THE SOUTH CAUCASUS COUNTRIES AND THEIR SECURITY DIMENSION
ISN- International Relations & Security Network, Zurich
Nov 5 2013
Oil Pump in Baku
Tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh and the breakaway republics of Abkhazia
and South Ossetia continue to give the South Caucasus region a bad
name. That won’t change any time soon, warns Eugene Kogan, unless
Russia alters its ‘status quo’ policies towards this volatile area.
By Eugene Kogan for Center for International and European Studies
(CIES)
The two unresolved conflicts in the South Caucasus hang over Armenia,
Azerbaijan and Georgia like the Sword of Damocles. As seen from every
view point, Russia’s influence, levers and policy toward conflicts
resolution remain the key issues. As long as Moscow maintains a
status quo policy and keeps the outside actors at arm’s length from
the region, the unresolved conflicts will continue to fester. The
potential for a third conflict should not be underestimated, since all
the necessary ingredients for an explosive situation are in place. The
aloofness of President Barack Obama coupled with a politically divided
and militarily impotent European Union makes conflicts resolution very
remote, if it is at all possible. The continuing ambiguous position of
NATO member states concerning the membership of Georgia in NATO makes
things worse for Georgia and leaves it vulnerable to intimidation
by Russia. Turkey’s ambitions are well-known, but Turkey alone is
no match for Russia in the South Caucasus. So, what can be done to
change the situation?
Unresolved and potential conflicts
1. Nagorno-Karabakh
It must be emphasized that Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia – the
three countries that constitute the South Caucasus – face similar
security challenges. Very often when open sources talk of Armenia and
Azerbaijan they refer only to the one not yet resolved conflict in
Nagorno-Karabakh. Another potential conflict is discussed below. The
unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict remains the only leverage
that Russia can use against Azerbaijan in order to keep the latter
from unfriendly actions. (Valiyev, 2011, p.143) These “unfriendly
actions” refer to the desire of Azerbaijan for closer cooperation
with the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and the European
Union (EU), something that goes against the interests of Russia. The
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict allows Moscow to keep Armenia and Azerbaijan,
to varying degrees, in its orbit of influence (Valiyev, 2011, p.135)
and, as a result, deters the other parties such as Turkey and the
United States (US) from engaging in conflict resolution. As long
as Moscow maintains the position of status quo and is unwilling to
change its stance there will be no resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict.[2] As will be stated below, Moscow may change its position if
and when it can gain something substantial from the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict resolution; such as for instance, extra leverage over the
political and economic interests of Azerbaijan.
According to Armenian government data, Russia currently ranks
as Armenia’s largest economic partner, with US$3 billion worth
of investments in Armenia. Russian firms control 80 per cent of
Armenia’s energy resources, account for two out of three of its
telecommunications companies and now hold a 30-year management contract
for its railway. (Abrahamyan, 2011)
However, if and when the unresolved conflict over Nagorno-Karabakh
flares up again, it may have a spillover effect, if the conflict
takes place not just over Nagorno-Karabakh but also along the still
non-demarcated border between Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan. Whether
Russia is waiting as the spoiler in the wings for the right moment to
get involved in such a conflict is not known to the author. However,
such a scenario cannot be dismissed out of hand. President Vladimir
Putin and his advisers assess every option very carefully and their
pros and cons, including the most potential one. The author is
certainly not privy to such highly classified information but it
would be naive to assume that such an analysis does not exist.
2.Abkhazia and South Ossetia
As for Georgia and its unresolved conflict with Russia over Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, little has changed since the end of the August 2008
war, which was disastrous for Georgia. The Geneva talks, or rather the
round of talks that are ongoing, have broken no new ground. All the
parties involved knew in advance that it is better to talk than fight.
As a result, they all agreed to meet face to face in Geneva with an
implicit understanding that no breakthrough would be achieved. (Kogan,
2009, p.35) The positions of the conflicting parties concerned, namely
Russia and its so-called “independent states”, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia and, on the other hand, Georgia, are diametrically opposed.
