Author: Badalian Vardan

WIMAX TECHNOLOGY PROPOSED TO BE USED FOR DATA TRANSMISSION IN ARMENIA
Noyan Tapan
Apr 04 2006
YEREVAN, APRIL 4, NOYAN TAPAN. Representatives of the Alvarion company
(Israel) on April 3 presented to the Armenian consumer the broadband
radio access systems envisaged for the digital transmission of
Internet, sound and visual data. Igor Bashes, manager for preliminary
sales preparation at Alvarion, said that the company occupies 31%
of the world market of these systems. It operated under the name of
BreezeCOM company before 2001. Alvarion was formed after the merger
with Floware company and later it was joined by Innowave and InterWAVE
companies. According to I. Bashes, the WiMAX systems of Alvarion ensure
a coverage within a 40-km radius in conditions of direct visibility
and within a 7-12-km radius in cities. He said that from 2007, these
systems can be applicable in laptops produced with Centrino processors
of the Intel company.
Alvarion’s authorized distributor and service center in CIS countries
is the Cedicom company, whose president Simon Paamon noted that now
the equipment to secure a radio access by the subscriber’s personal
computer costs 1,200 USD, but the price may decline 2-3fold as a
result of using Intel’s new chip.
According to Karapet Avetisian, Armenian representative of Cedicom,
technical director of Redinet company, Alvarion’s systems can be
used by ArmenTel and VivaCell companies, as well as by various
Internet service providers and the final users of the Internet. In
his words, Alvarion’s radiosystems allow the subscriber to use a 12
megabit/second capacity radio channel. He said that a base station
to secure communication with radio channels of this capacity for 250
subscribers will cost at least 20 thousand dollars. According to K.
Avetisian’s information, WiMAX systems of Alvarion are competible with
the network of Wi-Fi systems installed by the Arminco company. The
network operates by the radiomodem – optical channel combination. In
response to a question of NT correspondent, technical director
of Arminco Grigor Saghian said that the technology proposed by
Alvarion can promote a rapid development of Arminco’s network, since
optico-fiber channels with a higher transmission capacity cannot be
installed in all areas. In his opinion, both in terms of its price
and coverage provision, the WiMAX standard is more suitale for use
in Armenian rural areas remote from the main optico-fiber cables.

BIG ROW IN ARMENIA
Hakob Badalyan
Lragir.am
04 April 06
I did not notice the moment when I started to pay attention to the
public debates on the song Andre is going to sing in Eurovision. But
it has been a long time since I began to follow opinions, evaluations,
and arguments. Frankly speaking, for a long time I have been unable
to find out if what is happening is a dialogue or settling of accounts.
Andre is going to sing, and a row started in Armenia. As in any
other quarrel in Armenia there are also two arguments: is Andre’s
song Turkish or not Turkish. Nothing else. No one asks if the song
is good or bad. Is Andre the right candidate? If the debate was on
these questions, it could be considered useful and important. But the
debate is on confirming or declining that the song and the singer’s
image are Turkish. Therefore, this reminds me of settling of accounts
rather than concern about due performance of Armenia in Eurovision.
Whereas it is time that the Turkish factor stop being a blind
argument pro or con, for the people of Armenia and for Armenians in
general. They compared Andre to Tarkan to show that the song and the
image are bad. I wonder why the resemblance of the Armenian singer
to the Eastern pop star is viewed so negatively, whereas if Andre
resembled to Ricky Martin, for instance, that would not be considered
that bad. Of course, it is another question that maybe Andre is not
fit for the “classical” image of a pop singer. In other words, Andre is
too good for this image, for he may can make a serious singer. Maybe. I
have my own opinion, which is not essential here and is not a competent
opinion. However, I repeat that there was no professional discussion
of this. Everything is on the eternal plane of adversity of Armenians
and Turks, and with regard to Armenia Karabakh is added.
