THE INVISIBLE CYBER WAR
31.10.2013
Yiannos Charalambides
Doctor of International Relations and European Studies
Introduction
The international system is still dominated by sovereign nation states
which constitute the main structural actors of the global system.
However, nation states are not the only players acting in the global
landscape. Markets or multinational colossi, even terrorist
organisations such as Al Qaeda also operate in the international field
(Charalambides, 2013, pp.71-77; Katzman, 2005 pp.4-5, 7-8; Bjelopera,
2011 pp. 36-37) with the purpose of changing the structure of the
international system. In this respect, these international actors
pursue to replace the dominant role that states retain in the
international arena (Charalambides, 2013, pp. 71-75, 45-52).
Technology constitutes one of the main constituent elements of power
and therefore what remains to be examined is the role that technology
can play in the international system in terms of the power game that
is evolving. (Charalambides, 2010, pp. 34-35; Ifestos and Platias,
1992, pp. 83-84; Morgenthau, 1978pp. 9-14; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff
1992, p 115).
This article deals with the importance of technology in the current
era and particularly in the context of a new type of war, namely cyber
war. This type of war is relevant to structural changes occurring in
the international system, with technology playing its own significant
role (Charalambides, 2013 pp. 12-13).
The present analysis refers to the various types of wars and attempts
to give a definition regarding cyber warfare and explain how it works
in practice. In this respect, we examine the way that cyber war
affects the evolution of the international system and the resultant
structural changes as well as the significance that cyber war plays in
the international arena along with technology. In this reality, a
relevant question which is raised and that we must answer is the
following: whether the classical structural components of strength
such as military power, territory and population size, the morale of
the army and leadership are enough for a victorious outcome or whether
technology itself and/or in combination with other means may bring
dramatic changes regarding the component structure of wars and the
structure of the international system (Charalambides, 2010 Dougherty
and Pfaltzgraff 1992, p. 168; Gilpin 1981). So far, Great Powers seem
to be invincible. However, two relevant questions must be answered:
whether this hypothesis is correct and whether technology could
increase the possibilities of restoring the old legend of David who
defeated Goliath.
1. Various types of wars
In the current period, the international system suffers from various
types of wars.
Firstly, classical wars in which the parties involved use conventional
or even nuclear military means. It is a war that erupts between two or
more states. Civil and/or religious wars -like the one ongoing in
Syria (CNN News, 2012; CNN News, 2012a; CNN News, 2012b) – are
included in the category of classical wars and usually induce such
structural changes within the states that affect international affairs
either in a regional or global level. Egypt constitutes an example
through which we can observe the consequences of an uprising which
brought about structural changes. Although Mubarak’s regime had been
constructed on a basis of deficient democracy, it succeeded to become
a stabilising factor in the regional and global system. Mubarak’s
regime worked hard to achieve the consolidation of stability and peace
with neighbouring Israel. When the regime fell, tensions erupted
across the border with Israel (CNN, 2011, Charalambides 2012, p. 6).
On June 24, 2012 the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Morsi
was officially declared as the winner of the first free Egyptian
Presidential elections by a narrow margin over Ahmed Shafik. President
Morsi gained 51,7% of the vote, while Ahmed Shafik received 48, 2%
(CNN News, 2012c; BBC News, 2012). The political situation is volatile
and both the US and Israel are concerned about the political, social
and institutional role that the Muslim Brotherhood holds within the
new Egyptian political system. The question is whether the uprising of
the Egyptian people will lead to the establishment of a democratic
political system or whether the Muslim Brotherhood will attempt to
consolidate a political system, which would be based on and ruled by
Islamic Law. Egypt is suffering political instability and runs the
risk of a civil and religious war. Hence, the situation in Egypt
induced structural changes within the state and affected the stability
of the regional system.
Secondly, war on terrorism constitutes a sui generis type of war
between states and terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda, whose
main aim is to alter the current structure of the international system
(Bin Laden, 2005; Almasmari, Jamjoom and Abedine, 2012).
