Author: Badalian Vardan

“UZDUNROBITA” STOPS COOPERATION WITH KARABAKH TELECOM, AZERBAIJANI
MASS MEDIA SAY
YEREVAN, FEBRUARY 21. ARMINFO. The National Mobile Network Operator of
Uzbekistan, “Uzdunrobita” company, has stopped cooperating with
Karabakh Telecom under the bilateral inter-national Roaming Service,
Day.az report.
According to the source, Azerbaijani diplomats have achieve this in
Tashkent after they addressed an official letter of the Embassy to the
operator-company in connection with the given issues and materials on
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict. It should be noted that since 2002, the
National Operator of NKR, Karabakh Telecom, has invested in
development of the cellular network of the country $15 million. The
winner of the contest for “the second” mobile network operator of
Armenia, the subsidiary structure of Karabakh Telecom, K-Telecom,
plans to invest 100 mln EUR in creation of its own network of mobile
communication in Armenia at the initial stage.

Russian foreign minister says he hoped to visit Georgian PM’s grave
RTR Russia TV, Moscow
17 Feb 05
[Presenter] Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, who is on a visit
to Armenia, today reacted to criticism which the Georgian leadership
had levelled against him on the eve of his trip to Georgia.
Tbilisi expressed dissatisfaction over Moscow’s refusal to include
in the agenda a visit to a memorial to Georgian soldiers, killed in
battles for the country’s territorial integrity.
Here is what Sergey Lavrov said on this score.
[Lavrov] The memorial to those fallen in the course of the wars
in Abkhazia and Ossetia, I mean a visit to it would, undoubtedly,
require complex political commentaries. We grieve for all the victims
of these wars, on both sides. I would particularly like to note
that my plans, my personal plans, included a visit to the grave of
[the recently-assassinated Georgian Prime Minister] Zurab Zhvania,
to pay homage to his memory, to lay flowers on his grave. He is a man
who has done a very great deal in order for the Abkhazian and South
Ossetian conflicts to be settled exclusively by peaceful means.

ASBAREZ ONLINE
TOP STORIES
02/17/2005
TO ACCESS PREVIOUS ASBAREZ ONLINE EDITIONS PLEASE VISIT OUR
WEBSITE AT <;HTTP:// 1) 90th Anniversary Commemoration Committee Finalizes Programs 2) Russian FM Discusses Bilateral Ties, Karabagh in Armenia 3) Tbilisi Incident Concerns Javakhk Armenians 4) Christian Minority in Azerbaijan Gets Rid of Armenian 'Eye Sore' 1) 90th Anniversary Commemoration Committee Finalizes Programs LOS ANGELES--This year marks the 90th Anniversary of first genocide of the Twentieth Century--the genocide against the Armenian people. This page in history--the annihilation of close to two million Armenians --will be marked by Armenians throughout the world. The Armenian-American community of California, which has traditionally organized an array of events during the month of April, and specifically between April 17-24, will this year commemorate the Genocide's 90th Anniversary by hosting a series of events jointly organized by over two dozen Armenian political, cultural, and religious groups. With the recent addition of the Organization of Istanbul Armenians, the Iraqi Armenian Community, and the Armenian Youth Movement, the number of member groups of the United Armenian Genocide 90th Anniversary Commemoration Committee of California, grew to 26. The United Young Armenians, however, left the coalition. Having begun its work in 2004, the Committee has nearly finalized its agenda, and has resolved to mark the 90th Anniversary through: - Organizing a large-scale cultural event; - Hosting a commemoration in Sacramento with the participation of State-level elected officials and government representatives; - Organizing a demonstration adjacent to the Turkish Consulate of Los Angeles; - Hosting a requiem service at the monument, dedicated to the memory of the Genocide's victims, in the City of Montebello. - Hosting requiem services at all Armenians churches throughout the State; - Organizing a community-wide event, concluding the series of commemorative events. United Armenian Genocide 90th Anniversary Commemoration Committee of California 2) Russian FM Discusses Bilateral Ties, Karabagh in Armenia YEREVAN (RFE/RL)--Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with President Robert Kocharian and other Armenian leaders in Yerevan Thursday on an official visit which focused on bilateral relations and the Karabagh conflict. The talks were also aimed at preparing for Russian President Vladimir Putin's upcoming visit to Armenia, his country's main regional ally. "We expect a very busy year for our partnership and allied relationship," Lavrov said at the end of the one-day trip. "We have to implement agreements reached by the [Russian-Armenian] inter-governmental commission on economic cooperation last December. We agreed to accelerate implementation of all issues agreed by the parties so that our presidents can see… that their decisions are put into practice." "There