Author: Badalian Vardan

RUSSIA WILL NOT EXTRADITE YANUKOVYCH – PROSECUTOR GENERAL

April 11, 2014 | 13:53

Russia sees no reason to hand Viktor Yanukovych over to Ukraine,
Russian Federation (RF) Prosecutor General Yury Chaika stated.

“According to our data, he has not committed any crime, and therefore
there is no basis for his extradition,” Chaika told Interfax news
agency.

He added that, just as before, Russia considers Yanukovych to be the
legitimate President of Ukraine.

“Whereas today’s authorities in Kiev have come [to power] as a result
of a military coup; I say this as a jurist,” the RF attorney general
stated, in particular.

News from Armenia – NEWS.am

HUNDREDS ATTEND AYF’S TOWN HALL MEETING ON #SAVEKESSAB

Friday, April 11th, 2014

Kessab leader Garo Manjikian addresses the town hall via Skype

GLENDALE–The Armenian Youth Federation – Western Region hosted a
town hall meeting on Wednesday at the Krikor and Mariam Karamanoukian
Glendale Youth Center. Hundreds were in attendance as representatives
from the Armenian Revolutionary Federation, the Armenian National
Committee of America, the Kessab Educational Association of Los
Angeles, and the Syrian-Armenian Relief Fund presented information
about the recent attacks on the predominantly Armenian town of Kessab,
Syria, as well as Turkey’s involvement in the occurrences.

Vahe Lepedjian, a member of the AYF-WR Central Executive, explained
in his opening remarks that the AYF-WR thought it necessary to hold
this meeting in order to present the community with up-to-date and
accurate information regarding the recent occurrences in Kessab. Over
the past few weeks, the AYF-WR has seen an overwhelming response
to its #SaveKessab campaign on the internet, but information shared
through social media has not always been truthful.

“As an organization that is dedicated to strengthening and educating
our community, engaging and activating the masses serves as the best
motivation to continue working toward our goal,” Lepedjian said.

“Whether online or in person, our efforts have been matched with an
overwhelming amount of interest and support.”

Speaking on behalf of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation was Dr.

Viken Hovsepian, chairperson of the ARF Western United States Central
Committee. He presented the facts of the attack, saying that residents
of Kessab have evacuated the town and there have been no Armenian
casualties to date. He also explained that an emergency meeting was
called with the U.S. State Department the day of the attacks.

Representatives from the ARF and ANCA presented facts and evidence,
urging the State Department to begin a formal, independent
investigation into Turkey’s involvement in the attacks. Raffi
Hamparian, ANCA National Board member, spoke to the crowd about the
importance of contacting their representatives in Congress and calling
for congressional intelligence inquiry into the attacks.

Joining the meeting from Latakia via Skype was Garo Manjikian. He
is heading relief efforts in Latakia, where the majority of Kessab
residents have found refuge. He said that on the morning of March 21,
locals noticed that Turkish police posts at the border were vacated.

Hours later, the attackers crossed the border and attacked the town.

Residents, he said, adamantly wish to return to their homes in Kessab.

He thanked the international Armenian community for all its support
in the last few weeks.

The crisis in Kessab is of particular concern to the Armenian
community because of its unique historical significance as the last
indigenously-populated Armenian town on the lands of historic Western
Armenia. The attacks on Kessab serve as a bitter reminder of the same
tactics Turkish forces utilized as a precursor to genocide in 1909
and 1915.

Wednesday’s town hall meeting attracted activists of different
backgrounds. Jason Acherman, a member of the Encino Neighborhood
Council, attended the meeting to be further informed on the subject
of Kessab. “I just wanted to get a better sense of what’s going
on and see what I, as a non-Armenian-American, can do to help,”
he said. “I’m Jewish and my people have faced genocide as well,
so I have deep empathy for the Armenian community.”

The AYF-WR is gratified and inspired by the success of the #SaveKessab
campaign, but is likewise aware of a mass distribution of inaccurate
information and images not associated with the crisis in Kessab.

Moving forward, it is crucial that specific information is clarified
so that the campaign and its followers can take steps in the direction
of effective intervention and aid.

The AYF-WR would also like to address that its only official outlets
for the #SaveKessab campaign operate under “AYFWest” social media
accounts and Any merchandise found online is
unofficial and we discourage purchasing such merchandise as the
proceeds cannot be tracked. At this time of crisis, our united efforts
are critical.

