AZERBAIJAN’S FOREIGN POLICY IN 2012: TEN ISSUES TO WATCH
MilAz.info
Jan 16 2012
Azerbaijan
Paul Goble, Publications Advisor, Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy
Having just completed its most successful year in foreign affairs
since the restoration of independence, Azerbaijan enters 2012 with
many new opportunities and the challenges that come with them. No one
can say exactly what the next twelve months will bring, especially
in the area of foreign affairs, but below are ten issues that are
certain to be at the center of attention in Baku in the coming months.
1. A New Format for Karabakh Negotiations?
Azerbaijan’s overriding foreign policy goal now as it has been for
15 years is to end Armenian occupation of 20 percent of its territory.
There have been many moments of hope and despair over that period,
but at the start of 2012, the stage appears set for a major change
either in the composition of the OSCE Minsk Group or even in its
displacement by other forums as the center of talks on a peaceful
resolution of the conflict.
Like Turkey, Azerbaijanis are furious at France, one of the Minsk
Group co-chair countries, whose parliament has just passed a law
criminalizing the denial of the so-called “Armenian genocide” of 1915.
Like their Turkish counterparts, Azerbaijani officials and politicians
have suggested that at the very least this action means that Paris
can no longer claim to be an even-handed player in the talks, and
some in Baku and Ankara have suggested that at the very least Paris
should be replaced as a co-chair.
At the very least, such calls will reinforce Azerbaijani feelings that
the Minsk Group has not lived up to its promise. More likely still,
it will lead to calls for a change in the group’s membership or format.
And even more probably, it will mean that other venues, such as
the role now being played by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev will
expand. At the very least, this latest controversy suggests that a
settlement based on international law may be further away than it
was only a year ago, even though Armenia’s position domestically and
internationally is weaker now than ever before.
2. UN Security Council Membership
Official Baku and the Azerbaijani people celebrated Azerbaijan’s
election this past fall to a two-year term on the UN Security Council
as a reflection of its rising status in the world and its successful
diplomatic outreach to regions such as Latin America to which other
candidate countries devoted less attention.
Beyond any doubt, Azerbaijan’s election will enhance both its
international standing and its ability to promote its national
interests, but these gains will pose challenges. On the one hand,
as a member of the UN Security Council, Azerbaijan will have
to take positions on many issues it has not had to in the past,
something that will put it in the spotlight more often and make
the continued prosecution of its highly successful balanced foreign
policy somewhat more difficult. And on the other, Baku will find itself
drawn into numerous and intense negotiations on many of these issues,
an involvement that will place burdens on Azerbaijan’s still-growing
diplomatic apparatus.
At the very least, as officials in the Presidential Administration
and Foreign Ministry have indicated, Baku will have to expand its
permanent representation in New York and other United Nations centers
and increase the size of its foreign policy institutions even more
rapidly than it has done over the last five years under the direction
of President Ilham Aliyev.
3. Escalating Tensions around Iran
One issue that Azerbaijan will have to confront not only as a member
of the UN Security Council, but also more generally is the rapidly
escalating tensions between Tehran and the international community over
Iran’s nuclear program. While it has opposed nuclear proliferation,
Baku has been very clear that it will never allow its territory to
be used to attack Iran, and it continues to have close relations with
the Iranian government while also maintaining good relations with the
United States, the European Union and Israel, three of international
actors who are currently involved in a standoff with Tehran over its
nuclear program.
If tensions around Iran continue to escalate and particularly if they
lead to military actions by any of the sides, Baku could be forced to
choose, but more likely, it may become a central player in the drama,
with each side viewing Azerbaijan as a bridge or mediator whose
leaders and diplomats could prevent the crisis from deteriorating
further. That, too, will place new burdens on Azerbaijan, but it
may prove to be the opportunity to elevate Baku from being a major
regional power into one with far more influence beyond its immediate
neighborhood.
Other countries, including China and India, clearly see this, and they
are likely to seek to work with Baku lest things get out of hand,
a positive development beyond question, but one that will also pose
new challenges to Azerbaijan’s balanced foreign policy.
4. The End of the Turkish-Armenian Rapprochement
No single action so far unsettled Azerbaijan more than the apparent
opening of a rapprochement between Armenia and Turkey with the signing
of the so-called Zurich Protocols in October 2009. Azerbaijan viewed
Turkey as its closest ally in Baku’s efforts to end the Armenian
occupation of its territory, and Ankara’s willingness to sign an
agreement with Yerevan struck many in Baku as an act of betrayal-or at
the very least as an action that would allow Armenia an opportunity
to refuse to abide by international law and withdraw its forces from
Azerbaijani territories.
Because of Armenian intransigence and Azerbaijani criticism, Turkey
has backed away from these protocols with the Grand National Assembly
refusing even to consider them for possible ratification. Now it is
clear that the Protocols are a dead letter and that Turkey will not
open its borders with Armenia until Yerevan ends the occupation,
a reflection of Turkish attitudes toward Armenia and even more of
Ankara’s appreciation that it went too far by signing the accords
without carefully considering the views of Azerbaijan.
On the one hand, this means that Armenia cannot hope to expand its
economy by exporting its goods through Turkey unless and until it
withdraws from Azerbaijan, a situation that-given the increasingly
disastrous economic and political situation within Armenia-should force
Yerevan to negotiate a settlement more quickly. But on the other,
this development means that Armenia is more, not less, dependent
on the Russian Federation and that the key to any solution of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict lies in Moscow.
