Author: Badalian Vardan

THE ERDOGAN DOCTRINE: TURKEY’S PRIME MINISTER IS OUT TO RESCUE
By Owen Matthews

Newsweek
September 19, 2011

When it comes to bashing Israel, Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip
Erdogan is an old hand. He was at it even before he took power in March
2003, castigating the Israeli Defense Force for breaking Palestinians’
heads in the West Bank towns of Jenin and Nablus. He became a hero
in the Arab world two years ago when he stormed out of a Davos
panel discussion after snarling at Israeli President Shimon Peres:
“You know very well how to kill.”

But last week his vitriol reached a new level. In response to Israel’s
continued refusal to apologize for its deadly 2010 commando raid on
a Turkish-owned aid vessel en route to Gaza, he broke off diplomatic
and military relations in all but name, accused Israel of “running
wild” and behaving “like a spoiled child,” promised to take the case
to the International Court of Justice, and swore that in the future
all Turkish aid shipments to Gaza would have naval escorts. “We will
not allow anyone to walk all over our honor,” he fumed.

His talk of trampled honor and gunboats raises the question of who
exactly is the spoiled child. Still, there’s method to Erdogan’s heated
talk. It’s about something more than justice for the nine activists
who were killed aboard the Mavi Marmara as they challenged Israel’s
blockade of Gaza. The Iraq War and the Arab Spring have created a
regional power vacuum, and Erdogan is determined to fill it.

In the past decade he has transformed Turkey, presiding over phenomenal
economic growth and excluding the previously all-powerful Army
from national politics. Now he’s out to bring similarly sweeping
change to the entire region. After winning a third term in office
this June by a larger-than-ever majority, Erdogan portrayed himself
as a neo-Ottoman savior. “Believe me, Sarajevo won today as much
as Istanbul, Beirut won as much as Izmir, Damascus won as much as
Ankara!” he told cheering crowds at a victory speech in the capital.
“The West Bank and Jerusalem won as much as [Turkish Kurdistan’s
leading city] Diyarbakir!”

In line with that expansive vision, Erdogan is championing the one
issue that everyone in the Middle East–everyone other than Israel,
that is–can agree on: the rights of blockaded Gaza. He has praised
Hamas as “resistance fighters who are struggling to defend their land”
and called the blockade “a crime against humanity.” Many Israelis
view him as a mortal enemy of their country. The latest document
spill from WikiLeaks includes an October 2009 U.S. Embassy cable
quoting Israel’s ambassador to Turkey, Gabby Levy, on his assessment
of Erdogan: “Levy dismissed political calculation as a motivator for
Erdogan’s hostility, arguing the prime minister’s party had not gained
a single point in the polls from his bashing of Israel. Instead,
Levy attributed Erdogan’s harshness to deep-seated emotion: ‘He’s a
fundamentalist. He hates us religiously’ and his hatred is spreading.”

Yet the notion of Erdogan as a Jew-hating jihadi doesn’t really fit.
Just before the current standoff, Erdogan sat down to dinner with
the leaders of Turkey’s religious minorities, including the Chief
Rabbi of Istanbul, and promised to return thousands of properties
the Turkish state had confiscated from Christians and Jews in the
past century. He also made a point of praising the “vast diversity
of the people that have peacefully coexisted” in Istanbul. “In this
city the [Muslim] call to prayer and church bells sound together,”
said Erdogan. “Mosques, churches, and synagogues have stood side by
side on the same street for centuries.”

Skeptics might dismiss that attempt at ecumenicalism as just
sweet-sounding bunkum. But what’s very real–and a surer indicator of
where his priorities really lie–is Erdogan’s decision this month to
let NATO deploy antimissile radars near the Turkish-Iranian border.
Tehran is predictably furious. “We expect friendly countries and
neighbors … not to promote policies that create tension, which
will definitely have complicated consequences,” said Iranian Foreign
Ministry spokesman Ramin Mehmanparast. In the past, Erdogan has
often called President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad “my good friend,” and he
recently opposed new U.N. sanctions on Tehran’s nuclear program. But
when push came to shove, Erdogan sided with Turkey’s friends in NATO,
not in Iran.

His aim is no less than to rescue the entire Middle East from poverty
and dictatorship. To those who know him well, that crusade–for want
of a better term–is a direct extension of his personal religious
conviction. “He’s a very moral man, very serious about righting
injustices,” says one associate of the past 20 years. “If you ask if
that is rooted in his personal view of Islam, the answer is yes.”

