Artsakh President Convenes Consultation Meeting

ARTSAKH PRESIDENT CONVENES CONSULTATION MEETING

Panorama.am
11/09/2012

On 11 September, Artsakh Republic President Bako Sahakyan convened
a consultation meeting with the speaker of the NKR National Assembly
and members of political forces represented in the parliament.

The meeting addressed issues related to the republic’s domestic and
foreign policy.

Special attention was paid to the process of forming a new Cabinet
of Ministers.

President Sahakyan noted the necessity of applying a balanced and
objective approach here and in this context stressed the importance
of the viewpoints and opinions of political forces, presidential
press service reported.

Safarov Case Was Irony Against Justice: Washington Armenians Again L

SAFAROV CASE WAS IRONY AGAINST JUSTICE: WASHINGTON ARMENIANS AGAIN LAUNCHED RALLY

ARMENPRESS
11 September, 2012
YEREVAN

YEREVAN, SEPTEMBER 11, ARMENPRESS: Armenian Americans from
throughout the Greater Washington DC area called Hungary’s release
and Azerbaijan’s pardon and glorification of convicted axe-murderer
Ramil Safarov a travesty of justice and pressed for the killer’s
immediate re-incarceration, at a demonstration held in front of the
Hungarian Embassy. As ANCA told Armenpress the message runs:”Hungary’s
extradition of an unrepentant axe-murderer to Azerbaijan, where his
actions were hailed as heroic from the moment he committed the crime,
is simply unconscionable and must be reversed,” said AYF Ani Chapter
Chairwoman Tevin Poladian. “President Aliyev’s unapologetic pardon and
rewarding of Safarov sends a clear message to the rest of his troops —
‘kill a defenseless Armenian and you can be promoted in rank and get a
new apartment,’ — certainly not the actions of a leader committed to
peace.”The September 9th protest, organized by the local ARF Sebouh
Gomideh and AYF Ani chapter, was the second in two weeks to be held
in the nation’s capital. The first was an impromptu action held on
August 31st, just hours after media reports of Hungary’s extradition
of Safarov, an Azerbaijani army officer serving a life-sentence for
brutally hacking to death Armenian Lieutenant Gurgen Margaryan, in
his sleep, during a NATO sponsored English language training program
in Hungary in 2004. Armenian communities worldwide have protested
Hungary’s release and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev’s immediate,
pardon, promotion and compensation of Safarov, who has been glorified
by Azerbaijani government and media alike.During remarks offered
at the protest, ARF Sebouh Gomideh member Hovsep Avakian noted
that Safarov’s release is simply the most recently example of the
Azerbaijani Government’s efforts to undermine the internationally
mediated Nagorno Karabakh peace talks, citing the Aliyev regime’s
constant cease-fire violations against Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh
and repeated calls for war. “How can President Aliyev be considered
a reliable partner for peace, when his actions are geared to incite
violence, hatred and war?”Armenian National Committee of America
(ANCA) Executive Director Aram Hamparian cited the international
outrage at Hungary and Azerbaijan’s actions, including statements
by the White House and State Department issued within hours of
Safarov’s release. “Statements are an important first step,” said
Hamparian, “but what is needed now is action – including a ban on
all U.S. military assistance and sales to Azerbaijan.”The ANCA has
encouraged Armenian Americans and people of good conscience to reach
out to their U.S. Senators and Representatives, asking that they
support a range of pro-Armenian foreign aid priorities, including
cutting off all military assistance to Azerbaijan, humanitarian
and relocation assistance for the vulnerable Armenian population in
Syria, assistance to Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh. To take action,
visit: the end of
the protest, Soorp Khatch Armenian Church pastor, Rev. Fr. Sarkis
Aktavoukian and St. Mary Armenian Church pastor, Rev. Fr. Hovsep
Karapetyan, led protesters in prayers and a requiem ceremony in memory
of slain Armenian soldier Gurgen Margaryan.

http://www.anca.org/action_alerts/action_disp.At

Armenia In No Danger Of Terrorist Acts, Expert Says

ARMENIA IN NO DANGER OF TERRORIST ACTS, EXPERT SAYS

PanARMENIAN.Net
September 11, 2012 – 15:35 AMT

PanARMENIAN.Net – Armenia doesn~Rt run the immediate danger of
terrorist threat, according to Azeri studies expert.