SOUTH CAUCASUS RAILWAYS TAKING PART IN CAUCASUS TOURISM FAIR-2014 IN TBILISI

YEREVAN, April 11. / ARKA /. The South Caucasus Railway (SCR),
a Russian company operating Armenia’s railroads, said today it is
taking part in an international tourism exhibition called ‘Caucasus
Tourism Fair – 2014″ that opened today in Tbilisi, the capital of
neighboring Georgia.

It said its pavilion was visited today by deputy prime minister of
Georgia Giorgi Kvirikashvili, who was told about SCR’s services for
passengers traveling between Armenia and Georgia, and especially
about the trains taking Armenian holidaymakers to Georgian Black Sea
resorts in summer season.

SCR representatives spoke also about the company’s plans for further
improvement of the quality of passenger services, online ticket sales
program and prospects for railway tourism development.

The SCR is participating in the exhibition together with Armenian
Universal Travel Company, with which it has developed a special
railway tour.

The exhibition held at Georgia Exhibition Center will run until April
13. It is organized by Georgia Exhibition Center with the support of
the Ministry of Economy of Georgia and the Municipality of Tbilisi.

South Caucasus Railways is a 100% subsidiary of state-run Russian
Railways that was awarded a concesional management of SCR. The 30 year
contract was signed in 2008. It can be prolonged for another 10 years.

-0-

– See more at:

ARF AND PROSPEROUS ARMENIA REPS. LEAVE PRESIDENTIAL RESIDENCE THROUGH BACK DOOR

April 10, 2014 | 18:42

YEREVAN. – The representatives of ARF Dashnaktsutyun and Prosperous
Armenia factions decided not to answer reporters’ questions after
their consultations with President Serzh Sargsyan.

ARF Dashnaktsutyun representatives left the presidential residence
through the back door.

Although Prosperous Armenia’s Vartan Oskanian and Stepan Margaryan
promised to talk to reporters, they followed the lead of their
colleagues from ARF.

The president is carrying out political consultations with Orinats
Yerkir representatives at the moment.

President Serzh Sargsyan is expected to announce the name of the new
PM at 8pm, at the executive session of the ruling Republican Party.

On April 3, Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan submitted his resignation to
President Serzh Sargsyan, and the President accepted the resignation.

ARMENIA-EU RELATIONS: ‘WHAT SHALL WE DO?’

By Armenak Minasyants on April 8, 2014

On Sept. 3, 2013, following a meeting with Russian President Vladimir
Putin, President Serge Sarkisian unexpectedly announced Armenia’s
intention to join the Russian-led Customs Union (CU) comprised of
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia. In both Armenia and abroad, the
decision was perceived as a sudden political U-Turn by Yerevan. But
was this decision so unexpected?

Since the mid 1990’s, the Republic of Armenia has walked a long road of
cooperation and interaction with the European Union (EU). The EU was
seeking an increasingly close relationship with Armenia that would
extend beyond cooperation, into a gradual economic integration and
deepening of political ties. The European Commission put forward a
concrete plan for enhancing its relations with the Eastern neighbors,
including Armenia.

Armenian activists protest against Putin, and the regime’s decision to
join the Customs Union. (Photo: Samson Martirosyan/The Armenian Weekly)

For three and a half years, officials from Yerevan and Brussels were
negotiating the signing of the Association Agreement, as well as
the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA). However,
after the Sarkisian’s announcement, both parties faced a unique
situation, one that could be described by the title of a book by the
19th-century Russian philosopher, journalist, and literary critic
Nikolai Chernyshevsky: “What Shall We Do?” This rhetorical question
became a trending one, as Yerevan’s sudden decision brought classical
chaos to the ongoing preparations towards the EU-Eastern Partnership
(EaP) Vilnius Summit.

Before discussing the details of the agreements that were on the table
and analyzing the possible consequences of the decision to join the
CU, let us get better insight into the content of those agreements.

The Eastern Partnership initiative pursues the possibility of signing
new association agreements that encompass the following key elements:
deep and comprehensive free trade agreements with countries willing
and able to enter into a deeper engagement, gradual integration in
the EU economy, easier travel to the EU through visa liberalization,
and the introduction of measures to tackle illegal immigration.

The negotiated Armenia-EU Association Agreement was an all encircling
agreement that addressed numerous issues ranging from political
association, political reforms, dialogue and cooperation on foreign
and security policy issues, as well as economic cooperation and trade.