Simultaneously, we are witnessing a perpetual conflict between two
types of Globalisation; Western and Islamist. Regarding the latter
there is no doubt that it aims at establishing a Global Caliphate
(Elsea, 2007, pp. 10-15; Lecker 2008, pp. 251-253). The mentioned
ongoing conflict also takes the form of a religious war.
Thirdly, war among states and markets led to the current economic
crisis. The markets attempt to play a dominant role in the
international system and are not invisible. Therefore a relevant
question should be asked: what is the market? A short definition
answering this question could be set as follows: it is a legal and
economic process through which the rules of supply and demand come
together to define and determine the market prices. The market is not
an abstract set of factors and actors functioning in the international
system. On the contrary, it is a vibrant organisation acting in the
international system and it is comprised of:
All types of companies, (small, medium, large) enterprises and any
other entities engaged in any commercial, economic or financial
activity as well as the individuals who lead and manage companies and
industries; namely owners, shareholders, managers and directors.
Productive powers (forces), which is the combination of means of
production and labour (tools, machinery, land and infrastructure), as
well as the human labour power (Marx 1955).
Capital and money are instruments used by entrepreneurs in order to
generate profit, wealth and growth. However, they are also used by
employees (civilians) and labour forces in general, as income (i.e.
salary, interest income, dividends etc), in order to cover their
consuming needs.
The banking sector, national, private and international banking
institutions and bankers that play a key role in local and global
financial affairs.
The Stock Exchange and stockbrokers.
International organisations, banks and groups of powerful countries
regulating political and economic affairs such as the G-20, the
International Monetary Fund, the Global Bank For Reconstruction And
Development, as well as the World Trade Organisation (WTO).
All persons who are directly or indirectly involved in the market,
such as lawyers, bankers, accountants, politicians, workers (labour
force) and consumers, trade and labour unions and their members,
politicians and political parties, ministers and governments. Most
often – political parties, politicians and governments – are
financially sponsored by the business world or civilians -namely
bankers, businessmen or ordinary voters.
Energy – Power providers and all the factors that the power supply
chain consists of. Both states and/or individuals provide conventional
or renewable sources of energy, engineers and equipment so that energy
arrives at the end-user destination (industrial units, households) and
thereby the brokers define the exchange price of energy goods.
Research centres, universities and other forms of innovation
providers, who can create new commodities or new ways of developing
and thus enhancing, the quality of the products.
Central Governments which are obliged to provide security and
stability to all entities performing economic and other activities in
the context of the state’s apparatus.
International and local financial and commercial laws and other
regulators through which we can measure and evaluate the level of
compliance between rules, laws, directives and regulations on the one
hand and the level of actual implementation on the other.
`Credit Rating Agencies’ which are authorised to evaluate and thus
upgrade or downgrade private banks and the banking sector in general.
In fact, they hold a key regulatory role in the global financial and
political system (Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s and Fitch Ratings). The
`Credit Rating Agencies’ are used by investors, issuers, investment
banks, broker-dealers and governments for security reasons in terms of
protecting their financial interests and thus reducing the risk of
their investment. In this respect, the `Credit Rating Agencies’ draw
up reports in which the credit risk is analyzed with the aim of
protecting the investors and increasing the efficiency of the market.
Due to the current economic crisis both the US and the EU (including
its Member States) put in question the credibility of the `Credit
Rating Agencies’. Markets constitute vibrant organisations where human
beings play, operate, act and react and thereby psychology is always
turned into a political and economic instrument which might be used by
the `Credit Rating Agencies’ to influence markets in favouring
`suspicious interests’. The time and the way a report is drawn up,
often set forth the economic and political situation of a state, its
banking sector, financial status and its sovereign debt, affect either
negatively or positively the market and the economy of state in
question, as well as the markets in general.
Currency value and exchange rates as decisive instruments of the
market and for financial transactions.
2. Definition of Cyber war
Beyond the types of wars mentioned above, another type of war is also
noteworthy. It is the cyber war, which is inherent to technological
development and is always used in the context of a wide range of wars.
The actors involved in such a war use high level technologies. Cyber
war is part of the wider electronic war and its technological
capabilities are exploited as indispensable instruments for the
victorious outcome of a classical, conventional or any other kind of
conflict. In attempting to define what `cyber warfare’ is, the U.S.
government security expert, Richard A. Clarke maintains:
`When the terms of `Cyber war’ are used in this book, they refer to
actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or
networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption’ (Clarke
2010, p. 6).