The two sides cannot reconcile their differences even if urged to do
so by outside mediators, such as the EU, the Organization for Security
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the US and the United Nations (UN).
Reconciliation means that Georgia accepts the reality that the
territories of Abkhazia and South Ossetia are lost. Full stop! Even for
the current Prime Minister of Georgia, Bidzina Ivanishvili, it is hard
to accept such a final result and to agree to it. This it is exactly
what President Vladimir Putin counts on – the gradual acceptance of
the government of Georgia that it is the only possible result, and,
ultimately, to consent to it.
Putin and his advisers are not in a hurry. They know that time is on
their side. Furthermore, they know that as time passes officials in
the EU and the US will only vaguely remember that a conflict between
Russia and Georgia took place. They may remember the consequences
of the conflict, but since Russia has not withdrawn its forces from
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the West has nothing new to offer and
cannot induce Russia to withdraw its troops. The West’s repeated
reminders that Russia should withdraw its military from Abkhazia and
South Ossetia fall on deaf ears in Moscow. The statement by Hillary
Clinton, the US Secretary of State at the time, that “[s]ince we
strongly support the territorial integrity and independence of
Georgia, and we do not recognize the secessionist areas”[3] (Civil
Georgia, 2012) does not change Russia’s position. Russia has heard
such statements since the end of the August 2008 war and is used to
hearing them time and time again. With regard to Georgia’s drive to
join NATO, Moscow’s position was and still is an unequivocal “No”.[4]
(Brooke, 2012) In Prime Minister Ivanishvili’s first post-parliamentary
elections victory press conference he said that “I think that Russia’s
irritation at Georgia’s potential integration into NATO was intensified
by Saakashvili. I know that Georgia’s integration into NATO would not
be very pleasant for Russia, but I do not think it is a strategic
issue [author’s italics] for Russia.” (Kucera, 2012a) The issue is
not only strategic but it is also pivotal for Russian policy in the
South Caucasus. Keeping the three South Caucasus states under its
control was and still is President Putin’s strategy. Prime Minister
Ivanishvili’s statement about Georgia’s integration into NATO shows
how short-sighted, and/or perhaps how amateurish, Ivanishvili is. We
need to remember that Ivanishvili has neither background nor expertise
in security policy.
3. Caspian Sea oil fields
In addition to the unresolved conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan
faces another potential conflict with Iran over the Caspian Sea oil
fields. [5] (Kucera, 2013) The situation in that region is not as
stable and predictable as it was several years ago. Even though,
official statements originating in Baku dismiss such rumors or
allegations – that Azerbaijan faces a belligerent Iran and that
the relations between the two countries remain calm, friendly and
peaceful, the reality might be a bit different. Does this mean
that the government of Azerbaijan is not interested in attracting
too much attention to the potential conflict and prepares for the
worse, and/or that the government is fully aware of the fact that
the Azerbaijani military cannot match the military strength of the
Iranian armed forces?
A set of Wiki Leaks cables from 2009 described military tensions
between the two countries over oil explorations that seem likely
to be related to the same field, which Iran considers to belong
to it. In those cables, Azerbaijani officials bemoan the fact that
their military are unable to challenge Iran on this issue.[6] (Kucera,
2013) Since its 2008 maritime clash with Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan has
devoted considerable resources to a naval build up and the dual use
of maritime facilities to protect its Caspian Sea oil fields. The
Navy has 2500 personnel and 39 warships, the second largest fleet
in the Caspian Sea after Russia, but ahead of Iran.[7] (Weitz, 2012)
Is that fact alone sufficient to deter Iran from becoming embroiled
in a conflict with Azerbaijan? Will the Turkish military side with
Azerbaijan in such a conflict or shy away from being dragged in? After
all, Turkey with its “zero problems with the neighbors” policy may
resist any attempt by Azerbaijan to bring it into unnecessary conflict
with Iran. It can be said that the ingredients for the conflict are
in place but much depends on whether Azerbaijan gives up or shows
its resolve by standing firm.
