THE ARMENIAN QUESTION AND THE TURKISH-GERMAN ALLIANCE (1913-1914)
Orient XXI
12 march 2015
Orient XXI > L’Orient en guerre (1914-1918)
Thomas Schmutz > 12 March 2015
This article examines the German role concerning the reform question
in Eastern Anatolia in 1913 and 1914, in particular to resolve the
Armenian issue. It sheds new light on the degree of involvement of
Germany in the Ottoman Empire before the war.
One hundred years after the beginning of the First World War,
historiography still concentrates on the Western Front and the
diplomacy inside Europe. Forgotten seem the German dreams of
a German-dominated Orient and the continuation of the “special
relationship” between Kaiser and Sultan. The reform question concerning
the Armenians in Eastern Anatolia in the months before the Great War
shows the complexity of the Eastern Question and the height of German
entanglement in the pre-war Ottoman Empire.
Germany was a “newcomer” in the global history of colonialism and
imperialism. Under Otto von Bismarck, imperial strategy was more
defensive than under Wilhelm II. The famous search for a place in the
sun — “Platz an der Sonne” — did not begin until the late 1890s, when
hardly any spot on the world map was blank and spheres of influence
from the so-called Great Powers divided almost every inch of the known
planet. As “free space” was becoming harder to obtain, the strategy
was to fight against weak powers and to replace them. A long-term fix
point in German geostrategic thinking was the antagonism towards its
neighbour France and its colonial hemisphere. The relationship with
Russia worsened under Wilhelm II. England was a desirable partner
but Germany was not willing to simply become its junior associate.
Prestige and being among the big players was a main motive to get
involved in the Eastern Question.
First steps were made under Bismarck and Abdul Hamid. In 1880 the
Sultan demanded to get German officials for administration, finance,
and military. The entanglement began with a civil matter because
German officers were held back at first. Germany did not oppose the
Sultan during the Crete crisis and the Armenian massacres in 1895-96.
1898 was the year Wilhelm II himself travelled to the Orient, which had
a symbolic impact for their deep relationship. The emperor approved the
prestige project of the Baghdad railway, which took several years to
be built. German banks and arms industry such as Krupp strengthened
their ties to the Sublime Porte and Anatolia under Abdul Hamid
II. The Young Turk revolution brought — along with the tensions
in the Balkans — an even closer friendship. Many of the Young Turk
officers knew the German military system due to the exchange programme
between both armies. German military advisors tried to reform the army
and especially Colmar von der Goltz gained much admiration for his
involvement. But not all the Young Turks welcomed the rising German
influence. Some were more oriented towards Paris or London. This
was important for the search of an ally in the crucial moment of the
July crisis in 1914. German diplomats like ambassador Hans Freiherr
von Wangenheim were considered to be friends of the Turks. The German
imperial means were warships, officers and railroads. England, France
and Russia were watching them with suspicion. Sometimes Vienna and Rome
defended the German position, since with the Dreibund (Triple Alliance)
they had established a counter-balance to the Entente. Germany wanted
its place among the big players in the Orient.
Reforms for the Eastern Provinces of Anatolia
The Balkan Wars (1912-1913) and their outcome showed the weakness of
the Ottoman Empire. Time was running out for most European powers,
which were not ready yet to follow their imperial dreams in the Near
East, and the partition of the territory should be postponed. Russia
wanted “the Straits”1 but was not ready for war until 1917 according
to internal calculations. Despite this fact, the Russian rhetoric in
1912 and 1913 was rather belligerent. Its strategy was to undermine
Ottoman stability and gain influence on the territory beyond its
common border. One way to do so was to arm and radicalize both Kurds
and Armenians against the central government.
