Author: Baghdasarian Karlen

Court: Wrestler who dropped medal was right
By (AP)

BEIJING (AP) – It turns out that the Greco-Roman wrestler who was
stripped of his bronze medal for dropping it in disgust on the mat had
reason for being angry, according to the Court of Arbitration for
Sport.

Ara Abrahamian of Sweden complained to CAS that a penalty in the
second round of his 84-kilogram bout on Aug. 14 against Italian Andrea
Minguzzi wasn’t assessed until after the round ended. Once factored
in, Abrahamian automatically lost the match. Minguzzi went on to win
the gold medal.

Abrahamian’s coach was then denied a request for a video review, then
the wrestling federation’the International Federation of Associated
Wrestling Styles, or FILA’refused to consider a protest.

The 28-year-old Abrahamian had to be restrained from going after
matside officials following his loss to Minguzzi. He stormed away from
the area where interviews are conducted and slammed a door to the
dressing rooms.

After he was given his bronze during the medals ceremony, Abrahamian
walked off the podium, went over to mat and dropped it in disgust and
walked away. On Aug. 15, the International Olympic Committee
disqualified Abrahamian and stripped his medal for violating the
spirit of fair play during the medal ceremony.

The Armenian-born Abrahamian’who also lost a 2004 Olympic semifinal
match on a disputed call – initially wanted judges in the bout tossed
out and his medal restored. But in the end, he only wanted CAS to
verify that the lack of an immediate appeals process is a loophole
that needs to be fixed. It also was referred to as a violation of `the
Olympic Charter and FILA’s own rules about fair play.’

Judges said Abrahamian was right.

`We limit ourselves to ruling that FILA must, consistently with the
(Olympic) Charter and general principles of fairness, establish for
the future a jury of appeal to determine the validity or otherwise of
complaints of the kind ventilated by (Abrahamian),’ the judges wrote.

Elsewhere in the 20-page ruling, judges noted several times that FILA
did not appear at a hearing.
From: Baghdasarian

MAYBE WEAVER WAS REFERRING TO SMOKERS
By Jesse L. Byers

Glendale News Press
Aug 21 2008
CA

As a resident of Burbank, I can appreciate the controversy surrounding
Glendale’s proposed smoking ban ("Smoking ban still unsettled,"
July 31).

I was initially opposed to the smoking ordinance that we adopted in
Burbank, and though I think it has its negatives and it is sometimes
a little too far reaching, overall, I admit, it has worked and it
has been successful.

I do believe it is in Glendale’s best interest to adopt a similar
measure.

That being said, it might also be in everyone’s best interest to leave
Glendale City Councilman Dave Weaver alone ("Weaver’s remarks slammed,"
Aug. 7).

I’ve been keeping up on it and I can say that everything I have seen
points to Weaver having no bias or prejudice against anyone.

The lone statement he made that is being targeted is, there is "a lot
of opposition from one segment of the population that loves to smoke."

And the furor arises from the words put in his mouth by a Pasadena
Weekly reporter who claimed Weaver’s comment was referring to the
city’s substantial and politically influential Armenian community.

So why are people so outraged and certain that Weaver himself was
referencing to Armenians?

If he was, maybe he’s right.

According to the Center for Communications, Health and the Environment,
70% of native Armenians smoke, the highest percentage in that part
of the world.

Glendale’s Armenian population is about 80,000 strong. According to
the American Public Health Association, 77% of Armenian men smoke.

Given those statistics, it might be a safe bet that yes, if Weaver
was referring to Armenians then the largest portion of smokers in
Glendale are Armenian.

Then again, he could be way off. See, those 80,000 Armenians are only
about 40% of Glendale’s population.

And, according to the Armenian National Committee-Glendale Chapter,
61% of respondents to a recent survey don’t smoke.

That means Armenians are both a minority in Glendale and a minority
of the city’s smokers.

Accepting all that, Weaver’s comments were identifying only smokers
and no one else.

The newspaper in which the article appeared and the reporter have
both apologized for the statement.

So what’s the problem?

Seems to me people are looking for a reason to be angry, as if they’re
deliberately looking for a reason to brand someone as a bigot.

I know people who say they don’t support Sen. Barack Obama for
president and they’re automatically branded as racists.

Doing so is the same mentality as accusing Weaver of being prejudiced.

In other words, simplistic.

Maybe some people just don’t like Obama’s policies.

And maybe, when Weaver says smokers he just means smokers and not
Armenians.
From: Baghdasarian

IRAQI KURDISH, TURKOMANI POLITICIANS DENY PLAN TO REFER KIRKUK TO ICJ

Al-Sharqiyah TV
Program: The Harvest
Aug 18 2008
United Arab Emirates

Interviewee: Sa’di al-Barazanji, a leading figure in the Kurdistan Alliance
Interviewee: Hasan Turani, a leading figure in the Turkoman Front,
Interviewee: Ahmad al-Ubaydi, member of the Arab Unity Bloc in Kirkuk,

