Today’s Zaman, Turkey
19 October 2008, Sunday
Landmark Ergenekon case may face many tough hurdles ahead
The trial of suspected members of Ergenekon is due to start tomorrow
in the town of Silivri, where Workers Party members have announced
they will protest the trial.
Sometimes one might find a legal proceeding or an investigation to be
threatening for one reason or another. Take, for example, the case of
Ergenekon — a shadowy network with dark links to individuals and
groups nested within the state that is accused of murders and attacks
over several years to serve its purpose of social engineering and
perhaps taking over the government.
Sunday’s Zaman explains what steps would prevent a court case from
being resolved and some key facts from being illuminated.
First, here’s some background about Ergenekon: Eighty-six suspects
will stand trial starting Monday in the Silivri courthouse in
TekirdaÄ?. They face charges of provoking the people to revolt
against the government and other crimes. The charges were brought as
the result of an investigation that started accidentally when
ammunition and weapons were discovered in a house in a poor
Ä°stanbul neighborhood in June 2007.
During the course of the investigation, which lasted more than a year,
dozens of suspects were detained, released or arrested on suspicion of
trying to take over the state. Journalists, academics, writers and
retired senior army generals are being held as suspects in the
case. So how might the whole process be stalled and the public’s
attention diverted?
1) Exclude vital evidence
First, if the case you are working to stop has gotten this far, you
should not have let that happen in the first place. But still, the
Ergenekon case offers an excellent example of how there is still hope
if your case is in deep trouble.
The prosecution’s most significant weakness in the Ergenekon case is
the absence of the diaries allegedly belonging to a former general
chronicling coup plans against the Justice and Development Party (AK
Party) in 2004 and 2005. Many experts agree that it was smart to try
to keep these diaries out of the indictment, as without such vital
evidence, the case might have been covered up like the Susurluk affair
of 1996.
In that case, the relationship between a police chief, a Kurdish
deputy who led his personal army against the Kurdistan Workers’ Party
(PKK) and an internationally sought mafia boss was fully exposed. The
three were in a Mercedes that crashed in the town of Susurluk, killing
the mafia boss and the police chief on the spot.
Although the relationship was revealed, the Susurluk affair was
masterfully covered up, and the image of the state’s criminal joyride
was soon forgotten, leaving the public with only a hunch, which later
died and evaporated completely.
While you’re at it, you should obscure the most vital evidence of the
case. Fikri SaÄ?lar, who used to be a member of a parliamentary
commission established to investigate the Susurluk affair, says it’s
certain that the lack of the diary evidence will hurt the
prosecution’s case. SaÄ?lar explained to Sunday’s Zaman that the
indictment includes two main accusations against the suspects:
"establishing a terrorist organization" and "attempting to overthrow
the government and Parliament of the Republic of Turkey."
SaÄ?lar says the first claim can be proven easily because hand
grenades belonging to Ergenekon suspects found in the beginning of the
investigation were of the same batch as those used in an attack at the
Cumhuriyet daily in 2006. But proving the accusation of plotting to
overthrow the state or the government is possible only by using
journals kept by Navy Commander retired Adm. Ã-zden Ã-rnek as
evidence for the jury.
"If the coup diaries are not included in the indictment,"
SaÄ?lar said, "this case cannot be solved."
The choice to exclude the diaries is also confirmed by the Democratic
Society Party’s (DTP) Å?ırnak deputy Hasip Kaplan, who
says the Ergenekon investigation might become a fiasco without the
diaries.
Make the indictment lengthy
According to the most recent information from the prosecutors, the
Ergenekon indictment comprises 2,455 pages and 441 folders filled with
papers, reports, photographs and other documents that serve as
evidence to the accusations. It is practically impossible for the
already slow Turkish judiciary to overcome the gruesome task of
reviewing the massive Ergenekon indictment and its evidence
files. Experts agree that this is one of the most important problems
the prosecutors face.
Judging from what Parliament’s Susurluk Commission member
SaÄ?lar says, another way to doom the case is to politicize
it. SaÄ?lar said, "Everyone who opposed the prime minister or
the government was detained as part of the investigation at some
point, which complicated the already monolithic proportions of the
indictment." He also said that looking at Ergenekon from a left,
right, neo-nationalistic or other ideological perspective would render
the case fruitless.
"Tens of thousands of pages of evidence annexed to a 2,455 page
indictment. New detentions or arrests could kill the case,"
SaÄ?lar said, emphasizing that mixing politics with the
judiciary will ensure that the case leads nowhere.
