AZERBAIJAN HAS NEITHER POLITICAL NOR ECONOMIC RESOURCES TO UNLEASH WAR AGAINST NAGORNY KARABAKH
ArmInfo
2009-12-23 21:54:00
ArmInfo’s exclusive interview with Yevgenia Voyko, the leading expert
in foreign policy, the Russian Center for Political Conjuncture
Ms. Voyko, what is your assessment of the passing year? Was it
successful from the viewpoint of the Karabakh peace process? Can
we hope for breakthrough in that process considering activation of
meetings at the top level in 2009?
I’d characterize the situation in the conflict region as stagnating.
Apparently, all the participants in the negotiation process have a
similar approach i.e. the scenario "leave everything as it is" would be
the optimal one today. First of all, settling the territorial conflict
between Azerbaijan and Armenia in a diplomatic way was not a success,
apparently, since any decision a priori will meet the interests of
one party and infringe the interests of the other.
Second, this discredits the West for its inability to stop the .
Third, one should highlight the efforts by the OSCE MG, the activity
of which brings quite invisible results. The Minsk Group offers
taking the renewed Madrid Principles as a basis. These principles
envisage liberation of the Armenian territories and free expression
of will as regards the Nagorno Karabakh status, which is unacceptable
for Yerevan and cannot be a subject for discussion. However, the
negotiation efforts and the shuttle diplomacy of the Group do not
take into account the internal political and social conditions in
Armenia and Azerbaijan, namely, the permanent tension and conflict
which cannot be liquidated with one peaceful agreement.
As for the breakthrough, we are not likely to reach it in the Nagorny
Karabakh conflict settlement in the mid-term outlook, taking into
account the intended delay of ratification of the Armenian-Turkish
Protocols by the Turkish party. Linking the ratification of the
protocols with settlement of the Karabakh conflict and insisting on
the territorial compromises in favor of Azerbaijan, Ankara is trying
to keep aloof from the Armenian genocide issue. Practically it means
that Turkey is expressing not so much its position but the position
of the "brotherly" Azerbaijan, the economical relations with which
are progressing, whereas closing of the border to Armenia gave Ankara
no privileges or losses in the trade and economic sense. At present
Erdogan’s leading party has found itself also because of the domestic
political circumstances. Therefore, to make compromises to Armenia
(i.e. to ratify the Protocols without mentioning the Karabakh conflict)
would mean to face serious electoral risks. For this reason, Turkey
will probably ratify the Protocols only in case of the territorial
compromises in favor of Azerbaijan. Thus, it turns out that the
initiative has been directly or indirectly given to Armenia, and it
remains for the leadership of Armenia to make practical steps.
Immediately before the Munich meeting of the two leaders, Ilham Aliyev
reiterated that Azerbaijan is ready to settle the conflict by force.
Do you think that the military actions in the region may be resumed?
Would Azerbaijan risk unleashing a new war despite the big dangers
it may face in case of the new aggression against the NKR?
I watch Ilham Aliyev’s statements on possible resumption of military
actions only in the context of nervousness of the Azerbaijani
leadership because of the serious change in distribution of political
forces in the South Caucasus. Naturally, the initiated rapprochement
of Armenia and Turkey causes negative and quite harsh reaction
of the Azerbaijani leadership, which is scared of split in the
so-called Pan-Turkish informal bloc. It is no secret that for Turkey
normalization of relations with Armenia is a part of the tactical plan
on neutralization of the activity of Armenian leadership in the matter
of consolidation of the pool of the countries which have recognized the
Armenian genocide. The economical expediency in opening of the border
has practically no part for Turkey. For this reason, just aspiration
of Ankara to reduce for itself the sharpness of the ethnic problem
on the international agenda is the key moment for Turkey.