Asked if the Kurds, Arabs, and Turkmen have agreed to refer the
Kirkuk issue to the ICJ, Al-Barazanji says that "no Kurdistan
Alliance official has heard about this proposal." This is the
first time I have heard about this issue, he says, adding that
"we are still trying to solve problems related to Kirkuk and the
other disputed areas under Article 140 of the constitution and the
relevant laws." To my knowledge, he says, "the committee in charge of
the application of Article 140 is still working on a plan to normalize
the situation in the city by organizing a census and a referendum." In
another development, he says, "the UN secretary general’s special
representative has stated that the United Nations is ready to help
the Iraqi Government resolve the internal borders issue in accordance
with UN Security Council Resolution No 1770." A UN body, he says,
"has already begun investigations and field work and holds meetings
with the city’s residents to prepare for a political accord," adding
that "two groups are working in parallel on this issue" and that
"we have not yet exhausted constitutional and legal means to find a
solution." As I have said, he says, "if we fail to find a solution in
accordance with the constitution and through political means, then we
may seek international arbitration," adding that "the Kirkuk problem
has created many problems and triggered wars since the establishment of
the State of Iraq." Mustafa Barzani, he says, "turned down then Vice
President Saddam Husayn’s proposal that the city be divided into two
halves in accordance with the July 1970 agreement." He says that "under
the agreement, one half east of the Khasa River would have been part
of the then proposed Autonomous Region and the other half west of the
river would have been outside the Autonomous Region." Saddam, he says,
"proposed a second solution based on the results of the 1957 census
to define the Autonomous Region’s administrative borders and annex
the largely Kurdish areas to the Autonomous Region." Regrettably,
he says, "the second solution, which was accepted by the Kurdish
leadership, has not been applied honestly by the Iraqi Government
which found out that if the results of the said census are accepted,
Kirkuk will become part of the Autonomous Region." In my view,
"if this problem remains unsolved, Iraqis will not enjoy stability,"
he says, urging those saying that "Article 140 is no longer valid to
reconsider their position." Expressing his respect for all Iraqis,
even those objecting to his views, he says that "we will not break
away from Iraq, because we are a basic part of Iraq and want to
build a new Iraq side by side with the other Iraqis," wondering
"why some have such fears." He also says that "the entire Kurdistan
Region is part of Iraq regardless of the future status of Kirkuk,"
he says, adding that "Kirkuk in inhabited by Kurds, Turkmen, Arabs,
Chaldeans, Assyrians, and some Armenians." The Ottomans’ documents
and maps "show that Kirkuk is part of the Kurdistan Region," he says,
adding that "the original copy of the map is being kept at the Iraqi
Council of Representatives." The Ottoman Encyclopedias, including the
Al-I’lam Dictionary prepared by Turkish Writer Shams-al-Din Sami,
show that "Kirkuk is a Kurdish city inhabited by Kurds, Turkmen,
Arabs, and some Jews and Chaldeans," he says, stressing that "three
quarters of the city’s inhabitants are Kurds" and that "the Arabs
and Turkmen formed only one quarter."

Asked on whether the ICJ will take much time to find a solution to the
Kirkuk issue, Al-Barazanji says that "we are still working to reach
a solution in accordance with the constitution, which has been voted
for by the Iraqi people and which includes articles 140 and 143." The
latter article, he says, "has cancelled the State Administration Law
of the transitional period, with the exception of Article 53 which
defines the borders of the Kurdistan Region." Article 58 on Kirkuk,
he says, "includes paragraphs on how to normalize the situation and
amend the administrative border, which was distorted by the former
regime to change the demographic makeup of the city."

Asked if he has evidence that Kirkuk is part of the Kurdistan Region,
Al-Barazanji says that "the Ottoman and British documents and the
Al-I’lam Dictionary show that Kirkuk is part of the Kurdistan Region"
and that "if the problem had been solved in accordance with the July
agreement, Iraq would have avoided many problems." He also says that
"we do not want to regain Kirkuk by force, since Kirkuk is an Iraqi
city with a Kurdish identity."

Asked if the Turkmen Front supports the proposal to refer the
Kirkuk issue to the ICJ, Turani says that "the Turkmen Front has not
been informed of the proposal" and that "the Kirkuk issue cannot be
resolved under Article 140 or through referendum on the future status
of Kirkuk." He also says that "the best way to resolve this issue is
for the Turkmen, Kurds, Arabs, Chaldeans, and Assyrians – the main
components of the city – to reach a political accord on the city’s
future status." He also says that "Article 24 of the constitution,
as well as national consensus, stresses the need to reach a political
accord and establish a joint administration of the city" and that
"the International Court of Justice will not be able to resolve
the Kirkuk issue." Regarding the said documents referring to Kirkuk
as a Kurdish city, he says, "I would like to say that Sham-al-Din
Sami, who prepared the Al-I’lam Dictionary, was not a traveller,
never visited Kirkuk, and relied on baseless documents," adding that
"we have an official Ottoman document confirming that Kirkuk is a
Turkmen city." He also says that "the Kirkuk issue can be resolved
only through a national accord," that "the Turkmen and Arabs have not
been given any key role in the administration of the city," and that
"we have called for a joint administration in Kirkuk since the fall
of the former regime." The Arab and Turkmen members of the Kirkuk
Governorate Council "have proposed that the city should not be linked
to any region in the country," he says, adding that "the Iraqi State
Administration Law, particularly Article 53, refers to the dangerous
situation in the city and stresses that the city cannot be annexed to
any region." But the writers of the current constitution, he says,
"replaced Article 53 by Article 58, and the Kurdish brothers set 31
December 2007 as a time ceiling for resolving the issue in accordance
with Article 140." Therefore, "we announced that the issue could not
be resolved by the abovementioned date under Article 140," he says,
adding that "Article 142, which is part of the Iraqi Constitution,
calls for amending some articles of the constitution to resolve the
Kirkuk issue."

The anchorman says that "the proposal to refer the issue to the ICJ
was made after the Arabs and Turkmen declared their adherence to
Article 24."