Under these circumstances another reform discussion started. In 1895
Russia blocked the possibility of an intervention on behalf of the
Ottoman Armenians and in 1908 Russia was the greater oppressor of
the Armenian revolutionary movement. Only the events of the Balkan
Wars changed the strategy and the Armenian condition made Russia
demand reforms in the six Eastern Provinces with the threat of
military intervention. In June of 1913, Russia proposed a draft
for an agreement in order to improve the Armenian status, by means
of including proposals that representation in the courts and the
administrative bodies would guarantee them equality. German diplomats
knew about the Russian wishes for new reforms in Eastern Anatolia and
their strategy in spring 1913 was to prevent a Russian dominated region
inside the Ottoman Empire and to prevent the empire of the “sick man”2
of the Bosphorus from partition. When in June the Russian proposal
became official, the dragomans3 of the European powers discussed
in eight meetings during July the reform project. Germany defended
Turkish interests and opposed many issues of the proposal.
After the diplomatic deadlock in summer, Germany and Russia agreed to
continue the negotiations on a bilateral level. By the end of October
1913, a solution could be found, but Turkish resistance to foreign
control and new tensions between Berlin and St. Petersburg delayed
the process once more.
On 8 February 1914, an agreement was signed by the Ottoman Government
and Russia after six months of intense negotiations between
the European powers and the Sublime Porte. In particular due to
German intervention as well as counter proposals respecting Ottoman
sovereignty wishes, this agreement differed substantially from the
initial Russian proposal. One of the main differences was that the
main point of the Mandelstam proposal — one region and one inspector
for the Eastern Provinces — changed to two sectors and two inspectors.
The inspector-generals had still to be chosen among European “neutral”
states. Therefore another round of negotiations took place after the
agreement in order to name two inspector-generals who should implement
and monitor the reforms in Eastern Anatolia, but they took place in
early summer when Europe was already on its way towards war. From
the Ottoman side, everything was done to delay the installation and
work of the two foreign inspectors Major Hoff and Louis C. Westenenk
which where chosen in April and came to Istanbul in May.
In the ensuing war, Germany became the Ottoman ally and the reforms
were thus rendered obsolete in December 1914.
Preserve the Turkish interests
The Eastern provinces of Anatolia were not part of the German interest
zone. The main concern in Berlin was the future of Cilicia. The
ports of Alexandretta and Mersina, a connection from the coast to
the Baghdad Express and influential officers in high Ottoman army
positions in order to control the military were the German concerns.
A permanent topic for German diplomacy was the Russian threat. During
summer 1913, Wangenheim and state secretary Gottlieb von Jagow spoke
about the Russian expansionism as if it were a law of nature. The
German-Russian antagonism was the key position during the reform
discussions.The Mandelstam Project was dangerous in the eyes of
the German diplomacy, because the creation of an almost autonomous
region with one single man on top of the political power could be the
beginning of the partition of the Ottoman Empire. A German-Russian
approach in October 1913 was only possible, because Wangenheim and
Jagow really wanted reforms, but in a more modest and pro-Turkish way.
A way of doing so was to speak of Turkey as a “sovereign” power and
accusing Russia of involving in internal affairs.
One reason for the long time interval between the Mandelstam proposal
and the agreement in February 1914 was the new German military mission,
which was sent to Constantinople in November. After the terrible
defeat in the First Balkan War, the Ottoman government asked the
German Kaiser for more officers. Germany tried to keep this secret
and prepared a new mission with forty officers under the command of
Otto Viktor Karl Liman von Sanders. Since Britain obtained a naval
mission and French experts trained the Ottoman gendarmerie, the
German mission was only the continuation of the traditional German
help to reform the Ottoman army. As Russia heard of the new mission,
crisis broke out in November 1913.
The so-called Liman von Sanders crisis would almost trigger hostile
actions on the part of Russia and a European war was once again a
potential risk. The status and commando of the high-ranking German
officer made the Armenian reforms depend on finding a solution in a
new field between the classical antagonists of the diplomatic deadlock
from summer 1913. British protest was moderate since Sir Arthur H.