Azerbaijan perceives such a step by Turkey and not-regional players
(for instance, the USA) as a serious concession. This made Ilham
Aliyev to voice such an emotional statement. Nevertheless, at present
Azerbaijan has neither the political resources nor the economic ones
to unleash military actions in Karabakh. First, Azerbaijan will not
enlist wide international support like it happened in Georgia in
August 2008. Then, despite Tbilisi’s efforts, the West rendered no
large-scale assistance, which seriously damaged both the reputation
and the geopolitical weight of Georgia in the world. Azerbaijan will
have to rely on the international aid at least because the military
potential and the fighting spirit of the Armenians considerably
exceeds the Azerbaijanis. It is noteworthy that Armenia has a right
to rely on the military assistance of its partners under the CSTO.
Second, resumption of the military actions will damage Azerbaijan’s
reputation as an energy regional power and will make the projects
implemented there with the support of the USA and the EU less
attractive. Maintenance and development of its energy positions in the
Eurasian region is a tangible restriction for Ilham Aliyev’s sharp
maneuvers. In addition, military actions will lead to recognition
of the NKR by Armenia, which will deprive Azerbaijan of all the
opportunities to settle the problem in a diplomatic way.
How can Armenian-Turkish normalization affect the Karabakh peace
process?
The removal of Turkey’s claims for Nagorny Karabakh on paper doesn’t
absolutely hold from making these claims in public rhetoric. The
Armenian-Turkish rapprochement changes Ankara’s position on the
issue of a number of the NKR territories that "should be returned to
Azerbaijan" as the Turkish leadership thinks. Such presentation of the
problem automatically rules out any progress as it implies a demand
of one party’s territorial concession to the other. I do not rule out
that the emphasis on this component in Turkish rhetoric will be only
intensified in the course of time as it is important for Ankara to
demonstrate to Baku that it holds no secret negotiations behind its
strategic ally. Such an approach would become a safety net for Erdogan
in case the opposition in the Turkish parliament becomes more active.
Do you share the opinion that opening of the Armenian-Turkish border
may weaken Russia’s positions in the South Caucasus?
Yes, I do a little bit. Russia’s positions in the South Caucasus
greatly depend on its friendly relations with Armenia. I do not think
that the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement will weaken Armenian-Russian
friendship. Armenia will hardly change the vector of its foreign
policy but having just two open borders – to Georgia and Iran –
Yerevan is interested in enlarging its economic ties with external
players. Armenia has no common border with Russia and is forced to
develop ties with its neighbors. And Russia can do nothing about it.
The signing of the protocols between Armenia and NATO member Turkey
was due mostly to the active mediation of the US Administration,
which seeks to solve the problem of Iran’s nuclear dossier, to enhance
its role in regional processes and to enlarge the number of loyal
countries. By fostering the Armenian-Turkish reconciliation, the
United States seeks not so much to force Russia out of the region as
to solve the problem of Iran’s nuclear dossier. Washington’s long-term
goal is to create a circle of friendly states around Iran.
Will Russia strive to come closer with Azerbaijan to maintain its
influence in the region against the background of the Armenia-Turkish
reconciliation and considering the big gas contract having been
recently signed by Russia and Azerbaijan?
Russia has been intensifying the Azerbaijani vector of its foreign
policy for a long time already and the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement
did not have a decisive role in this process. Today, Azerbaijan’s
energy policy has two directions: Europe and Russia. With Europe
Azerbaijan has just verbal agreements and promises while Russia is
offering specific terms and is ready to buy Azerbaijani gas at the
market price. Azerbaijan has not yet decided on its participation
in Nabucco project. I do not share the opinion that Baku has shifted
its foreign political orientation towards Russia. The key reason why
Russia and Azerbaijan are intensifying their relations is the energy
while political issues are just the background.
What are the goals of the USA, EU and Russia in the Armenian-Turkish
normalization? Do their interests really coincide?
The key factor for the USA is consolidation of the pool of possible
allies along the perimeter of Iran. The Russian-American opposition
in the fight for influence in the post-Soviet area in general and the
South Caucasus in particular plays its own part in the Armenian-Turkish
process. Armenia is traditionally considered to be a pro-Russian
state in the South Caucasus, and to break this trend is one of the
tasks of US Administration. However, if enhancing of US positions
in Afghanistan is carried out directly, the mediator mechanisms,
in this case Turkey, are attracted in the Caucasus.