Al-Barazanji says that "I agree with Turani that the city of Kirkuk
should be administered jointly and that the Turkmen should exercise
their cultural, administrative, political, and educational rights
whether or not the city is annexed to the Kurdistan Region." He also
says that "the Turkmen are dear brothers," that "Turkish names in the
city are not evidence that the city is Turkmen," and that "the Ottomans
ruled the region for 400 years." He says that there "are Turkish names
in Egypt, Tunisia, and other countries because the Ottomans ruled the
region in the name of Islam." Some say that "Article 140 is no longer
valid – and this is not true – but everybody knows that Article 158 is
still valid," he says, warning that "the failure to solve this serious
problem will destabilize Iraq," criticizing the Al-Maliki government
for "failing to implement paragraph 22 of the policy statement." He
also says that "if the Turkmen become part of the Kurdistan Region,
they will probably occupy the post of a deputy prime minister, about
25 parliament seats, and five or six ministerial posts" and that
"the Kurdistan Region’s Government will defend their rights."

Asked if he has been informed of a proposal to refer the Kirkuk issue
to the ICJ, Al-Ubaydi says that "I have heard about this strange
proposal," stressing that "the issue can be resolved through wisdom,
accord, dialogue, and understanding." From the beginning, "we said that
the issue could be resolved through accord and a joint administration
in the city under the 2 December 2007 agreement, which calls for
giving the Arabs 32 per cent of the administrative responsibilities
in the city." He says that "an agreement is included in disputed
Article 24," that "the problem can be solved easily through mutual
confidence, which does not exist between us and the Kurdish List at
the Kirkuk Governorate Council," and that "an investment committee
to be formed in two days will be headed by a figure close to the
Kurds." Once the Arabs "are given 32 per cent of the seats of the
city’s administrative council, the problem will be solved," he says,
adding that "Article 140 should be referred to the committee in charge
of amending the constitution" and that "I object to any plan to refer
the Kirkuk issue to the ICJ."
From: Baghdasarian

Panorama.am

18:59 15/08/2008

`ONE NATION, ONE CULTURE’ IS TO START ON 17 AUGUST

On August 17 `One Nation, One Culture’ all Armenian cultural third
festival is to start and 947 representatives from 16 countries will
take part in it, said Tamara Poghosyan the director of the festival’s
foundation in a press conference. 239 representatives from Russia, 199
from Georgia, 91 from Turkey, as well as from Serbia, Bulgaria, Syria,
and USA are to participate in the festival.

According to T. Poghosyan the key frame of the festival is out on the
marzes of Armenia which is innovation compared with the previous
year. She said that only official opening and closing ceremonies and
an event named `Devotion’ are to be implemented in Yerevan. `Festival
Day in Marzes’ and `Festival Day in Artsakh’ will be implemented.

`Our participants have been always complaining that they wish to see
Armenia and not only Yerevan,’ she said. Davir Muradyan, the Deputy
Minister of Education who was present at the conference, said that the
mission of the festival is to fill the gap between Armenian youth and
youth of Diaspora.

Source: Panorama.am
From: Baghdasarian

AS RUSSIAN TANKS ROLL, EUROPE REASSESSES
By Judy Dempsey

New York Times
August 15, 2008
United States

News Analysis

BERLIN — The Russian tanks rumbling across parts of Georgia are
forcing a fundamental reassessment of strategic interests across
Europe in a way not considered since the fall of the Berlin Wall in
November 1989 and the subsequent collapse of Communism.

Skip to next paragraph Related News Analysis: No Cold War, but Big
Chill (August 16, 2008) For nearly two decades, European capitals in
concert with Washington have encouraged liberalization in lands once
firmly under the Soviet aegis. Now, they find themselves asking a
question barely posed in all those years: How far will or can Russia
go, and what should the response be?

The answer will play out not just in the European Union, but also
along its new eastern frontier, in once obscure places like Moldova
and Azerbaijan.

Already, French leaders, acting on behalf of Europe, have firmly told
the Russians they cannot insist on the ouster of Georgia’s president,
Mikheil Saakashvili, as a precondition for a cease-fire.

Farther west, in Poland, a long-stalled negotiation on stationing
parts of a United States missile defense system was quickly wrapped
up, as American negotiators on Thursday dropped resistance to giving
the Poles advanced Patriot missiles.

The Poles, of course, had their own security in mind. "Poland wants
to be in alliances where assistance comes in the very first hours
of — knock on wood — any possible conflict," Prime Minister Donald
Tusk said.

"The reality is that international relations are changing," said
Pawel Swieboda, director of demosEUROPA, an independent research
organization based in Warsaw. "For the first time since 1991, Russia
has used military force against a sovereign state in the post-Soviet
area. The world will not be the same. A new phenomenon is unfolding
in front or our eyes: a re-emerging power that is willing to use force
to guarantee its interests. The West does not know how to respond."

At stake 20 years ago was whether the Kremlin, then under Mikhail
Gorbachev, would intervene militarily to stop the collapse of
Communism. But Mr. Gorbachev chose to cut Eastern Europe free as
he focused — in vain — on preventing the collapse of the Soviet
Union itself.

Communist bloc lands from the Baltic States in the north to Bulgaria
in the south have since joined the European Union and NATO — a feat,
despite flaws, that in the Western view has made the continent more
secure and democratic.

But Russia never liked the expansion of NATO. In the 1990s, it was
too weak to resist; today, in the Caucasus, Russia is showing off its
power and sending an unmistakable message: Georgia, or a much larger
Ukraine, will never be allowed to join NATO.