As Sargis Asatryan noted at Yerevan-hosted news conference, Armenia
is a monoethnic state, without religious or national minorities
struggling for independence in the country.

However, Asatryan didn~Rt rule out the threat of localized terrorist
acts, specifically the murder of Armenians abroad. ~SAzeri President
Aliyev~Rs pardoning Ramil Safarov for axe-murdering Armenian officer
was a message to repeat the crime,~T the expert said.

Ramil Safarov, the Azerbaijani army officer who was serving a life
sentence in Hungary for axing to death Armenian Lt. Gurgen Margaryan,
was extradited to Azerbaijan and pardoned by Azerbaijani President
Ilham Aliyev.

Official Yerevan reacted by suspending diplomatic ties with Hungary.

Hungary, however, states that it had sent Safarov back to Azerbaijan
after receiving assurances from the Azerbaijani Justice Ministry that
Safarov’s sentence, which included the possibility of parole after
25 years, would be enforced.

According to some reports, Safarov was extradited to Azerbaijan in
exchange for Azeri purchase of Hungarian securities worth Euro 2-3
billion, an information official Budapest denies.

Worldwide Protests Against Safarov’s Release Continue

WORLDWIDE PROTESTS AGAINST SAFAROV’S RELEASE CONTINUE

TERT.AM
13:33 ~U 11.09.12

The international protests against the extradition and release of the
life-sentenced Azerbaijani officer, Ramil Safarov, reached New York
overnight, gathering a crowd of US-Armenians outside the Hungarian
Consulate

According to the Ministry of Diaspora, the event attracted
representatives from the US-Armenian coalition, as well as religious,
youth and student organizations. The crowd held up posters and chanted
slogans criticizing Hungary’s move. The protesters also voiced a
condemnatory statement.

Earlier, Washington had hosted two protests (on August 31 and September
9) organized by Armenian Revolutionary Federation-Dashnaksutyun’s
committee, Sephu, and a branch of the Armenian Youth Federation.

Executive Director of the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation-Dashnaksutyun Aram Hamparian made a speech at the meeting.

At the end, the Armenian church Holy Cross offered a liturgy to
commemorate Gurgen Margaryan, the Armenian officer who was brutally
axed to death by Safarov back in 2004.

A crowd of Czech-Armenians, upon the initiative of the community’s
coordinating council, organized this week-end a protest in front
of the Hungarian Embassy in Prague, demanding Safarov’s return to
Budapest and the recognition of the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic.

“Our protest is against the official Budapest’s dishonest and
unreasonable step, not the Hungarian nation which is our friend,”
they said in a statement.

The Czech-Armenians have launched active discussions in social networks
while the local media (particularly the newspaper “iDNES.cz/Zpravy)
keep condemning the Hungarian government’s decision to hand over the
violent murderer to his home country.

Plans for a new protest outside the Embassy are reportedly under
discussion now.

Armenia’s Banks Suffered Losses Due To Exchange Rate – Central Bank

ARMENIA’S BANKS SUFFERED LOSSES DUE TO EXCHANGE RATE – CENTRAL BANK

news.am
September 11, 2012 | 05:21

YEREVAN. – As a result of the fluctuations in Armenia’s national
currency, the dram’s (AMD) exchange rate against other currencies,
the country’s banking system suffered a loss worth AMD 1.9 billion
(approx. $4,630,715) in the first six months of 2012, the Central
bank’s financial stability report states.

At the same time, and as a result of foreign currency revaluation,
eleven banks suffered losses, whereas ten banks registered gains.