Study earlier cases
Revisiting the Susurluk case is another way to bring one closer to the
goal of ensuring a fruitless investigation and trial. Mehmet
ElkatmıÅ?, who led the Susurluk Commission, said the
biggest mistake so far in the Ergenekon investigation was waiting to
start one trial against so many suspects instead of trying those
suspects against whom the prosecution already had a case. "And the
remaining extensions of the gang should have been discovered as those
trials went on," ElkatmıÅ? said.
"Ergenekon is not a new phenomenon," ElkatmıÅ? said. "It
has existed since Susurluk. If the mistakes in Susurluk are repeated,
this is over before it begins."
ElkatmıÅ? said that retired Gen. Veli
Küçük — currently under arrest as a major
Ergenekon suspect and a former army member whose name was implicated
in Susurluk in 1996 — and former Police Chief Mehmet AÄ?ar were
able to refuse to testify to the Susurluk Commission under laws
designed to protect "state secrets." ElkatmıÅ? said a
similar mechanism might be used to stop some Ergenekon suspects from
testifying. ElkatmıÅ? said that if some invisible power
is hindering prosecutors, then granting the prosecutors special powers
could be a solution.
Musa SıvacıoÄ?lu, formerly the head of a
commission set up in Parliament to shed light on a similar incident
that exposed links between the military and a bombing in the
southeastern township of Å?emdinli in November 2005, also
expressed concern that the "state secret" path could work in
Ergenekon, which reveals another important hint about how to doom a
case: Pull some strings, but don’t give the prosecutors time to react.
Like SaÄ?lar, ElkatmıÅ? said detaining everyone who
criticizes the government might damage the course of the trial and
could be a way to ensure that nothing significant comes out of it.
Other potential ways to kill a case
Other experts in dealing with similar shady affairs point to potential
difficulties that might arise for the prosecution. Listen to them
carefully, for some of these potential pitfalls could emerge if you
try hard enough or get really lucky.
Ersönmez Yarbay, who headed a commission in Parliament to
investigate the 1993 killing of journalist UÄ?ur Mumcu — an
assassination now suspected of Ergenekon — said the greatest danger
threatening the case is Parliament not exerting greater effort to shed
light on the facts. Similarly, Hasan Fehmi GüneÅ?, who
was the interior minister of 1978, when journalist Abdi
İpekçi was shot dead in an assassination also attributed
to "deep state" elements, says, "A common will and approach in all
state agencies is necessary for successfully resolving the case."
Sadık AvundukluoÄ?lu, who headed a parliamentary
commission into unresolved murders that occurred between 1990 and
1995, said foreign centers supporting Ergenekon should be
exposed. Yusuf AlataÅ?, former president of the Human Rights
Association (Ä°HD), said he believes there are serious
differences of opinion among the three state prosecutors on the
Ergenekon case. "The chief prosecutor is giving the impression that
things are happening outside his control," he said. "The prosecution
is a single unit. Every other prosecutor should work for him. This
handicap should be removed; otherwise, the trial might be
unsuccessful."
Accusations against Ergenekon suspects
The indictment made public last month claims the Ergenekon network is
behind a series of political assassinations over the past two
decades. About 90 suspects will stand trial starting Monday.
The victims of alleged Ergenekon crimes include a secularist
journalist, UÄ?ur Mumcu, long believed to have been assassinated
by Islamic extremists in 1993; the head of a business conglomerate,
Ã-zdemir Sabancı, who was shot dead by militants of the
extreme-left Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party/Front (DHKP/C) in
his high-security office in 1996; secularist academic Necip
HablemitoÄ?lu, who was also believed to have been killed by
Islamic extremists, in 2002; and the 2006 Council of State attack.
The indictment also says Küçük, believed to be
one of the leading members of the network, had threatened Hrant Dink,
a Turkish-Armenian journalist slain by a teenager in 2007, before his
murder — a sign that Ergenekon could be behind that murder, too. The
indictment also accuses the group of plotting to assassinate Turkey’s
Nobel laureate author Orhan Pamuk and of a plan to attack DTP
deputies. The group also had close ties to terrorist organizations
including Hezbollah and the PKK, according to the indictment.
The Ergenekon indictment accuses a total 86 suspects, 70 of whom are
in jail, of links to the gang. Suspects will face accusations that
include "membership in an armed terrorist group," "attempting to
destroy the government," "inciting people to rebel against the
Republic of Turkey" and other similar crimes.
19 October 2008, Sunday
ERCAN YAVUZ ANKARA