Canada Free Press
Dec 30 2013
Is Turkey Returning to the `Zero Problems’ Policy?
By INSS Gallia Lindenstrauss , Yaniv Avraham
The disclosure of political corruption of unprecedented proportions in
Turkey’s history has catapulted the country into a state of major
political upheaval. So far, the response of Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan has consisted of counterattack and statements
attributing the exposé to a network of domestic and international
elements interested in toppling his party’s rule. He has even attacked
alleged provocations by foreign ambassadors in Turkey and threatened
to expel them. In practice, however, Turkey’s foreign policy, at least
with regard to some of the neighboring countries, is very different
from what the rhetoric would seem to indicate. In fact, in recent
weeks one can discern efforts to jumpstart Turkey’s erstwhile `zero
problems’ policy.
The disclosure of political corruption of unprecedented proportions in
Turkey’s history has catapulted the country into a state of major
political upheaval. So far, the response of Prime Minister Recep
Tayyip Erdogan has consisted of counterattack and statements
attributing the exposé to a network of domestic and international
elements interested in toppling his party’s rule. He has even attacked
alleged provocations by foreign ambassadors in Turkey and threatened
to expel them. In practice, however, Turkey’s foreign policy, at least
with regard to some of the neighboring countries, is very different
from what the rhetoric would seem to indicate. In fact, in recent
weeks one can discern efforts to jumpstart Turkey’s erstwhile `zero
problems’ policy.
The `zero problems’ policy, formulated by Foreign Minister Ahmet
Davutoglu (previously the Prime Minister’s chief foreign policy
advisor), involved taking active steps to resolve outstanding problems
between Turkey and its neighbors, as well as making efforts to
encourage stability in adjacent regions. While the policy had
considerable success until the onset of the Arab Awakening, since the
start of the regional upheaval Turkey has experienced several foreign
policy failures ï – to the point that Turkey was mocked as having `zero
neighbors’ with whom it had no problems. Unlike the previous
incarnation of the policy, no dramatic announcements have accompanied
it now, but in practice one can point to the reemergence of patterns
that characterized Turkey’s foreign policy before 2011. It is worth
noting that given that Davutoglu is not implicated in any of the
scandals rocking Turkey, he may be one Turkish politician to emerge
strengthened from the corruption incidents.
Of particular interest is the newfound closeness between Ankara and
Baghdad, following the tension that characterized their relations in
recent years. Over the last few months, there have been several state
visits by high ranking politicians, including the visit by Iraqi
Foreign Minister Hoshyar Zebari to Turkey, and Davutoglu’s reciprocal
visit to Iraq. It was also reported that mutual visits at the prime
ministerial level can be expected in the near future. Moreover,
Turkey, a state interested in becoming an energy hub and whose own
energy consumption is rising, is hard at work to promote the transport
of oil and natural gas from northern Iraq through Turkey by signing
direct agreements to that effect with the Kurdish regional government.
At present, it seems that understandings between Ankara and Baghdad,
which would ensure the division of oil revenue according to the Iraqi
constitution, have been reached. This includes the construction of a
measurement station on the border between the two states so that Iraqi
authorities can calculate the amount of oil exported from northern
Iraq.
The warming of relations between Turkey and Iran began even earlier
The warming of relations between Turkey and Iran began even earlier,
and the election of Hassan Rouhani as Iran’s president was one of the
reasons, or perhaps pretexts, for the thaw. Unlike Israel and Saudi
Arabia, for example, Turkey welcomed the interim agreement signed by
the E3+3 and Iran on Iran’s nuclear program. Furthermore, despite the
fundamental difference between the two nations on the future of
Assad’s government, the joint statement by the Turkish Foreign
Minister and Iranian Foreign Minister Mohammad Zarif at a press
conference in Tehran in late November, calling for a ceasefire in the
civil war in Syria before the Geneva 2 conference, was noteworthy.
Some of the corruption now exposed in Turkey involves trade relations
between Turkey and Iran and the extensive use of Turkey by Iran to
circumvent the economic sanctions, especially with regard to banking
transactions. Although as a result of these revelations international
pressure on Turkey to reduce the scope of its economic ties with Iran
will likely increase, it is also clear that there is much economic
interdependence between the two nations.
