Eurasia Review
January 29, 2015 Thursday
A Broken Region: Evaluating EU Policies In South Caucasus ` Analysis
By Jos Boonstra and Laure Delcour*
The Caucasus is a broken region. Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have
chosen different paths for political and economic development, while
Turkey and Russia ` which can also be considered part of the Caucasus
` have very different ties with these three states. In addition, the
Caucasus is divided between its southern part of three independent
republics and a northern Caucasus, which is part of Russia. Caucasian
borders have (to various degrees) emerged as
obstacles to cooperation, movement of people, and trade.
For the European Union (EU), this fragmented landscape is challenging.
The Union likes to think in terms of well-defined regions with
regional cooperation leading to integration. In the Balkans (which was
another broken region), all countries have been seeking eventual EU
membership (at different speeds and with mixed results) and the EU has
been able to help foster regional cooperation as part of the terms for
accession. This is unlikely to happen in the South Caucasus, where the
EU is not the only game in town and Russia aggressively seeks to
maintain its influence.
Over the past few years, the simultaneous deployment of two mutually
exclusive projects ` the Deep and Comprehensive Free-Trade Areas
(DCFTAs) offered by the EU as part of its Eastern Partnership (EaP)
and the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) ` has only
exacerbated differences in the South Caucasus. Since the Vilnius EaP
summit in November 2013, Georgia (like Moldova and Ukraine) has come
significantly closer to the EU by signing an Association Agreement
(AA) alongside a DCFTA. Neither of the other two South Caucasus
countries is likely to conclude similar agreements in the near future,
albeit for different reasons. Armenia has become a member of the EEU,
which entered into effect in January 2015, while Azerbaijan has so far
not engaged into any legally-binding economic integration project.
What does all this mean for the EU’s approach ` foremost through the
EaP ` in the South Caucasus? And how can the EU factor in these
differences into coherent bilateral and multilateral policies? Can the
EU play a positive role in helping to ‘fix’ this broken region?
BEHIND A BROKEN REGION: DIVERGING NATIONAL PATHS AND INTERESTS
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia have diverse foreign policy
priorities and domestic reform processes. Therefore, it is perhaps
unsurprising that they have different expectations vis-aÌ-vis the EU.
In addition, their engagement in regional projects driven by either
the EU or Russia is not clear-cut or irreversible, but fraught with
multiple tensions.
Over the past few years, Georgian attitudes towards the EU have
shifted as a result of both regional and domestic developments. During
the early years of the Saakashvili presidency (he was in power from
2004-2013), despite a rhetorical emphasis on the country’s European
identity, integration with the EU was not a key priority; instead,
membership in the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) was. The
2008 conflict with Russia ` which resulted in the de facto loss of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia while also putting an end to the hopes of
NATO accession in the short run ` marked a turning point. Despite
lingering resistance to some EU regulations (caused by the then
authorities’ liberal economic agenda), the conflict put closer links
with the EU at the top of
the Georgian agenda. Building on the progress made under Saakashvili,
the current government seems to be speeding up its regulatory
alignment with EU acquis (rules and practices). Furthermore, alongside
some attempts at normalising relations with Russia, the incumbent
government has remained firm in its pro-EU choice, and domestic
political developments have so far not jeopardised the country’s
course.
For Georgia, the EU’s EaP has two major flaws. First, it falls short
of offering any prospect of membership and the recognition of Georgia
as an ‘Eastern European country’ in the 2014 Association Agreement is
of little consolation. Second, the EaP offers nothing to address
Georgia’s immediate security concerns. For example, the November 2014
‘Treaty on Alliance and Strategic Partnership’ between Russia and
Abkhazia triggered suspicion and concern in Tbilisi, but the EU could
do nothing more than reiterate its support for Georgia’s territorial
integrity. The newly tabled treaty with South Ossetia goes a step
further in granting Russia full control over that Georgian territory.