Even so, Turkey’s neighbors and allies worry that Erdogan’s latest
face-?off with Israel could be the start of a new foreign policy, one
that focuses on hard power instead of soft. Up to now, Turkish Foreign
Minister Ahmet Davutoglu has pursued a policy of “zero problems with
neighbors,” full of touchy-feely confidence-building measures like
joint historical commissions with Armenia, visa-free travel with
Syria, airport-building contracts with Georgia, cultural exchanges
with Greece, and the like. But Ankara’s stance seems to have suddenly
turned tough. Turkish jets have bombed separatist Kurdish guerrillas
in the mountains of northern Iraq, killing an estimated 160 people,
according to the Turkish military. Davutoglu has begun publicly
calling for Syria’s embattled dictator, Bashar al-Assad, to step down.
And during a planned visit to Egypt this week, Erdogan says he intends
to cross the border into Gaza–a move guaranteed to infuriate Israel.

Saner voices in Israel are trying to downplay the war of words. “The
main thing is not to get confused, not to get into a tailspin,”
Defense Minister Ehud Barak told Israel Radio last week. “Turkey
is not about to become an enemy of Israel, and we have no cause to
waste invective and energy over this.” The trouble is that Erdogan
gets so much out of confronting Israel: not only does it raise his
stature in the region, but it also dovetails with his self-image as
a fighter for justice. That gives him little incentive to let the
matter rest–especially since he’s been at it for so many years.

POET HENRI COLE READS TONIGHT
John O’Rourke

BU Today (Boston University)
Sept 14 2011
MA

Middle Earth author is Robert Lowell Memorial Lecture speaker

It is no accident that language-and cadence-plays a central role in
Henri Cole’s poems. His mother was Armenian, his father a Southerner
from Virginia. Cole grew up speaking French, Armenian, and English,
an experience, he says, that “made me see language as a prism, instead
of a transparent window.” He began writing poems as a teenager. “I was
a shy young man, but when I put pen to paper, I had things to say,”
he says. “I was sociable.”

Now 55, Cole is one of his generation’s most accomplished poets. The
author of seven collections of poetry and the current poetry editor
of The New Republic, he describes himself as an autobiographical poet.

Many of his poems focus on his parents and his childhood; others
offer glimpses into his romantic longings and relationships. “Memory,”
says Cole, “holds the key to everything.”

Cole will read from his most recent collection, Touch (Farrar, Straus &
Giroux, 2011), tonight as the featured speaker at the Robert Lowell
Memorial Lecture. The semiannual event honors American poet Robert
Lowell, who taught at BU in the 1950s. Among Lowell’s famous students
were Sylvia Plath and Anne Sexton.

“Fresh imagination, bold truthfulness about feeling-economy-Henri
Cole’s poems have these qualities, so striking that they make a
lot of the movies, music, and other stuff of our culture look dull
and plodding by comparison,” says Robert Pinsky, a College of Arts &
Sciences professor of English and three-time U.S. poet laureate. “Cole
himself likens his poems to “eggs and bacon with black coffee on
the side” and cites nature and visual art as frequent sources of
inspiration. But sleeping and reading, he says, have been the two
biggest influences on his work: “Reading makes me want to write;
sleep gives me the concentration to do so.”

Cole, who supported himself with a string of entry-level jobs early
in his career, has received numerous honors. His volume Middle Earth
was a finalist for a Pulitzer Prize in 2003. He is the recipient of a
Guggenheim Fellowship and a Lenore Marshall Award. The Boston-based
poet teaches at Ohio State University, a job he finds deeply
rewarding. “Young people keep me human,” he says. “I love watching
them discover their voices.”

The Lowell Lecture series pairs a distinguished poet with a recent
graduate of BU’s Creative Writing Program. Appearing with Cole
at tonight’s reading is Sara Peters (GRS’08), a Stegner Fellow at
Stanford University, whose work has appeared in numerous publications.

Peters says she in in awe of Cole’s work and admits to feeling
“absolute honor and absolute terror,” about reading tonight. “I’m
petrified of being boring, so I’ll try to choose short poems with
exciting plot twists.” She says she’s often inspired by “secrets,
abuse, betrayal, guilt, embarrassment, shame, pretense, hyperbole,
sarcasm, empathy, lying, and violence” in her writing.

The Robert Lowell Memorial Lecture is tonight, Wednesday, September 14,
at 7:30 p.m. at The Castle, 225 Bay State Road. The event is free and
open to the public. A book signing and reception immediately follow.

The Robert Lowell Memorial Lectures are funded by Nancy Livingston
(COM’69) and her husband, Fred M. Levin, through the Shenson
Foundation, in memory of Ben and A. Jess Shenson.

QUEBECOIS AND ARMENIAN ARTISTS TAKE THE STAGE IN MONTREAL

ArmeniaDiaspora.com
Sept 14 2011

Epress.am — From 8 to 10 pm on Oct. 1, Québécois and Armenian
artists will be coming together for a gala concert in Montreal,
Canada, according to the concert site.