In the original incarnation of the `zero problems’ policy, some
attempts were made to warm relations with Armenia, and protocols that
were supposed to lead to opening the common border were signed in
October 2009. But the protocols were never ratified by the parliaments
and the process ended in failure, both because of internal opposition
in Armenia and because Azerbaijan, Turkey’s ally, was furious that it
had not been privy to the process despite its ongoing conflict with
Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh and the adjacent regions. In November
2013, Foreign Minister Davutoglu asked Switzerland to try to mediate
between Armenia and Azerbaijan (given that the 2009 thaw between
Turkey and Armenia occurred with Swiss help). In addition, the
participation of Davutoglu at the Organization of the Black Sea
Economic Cooperation meeting in Yerevan on December 12, 2013 was the
first time so highly ranked a Turkish official had visited Armenia
since the failed 2009 process. During his visit, Davutoglu departed
from the usual Turkish script on the 1915 events and said that the
deportations of the Armenian population were `inhumane.’ It also seems
that there is progress on Cyprus, and in his visit to Greece in
mid-December, Foreign Minister Davutoglu referred to the momentum in
talks between the sides on solving this ongoing conflict.
Given that in the past relation-s between Turkey and Israel had been
free of bilateral problems, there was no need for the `zero problems’
policy to relate to Israel, other than some attempts to mediate
between Israel and Syria and diplomatic assistance on the Palestinian
issue. After the Mavi Marmara incident, this was no longer the case:
the incident was the first direct confrontation between the two
nations. Recently, however, there have been several signs indicating
that the return of ambassadors to Tel Aviv and Ankara may soon occur.
In early December, for the first time since the incident, an Israeli
minister Environmental Protection Minister Amir Peretz participated in
an international conference in Turkey and met with his Turkish
counterpart. In addition, it was reported that the two countries have
signed a document that would pave the way for restoring flights by
Israeli airlines to Turkish destinations in the summer of 2014. More
important, it was reported that Israeli and Turkish representatives
met in mid-December for another round of discussions about
compensation over the Mavi Marmara incident and withdrawing the
lawsuits against IDF soldiers, and that the gap between the sides
seems to have narrowed considerably. Nonetheless, insofar as some
Turkish media outlets known to have strong ties to the ruling Justice
and Development Party accused Israel, the Jewish lobby, and the United
States for the revelation of the country’s political corruption, it
may well be that the timing is again not optimal for normalizing the
bilateral relations.
Unlike the pre-Arab Awakening period, there are no dramatic
declarations of the kind that used to attend the policy
At present, there are signs that the Turkish `zero problems’ policy is
making a comeback. Unlike the pre-Arab Awakening period, there are no
dramatic declarations of the kind that used to attend the policy, and
therefore the most one can say is that, de facto, there are
indications of its return. While in the past Turkey faced some
difficult issues with its neighbors, given the growing instability in
the Middle East, Turkey is operating in an even more complex strategic
environment. In this sense, the opening conditions for the attempt to
re-launch the `zero problems’ policy are tougher than in the past. It
is almost certain that the essential disagreements Turkey has with
both Syria and Egypt (given Turkey’s resolute calls for toppling
Bashar al-Assad’s regime and the criticism Turkey has expressed about
the military coup in Egypt) will not be resolved quickly. Turkey’s
current domestic political turmoil will also make it difficult to
advance some its new initiatives. The political corruption that has
recently come to light is the most potent of all threats to the
Justice and Development Party’s continued control of the government;
it is already obvious that Erdogan’s stature both within and outside
his party has been damaged. The politician who remains very popular
and untainted by scandal is President Abdullah Gul. Gul’s positions
are perceived as moderate compared to Erdogan’s and therefore, should
there be changes at the top of the political pyramid, he may be
expected to help smooth the way when it comes to Turkey’s foreign
affairs.
From: Baghdasarian
http://canadafreepress.com/index.php/article/60159