Limpus as admiral of the British naval mission in Constantinople had
a similarly high rank and influence. Another important reason for
the British reaction was the on-going negotiations with Germany over
their interests in the Near East, particularly the route and details
of the Baghdad railway project.
Concerning German interests, Berlin created two goals with one
method: German diplomacy should help Turkey to implement reforms and
to help with the much needed reforms both the Ottoman integrity and
the Armenian situation. Germany would gain more influence in doing
so. If there would be a partition, Germany could use the help from
the Armenians in Cilicia to create a own interest zone, which was
at the time defined as “working zone” (Arbeitszone), since German
engineers were working on railway infrastructure, ports and other
means of trade-related facilites. One very obvious observation was
that due to the lack of information sources inside Eastern Anatolia,
the knowledge of the problem zone and the Armenians and Kurds was
rather simple. The German reports only scratched the surface and
were thus not able to reveal the underlying complexity regarding the
different Armenian groups, their respective objectives and their
options. Better known was the coastline. The Mediterranean German
Fleet reported the situation at the Ottoman coast, fleet movements,
and transportation of officials between Germany and Istanbul.
Attack Russia
On 2 August 1914, Germany and the Ottoman Empire signed a secret
agreement. War started in Europe and it was only a question of time
when it would engage the Ottoman Empire. Referring to the Armenian
reform plan, one war goal was to end all international agreements
as it had always been — in the Ottoman view — a violation against
sovereignty. The two inspectors were recalled to Constantinople even
before the Ottoman Empire was at war. With Germany being at war,
considerations for the security in Anatolia were now made in reference
to war preparations of their ally. The Ottoman Empire should attack
Russia for the benefit of the German Eastern Front. Berlin tried
to fasten the war preparations and the mobilisation of the Ottoman
forces, while the Armenian future was uncertain. Wangenheim did not
recognize until summer 1915 that the Ottoman entry into the war was
not only the end of the Armenian reform attempts, but also the end
of any possible coexistence of the Christians in Eastern Anatolia
with their Muslim neighbours.
The German-Ottoman relationship was seen by the ruling elite in a
more global perception. Berlin hoped for a general Muslim uprising
against the Entente colonial powers, while the Sublime Porte adapted
panislamistic and panturanistic4 visions. Both strategies did not work
out. The Young Turks and the Kaiser kept their loyalty to each other
and to their dreams of territorial gains in the East, especially with
the unexpected development of Russia in 1917. The Turkish territorial
wishes were always meant as an extension of the existing territory and
its borders. When the Empire lost its European and African territories,
the vision of a new extension into the Asian heartland was only the
consequence of the imperial mindset. War would be the solution to the
Ottoman problem of the decline of its empire through the last century,
as it should unleash the German possibilites to reach the Wilhelminian
conception of Weltpolitik. Interestingly, both German ambassadors
Hans Freiherr von Wangenheim and Johann Heinrich von Bernstorff in
Istanbul in the decisive years 1914 and 1918 shared the same rule for
German entanglement: one should only engage into political activity
in a foreign territory if a direct connection on land or water from
the homeland is possible. The German prestige project of the Baghdad
railway was finished during the World War, just in the moment when
British territorial aims in Palestine became true.
In the end, the German-Ottoman war entanglement ended as it started:
in the shadow of the Western Front.
Thomas Schmutz
1Editor’s note: series of waterways in Turkey connecting the Aegean
Sea (and hence the Mediterranean) to the Black Sea. They consist
of the Dardanelles, the Sea of Marmara and the Bosphorus. They are
conventionally considered the boundary between the continents of
Europe and Asia.
2Editor’s note: phrase attributed to Tsar Nicolas II about the Ottoman
Empire. By extension, a country which faces great difficulties,
particularly economic.
3Editor’s note: from Arabic tourdjoumân, initially refers to an
interpreter or, as here, the officials of the Ottoman administration.
4Ed.: nationalist political and cultural movement which proclaims an
ethnic/cultural unity for disparate people who are supposed to have
a common ancestral origin in Central Asia, using the Iranian term
“Turan” as the designation for this place.