Georgia, therefore, views modernisation aÌ la EU as a model of
development, and thus a means to buttress its independence in the long
term. In the short run, Tbilisi is only too aware of the EU’s
inability to counter Moscow’s stronghold over Abkhazia and South
Ossetia, and any further attempts by Russia to encroach upon Georgian
territory.
Whereas Armenia recently chose to join the Russian-led EEU, Yerevan
had earlier also welcomed the EU’s enhanced offer under the EaP. The
2008 conflict in Georgia and a failed rapprochement with Turkey made
the country more vulnerable, while lingering tensions following the
divisive 2008 presidential elections triggered a sense of urgency for
greater economic modernisation. Armenia’s interest in the EaP has
translated into adoption of EU trade-related standards and even
completion of negotiations for a DCFTA.
Location and extent of the former Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast
(lighter color)
However, Armenia’s engagement with the EU is complicated by the
simmering Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan, since Yerevan
depends on Russian support to deter Turkish-backed Baku. During 2013,
Russia started increasing its pressure on Armenia to join the Eurasian
Customs Union (forerunner of the EEU) ` an option initially ruled out
by Yerevan. As a result, Armenia accommodated Russian requirements at
the expense of EU-inspired reforms.
However, Armenia’s relationship with Russia is complex, as illustrated
by both the large number of exemptions sought by Yerevan during EEU
negotiations and the recent anti-Russian demonstrations following the
tragic killing of an Armenian family by a Russian soldier in Gyumri.
Despite EEU accession, the Armenian authorities have sought to
preserve links with the EU to the greatest extent possible. While EEU
membership and a DCFTA are mutually exclusive, Armenia is keen to
conclude an agreement that would reflect improved relations with the
EU ` ideally, an AA without a trade component.
However, this is unlikely to be easily accepted by the EU, since
Yerevan’s 2013 U-turn generated disappointment and mistrust in
Brussels, and tailor-made bilateral arrange- ments would take time to
develop within the current rather stringent EaP format.
Thus far, Azerbaijan can afford the luxury of not aligning with the EU
` including prescriptions on human rights and democracy ` or
submitting to Moscow’s will through the EEU (and other Russia-driven
organisations). The country’s vast wealth of oil and gas has resulted
in the firm establishment of an authoritarian regime that maintains an
iron rule at home and advertises its economic progress abroad.
Initially, Baku seemed open to some reforms inspired by Brussels and
competed with Yerevan on receiving better marks in annual EU reports.
Yet the ruling elite soon gave up on political reform and tightened
control over society as the country’s economic growth skyrocketed.
First the political opposition was marginalised, followed by
repressing independent journalists over the last five years, and more
recently by a purge against independent non-governmental-organisations
(NGOs) and think tanks. Whereas the country’s relations with the EU
will remain modest, Brussels and Baku have different views on their
substance. Azerbaijan focuses on energy cooperation while the EU wants
a stronger emphasis on democracy and human rights.
However, in contrast to its sanctions on Belarus the EU is not
prepared to consider sanctions against Azerbaijan, unless mass
violations of human rights take place. This can be explained by three
interwoven factors. First, the EU is less concerned about developments
in a country that is not a direct neighbour and has no desire for
membership. Second, the EU views Azerbaijan as a future alternative to
Russia for gas supplies. Yet, even though the volume of Azerbaijani
gas supplied to Europe could increase by 2019 if the Trans-Anatolian
Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) pipeline is built, it will be dwarfed by
Russian, Norwegian, and Algerian deliveries. Last but not least, the
country is an interesting partner to the EU (and the US) from a
geostrategic perspective. Like neighbouring Iran, Azerbaijan is
Shiite, yet moderate and secular, and is ethnically and linguistically
close to (NATO member) Turkey.
Nonetheless, Azerbaijan (as well as Armenia) poses a severe security
threat to the Caucasus region and indirectly to Europe because of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Despite many similarities with other
protracted conflicts in the post-Soviet space, this conflict differs
in the sense that Russia is an indirect actor that cannot fully
control either side. Whereas peace talks have made some progress over
the last decade, the risks of a new war have not diminished. In this
context, the EU’s feeble security clout in the region makes Brussels a
secondary actor at best.