Various Protagonists: Russia, US, EU, NATO and Turkey
As for the other actors involved, namely Russia, the US, the EU,
NATO and Turkey, they have various vested interests in the countries
of the South Caucasus and different ideas as to what exactly they
would like to accomplish.
Russian interests: We need to remember that the interests of Russia
and Russian ideas regarding the three countries differ from the
interests and ideas of other actors. For Russian President Vladimir
Putin the three countries were and still are in Russia’s sphere or
zone of influence. Even though, Russian officials may dismiss the
author’s claim outright, reality often shows that Russia and the
West, including Turkey, do not see eye to eye about developments in
the security realm in the three South Caucasus countries. However,
and we need to emphasize this point, Russia’s muscular response to
Georgia back in August 2008 clearly demonstrated who is the master in
Moscow’s backyard and it sent a chilling signal to other contenders
for the South Caucasus region – “Beware of Russia”. Yes, Russia may
no longer be the mighty military power that it was perceived to
be during the Cold War and its military might be rusty, but when
it comes to defending its interests in the South Caucasus, Russia
treats these as seriously as ever. Even though, it is a fact that
the West, divided politically and military impotent, has weakened
over the years it cannot be entirely written-off. Despite internal
divisions and the lack of an overarching policy toward the three South
Caucasian countries, here the author makes some suggestions that may
hopefully be of use. One thing we need to remember is that as long as
President Putin knows that the West will flinch from taking decisive
actions supported by military power, he will treat the reluctant West
with scorn and a rueful smile. However, the West at large may still
surprise Russia.
The American position: As the Obama administration has other urgent
priorities on its international agenda, the South Caucasus has not
really been at the top of President Obama’s agenda since he was
first elected in 2008. It should be emphasized that President Obama
is unlike his predecessor, George W. Bush, who cared about Azerbaijan
and Georgia and encouraged the leaders of the two countries to pursue
a joint agenda. Surprisingly enough, some people in Azerbaijan and
Georgia continue to believe and stick feverishly to their beliefs that
the current US administration should pay more attention to the region.
For instance, Vafa Guluzade, a former senior foreign policy assistant
to the late Azerbaijani President Heydar Aliyev, said that “Baku
needs more US involvement in the Nagorno-Karabakh process.” However,
Elkhan Shahinoglu, director of the Baku-based Atlas Research Centre,
said that “Obama’s administration has never [author’s italics] paid
much attention to the Nagorno-Karabakh problem.” “I do not think that
it will change if Obama is re-elected in 2012.” (Grigoryan and Abbasov,
2012) As for the case of Georgia, there currently seems to be little
interest from Washington in being a counter-balance to Moscow.
(Shiriyev, 2012) As long as Putin remains the Master in Moscow’s
backyard the US will not get involved in the business related to the
fate of the three South Caucasus countries. The author’s analysis may
seem cynical but it is based on reality and facts that show that if
and when the West, including Turkey, wishes to play a game of strategic
interests on parity with Russia it must bear the consequences – namely
to be prepared to side militarily with Azerbaijan and Georgia versus
Russia and not just talk about it. That is undoubtedly a tall order
for the West.
The EU stance: It is clear at the moment and for the next three to
five years at least that the EU with its policy of democratization
and human rights agenda has failed and continues to fail to make
a real breakthrough in conflict resolution. The EU’s appeal of soft
power without muscular military support leaves Azerbaijan and Georgia
exposed to intimidation by Russia. EU-NATO member states are not yet
willing to admit Georgia into the Atlantic Alliance, since any attempt
will be met with Russia’s resolve to solve the Georgian problem once
and for all.[8] (Shiriyev, 2012) As to whether they are capable might
be a different story. Realpolitik analysts in Moscow, Brussels and
Tbilisi know that NATO membership is not going to happen [author’s
italics] as long as 9000 or so Russians soldiers are firmly entrenched
in Georgia’s two secessionist territories, Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
(Brook, 2012) Tomas de Waal, a Caucasus expert at the Washington-based
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, suggested that “[w]e had
a general reiteration of US support for Georgian NATO membership but
Obama used the word ‘ultimate’, which shows that he believes it is far
from imminent.” (Kucera, 2012b) Despite the commitment by NATO made
at the Bucharest Summit of 2-4 April 2008 to bring Georgia in, and
despite the negative reaction and the small chance of Georgia joining
NATO, the author makes some suggestions below that might be of use.