In addition, the Economist wrote that cyberspace constitutes `the
fifth domain of warfare’ (in addition to land, sea, air and space)
(Economist 2010) and William J. Lynn, U.S. Deputy Secretary of
Defense, underlines that “as a doctrinal matter, the Pentagon has
formally recognized cyberspace as a new domain in warfare. . . [which]
has become just as critical to military operations as land, sea, air,
and space’ (Lynn 2010, p.97-98).
These are some short definitions of cyber war. However, one could
assert that cyber war cannot be precisely defined. Pursuant to a study
requested by the Subcommittee on Security and Defence and issued by
the European Parliament:
`There is no common definition of what might constitute `cyber
warfare’. The 2007 attacks on Estonia, the 2008 attacks on Georgia,
the deployment of Stunxet, or the ongoing high level cyber-espionage
were all called cyber war at some point. Even cyber attacks that most
likely have nothing to do with conflicts between states, such as
`hacktivism’, or cyber attacks in the wake of the 2010 WikiLeaks
affair, or in support of the February – March 2011 Arab revolts have
been called cyber war, implying in effect that the concept of warfare
is not limited anymore to mere nation – states. In the absence of a
common definition, most of the EU Member States and the Commission
have studiously avoided using the term cyber warfare in official
documents and often prefer neutral such as `cyber espionage’, `cyber
attack’ or `cyber defence” (European Parliament, 2012, p. 9) .
2.1 Various levels of cyber war
According to the so-called AF-SAB model there are three levels of
military cyber attacks:
The First Level of military cyber attacks is the `network wars’ or
“system administrator versus system administrator’. This includes
mobile malicious logic, Trojan attacks, basic phishing attempts,
common exploits, website defacement and other common headaches falling
within this category’. This category of attacks is the least serious,
including `purported state-sponsored espionage attacks on the
government such as the `Moonlight Maze’ and `Titan Rain’ campaign’.
These attacks can be addressed by proper network security precautions’
(European Parliament, 2012, p. 7). `Titan Rain’ was a sophisticated
and cyber espionage attack which `began in 2003 against the US and led
to the wide-scale breach of classified US government and military
systems, with loss of 10-12 terabytes of information’ (European
Parliament, 2012, p.52). This attack and others had been organised and
performed by non-state Chinese hackers. Over a four year period, they
launched similar attacks on government systems and EU member states
and EU institutions. Albeit the attackers were not directly associated
with the Chinese State, they probably cooperated with the Chinese
Security Service as they were under an official command also having
connections with high level political leadership.
The Second Level cyber attacks fall under `cyber – adjunct to kinetic
combat’. The operator attempts to achieve a `kinetic effect’ in
conjunction to a conventional attack, such as an air strike.
Therefore, the operator uses malicious logic to defuse an air defence
network. This example exemplifies level 2 cyber attacks (European
Parliament, 2012, pp. 7-8). The 2008 cyber attacks on Georgia also
fall under this category. These attacks had been combined with
military conventional operations and therefore had a kinetic effect.
During the war on Georgia, the Russians defaced websites whilst they
also launched attacks on critical energy infrastructures. Another
relevant case of Level 2 cyber war practice was the one between Syria
and Israel in 2007, when the Israelis used the American cyber-weapon,
named `Senior Suter’, in order to defuse the Syrian Antiaircraft
Network and successfully launched their airstrikes against Syria and
precisely hit supposed nuclear facilities on the ground.
The last and Third Level is `malicious manipulation’, which
specialists consider as the most dangerous attacks. These attacks:
`are the ones to be feared, they are covert, they are planned, they
are orchestrated and they can use widespread havoc and disruption
without the victims realizing their problems are cyber related’.
According to a study issued by the services of the European
Parliament, `Level 3 attacks also conceal a wide range of possible
behaviour – this can include the simple manipulation of a spreadsheet,
to Stuxnet and similar purported limited attacks on critical
infrastructure, to mass -casualty attacks on an entire nation’s
critical infrastructure or even the misrouting of the internet itself’
(European Parliament 2012, p. 8).