Inter alia, it included cooperation in the fields of migration, rule
of law, human rights, fight against crime and corruption, protection
of personal data, and cooperation against trafficking and terrorism.

The DCFTA part of the negotiated agreement touched upon such fields
as market competition, technical barriers for implementation of free
trade, intellectual property rights, export duties, and restrictions,
sanitary and phytosanitary measures, thus giving Armenia a unique
opportunity to develop a European-oriented functioning national
economy, which would enable it to overcome financial difficulties.

It is crucial to mention that Armenia and the EU had hosted
seven rounds of negotiations until they finalized the talks on
the Association Agreement and the DCFTA in mid July 2013. These
two conceptual segments should be considered only in their common
integrity; thus it is not appropriate even to discuss the signing of
the Association Agreement without the DCFTA, an opinion that has been
voiced by several Armenian politicians.

At a press conference following the 2nd European People’s Party
Eastern Partnership Leaders’ Summit in Yerevan, Armenia, on Nov. 30,
2012. (Photo: President.am)

Simultaneously, once we are discussing the Eastern Partnership
Program, we should bear in mind that it is a policy that seeks to
create opportunities for everyone. The Eastern Partnership is not a
copy-paste approach. It is a different attitude from the EU towards the
Eastern neighbors. Concurrently, —since its foundation the Eastern
Partnership has been and is about the political association based on
shared European values, which the Eastern neighbors would commit to
enroot in their own affairs and enact in the spirit of the principle
“more for more.”

Within the framework of its participation in the EaP, Armenia undertook
several vital reforms ahead of the Vilnius Summit.

Unfortunately, the Vilnius Summit did not become a triumph point
for Armenia and its foreign policy. Nonetheless, it is imperative to
highlight the reasons and grounds that forced the Armenian authorities
to step away from the European path.

“Will something like #EuroMaidan ever happen in Armenia?” is the
trending question amongst the Armenian political circles. My resounding
reply is NO! Unfortunately, all the political forces and parties in
Armenia seek Moscow’s support/assistance/patronage in order to come
to power. After the Sept. 3 announcement, the Armenian political
opposition did not have a sufficient reaction to the president’s
declaration. The opposition parties failed to organize a pro-European
march or meetings.

One may argue that the opposition leaders were thinking that the
president’s announcement was not definitive but rather declarative.

Sadly, Putin is a “very charming” person and in practice it is almost
impossible to go against his word.

In this context, the Armenian pro-European civil society organizations,
activists, young people, students attempted to take the lead, but
unfortunately, after their rally on Sept. 5, 2013, in front of the
Presidential Palace and the Head Office of the Republican Party of
Armenia (ruling party and majority group at the National Assembly of
Armenia), several activists were badly beaten by unknown thugs. The
police are still investigating the cases without any results.

These developments created a circumstance wherein all the political
groups reached a deadlock. They neither have any human resources,
nor a concrete ideological/propaganda tool to instigate pro-European
rallies in the city squares. Even the ruling Republican Party, which
is a daughter organization of the European Peoples’ Party, is now
paralyzed, as its continued membership to the EPP is unclear: Does
the EPP, the biggest political group in the European Parliament, want
a political ally that has suddenly turned its back to the EU? This
is another rhetorical question, which is probably already decided
in Brussels.

If we compare the above-mentioned Armenian case with the Ukrainian
developments, we would see that in Ukraine there are pro-European
political parties (such as “Batkivshchyna” and “UDAR”), as well as
nationalistic parties (such as “Svoboda” party), which have strong
connections with their European counterparts. Hence, they were
able to effectively use pro-European propaganda to gather hundreds
of thousands of Ukrainians in the city centers, which led to the
overthrow of Yanukovych’s bloody regime.

Another important aspect, which should be considered while discussing
Armenia’s U-Turn, is the security concept. Although Yerevan has never
stated that the decision to join the Russian-led Customs Union was
connected to the rising pressure exercised by Russia in the security
sphere, for a common researcher this is the most visible and realistic
point that solidly explains Armenia’s decision.

On numerous occasions, high-ranking EU officials have stated their
position in regards to the Nagorno-Karabagh issue. The EU has supported
a peaceful dialogue based on the principles of international law and
the framework set forth by the OSCE Minsk Group, co-chaired by the
U.S., Russia, and France. However, the security aspect remains one of
the weakest points of Armenia’s external policy. The Armenian public,
as well as the politicians, consider Russia as the guarantor of peace
in the South Caucasus.