Translated into French by Alexis Varende.
References
Akcam, Taner (2006). A Shameful Act. The Armenian Genocide and the
Question of Turkish Responsibility. New York: Holt McDougal.
Aksakal, Mustafa (2008). The Ottoman Road to War in 1914. The Ottoman
Empire and the First World War. Cambridge, New York.
Canis, Konrad (2011). Internationale Stellung und Aussenpolitik
Deutschlands vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg. In Heidenreich, Bernd, Neitzel,
Sonke (Ed.). Das Deutsche Kaiserreich 1890-1914. Zurich, Paderborn :
Verlag Ferdinand Schoningh; Auflage: 368. 177 – 187.
Conrad, Sebastian (2006) Globalisierung und Nation im Deutschen
Kaiserreich. Munchen : C. H. Beck.
Davison, Roderic H. (1990). Essays in Ottoman and Turkish History,
1774-1923. The Impact of the West. Austin: University of Texas.
Dulffer, Jost, Kroger, Martin, Wippich, Rolf-Harald (1997).
Vermiedene Kriege. Deeskalation von Konflikten der Grossmachte zwischen
Krimkrieg und Erstem Weltkrieg 1865-1914. Munchen: Oldenbourg.
Kaligian, Dikran Mesrob (2011). Armenian Organization and Ideology
under Ottoman Rule 1908-1914. New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.
Kieser, Hans-Lukas (2000). Der verpasste Friede. Mission, Ethnie und
Staat in den Ostprovinzen der Turkei 1839-1938. Zurich: Chronos.
Kiessling, Friedrich, Schollgen, Gregor (2009). Das Zeitalter des
Imperialismus. Munchen: Oldenbourg.
Kreiser, Klaus, Neumann, Christoph K. (2009). Kleine Geschichte der
Turkei. Stuttgart: Reclam.
Reynolds, Michael A. (2011). Shattering Empires : The Clash and
Collapse of the Ottoman and Russian Empires 1908-1918. Cambridge.
Rodogno, Davide (2012). Against Massacre. Humanitarian Interventions in
the Ottoman Empire 1815-1914. New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
Scherer, Friedrich (2001). Adler und Halbmond. Bismarck und der Orient
1878-1890. Munchen: Schoningh.
Schollgen, Gregor (2000). Imperialismus und Gleichgewicht.
Deutschland, England und die orientalische Frage 1871-1914. Munchen:
Oldenbourg.
Stangeland, Sigurd Sverre (2013). Die Rolle Deutschlands im
Volkermord an den Armenien 1915-1916. Dissertation an Norwegens
Technisch-Naturwissenschaftlicher Universitat.
Trumpeter, Ulrich (1968). Germany and the Ottoman Empire 1914-1918.
New Jersey: Princeton.
Walkenhorst, Peter (2007). Nation – Volk – Rasse. Radikaler
Nationalismus im Deutschen Kaiserreich 1890-1914. Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
Weber, Frank G. (1970). Eagles on the Crescent. Germany, Austria,
and the Diplomacy of the Turkish Alliance 1914-1918. London: Cornell
University Press.
Weitz, Eric D. (2011). Germany and the Young Turks: Revolutionaries
into Statesmen. In Suny, Ronald Grigor, Gocek, Fatma Muge, Naimark,
Norman M. (Ed.). A Question of Genocide. Armenians and Turks at the
End of the Ottoman Empire. New York : Oxford University Press.
175-198.
Thomas Schmutz studied history, political science and German literature
at the University of Zurich and Paris Diderot 7. He is interested in
transnational history, global history, the history of violence and
the end of the Ottoman Empire. He currently wrote his master thesis on
the subject of the Armenian reform question and the German diplomacy
in the years 1913-1914.
,0662
From: Baghdasarian
http://orientxxi.info/l-orient-en-guerre-1914-1918/the-armenian-question-and-the