The implications of Russia’s action reverberate well beyond that,
from the European Union’s muddled relations with a crucial energy
supplier, Russia, through Armenia and Azerbaijan in the south and east,
to Ukraine and Moldova in the west.

This region has everything that the West and Russia covet and
abhor: immense reserves of oil and gas, innumerable ethnic splits
and tensions, corrupt and authoritarian governments, pockets of
territory that have become breeding grounds or havens for Islamic
fundamentalists. As a result, the region has become the arena for
competition between the Americans and Europeans on one hand, and
Russia on the other, over how to bring these countries into their
respective spheres of influence.

The European Union — as ever, slow and divided — has offered few
concrete proposals to bring the countries of what Russia calls its
"near abroad" — Belarus, Ukraine, the Caucasus and the Caspian —
closer to Europe. Analysts say the 27 member states have not been
able to separate their view of Russia from adopting a clear strategy
toward the former Soviet republics on the union’s new eastern borders.

"The Georgia crisis shows that Russia is in the process of testing
how far it can go," said Niklas Nilsson of the Central Asia-Caucasus
Institute in Stockholm. "This is part of a much bigger geopolitical
game. It is time for the Europeans to decide what kind of influence
it wants in the former Soviet states. That is the biggest strategic
challenge the E.U. now faces."

NATO, led by the United States and several Eastern European countries,
has reached out more actively. At a summit meeting in Bucharest,
Romania, in April, Georgia and Ukraine failed to get on a concrete
path to membership as they had sought, but did secure a promise of
being admitted eventually.

Georgia and its supporters say that NATO membership would have
protected Georgians from Russian tanks. Western European diplomats
by contrast note with relief that Georgia is not in NATO, and thus
they were not required to come to its defense.

The newly resurgent Russians, buoyed by oil and gas wealth and the
firm leadership of Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin, have played
their hand with less hesitation.

Tomas Valasek, the Slovak-born director of foreign policy and defense
at the Center for European Reform in London, says Russia has used
the ethnic and territorial card to persuade some NATO countries that
admitting Ukraine or Georgia would prove more dangerous and unstable
than keeping them out. Georgia’s incursion Aug. 7 into South Ossetia
serves both these Russian arguments, as well as Moscow’s passionate
objections to the West’s support for an independent Kosovo.

Recognize Kosovo’s break with Serbia, Mr. Putin warned last spring,
and Russia will feel entitled to do the same with South Ossetia and
Georgia’s other breakaway enclave, Abkhazia — where Mr. Putin needs
stability to realize his cherished project of the 2014 Winter Olympics
in nearby Sochi.

Ukraine, bigger than France and traditionally seen by Russians as
integral to their heritage and dominion, has been conspicuously
quiet over the past week. Senior Ukrainian officials say that the
weak European Union response on Georgia will only embolden Russia
to focus even more on Ukraine, where many inhabitants speak Russian
and, particularly in the eastern half, look to Moscow, not Kiev,
for leadership.

"The crisis in Georgia has clear implications for regional security,
and of course Ukraine," said Hryhoriy Nemyria, deputy prime minister
of Ukraine, who is responsible for European integration. "This crisis
makes crystal clear that the security vacuums that have existed in
the post-Soviet space remain dangerous."
From: Baghdasarian

LOCAL EASTERN EUROPEANS SEE BOTH SIDES IN GEORGIA CONFLICT
By Robert Morris – [email protected]

Myrtle Beach Sun News
Aug. 16, 2008
SC

Whether they have lived here for years or are only serving fast
food for the summer, Russians and Eastern Europeans across the Grand
Strand have been scouring the Internet this week for accounts about
the recent conflict in Georgia.

In the media from their native countries, they read accounts
about the fighting that may surprise many Americans: The South
Carolina-sized republic of Georgia, emboldened by its growing ties
with the United States and Western Europe, suddenly attacked an
increasingly independent separatist region within its own borders.

Innocent civilians, including Russian citizens, were killed by the
Georgian bombs, those Russian accounts say, and Russia was forced to
send troops in to stop the violence.

"We were shocked, because in the American news they said Russia started
the war with Georgia," said Valeriya Binyuk, a 21-year-old economics
student working at Mad Myrtle’s Ice Creamery for the summer. "Georgia
started the war. I think Russia was just protecting its citizens."

In the American media, a completely different story has
developed: Using the first excuse it could find, Russia invaded
Georgia to reassert its faded glory since the fall of the Soviet
Union. Commentators speculate that Moscow is punishing the former
Soviet state for aligning itself with the West and trying to push
so far into Georgia’s interior that the ensuing fear will undermine
support for the country’s anti-Russian president.

Ultimately, elements of each side’s story are likely to prove true
and blame for the conflict will fall on both countries, say experts
and some locals.

Either way, this week’s fighting – and the widely disparate media
accounts of it in both countries – may mark a significantly negative
shift in U.S.-Russia relations.

"In a way, we’ve left one period of post-Soviet history and entered
another," said Bill Richardson, dean of Coastal Carolina University’s
humanities college and an expert in Russian politics. "The Russian
state is just more powerful, and we’re moving back to a period of
tension between Russia and the U.S."

Three-way combat

The five days of fighting in Georgia centered on two regions, Abkhazia
and South Ossetia, which for more than a decade have both had limited
and uneasy independence from the rest of Georgia. The two areas have
significant numbers of Russian citizens.

Around Aug. 3, small skirmishes began between Ossetian separatists and
Georgian forces, and, as casualties escalated, Georgia began bombing
and sending in more forces. Claiming that Georgians were wiping out the
Russian citizens there, Russia sent its armies to aid the Ossetians.