Finally it is amazing that our participation in Eurovision, which is
a youth show, and the aim is pure business, caused such heated public
debates. Members of parliament, intelligentsia, builders, and farmers
got involved in these debates. The Public TV Channel even held a big
talk show to defend Andre from strictures. The question, however,
does not have such a big public importance. In fact, it should be
discussed by people who are in show business. But it is the Public
Channel’s business only, for they will spend money and get results,
therefore public debates are absolutely useless, since the problem
has a narrow scope of interest. The public is not a specialist of
Turkish studies, an ethnographer, or a musician. And the problem
has nothing to do with the public, it is not a price or a tariff,
it is not a public concern. There are a number of problems, which
failed to become a subject of public discussion. No debates are held
and the Public Channel never organizes talk shows on promotion of a
civic consciousness, improvement of governance, tricks with prices
and other problems, which are closely related to the society.
And for this reason I am being more convinced that with regard to Andre
it is not a debate but revenge, settling of accounts, interests. The
best evidence to this is that a singer, who is referred to as a
star, one day complains of and wonders why Andre and not Inga or
Anush Arshakyan go to Eurovision, or Shushan Petrosyan herself, and
several days later Petrosyan announces that we should not criticize
Andre but we should pray for him and wish him good luck, we should
love and appreciate what we have and come together. There is nothing
to do but to become convinced that they say what the moment requires.
Obviously, Andre has nothing to do here, he is just another good
opportunity for settling accounts. Another opportunity seemed to have
occurred to have a competent debate. This opportunity was missed,
whereas there is so much to discuss.

TREATY ASSURES THAT RUSSIAN TANKS WILL RUMBLE THEIR LAST
By Keti Sikharulidze
The Messenger, Georgia
April 3 2006
Russia and Georgia agree on a set deadline for the removal of Russian
bases; and sign it.
Georgian First Deputy Minister of Defense Mamuka Kudava and Russian
Land Forces Commander Alexei Maslov sign the military base withdrawal
agreement.
After a year of negotiations, Georgia and Russia signed a treaty
on March 31, “on the operation terms, deadlines and withdrawal of
Russian military bases and objects from the territory of Georgia.”
The treaty was signed in the southern Russian city of Sochi by Deputy
Defense Minister Mamuka Kudava from Georgia and General Aleksei Maslov,
Commander-in Chief of the Russian land forces.
“With the signing of this agreement we have ended an epic story that
has been going on since the Giorgievski treaty was signed in 1783. It
has now ended successfully, which is a victory for the Georgian
nation,” Kudava said after signing the agreement.
Russian ambassador to Georgia Vladimiir Chkhikvishvili commended the
treaty saying “all terms and conditions in the documents were solved
by mutual compromises acceptable for both sides.”
The negotiations surrounding the withdrawal of Russian bases from
Georgian territory have been centered primarily on a joint declaration
which was signed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov and former
Georgian Foreign Minister Salome Zourabichvili in May 2005.
“We have compromised by allowing Russia three years to withdraw
its military bases, as we believe that in reality such a long term
is not necessary. But we have decided to accept the arguments which
have been submitted by the Russian side,” Georgian Defense Minister
Irakli Okruashvili said at a news conference on March 31.
The withdrawal will be conducted according to the terms and conditions
laid out in the treaty. The Akhalkalaki base will be closed by October
1, 2007 while the Batumi base, which is also the headquarters of the
Russian forces in the South Caucasus, will be shut down in 2008.
According to the agreement, the heavy equipment currently on the two
bases must be removed by the end of the year. 370 pieces of military
hardware from the Akhalkalaki base will be transferred to Russia’s
102nd military base in Gyumri, Armenia while the rest of the equipment
will leave Georgian territory through Batumi port, including the 11
tanks, 127 armoured cars, and 76 pieces of artillery that are located
at the Batumi base. All other weapons must leave Georgia by December
31, 2007.
One potentially troubling unsolved problem remains however: Russia’s
Gudauta military base in Abkhazia is not included in the treaty. The
Russian side claims that the base has not been in use since 2001 and
that it no longer houses any weapons although recent reports suggest
that this allegedly abandoned base has come under attack from Abkhazian
boevics who have purportedly been trying to capture weapons. Russian
soldiers even injured several Abkhaz militiamen during this attack,
some reports indicate.
“This incident clearly shows that the base has not been closed, and
therefore we categorically call upon the international commonwealth
to pressure make everything evident and close it like Akhlakalaki
and Batumi bases,” stated Okruashvili. The Georgian side has demanded
that its own military representatives be allowed in to inspect this
supposedly derelict base.