5. Uncertainties in Moscow
Given the growing importance of Moscow in this regard and the presence
of more than a million Azerbaijanis in the Russian Federation, upcoming
parliamentary and presidential elections there and the uncertainties
they are already generating are going to be matters of first concern
for Baku.
6. A New Wave of Instability in the North Caucasus
Azerbaijan lives in what remains a very unstable neighborhood. No part
of that is more unstable than the North Caucasus, and that region is
likely to become more troubled in the year ahead. The amount of Russian
aid and outside investment are uncertain, and various groups in the
region are prepared to challenge Moscow’s appointed representatives
there, especially in the run-up to the Sochi Olympics planned for 2014.
Trouble in the North Caucasus affects Azerbaijan in two ways. On the
one hand, trouble there has a tendency to cross borders either as the
result of refugee flows or the perception of regional difficulties
that problems in the North involve. And on the other, Russia has
never been able to stabilize the North Caucasus without establishing
a dominant position in the south. Consequently, if there are problems
in the North Caucasus in 2012, Azerbaijan and its neighbors will have
to cope with expanded Russian interest in using the South Caucasus
to defend Moscow’s position in the North.
7. Echoes of the Arab Spring
Perhaps the greatest of unknowns for 2012 is the possible echoes
of the Arab Spring of 2011. The revolutions in Egypt and elsewhere
have inspired popular revolts in many countries, both politically
and technically, and they have also forced governments to take new
measures, with some seeking to find common ground with the population
and others invoking the need for stability to crack down on their
populations.
Azerbaijan has been far less affected by the Arab Spring than many
countries in the region; not only because its government enjoys more
support and has greater legitimacy than others, but also because Baku
under President Ilham Aliyev-as was the case under his father Heydar
Aliyev-has invested in promoting the welfare of the population. Given
the inevitability of a revolution of rising expectations and a growing
population, Baku will find itself under even more pressure to make
such investments in the future.
8. Eurovision and More Intense International Attention to Azerbaijan
All Azerbaijanis welcomed their country’s victory in the Eurovision
competition and look forward to Baku’s hosting of that competition in
2012. The victory attracted expanded international attention to the
country, and the upcoming competition promises to attract even more.
Because Azerbaijan has a good story to tell, most of this attention
has been and will be positive, but no country is without problems-and
problems more than achievements make for better media stories. Since
the victory at Eurovision 2011, Azerbaijan has been the subject of
many critical stories, some of which offer a distorted picture of
life in the country. And in the coming months, Azerbaijan is likely
to be the subject of many more.
What many people around the world will be watching is how Azerbaijanis
react. Some Azerbaijanis will undoubtedly see such stories as the work
of “the Armenian lobby,” but most will recognize that such stories
are a reflection of the way the world media works and understand that
the more important their country becomes, the more likely at least
some journalists will try to play up the negative. At the same time,
however, Azerbaijani representatives, including diaspora organizations,
will have an expanded role to play in correcting false reporting
about the country.
9. Expansion of Azerbaijan’s Diplomatic Presence Abroad
More than any other leader in the post-Soviet region, President Ilham
Aliyev has committed his country to the expansion of its diplomatic
presence abroad, particularly in regions like Asia and Latin America
that many other countries have fewer contacts with. That policy which
lay behind Azerbaijan’s election to the UN Security Council has led
to a doubling in the number of Azerbaijani missions abroad over the
last five years and-what is equally important-a dramatic growth in the
number of resident embassies and missions in Baku is set to continue.
Few international observers thought it would be possible for Azerbaijan
to expand so quickly, but Baku’s program for training new diplomats
at institutions like the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy has managed to
keep up. As its network of missions increase and as demands on those
which already exist grows, Azerbaijan will have to do even more in
this regard, perhaps doubling the size of its foreign service over
the next two years. That, too, will be a major challenge.
10. Growing Economic and Military Power
At the foundation of Azerbaijan’s expanding influence in the world is
its economy. Its oil and gas resources and its role as an exporter and
transporter of hydrocarbons already have made Baku a serious player in
Europe. That role will only expand as various pipeline projects come
on line and the true extent of new gas field finds is defined. That
could set Baku on a collision course with other exporters; at the
very least, Azerbaijan’s officials and diplomats will have to work
hard to defend Azerbaijan’s interests in this most important sector.
In 2011, Azerbaijan’s GDP formed 80 percent of the total GDP of the
three South Caucasus countries. That share will likely rise still
further in 2012 given the economic disaster in Armenia and troubles
in Georgia. And that economic power will add weight to its influence
not only over its neighbors in the South Caucasus, but in Central
Asia and the Greater Middle East more generally.
One area that is likely to become increasingly important over the
next year will be Azerbaijan’s export of weapons and military hardware.
Thanks to joint production agreements with Turkey and its own
military industry, Azerbaijan is now posed to take its place as a
major arms exporter, a status that will only give additional weight
to its diplomacy.
***
In short, 2012 is likely to be an exciting and challenging one for
Azerbaijan and its relations with the world. But as President Ilham
Aliyev recently said, the strength of the Azerbaijani government
combined with the strength of the Azerbaijani people means that
there is no task, foreign or domestic, that the country cannot hope
to achieve.
From: Baghdasarian
http://ada.edu.az/biweekly/issues/vol5no1/20120115072005626.html