As a result, Georgia remains vulnerable and, like Azerbaijan, has
to rely on its own military strength. Almost five years after the
debacle of the August 2008 war, the Georgian government has fully
realized that it has no real friends or allies that will fight side
by side with it. It needs to be emphasized that such a brutally honest
assessment may not be accepted and admitted by the Georgian officials.
The Turkish position: As for Turkey, even though local politicians
aim to present themselves as full of ambitions and capable of solving
problems on a global agenda, such a perception seems detached from
reality. Whenever Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan meets President
Vladimir Putin, any frictions, disagreements and/or even concerns over
the unresolved conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh or over the behavior of
the maverick Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili are swept under
the carpet until the next meeting. Furthermore, if and when Russia is
presented with the opportunity to seed mistrust between Azerbaijan and
Turkey, it does so unscrupulously and very successfully. For instance,
the signing of the Road Map between Armenia and Turkey in April 2009
and the signing of the Protocols on the Establishment of Diplomatic
Relations between the two countries on 10 October 2009 led to a
deterioration of relations between Azerbaijan and Turkey. As a result,
Russia skillfully used this development to increase its influence in
the region and attempted to derail some regional projects. (Valiyev,
2011, pp.137-138) The deterioration of Azerbaijani-Turkish
relations negatively affected the regional power balance and the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ankara union came under threat. For years, these countries
have been supportive of each other and most of the regional economic
and political aspects have involved all three. (Valiyev, 2011, p.139)
There is no doubt that Russian officials will dismiss the author’s
allegations out of hand. Furthermore, when it comes to assisting
Azerbaijan should the conflict with Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh be
reignited, Turkish officials say that “Turkey could not resist the
public pressure if there were an attack. We would be forced to send
weapons. But we are not talking about sending troops, fighting side
by side [author’s italics]. We can’t do that without NATO.” (Crisis
Group Policy Briefing, 2011, p.15) The latter is not going to agree
and be dragged into the conflict. As a result, Turkey’s leadership
must carefully reassess its strengths, weaknesses and capabilities.
So, does this leave Azerbaijan and Georgia vulnerable to intimidation
from Russia? It leaves the two in limbo with a very limited space
for maneuver. For instance, Georgia is left in the cold, despite
repeated statements from NATO-Brussels that Georgia will one day in the
future join the Alliance. In the case of Azerbaijan, the government of
Azerbaijan needs to understand that as long as President Putin see no
personal benefits for him and his government in the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict resolution, Moscow will maintain the policy of status quo,
which is best for its own interests. The other parties, namely the
co-chairs of the Minsk Group – France and the US – will do nothing to
change the situation as long as it cannot change in their favor. [9]
The situation of Armenia compared with that of Azerbaijan and
Georgia is even more precarious. The control of Russia over Armenia
and Russian leverage in the case of the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict are like tentacles that provide life support to the Armenian
patient. Russia’s policy in the South Caucasus at this stage leads
Azerbaijan to drift, with Georgia, toward the West with the hope
that the US and EU can be more reliable partners than their “great
and mighty” northern neighbor. (Valiyev, 2011, p.143) Hope alone
may not be a sufficient factor to lead Azerbaijan’s drift toward the
West. The West may not be sufficiently interested in partnering with
Azerbaijan, despite Azerbaijan’s interest and desire to wean itself
from Russia’s grip.
What can be done to change the situation in the face of the entrenched
interests of Russia in the South Caucasus region?