In addition the two sides also signed a document on the organization
of the transit of Russian military cargo and personnel across
Georgia. Russia needs such permission from Georgia in order to supply
its military base in Guymri as Georgia represents the only possible
ground transit route due to the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
According to the draft agreement, Georgia can refuse to allow the
transit of any military cargo that it believes could pose a threat
to its national security or if the final destination of the cargo is
located within a conflict zone or a warring state.
“It can be called a compromise from our side when we accepted this
transit agreement… However this does not mean that we will put
ourselves in a position where we will allow the transit of any cargo
that will pose a threat to regional stability,” said the Defense
Minister, adding that the amount of military cargo transited via
Georgia will be agreed upon by Russia and Georgia at least one year
in advance.
Russia also undertakes the commitment not to transit biological,
nuclear or chemical weapons, or weapon of mass destruction or any of
their components.
Despite these stipulations, Azerbaijan has protested what it sees as
a decision by Georgia to assist Russia arm Armenia – an accusation
which the Georgian Minister of Defense refutes.
“Russia does not bring this equipment to Armenia in order to give it
to the Armenian military, but to place it on their own military bases
there and besides, this complaint has no significant meaning for us
as the main thing is to withdraw foreign militaries from our country,”
Defense Minister Okruashvili noted.

GEORGIA: RUSSIA PLEDGES TO COMPLETE MILITARY PULLOUT ON SCHEDULE
Jean-Christophe Peuch 4/01/06
A EurasiaNet Partner Post from RFE/RL
EurasiaNet, NY
April 2 2006
Russia has agreed on the practical details of its military pullout
from Georgia. Envoys from Moscow tand Tbilisi signed two documents
to that effect in the Russian Black Sea resort of Sochi on March
31. The agreements confirm a pledge given by Russia last year that
the withdrawal would be completed within months.
Under the terms of a preliminary agreement reached May 30, 2005 in
Moscow, Russia had pledged to vacate the two former Soviet military
bases it retains in Georgia by the end of 2008.
The two documents signed March 31 by Georgian Deputy Defense Minister
Mamuka Kudava and General Aleksei Maslov, the commander-in-chief of
the Russian Ground Forces, set a detailed time frame for the planned
pullout.
Russia news agencies cite the Sochi agreements as saying the two
Russian bases in Akhalkalaki and Batumi are already operating in
preparation for pullout.
Out By Year’s End
Under the terms of the documents, Russia is to withdraw heavy military
hardware from the two bases — including equipment that falls under
the 1990 Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) Treaty — by the
end of 2006. All other weapons must leave Georgia at the latest by
December 31, 2007.
The closure of the Akhalkalaki base and the transfer to the Georgian
Defense Ministry of all other military facilities that are not
formally part of the two Russian bases must be completed within the
same time frame.
Addressing a news briefing in Tbilisi, Georgian Defense Minister
Irakli Okruashvili welcomed the signing of the Sochi agreements.
“We welcome the constructive approach adopted by the Russian side,
which in the past two weeks has worked intensively so that an agreement
could be reached on those documents,” Okruashvili said.
Proof Required
Okruashvili said, however, that Georgia would insist that Russia
provide evidence that it has vacated another base in the separatist
region of Abkhazia.
Russian troops officially pulled out from the Gudauta military facility
in 2001, but Tbilisi — which has no control over Abkhazia — insists
that it be allowed to inspect the base to make sure it is no longer
in use.
“There remains the problem of the base in Gudauta. We will work
actively so that the other side doesn’t try to beat around the bush,
and that the base is effectively vacated,” Okruashvili said.
Neither of the Sochi agreements makes any specific mention of the Black
Sea base of Batumi, through which most Russian military equipment is
to leave Georgia.
But after the March 31 signing ceremony, Russian General Maslov said
the Batumi base would be vacated within the next two years.
“During the course of the year 2008 we will vacate the Batumi military
base and [relocate] the command of the Russian Group of Forces in
the Transcaucasus,” Maslov said.
Provisional Concerns
Maslov also said part of the military equipment would be sent to army
units based in the North Caucasus region and that another part would
be given to the military base Russia maintains in the Armenian city
of Gyumri.
There have been concerns in Azerbaijan that Russia may give weapons and
military hardware to Armenia, with which it is linked by a military
alliance pact. Azerbaijan remains formally at war with Armenia over
its separatist enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.
Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev has said that Russia’s plans
for the military relocation justify calls for an increase in Baku’s
defense spending.
Talking to RFE/RL last year shortly after Russia announced it would
withdraw its bases from Georgia, the Armenian Army Chief of Staff,
General Mikayel Harutiunian, denied his country would benefit from
the planned transfer.
“The presence of the 102nd Russian military base [in Gyumri] on
Armenia’s territory is covered by a [bilateral] agreement,” Harutiunian
said. “What type of weapons should be stored at this base is up to
Russia to decide. As for a possible transfer of materiel or equipment
to Armenia, there is no agreement and there will not be any. Armenia
can equip its armed forces on its own within the limits of the [CFE
treaty] quotas.”
Heavy Weapons
Russia’s Defense Ministry said on March 17 equipment transferred
to the Gyumri base would include 370 pieces of military hardware,
including 35 tanks and armored vehicles.
Pullout operations through Batumi are expected to begin in May and
last until mid-August.
The Russian Foreign Ministry said in a March 31 statement the Sochi
documents require that Georgia “create normal conditions for the
activities of the bases until they are closed.”
Georgian authorities have in recent months detained a number of Russian
servicemen on charges of violating domestic travel regulations. Moscow
says the detentions aimed at hindering the functioning of its bases.

LANDLOCKED JAVAKHETIA: SYMPTOMS OF DIFFICULTIES OF THE NATION-STATE IN GEORGIA?
By Nicolas Landru In Tbilisi
Translated By Simone Koshimizu
Caucaz, Georgia
April 2 2006
Mountainous and isolated, over 92% of the population of Javakhetia
is composed of Armenians. According to Georgian historiography, this
region, located in the south-west of Georgia, is above all the cradle
of national Christianity. The Georgian government remains categorical
in view of the forum of local Armenian associations that called for
an autonomous status last September. Against a backdrop of economic
isolation and rows between the Armenian and Georgian Churches on
religious heritage, does this strained context show the difficulties
of building a nation-state in Georgia?
Questioned about the position adopted by the Georgian diocese of
the Armenian Apostolic Church in relation to this tension, Levon
Isakhanyan, directorate assistant of the diocese, replies first of
all that “no one knows what kind of country Georgia has become today.
According to article 2 of the Georgian Constitution, the territorial
organisation of the Georgian state is undefined”. Is the lack of
territorial organisation the source of the tensions that rose in
the region?
Javakhetia resulted from the crossing of Georgian, Turkish and
Armenian lands. It was part of the XII century great Georgian kingdom,
submitted to the Turkish control at the end of the Middle Ages,
and then inhabited mainly by Muslims of controversial origins –
Turkish or Georgian. The Russian conquest caused great upheavals:
the Muslim population was exchanged for Armenian Christians by the
Ottoman Empire. The arrival of Armenians fleeing the genocide in Turkey
between 1915 and 1921 strengthened the Armenian nature of the region.
Its isolation results from the expansion of the Russian empire against
the Ottomans. In this process, Javakhetia was strongly militarised
and its access was controlled. The USSR ended this process by turning
the region into a no man’s land. Being on the border of the NATO,
access was forbidden, isolating the local inhabitants from the rest
of Georgia. The development of ethnical affinities established in
the USSR after Stalinisation, which soon weakened the republics,
caused the region to be more attached to Yerevan than to Tbilisi.
Legacy of the past, the Russian military base of Akhalkalaki is among
those things that concentrated the grievances of the Georgian national
movement against the Empire. Today it has become a symbolic issue
of the independence that might be achieved, with the withdrawal of
the army planned for the end of 2007. But the Armenian population in
Akhalkalaki has not forgetton the Armenian genocide and the military
base, an almost unique economic resource, protects them from Turkey as
local people fear that Ankara could invade the region through the NATO.
Lack of interest of the central government
“In the Post-Soviet period, from Gamsakhurdia to Shevardnadze, nobody
thought seriously about the integration of the region into Georgia”,
explains Levon Isakhanyan. “We have normal roads and they don’t”,
he adds, explaining the different problems faced by the Armenians in
Tbilisi and by those of Javakhetia.
