TransConflict
Jan 6 2014
Between recognition and denial ` the genocide question and
Turkish-Armenian relations
JANUARY 6, 2014 4:23 PM
The Turkish-Armenian reconciliation process is now almost completely
stalled, with Turkey continuing to vehemently oppose the
Armenian-inspired international campaign to secure recognition of the
Armenian genocide.
By Dr. Ahmed Magdy Al-Soukkary
At the general assembly of parliament in Baku on 15th December, Ahmet
Davutoglu, Turkey’s foreign minister stated that meetings held with
Armenia are not a crime, but necessary politics. These statements came
a few days after his first high-level visit to Armenia in nearly five
years. The Armenian question ` or what is called the `Armenian
Genocide’ (1) – has for decades strained relations between Turkey and
Armenia. With the one-hundredth anniversary of the Armenian Genocide
taking place in 2015, some observers think it could provide a major
breakthrough in genocide recognition and Armenian-Turkish dialogue.
Others, however, insist that Turkey won’t recognize genocide, arguing
that the killings were in self-defence against people who were
disloyal to the Ottoman Empire during World War One (2). Turkey’s
continued denial has created conditions which, particularly in the
view of many Armenians, necessitates the continuation of the search
for international reaffirmation until acknowledgement is universal and
irreversible. In the meantime, the genocide issue continues to impact
the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia.
The legacy of genocide
Relations between Turkey and Armenia are burdened by a number of
inter-connected problems. Turks and Armenians have, for instance,
disagreed about how to describe the Ottoman-era massacres committed
against Armenians in the First World War (1914-1918).(3) During and
immediately after World War One, the atrocities committed against the
Armenians of the Ottoman Empire were public knowledge. In their May
24th 1915 joint declaration, the Allied Powers ` Great Britain, France
and Russia ` accused the Young Turk regime of crimes against humanity
and civilization. In 1919, the post-war Ottoman government prosecuted
a number of Young Turk conspirators of the crimes of massacre and
plunder. By signing the Treaty of Sèvres on August 10th 1920, Turkey
obligated itself to apprehend those `responsible for the massacres.’
The international community did not question at the time the veracity
of the reports on the extermination of the Armenians.
The international community essentially abandoned the Armenians in
1923 when the European Powers agreed to the Treaty of Lausanne, in
which Turkey was absolved of further responsibility. Turkey took
license from this to embark upon a policy of denial, suppression of
public discussion and prevention of any official mention of the
treatment of Armenians. Europe’s determination to escape the horrors
of World War One, isolationism in the US and revolutionary utopianism
in Russia, further stigmatized the Armenian survivors as witnesses of
a catastrophe politicians and the public wanted to quickly forget.
World War Two, however, brought the problem of mass extermination into
sharp relief, with the Holocaust reviving the sense of international
obligation towards victimized peoples. As this sense of duty became
embodied in a number of UN covenants, so Armenians began to find
renewed hope that their case would receive attention. The 1948
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
attached a label to mass slaughter and a new word entered the post-war
political vocabulary – genocide. With it came the realization among
Armenians that they had been victims of a crime which at the time
still lacked a name.(4)
To retrieve the memory of their forgotten genocide, Armenians
initiated efforts for national and international recognition. These
began with the introduction of commemorative resolutions in the United
States Congress in 1975 and efforts to enter the subject on the record
at the UN, which occurred with the 1985 adoption of a report on
genocide by the UN Commission on Human Rights. Broader recognition was
achieved in 1987 with the adoption of a resolution by the European
Parliament, which stated that `the tragic events of
1915-1917¦constitute genocide.’ In the following years, the
legislatures of countries such as Belgium, Canada, Cyprus, France,
Greece and Russia adopted resolutions affirming the historical record
on the Armenian Genocide. Acknowledgement also came through
declarations by heads of states and pronouncements by legislators.(5)
For Turkey, it has never faced-up to the atrocities committed during
the `dying’ days of the Ottoman Empire. Alarmed by territorial claims
and demands for reparations by Armenians, Turkey resented that its
casualties and war-time conditions in eastern Anatolia as the Ottomans
fought invaders on three fronts were not taken into account. To
question the official line became a criminal offence and a taboo
issue.(6)
Many who oppose official recognition of the genocide tend tacitly to
admit that it did happen, but that it would be politically
inconvenient to say so as this would anger Turkey ` an increasingly
powerful and influential country, an important NATO member and a
strategic partner of the west (albeit one more than ever inclined to
follow its own course). The implication is that it is still,
ninety-five years later, too soon to face reality.(7)
The AKP’s approach to dealing with the Genocide Question
Since assuming power in November 2002, the Islamist Justice and
Development Party (AKP) was preparing to start negotiations with the
European Union. This path implied that Turkey should implement the
EU’s conditionality principle to meet the criteria for starting
accession talks; an important transformative force. The European
course was instrumental in helping dispel fears of Turkey’s
traditional elites for the country’s Westernization process and
secular state identity under the AKP. The AKP government has realized
that solely political and economic criteria are not enough to become a
full member, consequently it began to invest in Turkey’s regional
competencies. The South Caucasus was, for instance, one region in
which Turkey could invest more, both politically and economically.
