repeatedly argued that such a route would weaken Iran’s geopolitical and economic leverage in the South Caucasus.
Since the early 1990s, the so-called Aras transit route running through northern Iran has functioned as the primary logistical link between Azerbaijan proper and Nakhchivan. This route generated steady transit revenues and reinforced Iran’s strategic role as a regional connector. The emergence of an alternative threatens to reduce Iranian influence.
Tehran’s concern has grown further amid reports that private US security contractors could be deployed to safeguard sections of the new route, potentially introducing a Western security footprint directly along Iran’s northern frontier.
Nor is this its sole objection, given Israel’s long-established relationship with Azerbaijan, and reports (denied by both countries) that Israeli intelligence officers use the country as a base for operations against Iran.
Though Baku has strived to maintain a certain balance between Israel and Iran, its relations with Tel Aviv have evolved into an unofficial strategic partnership covering cooperation on energy, military, and security. Azerbaijan supplies around 30% of Israel’s oil, and last year the state energy company, SOCAR, bought a 10% stake in Israel’s Tamar natural gas field. Moreover, Israel was also a key supplier of weaponry to Azerbaijan in the lead-up to the Second Nagorno-Karabakh war of 2020 and a short military campaign of 2023, which culminated in the fall of the Armenian-populated separatist entity.
The balance of power on the ground does not favor Tehran. Azerbaijan is also closely allied to Turkey, which at the time of writing had been the target of three Iranian ballistic missiles. Turkey and Azerbaijan could now activate the mutual defense clause within the Shusha declaration they signed in mid-2021. In the wake of the drone attack, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan spoke by phone with Aliyev and expressed his support.
Azerbaijan also enjoys support from the EU as it relies on Caspian energy and values the South Caucasus country’s role as a deterrent to both Russia and Iran. Then there is Washington, with Trump’s personal interest in the realization of the TRIPP, as evidenced by J.D. Vance’s February trip to Yerevan and Baku.
Iran clearly dislikes the way the cards have fallen, as it is signaled by lashing out. But a much bigger attack on Azerbaijan could spread a conflict to Turkey and beyond. It would be very unwise.
Emil Avdaliani is a research fellow at the Turan Research Center and a professor of international relations at the European University in Tbilisi, Georgia. His research focuses on the history of the Silk Roads and the interests of great powers in the Middle East and the Caucasus.
Europe’s Edge is CEPA’s online journal covering critical topics on the foreign policy docket across Europe and North America. All opinions expressed on Europe’s Edge are those of the author alone and may not represent those of the institutions they represent or the Center for European Policy Analysis. CEPA maintains a strict intellectual independence policy across all its projects and publications.
https://cepa.org/article/iran-tensions-in-the-caucuses/
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