Also, the country’s banking system secured AMD 5.9 billion (approx.

$14,379,590) pure income from foreign currency trading.

In line with the Central Bank’s report, the Armenian dram’s exchange
rate against the US dollar dropped by 7.71 percent in January-June
2012.

ISTANBUL: Turkey, Azerbaijan Sign More Contracts

TURKEY, AZERBAIJAN SIGN MORE CONTRACTS

Hurriyet
Sept 12 2012
Turkey

Turksih Prime Minister Erdogan (L) and Azeri President İlham Aliyev
shake hands during a joint press meeting. The countries have enhanced
ties, inking more deals. AA Photo Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan’s visit to Azerbaijan emphasized the improving business and
trade ties, with the two countries signing eight deals yesterday
in Qabala.

Turkey will not open its border gates with Armenia unless the country
solves its problems with Azerbaijan over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh
region, Erdogan said, speaking at a joint press conference with
Azerbaijani President İlham Aliyev after the signings.

A meeting of the Turkey-Azerbaijan High-Level Strategic Cooperation
Council, co-chaired by Erdogan and Aliyev, was held in Qabala
yesterday. Turkey and Azerbaijan signed eight cooperation agreements
in various fields, including energy, transportation, diplomacy,
culture and economy there, Anatolia news agency reported.

Turkey and Azerabaijan improved their energy ties with a deal earlier
this year to build the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), a planned
project to carry Caspian gas to eastern Turkey, from where it might
also be transferred to European markets. This was followed by fresh
talks on adding Turkmen gas to the project with contributions from
Azerbaijan.

“Opening the border gates [with Armenia] is out of the question, unless
the Nagorno-Karabakh problem is solved,” Erodgan said at the meeting.

September/12/2012

ISTANBUL: Turkish-Azerbaijan Relations: Beyond Mottos

TURKISH-AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS: BEYOND MOTTOS

Today’s Zaman
Sept 11 2012
Turkey

This week’s closed workshop on “The Post-Ottoman Space: Soft Politics
and Hard Choices”, held in Tbilisi and organized by the Turkish
Economic and Social Studies Foundation (TESEV) and Peace Research
Institute Oslo (PRIO), provided a fascinating opportunity for the
exploration of Turkey’s role in the Caucasus.

The workshop title is arguably misleading in terms of Turkey’s policy
directions, both historical and current. For starters, the notion of
a post-Ottoman space is immediately alienating to the South Caucasus
countries, which only briefly and in part belonged to the Ottoman
Empire. Moreover, the Safavid dynasty (1501-1722), made up of Azeri
Turks as well as Persians, rivaled the Ottomans.

These reflections were juxtaposed with Turkey’s current foreign policy
in the Caucasus, and Azerbaijan-Turkish relations. Undoubtedly,
Turkish-Azerbaijan relations have been largely self-defined and
promoted via the motto “one nation, two states,” which essentially
became the foreign policy strategy for the two countries. Most people
believe that this motto was coined in the 1990s, but in fact is much
older. It has its roots in the late Ottoman era, when the political
forces behind the independent Azerbaijan Democratic Republic declared
in the 1918-1920 period that their relations with Ottoman Empire
could be assessed as follows: “The Muslims of the Transcaucasus [i.e.,
Azerbaijanis] together with the Turks constitute one nationality.”

However, after the Bolshevik occupation of Azerbaijan, this slogan was
forgotten, and only raised again when Azerbaijan regained independence
in 1991. But by this stage, Azerbaijan was facing a new dilemma:
Is the “one nation, two state” notion more suitably applied to Iran,
or to Turkey?