Genocide allegations and closed borders have played a big role in
directing the course of Turkey-EU relations, with the European
Commission’s annual progress reports prioritising establishing good
relations and opening the border. In 2005, the European Parliament
passed a non-binding resolution establishing Turkey’s recognition of
the Armenian genocide as a requirement for membership. Another factor
is the European Neighbourhood Policy, which includes Armenia, with the
EU calling on candidates to resolve difficulties with their neighbours
before accession. The AKP therefore launched the opening of relations
with Armenia as a means of removing this obstacle to EU
integration.(8)
At this time, Turkey’s prime minister, Recep Tayyip ErdoÄ?an, was much
more open in his treatment of the Armenian issue. Whereas the Turkish
state had always dictated historical narratives down to every school
book, and treated scholars and journalists who thought differently as
threats to national security, ErdoÄ?an left history to historians.
ErdoÄ?an made statements asserting that it should be up to historians
to determine the exact nature of what happened to Armenians in the
Ottoman Empire during the First World War. He made sure that the rules
governing access to Ottoman archives were eased, even though by now
these are most likely cleansed of the most obviously damning
documents, and the military archives are still not fully open. Rules
governing the terminology used to describe these events were eased or
applied less stringently. While this was partially due to internal
processes, much of this openness can be explained by European
requirements during Turkey’s negotiations for entry into the European
Union.(9)
Negotiations between Turkey and Armenia ` a win-lose situation?
On August 31st 2009, Turkey and Armenia announced the beginning of
formal negotiations with the end goal of normalizing ties, with the
presentation of two protocols ` one on developing bilateral ties, and
the other on establishing diplomatic relations. Through Swiss
mediation, the signature of an agreement on to establish diplomatic
relations in Zurich on October 10th 2009 offered hope that some of the
difficult problems in the southern Caucasus may soon be resolved. The
two countries agreed in principle to open the border , closed since
1993 because of the war between Armenia and Azerbaijan, a Turkish
ally, resulting from the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute. Turkey had
conditioned its reopening on a settlement between Armenia and
Azerbaijan.(10)
Turkey placed special emphasis on two points:
The fact that the protocols, once signed, would require parliamentary
approval;(11)
ErdoÄ?an’s insistence on the connection between the ratification of the
protocols and the normalization of Armenian relations with Azerbaijan
received much criticism in Armenia.(12) This refers to the great
influence of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Turkey ` which has a close
partnership with Azerbaijan based on linguistic ties, plus major oil
and gas pipelines ` has long linked any improvement in its
relationship with Armenia to a negotiated settlement over Azerbaijan’s
Armenian-majority enclave of Nagorno Karabakh. Not to mention that
Turkey also closed the Armenia border in 1993 to put pressure on
Armenian forces to withdraw from the 13.5% of Azerbaijan they
currently occupy.(14)
Despite these efforts, however, the Turkish-Armenian reconciliation
process is now almost completely stalled (15). Officially, Turkey
continues to vehemently oppose the Armenian-inspired international
campaign to secure recognition of the genocide. Ambassadors, consuls
and other officials ` as well as historians who support the official
Turkish position, whether of ethnic Turkish origin or not ` propagate
the official Turkish position in as many forums as possible. Armenians
believe that the AKP government is ready to blackmail ` when it can `
any government that moves towards recognizing the genocide. For the
Armenians, therefore, it appears that the issue has not been left to
historians after all. However, Gerard Libaridian, the Armenian
historian, thinks that the Armenian issue is the blind spot of the
Turkish leaders’ vision.(16)
On the level of Turkish elite and society, there is some sort of
internal consensus that relations with Armenia should not be
normalized at the expense of relations with Azerbaijan. Indeed, for
the Turkish side, one of the most debated issues related to the
protocols was the lack of any reference to Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijan was determined not to support rapprochement between Turkey
and Armenia as long as Nagorno-Karabakh remained unresolved.(17) It
can be concluded that the protocols failed to achieve their
objectives, even though the Armenian side did accept the constitution
of a joint sub-commission of historians to discover the historical
truth behind the genocide issue.(18)
Between Armenian demands for recognition and Turkish denial of
genocide as an official state policy, both need to adopt a new
approach to dealing with this debatable historical issue with all its
complexities. For Turkey, it should take concrete steps in normalizing
its bilateral relations with Armenia, on the one hand, and trying to
reach a political compromise to the intractable genocide issue, on the
other. Armenia, meanwhile, needs to show a considerable amount of
positive encouragement towards resolving the problem by separating the
normalization of relations with Turkey from the Nagorno-Karabakh peace
process. Only through these mutual steps can the process of
reconciliation between Turkey and Armenia be revitalised.