In my opinion, however, the Sept. 3 decision has brought mostly
insecurity. Yes, Russia is one of the strongest players in the South
Caucasus, and Armenia is considered to be its closest ally in the

On Sept. 3, 2013, following a meeting with Russian President Vladimir
Putin, President Serge Sarkisian announced Armenia would join the
Russian-led Customs Union. (Photo: President.am)

region. However, Russia’s decision to sell huge amounts of advanced
weaponry to Azerbaijan (for around $2 billion USD), its signing of a
series (around 16) of bilateral agreements within different fields,
and finally Putin’s visit to Baku, all had a direct impact on Yerevan’s
decision-making. There were huge concerns that Azerbaijan was getting
ready to launch a widespread military operation on the borderlands
with Armenia, which could have had disastrous effects on regional
security. These concerns and the threat of a new military conflict
was the main playing card that Putin used to achieve his desired
results. However, the security concerns should have been on the
minds of Armenia’s political elite when they were enthusiastically
negotiating the Association Agreement and the DCFTA with the EU.

If in the beginning European officials and the EU itself were
disappointed with Yerevan’s decision, later on this disappointment
simply turned into a lack of interest towards Armenia. In mid-October
2013, there were intensive public discussions that Armenia would not
be invited to the upcoming EU-EaP Vilnius Summit in November 2013,
or that Armenia would simply decide not to participate, under Russian
pressure. Fortunately, these all remained rumors and the Armenian
delegation headed by President Sarkisian participated in the EU-EaP
Vilnius Summit.

In international politics and diplomacy, summit results are achieved
during the years of cooperation and commitment of the involved
parties. The EU-EaP Vilnius Summit was a landmark event in this
context, as first it destroyed the myths that the Association
Agreements and DCFTA’s are secret documents not accessible by the
public. Moreover, the Vilnius Summit was a half success and half
failure. The EU gained better knowledge and experience about how to
approach each partner country. At the end, Armenia and the EU presented
a joint statement. The Armenian Minister of Foreign Affairs Edward
Nalbandian and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and
Security Policy Catherine Ashton exchanged the Association Agreement
and the DCFTA’s texts to underline the difficult road these partners
had passed together.

Since the beginning of 2014, the Armenian government has implemented
several key actions aimed to fostering Armenia’s membership in the
Russian-led Customs Union. A special road map of actions has been
agreed to by the parties involved and several legislative reforms
are being introduced to move Armenia towards joining the CU.

Without expressing any approach to these developments, as a
conclusion, we should once again highlight the importance of the
Eastern Partnership Program, as a sustainable guarantee for achieving
European standards in all fields of life for the Armenian people. Our
Armenian society and people should stand firm and respect the values
we have proclaimed in our constitution and stipulated in various
international treaties.

Simultaneously, if the European Union wants to achieve more tangible
and long-term success in Armenia and bring the country back to “the
European tracks,” it should try to put more emphasis and impetus on
the following points:

1) Ensure the sustainability of the reforms. Over the last four
years, various reforms and EU-funded projects have been launched and
implemented in Armenia.1 However, the sustainability of all implemented
programs and reforms should be considered as a high priority for the
EU in a long-term strategy, as sustained and visible results may make
a strong argument for boosting more systematic multilateral dialogue.

2) Empower the EaP partners to be sovereign, both politically and
structurally. The Sept. 3 decision was a result of not only a weak
and unclear Armenian foreign policy, but also of a lack of political
guarantees and support coming from the EU. The above-mentioned reforms
should first benefit the Armenian government and allow it to feel more
sovereign in domestic and international affairs, and should avoid the
loss of sovereignty in case it becomes a member of the Customs Union.

Finally, there is no justification for Russia intervening in EaP
affairs, but EaP countries should voice their disagreement with Moscow
first. The future of the European Union and the Eastern Partnership
countries lies in an improved and more equal Europe. The times of
limited sovereignty in Europe is over; however, to make this statement
work more effectively in practice, the EU and the EaP countries should
be united in their willingness to see a better Europe for all.

Notes

1. See the list at

IRAN READY TO HELP END KARABAKH DISPUTE: ROUHANI

Press TV, Iran
April 9 2014

Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani has stressed the Islamic Republic’s
readiness to contribute to the settlement of the decades-old dispute
on the Nagorno-Karabakh region which Azerbaijan and Armenia both lay
claim to.