"The Georgians behaved pretty irresponsibly in how they went about
doing this," Richardson said. "But I also think Russia kind of
manipulated this."

By Monday, the Russian army had also attacked Georgian forces in
Abkhazia and even pushed past those regions into undisputed Georgian
territory, killing hundreds with aerial bombing.

On Wednesday, French President Nicolas Sarkozy brokered a cease-fire
between the warring countries, but even though the fighting stopped,
Russian troops have continued their advance into Georgia, reaching
25 miles from the capital city of Tbilisi.

‘A bad peace’

As many Eastern Europeans look at the fighting in Georgia, they repeat
the Russian proverb that "a bad peace is better than a good war." But,
they insist, Georgia was killing Russian citizens in South Ossetia,
so Russia was forced to respond.

"Russia is like a third person," said Anna Konchinkova, a fifth-year
law student with a summer job working for Russian-speaking Myrtle
Beach attorney David Canty. "Nobody wants a war."

Dennis Sorokin, a 20-year-old law student working for the summer at
a pay parking lot on Withers Drive, said the people of South Ossetia
should be considered the true victims of the fighting.

"Every country wants to be independent," Sorokin said. "Russia doesn’t
want to be in a war. They have a big territory and lots of people –
they don’t need that tiny country."

Amid the American news media’s depiction of a Russian invasion of
Georgia, the Eastern Europeans said they could only rely on their
home country’s media for news of the fighting.

"When you look at the CNN side, they all blame Russia," said Hovsep
Karapetyan, an Armenian who owns the Euro Foods grocery on Kings
Avenue. "They don’t show you what’s really going on."

Tamara Johnson, a native Russian who lived in Ukraine for 15 years
before marrying an American worker and moving to the U.S., said
Georgia’s plight captured the West’s attention because its leader,
Mikhail Saakashvili, so aggressively sought help from the U.S.

"When children are fighting, who gets mama’s kiss is who is crying
louder," Johnson said. "Georgia is crying louder."

The real rift

Regardless of who started it, the Georgian conflict is universally
seen as part of a widening fault line between the West and Russia.

In recent years, the former Soviet states of Georgia and Ukraine have
elected Western-leaning leaders and sought inclusion into NATO. In
Georgia, an important street in the capital is even named after
President George W. Bush.

After this month’s fighting began, Georgia announced it would break
from the Russian-led federation of post-Soviet states known as the
Commonwealth of Independent States – yet another move that will likely
heighten the tensions underlying the conflict.

"As Russia has become more sure of itself and more secure, it was
pretty clear that Russia was going to begin to assert itself as a
regional power," Richardson said. "The Russian government wanted to
show a potential alliance with NATO wasn’t going to bring them much,
and that the real power in the region is Russia."

Amid the dangers posed by a real shift in diplomatic attitudes between
the U.S. and Russia, some who have lived on both sides worry that
aggressively one-sided media coverage is only widening the divide.

In Conway, Belarus native Marina Hearle’s gallery mixes European art
with her husband’s collection of American baseball collectibles,
and her own paintings are as likely to have scenes from Conway as
from Russia.

"I just wish people would learn about each other more," Hearle
said. "Maybe they would understand what’s going on."

In Karapetyan’s store, amid all the Russian teas and chocolates,
he also stocks bottles of the famed Tkemali hot sauce from Georgia.

Georgians and Russians will remain friends, he said, but the
saber-rattling from the politicians concerns him.

"If they go too far, it’s going to get bigger and bigger," Karapetyan
said. "They should figure out how to stop it."

As Washington and Moscow continue their war of words over Georgia,
the situation could worsen, experts said.

"There’s always the potential for a miscalculation where things can
escalate," said Ken Rogers, chair of the department of politics
at CCU. "Hopefully, the relationship is important enough to both
countries that they will do what they can to make the impact as
minimal as possible. But who knows?"
From: Baghdasarian

REJECTING FALSE PARALLELS: WHY KOSOVO IS NOT SOUTH OSSETIA OR…
By Marko Attila Hoare

New Kosova Report
Wednesday, 13 August 2008
Sweden

Marko Attila HoareWe are all familiar with a certain dishonest
rhetorical tactic: the use of an argument that is objectively
ridiculous and that the person making it knows is ridiculous, but
that nevertheless can sound impressive to the ears of someone who
does not pause to think twice about it.

A good example is the claim that we should not recognise Kosovo’s
independence lest it set off a chain reaction across the world,
with secessionist territories rushing to follow Kosovo’s example by
declaring independence. Former Serbian foreign minister Vuk Draskovic
suggested these would include northern Cyprus, the Basque country,
Corsica, Northern Ireland, Scotland, South Ossetia, Chechnya and
Taiwan. A superficially more sophisticated older brother of this
argument is the one made by Russian President Putin and his supporters:
that if Kosovo is allowed unilaterally to secede from Serbia, the same
right should be accorded to the Russian-backed breakaway territories of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia (formally parts of Georgia) and Transnistria
(formally part of Moldova). Both of these arguments are sophisms,
and it is worth pausing for a moment to understand all the reasons why.

We can start by rejecting the obvious falsehood that recognising
Kosovo’s independence without Serbia’s consent would be an
irresponsible act of radicalism equivalent to Prometheus’s
revealing the secret of fire to mankind or Pandora’s opening of
the box. Unilateral declarations of independence – and unilateral
recognition of the independence of secessionist territories by outside
powers – are part and parcel of the modern world. It is enough to
mention France’s recognition of the independence of the United States
in 1778, Britain’s recognition of the independence of Bangladesh
in 1972 and Germany’s recognition of the independence of Croatia in
1991 – all of them without the consent of the country against which
the wars of American, Bangladeshi and Croatian independence had
been fought. None of these actions led to global chaos. Recognising
Kosovo’s independence without Serbia’s consent is hardly an action
without precedent in international relations.