During Gamsakhurdia’s government, a national construction with ethnical
characteristics was designed in Georgia. Overwhelmed by the war in
South Ossetia and Abkhazia, Tbilisi abandoned the region in 1991
fearing separatism. A conception of ethnical minorities “invited”
by the Georgian “host” did not allow the Armenians of Javakhetia to
give their Georgian citizenship an identity dimension.
In this context, the Armenian national and regional movement of
Javakhk ran the country within an autarchy.
The clientelism established by Shevardnadze allowed the country to
be governed by alternate local clans without establishing a regional
integration policy. The reattachment to the administrative entity
of Samtskhe-Javakhetia in 1994 changed the regional demographic
balance in favour of Georgians, which was interpreted by political
organisations of Javakhetia as an attempt of “Georginisation”.
A politically alienated region
Levon Isakhanyan confirms the legalistic position adopted by the
diocese of the Armenian Apostolic Church. “Only state structures
have the right to define the forms of territorial organisation and
the status of different regions in the heart of a unified Georgia”,
he says.
But, based on examples of European democracies, he adds that “if
Georgia wants to become a democratic country where all citizens feel
equal and protected, it should think about a definitive form”.
The legal vacuum and the present status quo give rise to a severe
lack of political legitimacy in Javakhetia. The gathering of the
United Javakhk political forces claims that the representatives of
the region do not defend the population’s interests.
Georgian authorities deny legitimacy to local political organisations,
such as Virk, as they are not elected. Georgia does not recognise
regional political parties; Virk says they could not be registered;
but according to some, these leaders would not wish to be registered
in order to keep a popular legitimacy of contestation.
As far as the United Javakhk is concerned, it is mainly seen as a
rising force – the JEM (Cultural and Sportive Youth Union of Javakhk)
could soon become well-known based on the example of the decisive
rally on 11 March when its members closed the Georgian church, the
university and the court of Akhalkalaki to protest against the murder
of an Armenian in Tsalka in the neighbouring region of Kvemo-Kartli.
Local government is composed by elected people (Sakrebulo) who have
little power compared to the Gamgebeli, the Georgian president’s
local representative, and have no more than 850,000 laris for the
yearly budget of Akhalkalaki, which is not enough to introduce
effective reforms.
National parties only appear in the region in pre-electoral period.
This explains the evident popularity of Virk and the United Javakhk
among the population. Igor Giorgadze’s party, which is opposed to
the present government, has an office in Akhalkalaki.
“Representatives of the Javakheti population are deputies chosen in
major parliamentary elections”, Levon Isakhanyan insists. But he also
brings up the legal pre-conditions that exist in order to acquire a
complex of rights and completely fulfil their status.
If the Forum of Armenian associations of Javakhetia does not have the
legal means of their claims yet, a deep unrest remains in Javakhetia
within the Georgian state, almost completely separated from Tbilisi
by the road system, language, media and ethno-cultural identity. The
conflict of legitimacy shows the political alienation of a region
that does not have a legal political force able to offer an adequate
identification to its inhabitants. However, in order to forbid the
closing of the Russian base in the end of 2007, local political
organisations might deploy the necessary means to make the coming
year tumultuous.
New initiatives in Tbilisi
“We have to do all we can for the development of Javakhetia”, Guiorgui
Kutsichvili declares. He is director of the International Centre
for Conflict Negotiation of Tbilisi and is now launching a programme
aiding the development of potato farming. “Georgian politicians should
finally understand the necessity of changing the landlocked status
of Javakhetia”, he adds. Other NGOs and international organisations
also try to promote the development of the region.
The desire to establish programmes of integration also seems to point
to the central government. “This year, the government will build new
roads in Javakhetia within the framework of the Millennium Challenge
Program; approximately 100,000 dollars will be spent. I think this
government thinks more seriously about the integration of Armenians
of Javakhetia into the common political space of Georgia than the
previous one”, Levon Isakhanyan suggests. He also mentions the teaching
programme for Georgians in Javakhetia, launched under the aegis of
the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). “The
government finally thinks about the teaching of the Georgian language
and that is really a good sign. We, Armenians of Georgia, need air
to breathe and we need Georgian to express ourselves”, he says.