“We are fully ready [to help] so that all problems in the region
including the Karabakh issue can be resolved fairly and within the
framework of international conventions,” Rouhani said in a joint
press conference with visiting Azeri President Ilham Aliyev in Tehran
on Wednesday.

The Iranian president noted that no change in “geographical boundaries”
in the region is acceptable, adding, “We must all try to settle
differences within the framework of political and peaceful issues.”

Rouhani stated that friendly relations between Iran and neighboring
Azerbaijan would benefit the two nations as well as regional stability.

Both Azerbaijan and Armenia claim the territory of Nagorno-Karabakh,
which is largely populated by Armenians but located in Azerbaijan.

Ethnic Armenian forces took control of the enclave which accounts
for 16 percent of Azerbaijan in the early 1990s during a six-year
war with the country that took place from February 1988 to May 1994.

The conflict left an estimated 30,000 people dead and one million
displaced before the two sides agreed to a ceasefire in 1994. However,
a peace accord has never been signed and the dispute still remains
unsettled.

Iran has on several occasions offered to intervene in the dispute.

KA/HGH/SS

POST-CRIMEA, PHANTOM OF ARMENIAN SEPARATISM HAUNTS GEORGIA

EurasiaNet.org
April 9 2014

April 9, 2014 – 11:50am, by Paul Rimple and Justyna Mielnikiewicz

For many in Georgia, Russia’s annexation Crimea is reigniting fears
about separatism rooted in ethnic conflict and Kremlin meddling. But
now Georgians aren’t just worrying about the breakaway entities of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, they also are concerned about the loyalty
of the predominantly ethnic-Armenian region of Samtskhe-Javakheti.

While locals dismiss separatism concerns as nonsense, some say the
speculation on the issue is indicative of a failure on the Georgian
central government’s part to address complaints of the country’s
Armenian-speaking minority in Samtskhe-Javakheti, which is roughly
a three-hour drive south of the Georgian capital, Tbilisi. Officials
contend progress has been made, but concede more can be done on the
inclusivity issue.

A mountainous, ragtag region bordering both Turkey and Armenia,
Samtskheâ~@~PJavakheti contains roughly 250,000 ethnic Armenians;
55 percent of the region’s total population, according to Georgia’s
latest census, compiled in 2002. Knowledge of the Georgian language
here can run thin. At the same time, in the view of some outsiders,
sympathy for Russia, which, until 2007, operated a 15,000-man base
in the regional town of Akhalkalaki, can run strong.

Over the past few weeks, suspicions among Georgians about the country’s
Armenian minority have risen, fueled by memories of Tbilisi’s 2008
conflict with Russia, as well as the Kremlin’s recent land-grab in
Crimea. Underscoring those suspicions was the appearance of unconfirmed
media reports about ethnic Armenians from Samtskhe-Javakheti allegedly
applying, en masse, to receive Russian passports.

Senior Georgian government officials have denied categorically these
reports, but, as Russia-Ukraine tension threatens to boil over, such
media coverage, condemned as sensationalism by three local watchdog
groups, could well continue. “Somebody is interested in stirring up
the water,” commented Seda Melkumian, the Samtskheâ~@~PJavakheti
representative for the Ombudsman’s Office. “So far, I haven’t met
one person with a Russian passport.”

Interethnic suspicion stems from a long-time tug-of-war over greater
language rights for the region’s Armenian speakers; for some Georgians,
it’s a campaign reminiscent of ethnic Russians’ complaints in Crimea.

But residents adamantly deny that such a struggle could encourage
them to break with Tbilisi. “We aren’t separatists,” asserted Melik
Raisian, a former member of the ruling Georgian Dream coalition from
Akhalkalaki. “We are Georgian citizens. Why do we always have to
prove we’re not separatists for wanting our rights?”

The separatist perception is generally connected to the United
Javakh Democratic Alliance (“Javakh”), a nationalist movement that
has called for political autonomy in the past. Many of the movements’
key members, including leader Vahag Chakhalian, were arrested in 2008
following a fatal bombing near the home of a police chief in the town
of Akhalkalaki. Chakhalian was released in 2013 as part of Georgia’s
mass amnesty of prisoners.

Javakh has little influence today, although many can identify with
its grievances. The 2007 closure of Akhalkalaki’s Russian army base
left many locals unemployed; as of 2012, the official unemployment
rate stood at 7.5 percent. Many had hoped to find work on the
Kars-Tbilisi-Baku railway, which goes through Javakheti, yet few have
been employed.