are no problems in our relations. But because those relations are constantly developing, they need constant attention," he added. "We are happy with the results of the visit. I believe that it will give an additional impetus to our relations," Oskanian said for his part. Kocharian told Lavrov that he is satisfied with the current state of bilateral ties and hopes that Russia will help to lift transport blockades resulting from the unresolved ethnic conflicts in the South Caucasus. The Karabagh conflict was a major theme of the talks. "We hope that the Prague process of regular meetings between the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan will bear fruit," Lavrov said. "The co-chairs of the OSCE's Minsk Group are ready to foster that. We will do our best to make sure that the process progresses successfully." "Sergei Lavrov is a minister who probably knows more [about the Karabagh peace process] than I," Oskanian joked at their joint news conference, underlining Moscow's role as a key international mediator. He announced that his next meeting with Azeri Foreign Minister Elmar Mammadyarov in Prague will take place on March 2. Economic issues were another subject of discussions, with Kocharian and Prime Minister Andranik Markarian again calling on the Russians to speed up work on reactivating four of five moribund Armenian enterprises which were handed over to them two years ago in payment for Armenia's $100 million debt. Markarian also expressed concern at Russia's plans to finance a new railway to Iran that would bypass Armenia and run through its arch-rival Azerbaijan Lavrov, who revealed to reporters last year that his father was a Tbilisi-born Armenian, assured Markarian that "Russia will take into account Armenia's interests and will not take any steps that would damage them," according to an Armenian government statement. 3) Tbilisi Incident Concerns Javakhk Armenians YEREVAN (Combined Sources)--Voicing concern over a recent incident in Tbilisi involving the desecration of Armenian gravestones, the Javakhk Union of Georgian Armenians sent a letter to Georgian President Mikhail Saakashvili, urging him to take measures to preserve Armenian cultural monuments in Georgia. On February 8, Armenian gravestones from the St. Virgin Church in Tbilisi's Norashen district were removed and replaced with Georgian ones. A Georgian priest also told the Armenian clerics to pray in Armenia because "this church is ours now." The 15th century church's ornaments made by the Hovnatanyans are still preserved. Head of the Georgian-Armenian diocese Archbishop Vazgen Mirzakhanyan, said he is concerned that the next incident will involve vandalism of the church. 4) Christian Minority in Azerbaijan Gets Rid of Armenian 'Eye Sore' By Simon Ostrovsky (AFP)--When a Christian people in this predominantly Muslim republic ground away the Armenian inscriptions from the walls of a church and tombs last month to erase evidence linking them to Azerbaijan's foe [Armenia], they thought they had the interests of their small community in mind. But now the tiny Christian church in the former Soviet republic of Azerbaijan has become the focus of a big scandal as the Udi minority struggles to find its identity in an ideological minefield. The church, which has not been used since Azerbaijan became part of the Soviet Union, has become the center of a dispute between the Norwegian backers of the reconstruction, who consider the alterations to be vandalism, and the Udi community. "We have no God, our people lost their religion under communism and this church is our only hope of reviving it," said Georgi Kechaari, one of the village elders who doubles as the ethnic group's historian. "But we live in Azerbaijan, and when people came into the church and saw Armenian letters, they automatically associated us with Armenians," he said. The Udi, who once used the Armenian alphabet, have struggled to separate their legacy from that of their fellow Christians, the Armenians, who fought a war with Azerbaijan and have been vilified here. Since the beginning of the conflict with Armenia over Mountainous Karabagh, which erupted just before the break-up of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan has rid of nearly everything associated with Armenia in has been wiped away, although hundreds of thousands of Armenians lived here before the war that ended in a cease-fire in 1994. Armenian-sounding city names have been changed, streets named after Armenians have been replaced with politically correct Azeri surnames, while Soviet history glorifying Armenian communist activists has been rewritten in school textbooks. But the white stone church in Nij, some two centuries old, had not been tampered with until the Udi undertook to reconstruct it with help from the state financed Norwegian Humanitarian Enterprise (NHE). "It was a beautiful inscription, 200 years old, it even survived the war," Norway's Ambassador to Azerbaijan Steinar Gil told AFP. "This is an act of vandalism and Norway in no way wants to be associated with it." But