Nor is it true that the world is covered by dozens or hundreds of
potentially separatist territories, all eagerly watching to see what
happens with Kosovo before deciding whether themselves to follow its
example. We know this is not true, because several of the territories
that are usually cited – South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria and
northern Cyprus, in particular – have already unilaterally seceded
from their parent countries. The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus
formally declared independence in 1983, years before Kosovo attempted
to secede from Serbia. Anyone with any knowledge of the chronology of
historical events in greater south-eastern Europe knows perfectly well
that the acts of secession in question were not in any way inspired
by events in Kosovo. In the cases of South Ossetia, Abkhazia and
Transnistria, the obvious precedent, in the eyes of the secessionist
leaderships, was the secession of the constituent republics of the
USSR, to which was coupled their own reluctance to be left in an
independent Georgia or Moldova.

Secessionist leaderships, in other words, choose the precedents
that suit them. Those South Ossetians, Abkhazians and Transnistrians
seeking precedents can cite the recognised secession of Lithuania,
Azerbaijan, Croatia, Montenegro, etc. If Kosovo is recognised, they
will be able to cite Kosovo as well. But nobody should confuse rhetoric
and propaganda with genuine motivation. And it is particularly comical
to hear the Russian leadership voice its ‘fears’ of Kosovo setting
a precedent, when it was the Russians whose military intervention
enabled South Ossetia, Abkhazia and Transnistria to break away from
Georgia and Moldova in the first place. That the Russians continued
to support the secessionists in question while crushing Chechnya’s bid
for independence should be enough for us to dispense with the illusion
that their arguments over Kosovo have anything to do with principles
over consistency and precedent-setting. They could, if they wish,
respond to our recognition of Kosovo’s independence by recognising
formally the independence of their Transnistrian and South Caucasian
clients – as Turkey has recognised northern Cyprus – but nothing forces
them to do this, certainly not their infinitely malleable ‘principles’.

This brings us to the question of whether Kosovo really is
fundamentally different from those secessionist countries that
we have already recognised – Slovenia, Croatia, Latvia, Georgia,
Montenegro, etc. – and fundamentally similar to those we have not –
South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria, Nagorno Karabakh, etc. The
answer on both counts is, simply, no. Kosovo is different from the
latter territories in terms of its status in the former federation
to which it belonged: it was – like Croatia, Slovenia and the other
former Yugoslav republics – a constituent member of the Yugoslav
federation in its own right. By contrast, Abkhazia, South Ossetia and
Nagorno Karabakh were not constituent members of the former Soviet
Union. Transnistria was not even an autonomous entity at all. If one
applies consistently the principle that all the members of the former
federations of the USSR, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia should have
the right to self-determination, then this right belongs to Kosovo.

Furthermore, when Kosovo joined Serbia in 1945, it did so formally
of its own free will, by a vote of its provincial assembly. Kosovo
was, before Slobodan Milosevic’s abrogation of its autonomy in the
late 1980s, already effectively independent of Serbia, which was
a composite republic consisting of the two autonomous provinces of
Kosovo and Vojvodina and so-called ‘Serbia proper’ – each of which was
a member of the Yugoslav federation in its own right, independently
of the other two. There is absolutely no reason why the international
community should, given the collapse of this federation, automatically
assign Kosovo to the possession of an independent Serbia. Since Kosovo
joined Serbia in 1945 on the understanding that it was simultaneously
part of Yugoslavia, the only reasonable course of action would be to
permit Kosovo’s assembly to decide what its status should be in the
new circumstances. These new circumstances were, let us not forget,
created by the leadership of Serbia’s deliberate and successful
campaign to break up Yugoslavia and deprive all Yugoslavs – including
the Kosovars – of their common homeland.

Not only is Kosovo not equivalent to Abkhazia, South Ossetia
and Transnistria in legal and constitutional terms, but it is not
equivalent to them in other respects either. With roughly two million
people, Kosovo has a resident population roughly four times the size
of Transnistria’s, ten times the size of Abkhazia’s and thirty times
the size of South Ossetia’s. It has a larger population than several
independent European states, including Estonia, Cyprus, Malta and
Iceland (about five times the population of Malta and seven times the
population of Iceland, in fact). Furthermore, Kosovo’s population is
overwhelmingly Albanian and supportive of independence, and was so even
before the exodus of non-Albanians following the Kosovo war in 1999.

By contrast, Abkhazia’s largest nationality was, until the ethnic
cleansing operations of the early 1990s, the ethnic Georgians, who
outnumbered ethnic Abkhaz by two and a half times, who comprised nearly
half the population of Abkhazia and who oppose independence. In South
Ossetia, ethnic Ossetians outnumbered ethnic Georgians by two-to-one;
still, an independent South Ossetia would be considerably smaller
in terms of population and territory than any independent European
state except for mini-states like Monaco, Liechtenstein and San
Marino. Were their independence recognised, Abkhazia and South Ossetia
would in practice become parts of Russia; a vast state would thereby
have expanded its borders at the expense of a much smaller state
(Georgia). As for Transnistria, its population is somewhat larger than
Abkhazia’s or South Ossetia’s, but Moldovans who oppose independence
comprise the largest nationality, albeit outnumbered by non-Moldovans
two-to-one. And as we noted above, Transnistria’s claim to independence
on constitutional grounds is even weaker than Abkhazia’s or South
Ossetia’s. One could make a case for the independence of any of these
territories, but in terms of constitutional status, population size,
national homogeneity and viability, Kosovo’s is by far the strongest.