The lack of economic opportunities drives many residents to Russia
for work. Melkumian estimates that about half of Javakheti’s families
have some family member in Russia. “In the villages, every family
has somebody there,” she said.

That situation, though, is no different from elsewhere in Georgia,
noted Ewa Chylinski, director of the European Center for Minority
Issues in Tbilisi. As of this January, the Russian Federation ranked
as the largest source of Georgia’s remittances, roughly $46.6 million
in 2013, according to the National Bank of Georgia.

Nonetheless, the money trail does not mean a desire for independence.

Chylinski rejected the notion of a separatist threat in Javakheti as
“groundless.” The main problem is not autonomy, but language, she
said. People cannot participate in Georgian society if they do not
speak Georgian.

But for many in Samtskhe-Javakheti, that does not affect their
identification with Georgia. “I’m Armenian, but I was born in Georgia.

My father was born in Georgia. His father was born in Georgia and
I will live in Georgia,” declared octogenarian Artush Artkopian,
speaking via a teenage translator in Armenian since his knowledge of
Georgian and Russian is limited.

Last year, Akhalkalaki’s local council announced plans to petition
the Georgian parliament to ratify the European Charter for Regional
of Minority Languages, a Council of Europe convention that would make
Armenian an official local language for Samtskhe-Javakheti. Getting
no support in Tbilisi, where opposition from the Georgian Orthodox
Church and politicians runs strong, the matter was soon dropped.

The central government, though, has taken some concrete steps to
increase knowledge of Georgian. In 2010, the Ministry of Education
established a program, called the “4 + 1″ system,” which established
a 5-percent quota for ethnic minorities in Georgian universities.

Minority applicants to four-year higher educational facilities take an
entrance exam in their own language, as well as an intensive one-year
Georgian-language course.

Shorena Tetvadze, director of the Akhalkalaki branch of the Zurab
Zhvania School of Public Administration, deems the program a success.

After six years of 4 + 1, 130 ethnic Armenians graduated from Georgian
universities in 2013, compared with only two in 2006, she said.

Akhalkalaki’s five grammar schools all teach Georgian, a policy the
State Ministry for Reconciliation and Civic Equality calls a relative
success. Three are Armenian-language schools, one is Russian and
the other a Georgian school, with an enrollment of 120. Tetvadze,
who is half ethnic Armenian, thinks more parents would enroll their
children in the Georgian school if they did not fear assimilation. But
45 kilometers north of Akhalkalaki, in the ethnically mixed regional
seat of Akhaltsikhe, 68-year-old barber Ambarcum Arakian dismissed
that concern.

“Here, we’re all natives. The Georgians know Armenian and the Armenians
know Georgian,” Arakian emphasized. He added that his grandson is
attending university via the 4+1 program, and his granddaughter is
going to a Georgian-language kindergarten “so she will know Georgian
better.”

“I’m not afraid of assimilation,” he said. “We won’t lose our culture.”

Editor’s Note: Paul Rimple is a freelance reporter based in
Tbilisi. Justyna Mielnikiewicz is a freelance photojournalist also
based in Tbilisi.

RUSSIAN GENERAL STAFF CHIEF RULES OUT MILITARY SOLUTION IN NAGORNO-KARABAKH

ITAR-TASS, Russia
April 7, 2014 Monday 10:11 PM GMT+4

BAKU April 7

– The Chairman of the Russian Army General Staff, Colonel-General
Valery Gerasimov called for a peaceful solution to the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict.

He met with Azerbaijani Defence Minister Zakir Gasanov on Monday,
April 7, to discuss further military-technical cooperation and ways
to increase it. One of the main tasks facing Russia, Azerbaijan and
Armenia is to solve the Karabakh issue in order to move forward and
rule out the use of force, Gerasimov said.

Gasanov said cooperation between the Armed Forces of Azerbaijan and
Russia was developing at a high level in all areas, including military
development, education, and military-technical ties.

“The Armed Forces of Azerbaijan are receiving modern Russian weapons,
tanks, combat vehicles and artillery systems. All this helps strengthen
our country’s defence capability,” Gasanov said.

Speaking of Nagorno-Karabakh, he said, “I hope that as a co-chair of
the OSCE Minsk Group, Russia will facilitate a peaceful resolution
of this issue.”