Dr. Ahmed Magdy Al-Soukkary is an Egyptian academic lecturer in
International Negotiations at the Faculty of Economics and Political
Science (FEPS), Cairo University. He has a very distinguished academic
career in Turkish Studies, completing a PhD in political science and
international relations on `The Process of International Negotiation `
a Theoretical Study with Application on the Turkish-European
Negotiations’. His MSc in political science explored `The Impacts of
the Iranian-Turkish Relations Towards the Arab Regional System in the
Nineties’, whilst his graduation research paper in political science
looked at `Turkey and The Arab ` Israeli Conflict 1948 ` 1989.’
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Footnotes
1) According to the definition of the 1948 Genocide Convention,
genocide involves the intent to destroy ` in a whole or in part ` a
national, ethical, racial or religious group as such. Genocide may
manifest itself in killing members of the group, causing serious
bodily or mental harm to its members, deliberately inflicting on the
group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical
destruction in whole or in part, and forcibly transferring children of
the group to another group. See Stuart D. Stein, `A Lecture on The
Armenian Genocide`.
2) Dr. Gregory Stanton, `The Cost of Denial`, Website of Genocide
Watch: The International Alliance to End Genocide.
3) Turkey in Europe: Breaking the vicious circle, the Second Report of
the Independent Commission on Turkey (September 2009), p.30.
4) Rouben, Paul Adalian, `International Recognition of Armenian Genocide.’
5) While for many years the Armenian issue based on the claims of
genocide was shouldered by Armenian Diaspora in many corners of the
world, but notably in the US, France, Lebanon and Argentine. Suddenly
a state representing the Armenian identity emerged next door to
Turkey. See: Rouben Paul Adalian, op.cit., and also: Cengiz Çandar,
`No Incentive for Turkey, Armenia To Normalize Relations’, Website of
Al-Monitor.
6) Turkey in Europe: Breaking the vicious circle, the Second Report of
the Independent Commission on Turkey (September 2009), p.30.
7) Vicken Cheterian, `Armenian genocide and Turkey: then and now`.
8) TuÄ?çe Erçetin, `The Reasons of the AKP’s Decision on the Armenian
Opening and its Failure Factors`.
9) Gerard J. Libaridian, `ErdoÄ?an and His Armenian Problem’, Turkish
Policy Quarterly, Vol. 12, No. 1 (Spring 2013), p. 54.
10) Ricardo Torres, `The Normalization Process Between Turkey and
Armenia`, Serie de Articulos Y Testimonios, No. 71 (June 2011).
11) Gallia Lindenstrauss, `The Historic Accord between Turkey and
Armenia: What Lies Ahead?`, INSS Insight, No. 136 (12 October 2009).
12) Ricardo Torres, `The Normalization Process Between Turkey and
Armenia`, Serie de Articulos Y Testimonios, No. 71 (June 2011).
13) Ã`mit Kurt and Bezen Balamir CoÅ?kun, `History vs. geopolitics: an
overview of Turkish-Armenian relations in the 2000s`, 01 June 2013.
14) Turkey in Europe: Breaking the vicious circle¦, Ibid.
15) Yigal Schleifer, `Can Cheese Bridge the Turkey ` Armenia Divide?`.
16) Gerard J. Libaridian, op.cit., p.59.
17) Ã`mit Kurt and Bezen Balamir CoÅ?kun, Op.Cit.
18) Gerard J. Libaridian, op.cit., p. 63.
From: Baghdasarian
http://www.transconflict.com/2014/01/recognition-denial-genocide-question-turkish-armenian-relations-071/