It is of utmost importance to underline that with a reference to
`Stuxnet’ we mean a `cyber missile’ which had been `directed squarely
at the Iranian nuclear program by targeting its uranium enrichment
capability’ (European Parliament p. 52, The Economist, 2010). As the
report of the European Parliament maintains: `There has been clear
evidence that Stuxnet was successful in damaging and delaying the
Iranian enrichment program'(European Parliament, 2012, p. 52, Farwell
and Rohozinski 2011, pp. 23-40). This attack was not the first one
which used the invisible `weapon’ of high technology. As Thomas Reed
underlines, an advisor to President Ronald Reagan alleged that the CIA
used a logistic bomb in 1982 to destroy a Soviet pipeline and he adds:
`It was programmed to go haywire, to reset pump speeds and valve
settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to the
pipeline joints and welds. The result was the most monumental
non-nuclear explosion and fire ever seen from space’ (Reed, 2004, p.
269).
2.2 American superiority
It is evident why the US is considered the champion state in
cyber-warfare and cyber-defence. Beyond the cases mentioned above, in
1991, during the First Iraqi War, the US impressed the international
community with its advanced skills of cyber-war. Years later, in 2010,
NATO – led by US – was the first organisation that realised the
necessity to address the `new threats’ stemming from cyber-attacks.
This necessity became more obvious after the 2007 attack on Estonia,
which entailed web – vandalism. In particular, over a three week
period the attackers caused disruption to Estonian public services and
banking sector. The attackers were probably Russian hackers and the
attack was a strong shock for the international community. It was an
episode that alarmed relevant stakeholders and led NATO to rethink and
take pertinent decisions regarding its defensive strategic concept. At
the Lisbon Summit in November 2010, NATO established the Cyber Defence
Management Authority (CDMA), with the competence to coordinate and
shape strategic decision-making on cyber-defence within the Alliance
(European Parliament, 2012, p. 26, NATO 2010a). However, China and
Russia are also involved in all levels of cyber-war, as they have no
other alternative than to respond to the requirements of the
contemporary era, in order to serve and protect their national
interests by undertaking all kinds of preventive measures. In fact
they not only defend themselves, but also follow an aggressive policy.
In this respect, one should view cyber-attacks through the lens of
political practices. Hereupon, we may underline that quantitative
analysis of cyber-war cannot be focused exclusively on the three
aforementioned levels, but also on the civilian, commercial, economic,
administrative, banking or military sectors which the cyber-attacks
usually target. In this respect, such a cyber trade-economic war is
currently underway between China and the US. Pursuant to a
congressional report titled `China-US Trade Issues’, Wayne M. Morrison
maintains:
“Many U.S. analysts and policymakers contend that the Chinese
government is a major source of cyber-economic espionage against U.S.
firms. For example, Representative Mike Rogers, chairman of the House
Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence, stated at an October 4,
2011, hearing that attributing this espionage isn’t easy, but talk to
any private sector cyber analyst, and they will tell you there is
little doubt that this is a massive campaign being conducted by the
Chinese government. I don’t believe that there is a precedent in
history for such a massive and sustained intelligence effort by a
government to blatantly steal commercial data and intellectual
property. China’s economic espionage has reached an intolerable level
and I believe that the United States and our allies in Europe and Asia
have an obligation to confront Beijing and demand that they put a stop
to this piracy’.
According to a report by the U.S. Office of the Director of National
Intelligence (DNI): `Chinese actors are the world’s most active and
persistent perpetrators of economic espionage. U.S. private sector
firms and cyber security specialists have reported an onslaught of
computer network intrusions that have originated in China, but the IC
(Intelligence Community) cannot confirm who was responsible.’ The
report goes on to warn that `China will continue to be driven by its
longstanding policy of ‘catching up fast and surpassing’ Western
powers. The growing interrelationships between Chinese and U.S
companies – such as the employment of Chinese-national technical
experts at U.S. facilities and outsourcing U.S. production and R&D to
facilities in China – will offer Chinese government agencies and
businesses increasing opportunities to collect sensitive US economic
information’ (Morrison 2012, p. 33).
2.3 China, Russia and hackers’ army
China and Russia hold a privileged position in the list of the main
global cyber powers, with a huge army of hackers operating
particularly against US interests. Most of the hackers have no
official relations with the Chinese or Russian governments. However it
is a commonly known `secret’ that the Chinese government has tacitly
approved the hackers’ attacks. The Chinese concept on Cyber-warfare,
titled `Integrated Network Electronic Warfare’, is similar to the US
Network Electronic Warfare. In this context civilian sources (People’s
of war) are mobilised in order to attempt operating at a strategic
level of conflict, namely `information warfare’. This information
warfare is divided in three categories: Media warfare, Psychological
warfare and Legal warfare (European Parliament, p. 55). The Chinese
have a very strong system of defensive and offensive capabilities,
whilst there is a real army, the `Patriot Hackers’ which are
responsible for the attacks against western governments and interests.
The `Red Hacker Alliance’ is the largest club of attackers, numbering
400,000 members. The Pentagon had to take special measures in order to
prevent their attacks (European Parliament, 2012, p. 57).
Along the same lines, Russia is concentrated on the means and measures
that it should take in order to protect its civil society,
military/governmental infrastructures and apparatus from US hackers.
In terms of `soft and smart power’ the US pursues to influence the
Russian public opinion and furthermore the decision making process
(Nye, 1991; Nye 2004, pp. 2, 34-35, 44-45; 2006; Crocker et al, 2007,
p.13; Etheridge, 2009). This is a strategy named `reflexive control’.
In accordance with this concept `one enemy transmits the reasons and
bases for making decisions to the other’ (Thomas 2004). This is a
strategic method through which the US influences certain public
opinions that are under the pressure of authoritarian regimes, and
pushes them to revolt. Iran and the Arab Spring constitute evident
cases of this strategic method used by the US cyber-war services. All
relevant information, reasons and data which can influence the
procedure of the decisions taken by repressed public opinions are
promoted through the cyberspace. Certainly, the result of this method,
inherent to a `smart power’ strategic concept, is not always positive.
Beyond the influence that the US may exert over foreign public
opinions, there are other factors acting in a society and within an
authoritarian political system. These factors affect the procedure of
the decision making. Such a strategic goal becomes easier when the
foreign public opinion is ready to adopt a propaganda promoted through
the internet. The success or failure of this policy also depends on
the skills of the intelligence services of the state being under the
US attack. The key issue is whether they successfully react against
such a `cyber war game’. Therefore, the Russian information doctrine
focuses on protecting the public opinion and the Russian `spiritual
renewal’ by establishing segments of `information psychological’ and
`information technical means’ (Bikkenin, 2003).
3. A landmark case
The `WikiLeaks case’, widely known as `Cablegate’ – the publication of
thousands of top secret US documents – shows the electronically
sophisticated character of the new era; an era where technology
constitutes a primary instrument for the secret services and for any
other skilled person or organisation. The publication of numerous top
secret documents (251,287 diplomatic cables) shed light on dimming
aspects of secret diplomacy and illustrated how diplomats comment and
evaluate each other behind the scenes (WikiLeaks 2012). On August 20,
2010, the Swedish prosecutor issued an arrest warrant against the
founder of WikiLeaks, Julian Assange amid two accusations. One
concerns the allegation of rape and the other of molestation. Assange
denied the charges arguing that he was a victim of a smear campaign.
The Swedish Authority requested his extradition from Britain where
Assange found shelter in the embassy of Ecuador. Assange applied for
asylum and the Ecuadorian Authorities on August 16, 2012 took a
positive decision triggering a diplomatic episode with Britain. The
Foreign Minister of Ecuador stated that his country granted asylum to
Assange `because he will be politically persecuted if extradited’
(Lai, 2012). The British government was clear about its intention of
arresting and extraditing him to Sweden. Assange feared he would be
sent by the Swedish Authorities to the US where he might face the
death penalty. The US Authorities accused him of publishing top secret
cables (official US documents), putting the country’s security at
risk. On August 14, 2012, in an effort to explain the upcoming
positive decision – which would be issued two days later – the
Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa stated:
`The process in Sweden needs to be reviewed, you have to consider the
possibility of extradition to the United States, if there’s a secret
tribunal there, if there’s any risk of a death penalty. It requires a
large amount of information, an analysis of international law to make
an informed, absolutely responsible and sovereign decision’ (Correa,
2012, cited in CNN Wire Staff 2012).