Following their briefing of Minsk Group members in Vienna on April 3,
the Co-Chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group (Ambassadors Igor Popov of the
Russian Federation, Jacques Faure of France, and James Warlick of the
United States of America) met on April 4 with the Foreign Ministers
of Azerbaijan, Elmar Mammadyarov, and Armenia, Edward Nalbandian. The
Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office, Ambassador
Andrzej Kasprzyk, also participated in the meeting.

The co-chairs reiterated to the Ministers their commitment to working
toward a just and peaceful settlement of the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict. They discussed a possible summit meeting between the
Presidents in the near future, and acknowledged the urgency of further
progress on the substantive issues. The co-chairs again emphasised
to the Ministers the need to take concrete steps to reduce tensions
in the region and advance the peace process.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict began on February 22, 1988. On November
29, 1989 direct rule in Nagorno-Karabakh was ended and Azerbaijan
regained control of the region. However later a joint session of the
Armenian parliament and the top legislative body of Nagorno-Karabakh
proclaimed the unification of Nagorno-Karabakh with Armenia.

On December 10, 1991, Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh held a referendum,
boycotted by local Azeris, that approved the creation of an independent
state.

The struggle over Nagorno-Karabakh escalated after both Armenia and
Azerbaijan obtained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. By
the end of 1993, the conflict had caused thousands of casualties and
created hundreds of thousands of refugees on both sides. An unofficial
ceasefire was reached on May 12, 1994.

As of August, 2008, the co-chairmen of the OSCE Minsk Group were
attempting to negotiate a full settlement of the conflict. On August 2,
2008, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian President Serzh
Sargsyan travelled to Moscow for talks with Dmitry Medvedev, who was
Russian president at that time. As a result, the three presidents
signed an agreement that calls for talks on a political settlement
of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

SYRIA’S LATEST BATTLE: THE PR FIGHT OVER SANCTUARY FOR CHRISTIANS

The Christian Science Monitor
April 7, 2014 Monday

Since taking over the Armenian town of Kessab, the Syrian opposition
has tried to show it, too, can protect minorities. The regime is
determined to disrupt the effort.

Martin Armstrong Contributor

When the Syrian opposition took over the Armenian-Christian town of
Kessab in coastal Syria last month, its 2,000 residents fled. Given
the presence of Al Qaeda-linked Jabhat al-Nusra and other Islamist
groups, they feared the worst for their town.

So far, these fears have not been realized. Instead, rebels appear
to be using Kessab as an opportunity to try to undo their reputation
for extreme brutality towards Syria’s Christians and Shiites. But the
Assad regime, which considers itself the protector of minorities,
has launched a media campaign to demonstrate how Islamists are
terrorizing Christians in Kessab, turning the town into a public
relations battlefield in Syria’s civil war.

Christians’ fears of the armed opposition have been stoked by events
such as the Hatla massacre, in which at least 30 Shiite villagers
were killed, and by snapshots of life under the control of extremist
groups: strict Islamist doctrine, public beheadings of “infidels,”
and the alleged levying of a jizya, or protection tax, on some
Christian communities by the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant,
an Al Qaeda-linked militant group.

Seizing on this reputation, the regime has flooded social media with
shocking images of death and desecration of Shiite and Christian
religious sites lifted from other events during the three-year-long
war. Regime loyalists have even distributed a 2005 horror film called
“Internal Damnation” to give the impression that a sectarian massacre
took place.

The Syrian opposition has been quick to present its own narrative.

Pro-opposition media have released videos of rebels helping elderly
Kessab residents unable to flee regime airstrikes, and protecting local
churches. Ahmed Jarba, the leader of the Syrian National Coalition,
visited the town recently to demonstrate the opposition’s willingness
to protect the population.

The opposition-aligned Syrian Christians for Democracy called on US
lawmakers to launch an inquiry into the regime’s “systematic abuse
of the Christian community,” claiming that Syrian Armenians have been
forcibly conscripted to fight with the regime.

Kessab remains in the hands of the opposition, which has pushed on
to other parts of coastal Syria.

“As Armenians, we are not interested in the war of information that
is taking place. Different parties have used the situation in Kessab
to promote their own agendas,” says Father Paul Haidostian, head of
the Haigazian University in Beirut.

The Turkey factor

History weighs heavily on Kessab’s Armenians, whose presence in the
town and the surrounding valley dates back to the 12th century. During
the 1915 massacre, in which 1.5 million Armenians were killed,
residents of the town, then under Ottoman jurisdiction, were deported
to the deserts of Deir al-Zour, near the Iraqi border, and Jordan.