the Udis insist they erased the inscriptions to right a historic wrong. Kechaari alleged that the Armenian inscriptions, which stated that the Church was built in 1823, were fakes put there by Armenians in the 1920s so that they could make historical claims to it. The Udis are the last surviving tribe of the Caucasus Albanians, a group unrelated to the Mediterranean Albanians, whose Christian kingdom ruled this region in medieval times before Turkic hordes swept in from Central Asia in the 13th and 15th centuries. They number under 10,000 people and Nij is the only predominantly Udi village to survive to this day, and although they call themselves Christian, there is little that Christians from other parts of the world would find in common with them. The Udis have not had a pastor for nearly a century and celebrate Islamic holidays together with their Muslim neighbors. But while the Udis soul search for an identity, Azerbaijan has used their legacy to strengthen its claims to Karabagh. Armenians argue that the multitude of churches in the occupied region proves that they as a Christian people can lay a historic claim to it. But Azeris, who consider themselves to be the descendants of Albanians who were assimilated into a Turkic group, say the area is rightfully theirs because the churches were actually built by their ancestors the Albanians. To the Udi, who used Armenian script when their church was built, toeing the official Azeri line has become more of a priority than historical accuracy. The perception that they are one with the Armenians has meant that there has been little trust from the authorities; Udi men for example were only allowed to start serving in the Azeri Army two years ago. But their use of power tools to fit the status quo took their Norwegian sponsors by surprise. "They think they have erased a reminder of being Armenian...instead they have taken away the chance to have a good image when the church is inaugurated," the director of the NHE in Azerbaijan, Alf Henry Rasmussen said, adding that a visit to the church by Norway's prime minister will probably now be canceled. "Everyone will stare at the missing stones. I'm not quite sure if we can continue our work there," Rasmussen said. All subscription inquiries and changes must be made through the proper carrier and not Asbarez Online. ASBAREZ ONLINE does not transmit address changes and subscription requests. (c) 2005 ASBAREZ ONLINE. All Rights Reserved. ASBAREZ provides this news service to ARMENIAN NEWS NETWORK members for academic research or personal use only and may not be reproduced in or through mass media outlets. --Boundary_(ID_QjS5LRMjJqU2iEtvGkqsWw)--

Russian company buys Armenian power grid – agency
Regnum, Moscow
12 Feb 05
[No dateline as received] In November last year Regnum news agency
reported about talks between the British trade and industrial concern
Midland Resources Holding Ltd and the RAO UES (Russia) [Russia’s
power grid monopoly Unified Energy System] on the sale of the Armenian
power grid. The press secretary of the Armenian power grid, Margarita
Grigoryan, officially denied reports from a well-informed source in
the company that the Russian holding would become the owner of the
Armenian power grid in January 2005.
Meanwhile, Yerevan-based newspaper Aykakan Zhamanak reported on 12
February that a subsidiary of the RAO UES of Russia, Inter RAO UES,
has bought the Armenian power grid from Midland Resources for 80m
dollars. The deal will be officially made public in April 2005, the
newspaper noted. Aykakan Zhamanak noted that the World Bank is roundly
against handing over the Armenian power grid to Russia. The newspaper
also alleged that “after the sale of the Armenian power grid, Russia
will not be the only one to control them”. [Sentence as published]
To recap, an agreement on the sale of the Armenian power grid was
signed in Yerevan on 26 August between the Armenian government and
the British trade and industrial concern Midland Resources Holding
Ltd. In accordance with the document, 80.1 per cent of the Armenian
power grid shares were sold to the concern for 37.15m dollars. The
British company was to pay 12.15m dollars for the shares and to
allocate another 25m dollars to the Armenian budget to cover the
Armenian power grid’s debts and to pay wage arrears.
The RAO UES of Russia owns the Sevan-Razdan cascade of hydro-electric
power plants and the Razdan thermoelectric power plant and controls
finances of the Armenia Nuclear Power Plant. The RAO UES set up the
International Energy Corporation closed-type joint-stock company in May
2003 for the management of the Sevan-Razdan cascade of hydro-electric
power plants, which was handed over to Russia to cover part of the debt
for the nuclear fuel delivered for the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant.
Finances of the Armenian Nuclear Power Plant have been placed in
trust management of Inter RAO UES, a subsidiary of the RAO UES,
(60 per cent of shares) and Russia’s state nuclear power holding
Rosenergoatom (40 per cent) for five years.