THE EASTERN PARTNERSHIP IN THE SOUTH CAUCASUS: TIME FOR A REALITY CHECK
Launched in 2009, the EaP has offered new opportunities for South
Caucasus countries to develop their relationship with the EU. On a
bilateral basis, the main accomplishment of the EaP in the region has
been the conclusion of an AA and DCFTA with Georgia. Moreover, all
three countries are aiming for (albeit at different speeds) visa
liberalisation, which also requires substantial reforms in key areas
such as migration management or the fight against corruption. Georgia
may get a visa-free regime this year, while Armenia may progress
toward a visa liberalisation action plan. Azerbaijan is further
behind, but visa facilitation and readmission agreements signed with
the EU are in force.
With the EaP, the EU has emerged in the South Caucasus as an agent for
domestic change (at least in Georgia, to some degree in Armenia and to
a much lesser extent in Azerbaijan). But EU-inspired change has its
limits, as the EU is only as influential as South Caucasus states
allow it to be. Reforms often remain shallow and local elites
carefully calculate the high short-term costs against longer-term (and
vaguer) benefits. At the same time, by making its AA/DCFTA offer the
main bilateral ‘take-it-or leave-it’ package, the EU has put itself in
a difficult situation. So far, no plan B has been developed for
countries that seek deeper relations with the EU but no AA or DCFTA.
The EaP’s multilateral track is also in need of revision as it is
incapable of handling the growing differences between South Caucasus
countries in their relationships with the EU. At the political level,
the work of the multilateral track is affected by regional tensions
and conflicts. For instance, the work of the EaP’s parliamentary
dimension (Euronest) has often been paralysed by divergences between
Armenia and Azerbaijan. Standard bilateral European Parliament
Delegations with South Caucasus (or East European) countries would be
more practical as is already the case with Moldova, Ukraine and soon
Georgia.
At the technical level, thematic groupings (officially known as
‘platforms’ ` the backbone of the multilateral track) are mainly
EU-driven and their content primarily reflects EU concerns. The
platform on economic integration is a blatant example of this. The
emphasis on approximation with EU trade regulations is relevant to
Georgia, but less so to Armenia and Azerbaijan. Other platforms (for
example, on democracy, good governance, and stability) also inspire
uneven interest among the three partners.
However, the multilateral track does offer a useful framework for
representatives of the three EU partners to meet. Regional tensions
and conflicts feed into high-level meetings, but thematic platforms
and panels provide fora where officials from Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia and East European states can discuss their respective reform
experiences. In addition, the non-governmental formats (the Civil
Society Forum, the Business Forum) have fostered contacts between
South Caucasian societies. Meanwhile, the EaP’s six flagship projects
` from integrated border management to environmental governance ` need
careful evaluation. Fruitful projects should be continued and
strengthened, while those that have not produced results after five
years should be either reformed or scrapped.
Even though results are likely to be modest and mostly long-term, in
essence the multilateral track should help build confidence between
the participating countries. For the EU, the multi-lateral track also
offers a forum to explain its policies and to provide an alternative
narrative to Russia’s policies. In the post-Soviet space Russia has
highly problematic relations with some countries (foremost Georgia and
Ukraine), while its EEU initiative does not meet much enthusiasm among
current and potential members. Here the EU has an advantage as it can
bring all countries together. The EaP multilateral track, therefore,
has potential, subject to internal review and discussion with EaP
partners regarding their preferences.
THE WAY AHEAD
The South Caucasus is a broken region with severe internal and
external blockades to region- al cooperation, which will require the
EU to prioritise bilateral approaches to the region. Relations should
be increasingly country-tailored, taking into account the needs of
both the EU and its partners. The multilateral approach to the six EaP
countries can be an additional asset if focused on confidence
building, possibly complemented by a few cross-border projects with
mixed participation.
It is in the EU’s interest that the Caucasus becomes a stable and
democratic region. But the EU has little influence to make this happen
without two currently missing ingredients: a much more substantial
engagement on security challenges and a clear finaliteÌ? for its
Eastern partners. The Russian authoritarian model will keep traction
as it pretends to solve the short-term worries of some of these states
and to safe-guard the incumbent regimes. At the very least, the EU
should be ready to fully support those countries that do opt for
in-depth political and economic reforms. Such an approach would not
prevent the EU from setting democracy and human rights benchmarks with
authoritarian states such as Azerbaijan.
The EU should also increasingly focus on linking EU member-state
societies to those of the South Caucasus. This requires shifting its
policy paradigm from narrow legal and technical approximation to
broader societal integration, for instance through people-to-people
contacts. Europe’s attractiveness remains high ` also in Armenia and
Azerbaijan ` and in the long run will be more influential than
short-sighted Russian propaganda. Civil society cooperation (including
through the Civil Society Forum), visa liberalisation policies, and
support to educational exchanges have been overshadowed by the EU’s
focus on AA/DCFTA negotiations. However, societal links should be
turned into both a key priority in current relations and a basis for a
deeper long-term partnership.
The EaP sought to help stabilise the EU’s South Caucasus neighbours
but lacked a security component from the outset. Neither a harder
security posture from the EU, nor success in settling protracted
conflicts in the South Caucasus (without Russian involvement and
agreement), are on the table. The current EU engagement in security
matters is largely confined to the Common Secu- rity and Defence
Policy (CSDP) border monitoring mission in Georgia (EUMM) and the
participation of an EU Special Representative in the Geneva talks
between Georgia and Russia.
Besides stepping up EU engagement through NATO and the Organisation
for Security Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) at the Minsk talks
concerning Nagorno-Karabakh, there is little more the EU can do.
Specific Caucasus security strategies by the EU would seem
overambitious since member states ` for a variety of reasons ` will
likely not support heavier involvement in the region’s security.
Nonetheless, the region’s protracted conflicts remain volatile and
inflammable.
However, the EU could more strongly support the reform of the security
sectors of those countries willing to engage, for instance by
assisting in reforming partners’ police, border guards, judicial
systems, and democratic oversight mechanisms. This should be possible
in Georgia (and already undertaken to some degree), and it could be
worthwhile to investigate such options with Armenia and Azerbaijan
perhaps by linking it to confidence building measures between both
adversaries. Furthermore, there are elements of security sector reform
(SSR) in the EU’s visa liberalisation policies with Caucasus countries
as these affect some aspects of the police, border guards and judicial
systems; this can potentially be an entry point for broader SSR
engagement.
CONCLUSION
The ongoing fragility and fragmentation of the South Caucasus will not
be fixed anytime soon as the region is prone to domestic instability,
inflammable protracted conflicts, and Russia’s heavy influence. The EU
will not (and cannot) ix the Caucasus region, but it can have a
positive bearing on its development, provided that it can design a
clearer and firmer long-term vision. The EU should seek to play a
responsible and more active security role in the South Caucasus by
being prepared for further problematic relations with Russia, and
being ready to cope with a shifting, complex, and uncertain domestic
and regional environment. Also, the EU will need to adopt a more
flexible bilateral approach complemented by renewed multilateral
cooperation for- mats via the EaP. Last but certainly not least, given
its attractiveness to South Caucasus societies, the EU should place
societies and people-to-people contacts at the core of its policies in
all three countries.
*About the authors:
Jos Boonstra is head of the Eastern Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia
programme at FRIDE
Laure Delcour is scientific coordinator and research fellow of the EU
FP7 CASCADE project at the Fondation Maison des Sciences de l’Homme
Source:
The research for this paper is funded by the European Union’s Seventh
Framework Programme (FP7/2007-2013) under grant agreement n° 613354 –
CASCADE Project.
This article was published by FRIDE as POLICY BRIEF – No 193 – JANUARY
2015 (PDF)
The post A Broken Region: Evaluating EU Policies In South Caucasus –
Analysis appeared first on Eurasia Review.
From: Baghdasarian
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