The EU countries in the waterway of the American foreign policy
(specifically, the Great Britain, partially FRG and Eastern Europe)
pursue the same goal as the USA. However, they may pursue just
humanitarian goals, which is characteristic to European political
elites. Brussels unlike Washington has no evident "own" interest,
except reduction of tension and the conflict component in the region
to ensure stability of future supply of energy resources to the EU.
Russia has no direct interest in the Armenian-Turkish rapprochement
either. The political and economic ties between Moscow and Yerevan
were developing and keep on developing without that factor. On the
other hand, the procedure of signing the Protocols looked like the
meeting of "senior-junior" partners Russia-Armenia and USA-Turkey.
Observation of this secret balance of forces required Russia’s
involvement. In addition, it is important for the Russian leadership
to demonstrate its weight and influence on regional processes and not
to stay aside of the geopolitical decisions of its counteragents. It
is interesting that soon after the Protocols were signed in Zurich,
Turkey approved the South Stream gas pipeline to be laid across
its territorial waters. Apparently it was a gesture of good will to
the Russian partners by Turkey in response to Moscow’s mediation in
normalization of the Armenian-Turkish relations.
While in the USA Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan again linked the
Armenian-Turkish and the Karabakh processes and sharply criticized
the OSCE MG. Who, do you think, that message was addressed to,
first of all? Can such a statement slow the Armenian-Turkish process
considering the official Yerevan’s stance on normalization of the
relations without preconditions?
The statement by the Turkish prime minister was addressed to the
leadership of Azerbaijan, first of all. It is important for Erdogan
to maintain the existing relations with the counteragent for the
so-called "Pan-Turkish" bloc. Turkey is trying to lead and to preserve
sustainability of energy contracts with Baku. Ankara and Baku have
been debating for the price of Azerbaijani gas supplied to Turkey
(not in favor of Azerbaijan).
Since the activity of the pro-Kurdish party was banned, the position
of the ruling Turkish Party of Justice and Development and the prime
minister may be seriously shattered. Erdogan’s public curtsey to Ilham
Aliyev in the USA was a signal that normalization of relations with
Armenia is postponed. The Armenian leadership is well aware of that
as well. Actually, the Armenian party is expected to respond.
I’d like to brief also on the position of the USA. An aspiration to
simultaneously preserve Azerbaijan on the orbit of its influence
and attach dynamics of development of relations with Armenia is a
serious problem of the American foreign political strategy in the
South Caucasus. A bright example of that is the recent allocation of
$8 million by US Congress to Nagorno Karabakh that caused indignation
of the Azerbaijani authorities. However, the financial assistance was
hardly provided just to orient Yerevan to the direction which White
House needs. Apparently, the matter concerns allocation of funds for
development of the infrastructure potential of the NKR, some other
humanitarian projects, however, there remains zealous attitude of
Azerbaijan to such American game: first, active cooperation of the USA
during signing of the Armenian-Turkish Protocols, now – financial aid
to the NKR, and afterwards – blackmail of the Turks by the possibility
of recognition of the Armenian Genocide.
Such an ambiguous stance risks to discredit the idea of American
mediation in the South Caucasus region, that already leads to energy
rapprochement of Turkey and Russia, for example, that is undesirable
for the USA. The aspiration of Washington to use the Armenian Genocide
issue as a tool for promotion of its interests in the South Caucasus
testifies in favor of this stance. Barack Obama’s words saying it will
be difficult for him to hinder recognition of the Armenian Genocide
in the Congress in case Turkey refuses to ratify the Protocols, are
of double meaning. It means that in case of ratification of these
documents by the Turkish Parliament, Obama may avoid the procedure
of the Genocide recognition in the Congress.
By Aram Araratyan, ArmInfo.December 18 2009
From: Baghdasarian