Probably, the sale of the Armenian power grid should be viewed in
the context of the RAO UES’ attempt to synchronize the power grids
of the entire region, including Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.
Taking account of the fact that after the commissioning of the
Iran-Armenia gas pipeline, Armenia will export electricity to Iran
in exchange for the supplied gas, which is outlined in the major
agreement, the issue of synchronizing the Armenian and Iranian power
grids could also emerge on the agenda. Since the RAO UES is also the
owner of Georgia’s major power facilities, one can say that the RAO UES
is striving to synchronize the work of the power grids of the whole of
the region, including Armenia, Georgia and even Turkey in the future.

Caucaz.com, Georgia
Feb 14 2005
Toward a normalization of Azerbaijan-Iran relations
Gilles Riaux’s Column
By Gilles RIAUX, PhD student at the French Geopolitics Institute –
Paris 8 University in Paris
On 14/02/2005
The recent visit to Iran of Azerbaijani president Ilham Aliyev, from
Janurary 24th to 26th 2005, confirms the rapprochement between Tehran
and Baku. Not only did he meet with the Iranian president Mohammad
Khatami whom the presidential term of office will be ending soon, but
Ilham Aliyev also met with le Guide Ali Khameney and Ali Akhbar
Hashemi Rafsandjani – two of the most influent men of the Islamic
Republic of Iran.
Among the topics discussed the major ones were the condemnation of
the Armenian occupation in Nagorno-Karabagh, the strengthening of
economic bonds and the cooperation for fight against terrorism, drug
trafficking and organized crime.
Furthermore, this visit was a follow up to the one of Khatami in Baku
in August 2004. This visit ended up on the opening of a consulate of
the Republic of Azerbaijan in Tabriz and the signing of agreements
for the improvement of communication infrastructures and energetic
cooperation between the two countries. Those two official meetings
show, if not proove, the undeniable rapprochement between Baku and
Tehran – rapprochement initiated by Heydar Aliyev’s visit to Iran,
early 2002.
And yet over the 90’s, there was an obvious distrust between the two
capitals. This distrust was at its strongest point in July 2001 when
an Iranian military ship demanded an oil prospecting ship coming form
Azerbaijan to get away from the Iran territorial waters.
At the beginning, Iran saw USSR’s fall as a way to expand its
influence in Central Asia and Caucasus, by taking advantage of their
religious and cultural common history. Until it was conquered by the
Russian Empire at the beginning of the 19th century, the current
territory of the Azerbaijani republic was an integral part of Iran.
There the major ethnic group of the population is Shiite (the
Azeris), which is also the main minority in Iran.
However, the new and weak republics of Central Asia and Caucasus
choose to strongly assert their national indentity so as to prevent
any foreign interference. The new president of the Republic of
Azerbaijan, Abulfaz Elçibey, takes a nationalist stance, especially
agressive toward Iran. He asks for an Iranian Azerbaijan to secede
from Iran, and for the creation of a great Azerbaijan of which the
capital would be Tabriz.
It is then that Tehran decides to actively support Armenia for the
Nagorno-Karabagh conflict, in order to defuse a possible secession of
Iran’s Azeris and to weaken the republic of Azerbaijan. Officially,
Iran takes a neutral stance but as its Minister of Foreign Affairs,
Mahmud Vae’zi, admitted it, Iran’s support to Armenia is dictated by
domestic issues (source ). The Islamic
Republic turns for good its revolutionary project into a strict
realism regarding its Foreign policy.
The coming of power of apparatchik Heydar Aliyev marks a turning
point for Azerbaijan. He trades the hazardous nationalist policy of
his predecessor for a realism inherited from a long experience of the
Soviet system. From this point, he has to bring back on its feet a
country which is then on its knees and weakened by a territorial
conflict lost for good.
So as to succeed in his project to turn Azerbaijan into « a new
Kuwait », Heydar Aliyev has first to work on the issue of oil
exportations, in order to provide a stable environment by improving
its relations with the region’s power. Once the difficult BTC oil
pipeline project passed, Tehran gets that it would never become a
mandatory partner for Azerbaijan. Indeed despite Iran’s outstanding
location, the USA would never have accepted that Caspian Sea oil
transit through the territory of the Islamic republic.