Azerbaijan’s independence movement in the late 1980s began at the
state border with Iran, when Soviet Azerbaijanis moved over the
Iranian border in order to reunite with the Azerbaijanis living on
Iranian territory. Here we have one nation of Azerbaijanis, but not
two states. Iranian Azerbaijanis exist under Iranian rule. In regard
to Turkey, the “one nation, two state” slogan was very compelling in
terms of gaining regional influence with the support of a powerful
country like Turkey, bolstered by the historical linguistic, religious
and ethnic affinities. Furthermore, the soft power factors (media,
TV, expanding commercial relations, education and popular culture)
brought the two countries relations even closer. It is certainly true
that both countries did occasionally have inflated expectations of one
another, but the relationship was bolstered by increasing bilateral
energy cooperation. As a counterbalance to Russia and Iran, Turkey’s
presence in the region was largely supported by the United States, and
US-Azerbaijan relationship developed with support from Turkey. Even so,
the two countries have diverged on a number of foreign policy issues,
with the three following examples as the biggest points of contention.

The first key difference arose with the Cyprus issue. Turkish political
elites pressured Baku about the need to recognize the independence
of the unrecognized Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus.

Indeed, Azerbaijan promised in advance of the Annan Plan on Cyprus
reunification, that if the Turks would accept it, Azerbaijan
would do everything for Turks. After the failure of the Annan plan,
whereby 76 percent of the Greek Cypriots rejected the UN proposal for
unification in April 2004, the Turkish elite perceived “everything” as
“recognizing independence.” In reality, the situation was different —
even because of the direct flight from Baku to Lefkosha, the Cyprus
Republic blocked all the countries of the South Caucasus from starting
negotiations on the European Neighborhood Policy Action Plan in time.

In addition, Baku was worried that Cyprus would recognize the
independence of the de-facto authorities in Nagorno-Karabakh.

The second difference was the Kosovo question. Turkey supported
Kosovo’s independence as a newly emerging friendly, Muslim state in
Europe, while Azerbaijan fully supported Serbia. From Baku’s point of
view, national interests did not mean forging alliances based solely
on religious or ethnic unity. This was an early signal to Turkey,
before the Turkish-Armenian rapprochement was on the agenda. One
point Baku missed is that after 2002, Turkey underwent a power shift
away from the Nationalists. Azerbaijan was lucky that despite this
development, nationalistic sentiments in Turkish society prevailed,
helping block Turkish-Armenian rapprochement.

The third and most serious crisis was the Turkish-Armenian
rapprochement. In hindsight, we can see that the signing of the Zurich
protocols in October 2009 actually strengthened the Azerbaijani-Turkish
relationship. The problem in the past was that societal relations were
based on an unthinking acceptance of the fraternal Azerbaijan-Turkey
axis, without ever really trying to understand each other’s cultures.

Now we have reached a point where both countries understand the need
to deepen the relationship at the level of society; until 2009 both
sides “widened” rather than deepened the relationship. News coverage
of Azerbaijan’s internal dynamics in the main­stream Turkish press
was extremely limited prior to the last three years, whereas the
Azerbaijan public has always closely followed developments in Turkey.

In addition, both countries understand that they must respect each
other’s foreign policy choices and can benefit from close cooperation,
which will also soothe fears about threats to national interests, which
may be very divergent. For instance, these days the Azerbaijan-Israel
relationship is a close one, but the Baku-Tehran one is tense, while
Israel-Turkey relations are struggling, and Ankara’s dealings with
Iran are more positive. However, the countries may be able to help
one another: Azerbaijan can help normalize Turkish-Israeli relations,
and Turkey can do same for Azerbaijan in Iran. One can argue that
the 2009 crisis between the two countries changed a lot of latent
problems. In 2010, the two countries signed the Agreement on Strategic
Partnership and Mutual Support, and developed and deepened their
existing bilateral relations in different areas (education, health,
industry). The Trans-Anatolian gas pipeline (TANAP) agreement was
the final move, proving that a crisis was an effective means of
understanding the true cost of friendship, beyond any motto.

Soccer: Bulgaria Beat Armenia In 2014 World Cup Qualifier

BULGARIA BEAT ARMENIA IN 2014 WORLD CUP QUALIFIER

Novinite
Sept 11 2012
Bulgaria

Bulgaria have beaten Armenia 1:0 in the Bulgarian capital Sofia in
a qualifier for the 2014 World Cup in Brazil.