Isakhanyan considers it a diplomatic move on the part of the government
to recognise Armenian as a regional language in Javakhetia and to
seriously examine what the population claims, if they express it as
a majority.
But there’s a long way from raising awareness to the introduction of
effective reforms and the local population’s reluctance to political
and linguistic integration for fear of assimilating and losing their
identity is still a reality. But without definitely adopting a model
of construction of a nation-state in Georgia, can problems be solved?

THE “A1+” CASE IS DESCRIBED IN 4 VOLUMES, 500 PAGES EACH
A1+
[06:23 pm] 31 March, 2006
“This year the European Court will make a decision about the TV Company
“Nojjan Tapan”, and “A1+” will have to wait a little more as they have
participated in many competitions, and their case is larger in volume”,
head of the Investigating Journalists’ Association Edik Baghdasaryan
informed during the discussion today. He had had an interview with
one of the judges of the European Court.
Head of “A1+” Mesrop Movsesyan informed that the case of “A1+” is
described in four volumes, 500 pages each.
The RA ex Ombudsman Larissa Alaverdyan was also interested in the case
and found out that this was unprecedented in the history of the Court;
and it can make the course slower.
And what if the European Court hears the case of “A1”?
According to those present, we will have another moral victory. And
the financial compensation will unfortunately come not from Amalyan’s
pocket, but from the state budget.

FOREIGN MINISTER MEETS LITHUANIAN AMBASSADOR
[March 31, 2006, 12:15:08]
AzerTag, Azerbaijan
March 31 2006
Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Elmar Mammadyarov met on Thursday
newly appointed Ambassador of Lithuania Viatautas Nauduzas.
Minister Mammadyarov expressed confidence that the Ambassador would
do his best for the Azerbaijan – Lithuania relationship to be further
developed.
He informed Mr. Nauduzas about the current socio-political and
economic situation in Azerbaijan, and the country~Rs participation
in a number of regional projects including the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
oil and Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum gas pipeline ones.
Touching on the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan over
Nagorno-Karabakh, Mr. Mammadyarov reminded of occupation of 20% of
the Azeri lands by Armenian armed forces, told of the refugee problem,
and the course of peace negotiations.
Ambassador of Lithuania Viatautas Nauduzas first presented his
credentials to Foreign Minister Mammadyarov saying he will work hard
for development of relationship between the two countries. He said his
country is keen in enhancing cooperation with Azerbaijan in a number
of fields, especially in those of transport, finance and military
ones. The diplomat also advised that opening of Lithuanian embassy
in Baku is expected in the near future.

ARMENIAN INVESTMENT PROMOTION AGENCY AMONG TOP FIVE
YEREVAN, MARCH 31, NOYAN TAPAN. The World Association of Investment
Promotion Agencies (WAIPA) and the Worl Bank Multilateral Investment
Guaranteeing Agency (MIGA) have included the Investment Promotion
Agency of Armenia among the top five agencies that provide information
to investors. According to the Armenian Developent Agency (ADA),
114 agencies of developed and transitional countries have been
studied. Besides Armenia, Columbia, Nicaragua, Senegal and South Africa
are among the top five. The above mentioned countries received their
awards on March 7-8 in Geneva. The main three directions: quality
of the Internet site of the agency, accessibilty of information and
the staff responses to invsetment bids were taken into account when
studying the activities of the agencies.

PRESENTATION OF “INTERPRETATIONS ON RA LAW “ON INSOLVENCY” TAKES
PLACE IN YEREVAN
YEREVAN, MARCH 31, NOYAN TAPAN. The presentation of the book
“Interpretation on RA Law “On Insolvency (bankruptcy)” took place
at the “Queen Erato” hall of the Marriott hotel on March 31. The
mentioned law is the third one adopted in failure during the recent 8
years. That was adopted by the National Assembly on December 17, 2003,
put into operation on January 30, 2004. Deputy Minister of Justice
Anatoly Matevosian considered publication of interpretations a great
event. According to him, that is the first attempt to present the law
with its interpretations. He expressed a hope that this practice will
continue and interpretations of foundamental laws: the Criminal Code,
Civil Code and the Code on Civil and Criminal Procedures, will be
published as well.