1. The signing of the Road Map between Armenia and Turkey in April
2009 and of the Protocols on the Establishment of Diplomatic Relations
between the two countries on 10 October 2009 was badly conceived,
since it assumed from the outset that in direct bilateral talks there
would only be a win-win situation. The reality proved to be different
because the bilateral talks ignored the interests of four other actors:
Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran and Russia. If Turkey was willing to lead
the new initiative towards Armenia it must enlist the support of
Azerbaijan, Georgia and the tacit support of Iran against Russia.
Neither the EU nor the US will move a finger at the initial stage,
since they are not yet convinced that Turkey is capable of organizing
and leading such an initiative. In other words, both the Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Defense need to think
through and assess very carefully various options and/or scenarios
pertaining to both the positive and negative developments.
2. The EU member states need to stop their internal bickering and
finally realize that Moscow’s policy of dividing them into various
camps and marginalizing the Union’s smaller and lesser powerful
countries will always lead to the same negative outcome – impotence
and powerlessness. Russia respects strength and resolve and these
are exactly the qualities that the EU must show that it possesses.
3. NATO cannot play the game of ambiguity any longer. It needs to
decide whether it is ready to offer membership to Georgia and then
stand by its decision even if it means confrontation with Russia. Any
flinching will be met by scorn and a rueful smile from President
Vladimir Putin. It is indeed correct to say that NATO failed Georgia,
but thus far Georgia has not failed NATO. NATO member states need to
remember this. The formula – “One for All and All for One” – is not
just a shallow motto but a motto with substance.
4. The EU standing together against Russia, and Turkey doing the
dirty work, may bring the US from its sheltered cocoon to side with
its allies, but we cannot take this for granted.
5. The Armenian government needs to realize that its utter dependence
on Russia puts it in a very vulnerable position. Russia will not give
up its control over Armenia and risk losing the whole South Caucasian
game. Russia will further increase the sense of mistrust in Armenia
and its close neighbors, Azerbaijan and Turkey. As presented above,
Russia successfully manipulated this phobia among the Azeri leadership.
6. The most difficult task is to convince the government of Azerbaijan
to give up on Nagorno-Karabakh for the sake of peaceful co-existence
and ultimately reducing Russia’s influence in and leverage on the
South Caucasus region.
________________________________
Endnotes
[1] This text represents the author’s own personal view and in no
way the views of the Center for International and European Studies
(CIES) at Kadir Has University, Istanbul.
[2] The author’s assertion is supported by Anar Valiyev. See Valiyev,
2011, pp. 135, 137.
[3] See also Markedonov, 2012.
[4] See also Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 2012.
[5] For an earlier article on the issue, see Lindenstrauss and
Celniker, 2012. For a recent article on the issue, see Goble, 2013.
[6] For the poor state of the Azerbaijani military, see
Eurasianet.org,2010. See also Abbasov, 2010. Yashar Jafarly, an army
Colonel (in Reserve) and director of the Public Union of Officers
in Reserve, said that “since the 1994 ceasefire with Armenia” over
Nagorno-Karabakh “about 15 to 20 per cent of Azerbaijan’s 3500 army
deaths have been related to combat causes [author’s italics].” See
Abbasov, 2011. In other words, almost 80 per cent of deaths have
been related to non-combat causes. That is an appaling number of
non-combat deaths. For the latest death of the non-combat private,
see Lomsadze, 2013.
[7] For the recent dispute between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan around
the Caspian Sea oil fields, see Abbasov, 2012.
[8] See also the excellent piece written by Jgharkava, 2012. For
earlier pieces, see Talev and Bedwell, 2012; Wilson, 2011.
[9] In support of the author’s argument, see Benedikter, 2011,
pp. 162-163.
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Eugene Kogan is a Research Associate at the Center for International
and European Studies (CIES) at Kadir Has University in Istanbul. He
was previously Guest Researcher at the Vienna-based International
Institute for Liberal Policy. He has written over 70 articles
and reports on issues pertaining to hard defense and security and
military technologies of Russia and Post-Soviet states, Central and
Eastern Europe, Israel and China. He has also addressed the issue of
Russian-Turkish relations.
This article was originally published by CIES in March 2013. It is
also available in the ISN Digital Library.
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