Modern European history has witnessed the continual emergence of newly
independent states that successfully secede from larger entities:
roughly in chronological order, these have been Switzerland, Sweden,
the Netherlands, Portugal, Greece, Belgium, Luxemburg, Serbia,
Montenegro, Romania, Norway, Bulgaria, Albania, Poland, Finland,
Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Iceland, Cyprus, Malta, Lithuania, Latvia,
Estonia, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Ukraine, Belarus, Slovenia,
Croatia, Macedonia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Slovakia, the Czech Republic
and Montenegro (for the second time). There are, of course, many
countries or nations that have failed to secede, or whose secession
has not been recognised internationally. The merits of any particular
claim to self-determination have to be judged on their own basis.

In supporting Kosovo’s independence, both justice and as many
precedents as we care to pick will be on our side. And we can safely
ignore the sophisms put forward by hostile governments against us.

Marko Attila Hoare is a Senior Research Fellow at Kingston University,
London with considerable experience in the Balkans. He is author of
books The History of Bosnia and How Bosnia Armed. This article was
first published on 28 November, 2007.
From: Baghdasarian

ALOVSAT ALIYEV: "AZERBAIJAN WILL NOT BE ALONE IN FACING THE THREAT OF DEMOGRAPHIC CATASTROPHE, WHICH EMERGED IN THE REGION DUE TO RUSSIA’S EMPIRE AMBITIONS"

Today.Az
13 August 2008
Azerbaijan

Day.Az interview with Alovsat Aliyev, head of the Center of legal
assistance to migrants of Azerbaijan.

– How can the Russian-Georgian military conflict influence the
migration processes in the South Caucasus region?

– First of all, we are now witnessing Russia’s open aggression against
Georgia. The area of military actions has already been moved from
the South Ossetian zone inside Georgia, which is a direct violation
of the territorial integrity of Georgia by Russia, longing to seize
control over the entire South Caucasus.

The currently obvious attempt to occupy Georgia just demonstrates that
Russia still considers the former USSR republics to be its property,
but not independent states. This is a real flag of distress for the
whole South Caucasus region, including for Azerbaijan, which should
understand the Kremlin’s message: Nagorno Karabakh’s fate is in our
hands and we will always support separatism.

Russia’s conduct creates a great risk of significant demographic
problems in the South Caucasus region, as first refugees from Georgia
has already arrived in Azerbaijan. Naturally, Gergian refugees,
arriving to Azerbaijan are not men of the call-up age, but are women,
elderly people and children, who fell victims of Russia’s aggression.

I think that this flow of refugees from Georgia to Azerbaijan may
increase with Russia’s continuing annexation of Georgian territory. At
the same time, Azerbaijani citizens, residing in regions neighboring
Georgia may also move, as mass migration and refugees is one of the
main elements of war. It is the war declared to Georgia by Russia,
which is thus threatening the security of entire South Caucasus region.

– Is Azerbaijan ready for receipt of so many refugees from Georgia?

– Our country has sufficient experience in settling migration
problems. As we all remember that Azerbaijan managed to settle
about a million of refugees and internally displaced persons, who
were deprived of their homes in the result of Armenian aggression,
encouraged by Russia, against our country.

At the moment there is no threat that the flow of refugees from
Georgia will be so large. Anyway, I think Azerbaijan will cope with
these flows. Our country will not be alone in facing the threat of
the demographic catastrophe, which emerged in our region due to the
empire ambitions of Russia, ready for the open annexation of a small
neighbor in order to meet them.

– Russia’s anti-Georgian actions are not limited by annexation. For
example, the Russian movement against illegal immigration is compiling
the list of flats, where Georgians live "illegally". Movement leader
Alexander Belov noted that upon the completion of this action, the
lists may be submitted to the law-enforcement bodies, if the government
decides to expel the citizens of this country from Russia. Are these
actions of the movement lawful?

– These are absolutely lawless actions by the movement and the open
violation of human rights, as there are sufficient number of structures
in Russia, which regulate the migration processes in the country and
there is no need for the movement’s actions. These actions have all
signs of inciting national enmity and this is considered a crime.

Naturally, considering the growth of xenophobia and nationalism
in Russia, no one can reject possible anti-Georgian hysteria in
Russia. But I would recommend to all persons of Georgian nationality,
who face the violation of their rights and fall victims of nationalism
in Russia, fix each fact of the kind and file a claim against those,
responsible for it.

Thus, they will be able to add arguments to official Tbilisi, which
declares the Kremlin’s intention to terminate the freedom-loving
Georgian people.
From: Baghdasarian

RUSSIA MAY TURN FOCUS TO PRO-U.S. UKRAINE AFTER BEATING GEORGIA
By Henry Meyer

Bloomberg
Aug 13, 2008

Aug. 13 (Bloomberg) — Now that Russia has humiliated Georgia with a
punishing military offensive, it may shift its attention to reining in
pro-Western Ukraine, another American ally in the former Soviet Union.

Russian President Dmitry Medvedev and Prime Minister Vladimir Putin’s
first order of business likely will be to try to thwart Ukraine’s
bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

"The Moscow authorities will use this opportunity to remind Ukraine
of the damages of allying itself with NATO," said Geoffrey Smith at
Renaissance Capital investment bank in Kiev.