It may be difficult sometimes to understand the Iranian Foreign
Policy, this one resulting from arrangements between the different
factions in power. However, Iran being surrounded by the USA and
ethnic minorities – primarily Azeris – developing cultural claims,
Tehran is now inclined to improve its relations with Baku.
This improvement is both following the domestic, and the foreign
line. And for Iran taking part in stabilizing Caucasus, by the
resolution of Nagorno-Karabakh conflict or the fight against the
different smuggling that destabilize the region, has become necessary
since this country wants to be a regional power. It is also a way to
loosen the American grip.
Ilham Aliyev’s visit to Tabriz, the new Consulate of the Republic of
Azerbaijan, as well as the mausoleum of Sharyar – key figure of the
Azeri litterature in Iran, is also helping the domestic line. It gave
the opportunity to bring to Iran’s Azeris goodwill tokens for their
cultural claims, and to limit the radicalization of Azeri
nationlists.
But this apparent normalization conceals still pretty poorly the
difficulties met by two States which choose a realistic Foreign
Policy. The position towards the United States and the legal status
of the Caspian Sea are still the major disagreements which prevent a
strong alliance between Azerbaijan and Iran.
–Boundary_(ID_6dSEMU8kYe8EXY+zDO6D7A)–

PanArmenian News
Feb 10 2005
WITH DEVELOPING TURKEY-RUSSIA RELATIONS, KREMLIN MAY PLAY MAJOR ROLE
IN KARABAKH SETTLEMENT
10.02.2005 15:41
/PanARMENIAN.Net/ With the developing Turkey-Russia relationsKremlin
may play a major role in the settlement of the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict in the future, Turkish Parliament Speaker Bulent Arinc said.
Simultaneously he noted that Armenia, “adhering to a non-constructive
stance, is not interested in the conflict resolution.”

FEBRUARY 8 DAY OF ANNOUNCEMENTS AT RA NATIONAL ASSEMBLY
Azg/arm
10 Feb 05
The key event of the day was the announcement represented by Justice
faction and read by Aram G. Sargsian. The faction expected that the
representatives of other factions and groups of the parliament will
sign their announcement.
It was emphasized in the announcement that “as a result of Nagorno
Karabakhâ~@~Ys isolation from the negotiation process, the essence
of the conflict has changed, turning into a territorial claim between
Armenia and Azerbaijan. At present, the settlement of the conflict
is observed through the scope of Azerbaijanâ~@~Y s territorial
integrity.”
The announcement stated that Nagorno Karabakh achieved its independence
legally, according to the international criteria of the right for
self-determination.
Stepan Zakarian, another member of the faction, condemned the policy
conducted by our foreign ministry and also touched upon the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict. He said that our political figures are constantly
losing their calculations concerning the Karabakh issue.
They explained the decision to send a detachment to Iraq by the
possibility that the US can participate in the settlement of Nagorno
Karabakh issue. But on the very next day after our detachment departed
to Iraq, the US made a statement supporting the territorial integrity
of Azerbaijan.
It was obvious that the opposition made the issue of Nagorno Karabakh
a key one for their activities.
The MPs also discussed the clash between two criminal groups in a
Armenian settlement. Victor Dallaqian said that “the clash was a result
of the disorder in the republic. Immorality destroyed Rome; Caligula
made his horse a senator. While the disorder threatens Armenia.”
By Karine Danielian
–Boundary_(ID_C3da7wbIMc9d+KRZ4q+LIQ)–

AzerTag, Azerbaijan
Feb 9 2005
FACTS PRESENTED BY AZERBAIJAN PROVED, SAYS DEPUTY FOREIGN MINISTER
[February 09, 2005, 16:59:36]
The facts presented by Azerbaijan officials to the OSCE fact-finding
group examining settling of occupied Azerbaijani territories with
ethnic Armenians have been proved, stated Deputy Foreign Minister of
Azerbaijan Araz Azimov. The first stage has already ended; after the
facts revealed are analyzed, a corresponding report will be presented
to the OSCE Minsk Group, and the organization’s Permanent Council,
and then a political appraisal will be given to the situation, he
said.
In response to the claims that the Armenian families moved to these
territories are those who once left Azerbaijan, Araz Azimov noted
that in accordance with Geneva Convention of 1949, settling of
occupied territories is allowed under no circumstances, and that an
occupant has no right to make any demographic changes in the occupied
territories.