Close to 5,000 people reportedly died. The survivors returned to
Kessab by the 1920s.

The recent displacement is upsetting partially because of its
familiarity, even if there is no evidence of violence, says Hagop
Khatcherian, secretary general of the Lebanese-Armenian Tashnag Party,
who recently traveled to Syria to assess the needs of the displaced.

The majority of the town’s population has found safe haven in the
coastal regime-controlled city of Latakia, despite Turkey’s proximity.

Around 80 families made their way to Lebanon, finding refuge with
relatives in Beirut and the Armenian town of Anjar in the Bekaa Valley.

Some Kessab residents now in Beirut say the opposition’s ground
assault was preceded by an artillery bombardment launched from inside
Turkey. Armenian media outlets have reported that the fighters passed
through Turkish military barracks en route to Kessab, which is less
than one mile from the border.

Both claims suggest a degree of Turkish complicity that has aggravated
old wounds among Armenians and bred distrust of the opposition,
given the bad blood between Armenians and Turkey, the modern state
that emerged from the Ottoman Empire.

Last week Turkish Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu released a statement
saying those displaced from Kessab were welcome in Turkey, which has
already welcomed hundreds of thousands of Syrian Sunnis.

But Harout Yerganian, former head of the Lebanese Armenian Ramgavar
Party, found the message insulting. “When my grandmother was deported
during the genocide, a Turkish officer ripped out her left earring
and stole it,” he says. “I remember the scar when I was growing up.”

A childhood swim

Mego Apanian, an Armenian who grew up in Kessab, is sheltering his
aunt and uncle in Beirut. “They are in shock,” he says. “They don’t
know if they will have homes to go back to.”

In a cafe in the Beirut’s Armenian neighborhood of Bourj Hammoud,
Apanian recalls his childhood in Kessab.

“When we were young, we used to go down to the beach in al-Samra,
below Kessab, to swim. The Syrian side was very rocky but the Turkish
side was sandy and more desirable,” he says. Syrian border guards
would allow the swimmers to cross into Turkey, while watching them
with binoculars.

“If the Turkish border patrol came, they would shout and we would
run back to the Syrian side. We grew up with this fear and distrust
of Turkey.”

Despite its public relations campaign, the opposition is weighed
down not only by its own record of targeting minorities but also its
assistance from Turkey.

“Everyone knew the Assad regime was totalitarian, but the Armenian
community was treated okay. The extremist groups in the opposition
have made too many mistakes. There was no massacre, but the people
of Kessab have had their peaceful, traditional way of life ripped
away from them,” Yergenian says.

Prime Minister of Georgia calls for constitutional same-sex marriage ban
By Joseph Patrick McCormick
April 8, 2014

The Prime Minister of Georgia recently introduced an amendment calling
for same-sex marriage to be banned in the country’s constitution.

Irakli Garibashvili in late March introduced the amendment which would
specifically define marriage as between one man and one woman.

It was introduced apparently to avoid `misinterpretation’ of an
anti-discrimination bill which was also introduced at the same time.
The latter seeks to fill in legal gaps in anti-discrimination laws to
include LGBT people.

If passed, Georgia would join six other EU Member states with
constitutional same-sex marriage bans, including most recently
Croatia, which in December 2013 passed its ban.

Bulgaria, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania and Poland also ban same-sex
marriage.

Michael Cashman MEP, Co-President of the LGBT Intergroup, reacted:
`These are deeply unwelcome developments. Since the decriminalisation
of homosexuality in 2000, Georgia showed a commitment to protecting
LGBTI people from discrimination by changing its labour code as well
as introducing legislation protecting LGBT people from hate crime.

`Georgia should celebrate diversity and not return to a repressive and
negative past. Now is the time for leadership on the issue of human
rights of LGBTI people. The rights to equal protection of the law, and
the right to live without fear.’

Ulrike Lunacek MEP, Co-President of the LGBT Intergroup and Member of
the European Parliament delegation to the Southern Caucasus, added:
`It is a disgrace that Prime Minister Garibashvili introduced this
amendment at the same time that a bill closing the legal gap in the
protection of LGBTI people was introduced. The amendment serves no
purpose but to institutionalise discrimination against LGBTI people.’

`As equality is the defining element of a civilised and inclusive
society, I call on the Georgian Parliament to vote against this
homophobic amendment and continue on the road to equality.’