The U.S. has long seen Georgia and Ukraine as counterweights to
Russia’s influence in the region. Opposition leaders in the two
countries came to power after U.S.-backed popular protests in 2003
and 2004. Their ascension advanced an American strategy of expanding
NATO to include both countries and securing energy routes from the
Caspian Sea that bypass Russia. The BP Plc-led Baku- Tbilisi-Ceyhan
oil pipeline to Turkey runs through Georgia.

The future effectiveness of that policy is now in doubt, with Georgia’s
U.S.-educated President Mikheil Saakashvili, 40, weakened by a five-day
blitz that his American patrons were powerless to halt.

Medvedev, 42, and Putin, 56, say Russia began the offensive in response
to a drive by Georgia to restore control over the breakaway region
of South Ossetia. Now Russia has ousted Georgian forces from there
and from Abkhazia, another separatist region, and destroyed much of
the central government’s military.

Less Confident

"Georgia will be enormously more careful in its actions in the future,
and much less confident of its relationship with the United States,"
said U.S.-based geopolitical advisory group Stratfor in a research
note.

NATO is due in December to review the two countries’ bids to join the
Western military alliance. NATO leaders in April promised Ukraine
and Georgia eventual membership while declining them fast- track
status. Russia, which has also denounced U.S. plans to station
missile defense sites in former Soviet satellites Poland and the
Czech Republic, says the expansion of the Cold War-era alliance to
its borders is a security threat.

NATO should affirm the potential of Georgia and Ukraine to become
alliance members in the face of Russia’s incursion into Georgia,
senior U.S. officials said yesterday in Washington.

"Russia may find it convenient to raise the level of tension with
Ukraine in the run-up to the December NATO review," Citigroup
Inc.’s London-based David Lubin and Ali Al- Eyd wrote in a note to
clients. "If the conflict with Russia decelerates or reverses Georgia’s
integration with the West, a similar fate could also affect Ukraine."

Divided Country

Ukraine has a large Russian-speaking population in the south and
east that opposes NATO entry and looks to Moscow. Russian officials
warn that if President Viktor Yushchenko pushes Ukraine into NATO,
the nation may split in two. Russia has made its displeasure with
Ukraine clear in recent years, cutting off gas supplies to the country
in 2005 and reducing deliveries earlier this year.

The military operation in Georgia will serve "as a warning" to
Ukraine that it should desist from petitioning for NATO entry,
said Janusz Bugajski, director of the New European Democracies
Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in
Washington. "Otherwise, Moscow may intervene to protect the allegedly
threatened interests of the Russian population."

Too Aggressive

An overly aggressive move by Russia against Ukraine might invite a
backlash, said Renaissance Capital’s Smith.

"If it reacts too violently against Ukraine, then it risks provoking
the reaction it least wants: trade and investment barriers for its
companies, a more antagonistic approach to energy transit, and above
all, it risks scaring Ukraine into seeking western protection,"
he said.

Germany and France opposed NATO entry for Georgia and Ukraine because
of the Georgian separatist disputes and opposition to membership among
some Ukrainians. They now will feel their concerns have been justified,
said Cliff Kupchan of New-York based Eurasia Group a political risk
consulting firm.

"Considering both European reticence and possible fears about Ukraine,
I think it is very much on the slow track," he said, referring to
NATO membership for both states.

The assault by Russian artillery, tanks and bombers inflicted
significant damage on Georgia’s armed forces, which last month
increased their size to 37,000 soldiers. Russia’s military has 1.13
million personnel. The U.S. trained and equipped Georgia’s military
and in 2006 approved almost $300 million in aid over five years.

Army Regroups

"A substantial part of our military power has been destroyed," said
Georgian National Security Council chief Kakha Lomaia. "However,
we did preserve the core of our army, and have managed to regroup it
close to the capital."

An airbase in Senaki was destroyed and three Georgian ships blown up
in the Black Sea port of Poti, he said.

A month ago, about 1,000 U.S. soldiers joined 600 Georgians and 100
from Ukraine, Azerbaijan and Armenia in joint exercises at the Vaziani
military base near Tbilisi. Russia repeatedly bombed the base during
this month’s war.

"The American role in the region has been weakened," Jan Techau,
a European and security affairs analyst at the German Council on
Foreign Relations in Berlin, said in a telephone interview. "It’s a
reassertion of Russia’s dominant role in the region."

Ian Hague, a Bank of Georgia board member and fund manager with
$1.8 billion in the former Soviet Union, said the attack on Georgia
discouraged Western investments in energy infrastructure by raising
the risk premium.

"It’s somewhat reminiscent, in 1939, when Stalin attacked Finland,"
former U.S. national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski told
Bloomberg Television. "I think this kind of confrontation is the best
kind of answer as to why they are seeking to be members of NATO."
From: Baghdasarian

ANOTHER DEFEAT: CHINA LEADER

Panorama.am
20:43 11/08/2008

Armenian judoist Armen Nazarian (66kg), was defeated by Egyptian
sportsman during the 29-th Olympic games, and left the competition.

Another Armenian sportsman, boxer Eduard Hambardzumian (64kg), has
also lost in 1/32 final to Feliqs Diassin from Dominique republic.

Today is the third day of the competition, but none of Armenian
sportsmen has received any medal. Only boxer Andranik Hakobyan(75kg)
has defeated Ahmed Sarakou from Ghana in 1/32 final and will continue
struggling for medal.

Note that the host of the Games, China is leading by the quantity of
gold medals.
From: Baghdasarian