He especially emphasized that it was after the occupation that the
Armenian families were placed there, that contradicts international
humanitarian law. Armenian claims of this kind are groundless, and
will not be taken seriously, said the Deputy Foreign Minister.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress

“Turkish-Russian Relations: Implications for Eurasia’s Geopolitics”
PINR The Power and Interest News Report
Feb 9 2005
As a result of its geography, Turkey maintains a multi-dimensional
and dynamic foreign policy. Turkish foreign policymakers are
carefully analyzing their foreign policy options in light of the 9/11
attacks and the war in Iraq. Within this set of complex links,
Turkish-Russian relations appear rather perplexing. Historically,
there have been many wars between these two states up until the end
of WWI. Both countries have imperial legacies and have experienced a
post-imperial traumatic loneliness. Great imperial legacies and the
feelings of isolation after the collapse of the previous empires are
important factors that shape the national memory of these countries.
After Russian President Vladimir Putin’s visit to Turkey in December
of last year, Turkey’s prime minister paid a one day official visit
to Russia on January 10, 2005. It is relevant to analyze current
factors that determine the relations between these two states.
Domestic politics in Russia is often the result of competing views of
Westerners, anti-Westerners, Eurasianists, ultra-nationalists and
nostalgic communists. Russian foreign policy is generally determined
along the line of domestic political preferences. There is a symbolic
pendulum in Russian foreign policy that vacillates between Europe and
Asia depending on the political balances currently at play. Russian
foreign policy is today more critical of the West and follows a more
Eurasian-oriented path.
For Moscow, the existence of such national memory and geopolitical
orientation makes it difficult to determine a fixed and
well-functioning foreign policy towards Turkey. Like Russia, Turkey
has Caucasian, Balkan, Middle Eastern and European identities and
different interests at stake in all of these regions. Another
significant factor is that both countries are going through dynamic
domestic and economic transformations. The change in the early four
years of the current decade is surely dramatic at both societal and
state levels.
Issues at Stake
More specifically, the future of Turkish-Russian relations will be a
product of bilateral, regional and international developments.
High-level mutual visits in the recent period underline a number of
important issues between the two states. Although observers seem to
have an optimistic perception of the relations both in Moscow and
Ankara, there are issues of contention between the two states.
The issues of bilateral relations will be trade, investments by
Turkish and Russian businessmen, tourism, natural gas purchases,
Russian oil tankers transiting the straits, future pipeline projects
that may pass through the Trace or Anatolia, the Chechen question,
Russian arms sales, and the actions of Kurdish separatists on Russian
soil. A major recent development is the Russian leader’s statement
that the Turkish society in Northern Cyprus deserves better treatment
from the international community, since the Turkish Cypriots voted in
favor of the U.N. plan designed to put an end to the division of the
island.
Although there is much talk about the convergence of interests
between Turkey and Russia, one should also point out the conflicting
ones. Both countries favor improving their current relations and
adopting a more pragmatic stance on the international arena.
Officials on both sides signed a number of agreements, which will
surely facilitate the establishment of constructive relations.
The volume of bilateral trade reached $10 billion in 2004, and both
sides aim to increase this volume to $25 billion by 2007. Turkey’s
construction sector is active in Moscow and is increasing its market
share in Russia. Russian businessmen closely follow Turkey’s
privatization process and want to take part in energy projects in
Turkey. Another major cooperation area is Russian arms sales to
Turkey. Considering the Iraq crisis and potential instability in Iran
and Syria, Ankara pays serious attention to military modernization
projects and has an interest in Russian arms supplies. Finally,
Russian tourists increasingly prefer Turkey’s Mediterranean coast for
their vacations.
At another level, the mutual agenda is set around Russia’s energy
geopolitics, its near abroad policies, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
(B.T.C.) oil pipeline, ethnic secessionist movements in the Caucasus,
the reduction of Russian military forces in the region in accordance
with international agreements, and the problems emerging after the
Iraq war. Russia dislikes the B.T.C. pipeline, which is expected to
transit Azeri and Kazak oil to the West. Moscow regards this pipeline
as a challenge to its status in the Caspian basin and an obstacle to
its oil trade. Although the major conflict surrounding the B.T.C.
pipeline was between Russia and a number of former Soviet states, it
indirectly influenced Turkish-Russian relations. However, the Blue
Stream project — a natural gas pipeline that runs from Russia to
Turkey via the Black Sea — and several other Turkish-Russian oil
pipeline projects have led to the emergence of a “low profile” policy
concerning oil politics on the part of Russia. Although it is
speculative at the moment, the head of British Petroleum Company in
Azerbaijan recently floated the possibility of carrying Russian oil
through the B.T.C.