According to the website, Montreal mayor Gérald Tremblay paid a visit
to Armenia in Oct. 2010, during which time a bilateral agreement was
signed with former Yerevan mayor Gagik Beglaryan to make Montreal and
Yerevan sister cities. The agreement was set up to facilitate tourism,
as well as technical and economic cooperation between the two cities.

Furthermore, when Mr. Tremblay returned to Montreal, he declared
October the month of Armenia.

Notable artists participating in the Oct. 1 concert include former
Eurovision contestants representing Armenia Eva Rivas and the
sister-duo Inga and Anush. Québécois artists will be represented by
Daniel Lavois, Isabelle Boulay, Dan Bigras and Marie Élaine Thibert.

The concert will also feature Armenian artists Alla Levonyan, Arthur
Hakobyan, Narine Dovlatyan and Emma Asatryan, as well as the 20
musicians comprising the Armenian Jazz Band.

The event is set to take place at Salle Wilfrid-Pelletier at Place
des Arts. Tickets can be reserved online.

Article source:

LETTER TO THE PM FROM HRANT’S FRIENDS

Today’s Zaman
Sept 14 2011
Turkey

Sept. 15 is the birthday of Hrant Dink [the Turkish-Armenian journalist
who was shot to death in 2007]. If he were alive today, he would
turn 57.

If the darkness which creates murderers out of babies had not taken
Dink away from us on Jan. 19, 2007, he would most probably be sipping
his rakı with his grandchildren, family and friends tonight. There
will be a new hearing of the Dink trial on Sept. 19. Another one in a
string of never-ending hearings, the number of which we have forgotten,
and yet, no distance has been covered so far. On such a day, we write
the following letter to the prime minister as Hrant’s friends. Esteemed
prime minister, they have killed our friend, Hrant Dink. Our search
for justice has been to no avail now, five years after his death. The
state to whom we sent a petition seeking justice has sided with the
killers. We have complaints about this.

OUTSPOKEN US PROFESSORS SLAM PALMER REPORT, APPROVE TURKEY’S POSITION

Today’s Zaman
Sept 14 2011
Turkey

Two distinguished professors from the United States have slammed
the UN “Report of the Secretary-General’s Panel of Inquiry on the 31
May 2010 Flotilla Incident” released in September in relation to an
Israeli raid on the Mavi Marmara ship, for its conclusion that the
Gaza blockade of Israel is legal.

“The Palmer-Uribe report is a fundamentally flawed document. It is
simply not possible to make the case that the blockade of Gaza, which
is a clear-cut case of collective punishment, is legal under existing
international law. Furthermore, the four-member committee could not
determine what really happened on the Mavi Marmara because it had no
power to call witnesses and gather evidence,” said John Mearsheimer,
professor of political science at the University of Chicago.

Answering our questions, Professor of International Affairs Stephen
Walt from Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government
said: “I believe the Palmer-Uribe report is mistaken about the legality
of the Gaza blockade. It is permissible for Israel to halt the shipment
of weapons into Gaza, but not to block delivery of other items and
not to prevent exports out of Gaza. These actions are punitive,
and should end immediately.”

Professors Mearsheimer and Walt are authors of “The Israel Lobby and
US Foreign Policy,” which was published in late Aug. 2007 and became
a New York Times Best Seller. Describing the Israel lobby as a “loose
coalition of individuals and organizations who actively work to steer
US foreign policy in a pro-Israel direction,” the book focused on
the lobby’s influence on US foreign policy and its negative effect
on American interests.

Before writing the book, the professors had been working on a paper
commissioned by the Atlantic Monthly, which was later rejected and
was published elsewhere attracting considerable controversy, both
praise and criticism.

Prepared by former New Zealand Prime Minister Geoffrey Palmer
and former Colombian President Alvaro Uribe and presented to UN
Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon on Sept. 2, the UN panel’s report on the
Mavi Marmara labeled the Israeli raid as “excessive and unreasonable,”
but also claimed that due to Israel’s security concerns, its blockade
of Gaza is legal. The UN panel also blamed Turkey and flotilla
organizers for contributing to the deaths.

Palmer and Uribe were authorized to write the report even though
consensus or unanimity was not established by the UN inquiry committee
which consisted of Turkish and Israeli representatives. The report
was published even though Israel and Turkey had not signed it.

The report contradicted an earlier report on the Gaza flotilla incident
that found Israeli forces had violated international law when they
raided the flotilla. That report had been prepared in September by
three human rights experts appointed by the UN’s top human rights body.