After drawing Italy 2:2 in the first qualifier in Sofia last week,
the Bulgarians managed to triumph over Armenia in the first match
ever between the two nations.

Thus, Bulgaria scored its first victory since beating Wales in Cardiff
in 2010, and the first win at home since beating Georgia in Sofia
in 2009.

Expect details

http://www.novinite.com/view_news.php?id=143143

Turkish Premier To Discuss Karabakh Settlement

TURKISH PREMIER TO DISCUSS KARABAKH SETTLEMENT

Vestnik Kavkaza
Sept 11 2012
Russia

Marina Petrova. Exclusively to VK

Today the prime-minister of Turkey Recep Erdogan comes to Azerbaijan
where he together with the president Ilham Aliyev will chair the
session of the Strategic Cooperation Council. They plan to sign
five bilateral agreements and discuss problems of politics, economy,
military cooperation, and the Nagorno-Karabakh settlement.

Ankara began to provide active foreign policy in the Caucasus
straight after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Turkey recognized
Azerbaijan~Rs independence a month before recognition of other
former Soviet republics. Ankara was full of illusions connected with
reviving of lost cultural ties between two nations. However, first
enthusiasm disappeared, and time places everything in context. After
20 years Azerbaijan didn~Rt approach Turkey as it approached Russia
in cultural and value aspects. And Ankara~Rs policy on the settlement
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict influenced it much.

Azerbaijan had never asked anybody, including Ankara, to interfere
in the conflict directly. The Azerbaijani leaders might hope only for
Turkey would explain the world the Azerbaijani point of view through
its Western contacts. Almost the whole world stood for Armenia in the
conflict in the early 1990s. Initially Turkey had a neutral position.

It enabled Ankara to be a mediator and conduct several rounds of talks,
and the foreign minister of Turkey Hikmet Cetin did his best for the
US paid attention to the conflict.

However, the moderate position of Turkey didn~Rt last long. In February
1992 bloody massacres of Azerbaijani population took place in the
town of Khojaly. Mass anti-Armenian demonstrations were held in Ankara.

People demanded military intervention on the side of Azerbaijan
from the Turkish authorities. The power couldn~Rt ignore people,
and a new pro-Azerbaijani position had been elaborated soon.

New Armenian advances, photos of numerous Azerbaijani refugees
abandoning their homes, occupation of Azerbaijani territories,
and mild, almost neutral position of official Ankara ~V all these
circumstances caused heavy criticism of the government by the Turkish
media and the opposition. The Turkish authorities had ambitious
targets to return their regional leadership in the Caucasus and Middle
Asia. In March 1992 the opposition demanded to send troops to the
Armenian border. The government couldn~Rt ignore the criticism.

In early March Ankara declared the examination of all planes flying to
Armenia through Turkish air space. Moreover, Turkey didn~Rt give way
to aid for Armenia through its territory, thus, it extended economic
embargo against the country. By the middle of March 1992 the prime
minister of Turkey Suleiman Demirel didn~Rt except even military
intervention on the Azerbaijani side.

However, there were several constraining factors which didn~Rt let
Turkey to take any decisive steps in the conflict. First of all, Turkey
depended on the American aid in the struggle against RKK in southeast
Anatolia. Due to serious Armenian lobby in the US Congress, America,
being officially neutral, actually stood on the side occupants. The
same Armenian lobby could easily convinced the Congress to reduce the
aid in the Turkish war against Kurds, if Ankara were involved in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or made other firm pro-Azerbaijani steps.

Furthermore, at that time Ankara intensively tried to gain accession
to the European Union which believed that the country was developing
democracy insufficiently. If Turkey dared at some military adventure
in the Caucasus, it would pay too much for this in Europe. The EU
demanded normalization of relations with Armenia from Turkey. It
would be impossible in the context of Ankara~Rs participation in
the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. Moreover, the stability in the
region was necessary for construction of new oil and gas pipelines
which had to transit Caspian and Middle-Asian energy resources to the
European markets through the Turkish territory, which would increase
its importance in Europe~Rs eyes.