According to the official Turkish policy line, the Chechen question
is a Russian internal problem. Turkish officials frequently declare
that Russian security measures should not violate human rights in
Chechnya. However, a large Chechen diaspora in Turkey follows a
different line and tries its best to assist Chechen guerrillas,
creating significant tensions between the Turkish and Russian
governments. In return, Turkish officials have expressed discontent
about the Kurdistan Workers Party’s — a separatist Kurdish armed
movement — activities in Russian territories. For the time being,
both sides extend considerable vigor in order not to sever their
relations on account of trans-boundary ethnic problems.
Toward a New Geopolitics
Russia has a regional profile and is sensitive about losing its
influence in ex-Soviet territories. Since 1991, Turkey has emerged as
a significant regional player, pursuing a special relationship with
the E.U. and paying serious attention to building good relations in
the Caucasus and Central Asia. How closer Turkish-Russian relations
will be interpreted in Brussels and Washington is another important
question.
The U.S. military deployment in different parts of Eurasia, the
pro-Western change in domestic landscapes of Georgia and Ukraine, the
U.S. wars in Afghanistan and Iraq are, among others, the developments
that have paved the way for the emergence of a new geopolitics in
Eurasia. The European and U.S. expansion into former Soviet
territories influences Russian policymakers to seek new alliances in
Asia. Russian rapprochement with Iran, China and India are examples
of this new policy. In this sense, the new developments in the
aftermath of the 9/11 attacks are bringing together the policies of
not only Russia and other major Asian powers, but also some critical
European states like France and Germany.
After receiving a negotiation date for E.U. membership, Turkey is
emerging as a European actor in the region. However, Turkey’s new
orientation was tested during the subsequent domestic transformations
of Georgia and Ukraine. Turkey adopted a low profile attitude toward
the Russian policies vis-à-vis Ukraine and Georgia, and sensitively
displayed a constructive outlook by pointing to the relevant
international norms and agreements as the way to resolve the crises.
Ankara tries to avoid taking sides in any “Russia versus the West”
struggles, while developing its own relations with Moscow.
One other important area of contention is Turkish-Armenian relations,
which are held hostage to historical enmities and Turkey’s
pro-Azerbaijan policies in the Caucasus. Currently, Russia is the
main ally of Armenia, and possible Russian mediation between Turkey
and Armenia on a number of issues can be expected. Following recent
positive developments on this front, there may be Russian-Turkish
joint attempts to solve the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict.
Conclusion
By looking at the current developments, it can be concluded that
Turkish-Russian relations will improve in the political, economic and
security realms. However, the relations are not free from a number of
serious problems that could threaten to derail these growing ties;
both countries have converging and conflicting interests in
neighboring regions, and this status makes Turkish-Russian relations
promising yet difficult. Turkey and Russia are two influential actors
in the Eurasian geopolitics and their relations have implications for
the whole Eurasian region. Because of this, internal and external
players in Eurasian geopolitical gambling will keep an eye on this
growing relationship.
Report Drafted By:
Dr. Bulent Aras
The Power and Interest News Report (PINR) is an independent
organization that utilizes open source intelligence to provide
conflict analysis services in the context of international relations.
PINR approaches a subject based upon the powers and interests
involved, leaving the moral judgments to the reader. This report may
not be reproduced, reprinted or broadcast without the written
permission of [email protected]. All comments should be directed to
[email protected].
–Boundary_(ID_EjscDefBJQr1PpCUd7SCdQ)–

Azeri journalist to visit breakaway Karabakh
Regnum, Moscow
5 Feb 05
The Nagornyy Karabakh authorities have accepted the proposal of the
Azerbaijani journalist and correspondent of the Monitor magazine,
Eynulla Fatullayev, to visit Nagornyy Karabakh.
At yesterday’s press conference in Stepanakert, the foreign minister
of the Nagornyy Karabakh republic, Arman Melikyan, gave a positive
assessment to the visit in terms of establishing mutual understanding
between the sides to the conflict. At the same time, the minister
pointed out that pressure had been put on the journalist in Baku.
The visit of the Azerbaijani journalist, who intends to meet
representatives of social and political circles and the local media,
is scheduled for 10 February.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress