Today’s Zaman, Turkey
Sept 15 2013
Russia plays, Europe pays: Armenia’s Customs Union adventure (1)
ZAUR SHIRIYEV
[email protected]
Armenian President Serzh Sarksyan’s declaration that Yerevan will join
the Russian-led Customs Union (CU) has unseated an enduring and
continuing debate both domestically and internationally.
Undoubtedly, the decision has come as a surprise to the wider public
— but not to high-level European Union officials. As stated by EU
Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighborhood Policy Stefan
Füle, Armenia only informed the EU about the possibility of its
accession to the CU on Aug. 31, just three days before the official
declaration of the decision. It seems likely that President Sarksyan
made his final decision during an unexpected visit to Croatia on Aug.
28, where he met with Ara Abrahamyan, a Russian-Armenian businessman
and president of the Union of Russian Armenians. According to
speculation in the Armenian media, Abrahamyan arranged for Sarksyan to
meet with Putin, and while still in Croatia, Sarksyan notified the EU
of his decision.
What is now clear is that an EU Association Agreement is no longer on
the table with Yerevan at the November Vilnius Summit. Armenia’s
decision will have important consequences for both the EU and the
South Caucasus region.
>From the EU’s perspective, Armenia has ended its `either-or’ dilemma
between the EU and the Russian-sponsored CU and Eurasian Union. On
Sept. 12, the European Parliament passed a resolution proclaiming
Russia’s actions towards the Eastern Partnership (EaP) countries
`unacceptable,’ and called upon the European Commission to take
definite action. In reality, this resolution is merely a demonstration
of political frustration and is unlikely to influence Moscow’s
behavior. In another statement, the EU has said that it is trying to
draft a workable road map for EaP countries to finalize an agreement
with the EU while also meeting Moscow’s demands.
According to Füle, `it may certainly be possible for members of the
EaP to increase their cooperation with the CU, perhaps as observers;
and participation in Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area (DCFTA)
agreements is of course fully compatible with our partners’ existing
free trade agreements with others in the Commonwealth of Independent
States (CIS).’ Ukraine has already taken this middle path by signing a
deal to become an observer in the CU trade bloc while still hoping to
finalize an EU Association Agreement in Vilnius.
Armenia has not yet declared the specifics of its CU alignment, i.e.,
whether it will hold observer status, or full membership — but the
latter seems more likely.
However, the EU has not abandoned all hope. During his visit to
Armenia on Sept. 12-14, Füle insisted that the EU will seek
possibilities for a continued partnership with Yerevan through a new
legal framework for cooperation.
Armenia has long struggled with the EU-Russia dilemma; Yerevan found
itself in a situation wherein `Russia plays, Europe pays.’ It relied
on the EU’s high-profile financial support in harsh economic
conditions, while at the same time Russia continued to bolster its
political and economic influence in the country.
On the eve of the Vilnius Summit in November, the EU-Russia-Armenia
triangle looks set to open up several short and long-term political
questions.
First of all, Armenia may suggest that it can still sign the
Association Agreement without its economic component, and, apparently,
the EU might agree to this solution to avoid losing all ties with
Armenia. Armenia in this regard is likely to play for time, because
under normal regulations, such agreements — including CU accession or
EU alignment — must be approved by parliament. And for now, no formal
agreement has yet been negotiated on the CU accession, which requires
a full assessment of the current customs regulations before the CU
regulations can be implemented. President Sarksyan is unlikely to risk
his personal reputation and relationship with Moscow by putting the
decision on CU membership to referendum, but he could arrange this by
some behind-the-scenes management of political groups in parliament.
By doing this, Sarksyan could avoid burning his political capital,
allowing him to say that the decision was reached democratically, by
the public.
The second possibility, which is unlikely, is that Armenia will rely
on dissent from the current members of the CU, Kazakhstan and Belarus.
However, there is no obvious argument that Belarus or Kazakhstan could
or would raise, and the timeline is very short: In October the CU
summit will take place, during which its three members are supposed to
approve Armenia’s membership. But it will not be a final decision;
Armenian Speaker of the National Assembly Hovik Abrahamyan announced
that the possible dates for signing the Treaty of Accession to the CU
could be arranged for 2014. Not surprisingly, as stated above,
Abrahamyan also acknowledged that there is still no final text of the
treaty, and it is likely that Armenia will not accept the text or that
parliament will vote against it.
The third possibility, which was on the European agenda, is to win
Armenia back to EU orientation by revitalizing the Turkish-Armenian
rapprochement process, which collapsed in 2009 for various reasons,
but mainly the unresolved Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Some political
experts have suggested that the last-ditch attempt to rescue Yerevan
from Moscow’s domination will be by trying to open the
Turkish-Armenian border. But taking into account the stalemate on the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the current passivity in the
conflict-resolution process, and the fact that after its CU decision
Armenia is more dependent on Moscow, the unfortunate conclusion is
that the conflict-resolution process has ended up in the hands of
Russia. This will affect Azerbaijan’s role and strategy towards Russia
as well as the conflict-resolution process itself.
In the next section of this column, I will discuss the potential
impact of Armenia’s CU decision on Yerevan’s domestic policy along
with the Azerbaijani and Georgian positions.