In addition, Turkey had to maintain good relations with Russia in
the economic sphere even more than in the political one. After the
dissolution of the USSR Russia turned into an attractive market, and
Turkish companies flew into it. The trade turnover between Turkey and
Russia in 1992 was in several times more than the turnover between
Turkey and Azerbaijan and Middle Asian states combined. At the same
time, Russia exported armament to Turkey for its struggle against RKK.

Any military aid to Azerbaijan would mean to Ankara a serious worsening
of relations with Russia. It was absolutely unprofitable.

The situation with Northern Cyprus tied Turkish hand and foot in the
Karabakh front. Even though the cases of Nagorno-Karabakh and Cyprus
are absolutely different, the Turks didn~Rt forget what a negative
reaction of the international society was caused by their intervention
in 1974.

And finally the sad past of the Ottoman Empire, especially the events
of 1915 in Eastern Anatolia, wasn~Rt neglected. Even in the 1970s
the Armenian Diaspora began to insist on recognition of these events
as genocide of the Armenian population. Ankara was afraid that any
activities in the Karabakh direction would be considered by powerful
Western Armenian Diaspora as a new effort to massacre Armenians. It
might lead to worsening of relations with the whole world and put
Turkey to the situation of isolation. Turkey had to show its good will
toward independent Armenia. The situation made a strict anti-Armenian
and pro-Azerbaijani position impossible for Turkey. Suleiman Demirel
tried to calm down the society furious about the massacre in Khojaly
and stated that the military intervention of Turkey would only make
the whole world support Armenia.

As for the Azerbaijani reaction on the Turkish position, there were two
aspects. On the one hand, the Azerbaijani were disappointed by Ankara
which recently had stated on reconsolidation of brother nations. On
the other hand, official Baku understood importance of constraining
factors for the Turkish authorities. However, the Turkish image was
ruined mostly by the unsuccessful energy deal between Ankara and
Yerevan in November 1992. The main pressure leverage on Armenia was
energy embargo. And though the deal failed, the Azerbaijani population
didn~Rt forget about it. They could accept the Turkish passive position
in a way, but they couldn~Rt forgive Ankara cooperation with their
enemy. Soon Azerbaijan realized that Turkey lacks enthusiasm and
political will to be its supporter in the international arena.

Thus, the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict dispelled illusions of some
Turkish officials who believed that it would be easy to gain authority
in the former Soviet space. Considering complicated relations between
Ankara, Washington, Europe, Moscow, and Middle East, Turkey couldn~Rt
provide independent policy in the region.

At the same time, Turkey has many times stated on a desire of intensive
involvement into the process of the Karabakh settlement and being
a mediator. Probably during the current meeting in Qabala the prime
minister Erdogan and the President Aliyev will touch on this painful
theme again.

http://vestnikkavkaza.net/analysis/politics/31237.html

Armenia Ratifies CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement

ARMENIA RATIFIES CIS FREE TRADE ZONE AGREEMENT

/ARKA/
September 11, 2012
YERVAN

YEREVAN, September 11. /ARKA/. The National Assembly of Armenia
ratified Tuesday an agreement on CIS free trade zone with 97 (for)
versus 2 (against) votes.

Thus, Armenia has become the fourth CIS member state after Russia,
Belarus and Ukraine to ratify the document.

Russia, Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Tajikistan
and Ukraine signed CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement on October 18, 2011.

Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, on their side, made a decision
to further discuss and evaluate the agreement.

The agreement will ensure all the necessary conditions for effective
operation of free trade within the CIS space as well as will foster
the further integration based on the norms of the World Labor
Organization. It will replace the existing agreements on bilateral
and multilateral free trade between the Commonwealth countries.