Newsweek
Nov 28 2009
Risky Diplomacy
Turkey’s foreign minister discusses his country’s expanding role as a
regional power.
By Owen Matthews, Yenal Belgici, and Semin Gumusel | Newsweek Web Exclusive
Nov 28, 2009
Has the West really "lost" Turkey? With Ankara showing a new
cordiality to countries like Syria and Iran, foreign-policy analysts
are scrambling to assess whether Turkey has shrugged off Europe and
the United States in favor of its Muslim neighbors. Turkish Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu sat down with NEWSWEEK’s Owen Matthews, Yenal
Belgici, and Semin Gumusel in Ankara recently to discuss NATO, Iran,
Barack Obama, and the thinking behind Turkey’s new diplomacy.
Excerpts:
Matthews: Many of Turkey’s allies are wondering, after Prime Minister
Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s recent visit to Iran, whose side is Turkey on?
Davutoglu: In order to answer this question, you have to understand
the geography and the history of Turkey. We are a European country and
we are an Asian country. We have direct access to the Balkans, the
Caucasus, and the Middle East. So Turkish foreign policy has to be
multiregional, multidimensional. We are also part of European history.
But at the same time, the history of more than 20 [Middle Eastern and
Balkan] countries could be written only using Turkish archives. We
have more Bosnians in Turkey than in Bosnia itself, more Albanians
than in Albania, as well as Kurds and Arabs. Because of these historic
connections, all these countries have certain expectations from us.
Matthews: Yet during the Cold War you were unequivocally a U.S. ally.
The Cold War was a static international environment; you had only two
options’either [to be a] member of NATO or a member of the Warsaw
Pact. There was no third alternative. After the Cold War, a dynamic
situation emerged, and Turkey had to assume a foreign-policy role in
all [its neighboring] regions regardless of their ethnic or religious
background. But at the same time, Turkey’s most institutionalized
relationship remains its membership of NATO’this is Turkey’s strongest
tie. Similarly, the main objective of Turkish foreign policy is
integration with Europe. Our history is part of Europe’s, our culture
is part of Europe’s, and our process of modernization is parallel to
the developments in Europe. Our membership of NATO and the negotiation
process with the EU is the strategic priority of Turkey. But it
doesn’t mean that because of these strong ties we can ignore the
Middle East, we can ignore Asia, Central Asia, North Africa, or
Africa.
Matthews: Isn’t friendship with Iran mutually exclusive with
membership in NATO?
Our relations with Iran are not something new. The Turkish-Iranian
border has been stable for 370 years. We have been implementing a
policy of "zero problems with our neighbors," not just with Iran, but
also Iraq and Syria and also with non-Muslim countries such as
Georgia, Bulgaria, Greece, Russia, Romania, and with all of our other
neighbors. All our [regional] relations improved. Today Russia is our
biggest trade partner; our relationship with Greece and Georgia are
excellent. So it’s a consistent policy across the board. You can’t say
that Turkey is giving special priority to Iran. The question should
be: is having zero problems with our neighbors compatible with being a
candidate for the EU and a member of NATO? From our perspective, yes,
they are compatible. This is the whole philosophy of the EU itself,
which emerged through minimizing political problems with its
neighbors. Similarly, we want to have a zone of security and stability
around us. And this is exactly the European approach, based on
European philosophy and European values. If you study Germany’s
Ostpolitik [of détente with the Soviet bloc] in the 1960s, you can
understand Turkey’s Eastern politics in 2009.
Matthews: Turkey is now in a position of influence that it hasn’t had
in long time. Does that not mean that Turkey has emerged as one of the
winners of the Iraq War?
We would have the same foreign policy toward the Middle East even if
there had been no war in Iraq. Our foreign policy toward the Middle
East, the Caucasus, and the Balkans is not opportunistic but based on
firm principles. In order to have a new prosperous, stable, secure
Middle East, we have been implementing a proactive peace diplomacy.
That’s why we initiated direct Syrian-Israeli talks; that’s how we
were able to unite Sunni groups [in Iraq] and convince them to
participate in politics in 2005. We have been very active in Lebanese
politics to resolve disputes between Sunnis and Shias, and active in
Gaza trying to achieve a ceasefire. We have also been trying to
resolve issues regarding the Iranian nuclear program and signed
agreements with Armenia and moved forward in resolving the
Armenian-Azerbaijan dispute. During the Georgian crisis we initiated
the Caucasus Stability and Cooperation Platform, and we have mediated
in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia.
Matthews: But the Iraq War created a power vacuum that you are now filling.
The same war in Iraq also created big risks for Turkey. This type of
international issue creates risks and advantages at the same time. How
this new context will be interpreted and be responded to depends on
the political will of a country. Turkey implemented a consistent
foreign policy; therefore, now we have excellent relations in the
region. But it is because of our foreign policy, not because of the
war in Iraq. We have been sincere, we have been active, and we did not
change our policy because of some very conjectural short-term
interests.
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From: Baghdasarian