`WikiLeaks’ cast a shadow on the US security system and humiliated the
American secret services. It is in fact a landmark case which
illustrates both the importance that technology plays in international
affairs and the new types of wars which noiselessly occur not only
among states, but also between states and non-state actors. In this
case we observe the way technology pulverises the gap of strength
existing between a Great Power and a private organisation of
electronic media.
Conclusions
Technology constitutes a structural component factor of strength used
by states in order to serve their national interests in the context of
a trade/economic cyber war, like those underway between the US and
China or the US and Russia, without excluding that other countries
will also get involved. This is a conflict among the Titans of the
international system with the US playing the role of Zeus.
Furthermore, technology and cyber war are also used in the frame of
conventional wars and the war on terror. In fact, it is a combination
of an economic/commercial and cyber war upon which the new era is
reflected. It illustrates how complicated international relations are
in the contemporary period. It is evident that there are “two or three
types of wars”, one existing within the other, without the need to use
the traditional, classical military means. Particularly, the Army uses
cyber mechanisms as an indispensable tool for espionage purposes in
the frame of a wider strategic plan with the aim of promoting and
protecting national interests. In parallel, the tools and weapons of
cyber war are also used in conventional wars. Advanced technology is
always of outmost importance for the international actors in order to
win a victory.
The international system is already in a new era in which structural
changes occur and power coexists with technological development and
capacities. An invisible cyber war, among Great Powers, such as the
US, Russia and China is underway. Certainly, other countries, apart
from Great Powers, are already involved in a cyber war for which new
types of armies have been formed. Hackers now play the role of `modern
soldiers’, thus evincing the eminent importance that technology holds
as an indispensable factor of national strength (Dougherty and
Pfaltzgraff 1992, p. 116). In this reality, the structure and methods
of wars tend to change along with the structure of the international
system where the state still holds its dominant role. However, markets
and terrorist organisations such as Al Qaeda spare no efforts to
replace the states’ dominant position. Through the lens of the
`WikeLeaks case’ we observe a new political phenomenon stemming from
technology and reflecting the growing significance of technology and
the changes occurring in the international system where an electronic
media non-governmental organisation got involved in a cyber war with
the US. The US defeat until this moment is obvious. This incident
brings to mind the well known story of David and Goliath. And thus
history repeats itself by using other means. At that time, it was the
sling and stones, nowadays it is technology.
May, 2013
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“21st CENTURY”, N 1, 2013
http://www.noravank.am/eng/articles/detail.php?ELEMENT_ID=12390
http://articles.cnn.com/2012-05-22/middleeast/world_meast_yemen-violence_1_al-qaeda-al-sharia-president-saleh?_s=PM:MIDDLEEAST
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-18571580
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/R41416.pdf
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL32759.pdf
http://www.cdi.org/program/issue/index.cfm?ProgramID=39&issueid=48
http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/08/02/kofi-annan-resigns-as-envoy-to-syria/
http://edition.cnn.com/2012/06/24/world/africa/egypt-politics/index.html?hpt=hp_t1
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/14/world/americas/ecuador-assange/index.html
http://www.economist.com/node/16478792
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/studies
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL31367.pdf
http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/01/14/how-soft-power-got-smart/
http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/download/pdf/Poverty-Philosophy.pdf
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/terror/RL33038.pdf
http://www.cnn.com/2012/08/16/world/europe/assange-extradition-timeline/index.html?iid=article_sidebar
http://jis.oxfordjournals.org/content/19/2/251
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/row/RL33536.pdf
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49193.htm
http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/08/19/in_mideast_the_goal_is_smart_power/
http://www.dodccrp.org/events/2004_CCTS/CD/papers/064.pdf.
http://www.economist.com/blogs/babbage/2010/09/stuxnet
http://wikileaks.org/cablegate.html#