Predicting earthquakes from space
RIA Novosti, Russia
March 31 2006
16:30 | 31/ 03/ 2006
MOSCOW. (Yury Zaitsev for RIA Novosti.) – A Russian strategic
nuclear-powered submarine is poised to launch an innovative, compact,
80-kg spacecraft from the Barents Sea in the second quarter of
this year.
The Compass 2 satellite is expected to help make the first step in
the practical forecasting of earthquakes from space.
The move comes as a result of extensive research into specific
phenomena in the Earth’s magnetosphere and ionosphere, often observed
prior to earthquakes, by the Institute of Terrestrial Magnetism,
Ionosphere and Radio Waves Propagation (IZMIRAN) of the Russian
Academy of Sciences.
The first observations of ionosphere anomalies manifested days before
major earthquakes date back to the 1960s. At first, treated no more
seriously than UFOs, palm reading and astrology, the findings elbowed
their way into the scientific domain in 1979 as the institute launched
its Interkosmos 19 satellite. A recording analyzed after one major
earthquake showed a prolonged area (narrow in latitude and very broad
in longitude) of abnormal, low-frequency noise centered exactly above
the earthquake’s epicenter several hours before the first shock was
felt. Officially registered as a scientific discovery, the phenomenon
was later confirmed by findings from other satellites.
This area of research received a powerful push in December 1988 in
the wake of a devastating earthquake in Armenia. A pool of Soviet
scientific institutions developed a forecasting system that was to
be deployed first onboard the Mir orbiter and then across the orbit
within a network of unmanned spacecraft. After the Mir, Salyut 6,
and Salyut 7 completed the early stages of the plan, the program
was effectively buried with the demise of the Soviet Union, but went
forward at the end of the turbulent 1990s.
While other precursors of major earthquakes – the concentration of
radon, an inert gas, near the epicenter; the concentration of electrons
in the ionosphere above the epicenter; and the content of crust-emitted
metal-rich aerosols in the air, leading to an abnormally strong
electric field there – had been piling up for a long time, they were
always obtained as by-products of other research programs. Sufficient
statistical data array required a separate specialized satellite.
In 2001, the institute took the lead in the effort, committing to make
a satellite and inviting the Makeyev State Missile Center (Miass,
Urals) to convert the Shtil (SS-N-23 Skiff) military missile into a
launch vehicle for the project. Later, however, Makeyev also had to
develop the satellite under the effort codenamed Vulkan (Volcano)
in the Russian Space Agency’s 2001-2005 Federal Space Program.
The first international Complex Orbital Magneto-Plasma Autonomous
Small Satellite, or Compass, was orbited in December 2001 as a
by-load together with the Meteor 3M, a Russian weather satellite,
to provide insight into possible links between Earth’s crust and
magnetosphere behavior. This first field test of an earthquake forecast
assessment system largely failed because, while early findings were
very promising, the equipment developed jointly by Russia, Hungary,
Greece, Ukraine and Poland soon ceased to operate.
Certain progress was made, however, as the data of Compass’s launch
mate, Meteor 3M, were analyzed by special methods to obtain earthquake
precursors. On aggregate, 44 of 47 events registered between October
2002 and May 2003 agreed with data retrieved from land-based seismic
records. The generally positive result has led to the upcoming Compass
2 launch and is likely to lead to a follow-up Compass 3 effort. The
latter satellite is to be launched in the fourth quarter of 2006 to
test more modern and efficient monitoring systems.
The International Space Station has also been long helping collect
ionosphere information. Thanks to the ISS’s low orbit, some research
programs crucial for the future Vulkan disaster forecasting system
have been conducted here as part of a broader effort codenamed Uragan
(Hurricane).
On the ground, the Vulkan will include a network of geophysical
laboratories, a downlink station and an analysis center. The ground
facilities lack the scope and access to recordable events, which
explains the need for an orbital component to yield a global survey
of seismic activity with accurately timed warnings (one to five
days between a precursor and a possible earthquake). All in all,
two groups of small satellites are to be deployed at 400-500- and
900-1,000-km solar synchronous orbits.
When fully operational, the Vulkan’s ground and spaceborne components
will collect, process and analyze the disaster precursor data, thus
contributing to medium-, long- and short-term plans of emergency
management services in Russia and internationally.
Yury Zaitsev is an expert with the Space Research Institute at the
Russian Academy of Sciences.