Turkey expelled Israel’s envoy and froze military cooperation with
Jerusalem after the release of the Palmer-Uribe report on the deaths of
nine Turks in the Israeli raid on the Mavi Marmara failed to trigger
an apology.

According to Mearsheimer, Turkey’s reaction to the report was correct.

“Indeed, I admire how Turkey has acted toward Israel in recent years.

I think it is about time that someone stood up to Israel and said
loudly and clearly that its behavior toward the Palestinians is
morally reprehensible and must be stopped,” he said.

Walt said that hard-line defenders of Israel will “undoubtedly try
to demonize Turkey” and undermine US-Turkish relations.

“But Turkey can protect itself by explaining its position carefully,
maintaining its democratic character, and emphasizing its desire for
good relations with Washington,” he added.

Answering our questions, Professor Mearsheimer elaborated on the issue.

What is your assessment of the Palmer-Uribe report that the blockade
on Gaza was characterized as being “both legal and appropriate,”
contradicting the UN Human Rights Council fact-finding mission, which
had said both the attack on the Mavi Marmara and the Gaza blockade
were illegal?

I think the Palmer-Uribe report is a fundamentally flawed document. It
is simply not possible to make the case that the blockade of Gaza,
which is a clear-cut case of collective punishment, is legal under
existing international law. Furthermore, the four-member committee
could not determine what really happened on the Mavi Marmara because
it had no power to call witnesses and gather evidence. It had to
rely instead on reports from the Israeli and Turkish governments,
and everyone knows that Israel has no interest in getting all the
facts about the Mavi Marmara out on the table. So, the findings were
just not credible. Finally, any committee that has as a member, a
serial human rights violator, like Columbian President Uribe cannot
be taken seriously. In sum, the Palmer-Uribe report was worthless.

What do you think about Turkey’s reaction? Some criticized it as
being too strong and harsh against an old ally.

I think Turkey’s reaction to the report was correct. Indeed, I
admire how Turkey has acted toward Israel in recent years. I think
it is about time that someone stood up to Israel and said loudly
and clearly that its behavior toward the Palestinians is morally
reprehensible and must be stopped. The Palestinians deserve a state
of their own. Some will say [Prime Minister Recep Tayyip] Erdoðan
is anti-Israel. I don’t believe this for a second. I think he is
simply criticizing Israeli policy in the Occupied Territories and
is not challenging the legitimacy of Israel in any way. Hopefully,
more countries in the Arab and Islamic world will follow his lead.

Turkey is planning to challenge Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip
at the International Court of Justice [ICJ]. How do you think the
case would evolve in The Hague, if Turkey took it to the ICJ?

If the case is taken to the ICJ, I think the Israelis fear that the
ICJ would find the blockade illegal, and if I had to bet, I think
the court would do just that.

Do you think following the Palmer-Uribe report conclusions it has
now become legitimate to attack civilian ships in international waters?

I don’t think so, for two reasons: First, it is widely recognized
that the Palmer-Uribe report is largely worthless and second, it is
widely recognized that it is not legal to attack civilian ships in
international waters.

One of the nine killed Turkish citizens was also an American citizen
Furkan Doðan. Yet there was almost no reaction at all from the
US on the deadly flotilla attack. How can one explain the lack of
any reaction? The Israel lobby, maybe? Prime Minister Erdoðan said
recently that he had asked President Barack Obama why the US did not
react to the killing of one its citizens, but he did not get a reply…

It is easy to explain why the United States has shown hardly any
interest in Israel’s killing of Furkan Doðan, who [was also] an
American citizen. It is because of the power of the Israel lobby,
which makes it almost impossible for any US president to get tough
with Israel, even when it kills Americans. Remember, Israel attacked
the USS Liberty in June 1967 and killed 34 American sailors and
wounded another 170. The Israelis maintain that it was a case of
mistaken identity. Hardly anyone who was on that ship accepts that
explanation. Many other Americans agree with them. Yet there has
never been a meaningful investigation of that horrific incident. Also
remember that an Israeli bulldozer killed Rachel Corrie in the Gaza
Strip in March 2003 when she was peacefully protesting the demolition
of a Palestinian home. The US government has done hardly anything to
seek justice for her and her family.

With the democratic movements sweeping the Middle East — the Arab
Awakening — Israel has seen no problem in “losing” Turkey despite
many calls on the Israeli government to apologize. What sort of a
Middle East should Israel brace for in the coming months and years?

Israel is deeply worried about its fractured relationship with Turkey
and with Egypt; those two countries were once solid allies and they
played a key role in allowing Israel to brutalize the Palestinians.

But thankfully those days are gone, and Israel is being isolated in
the Middle East for its behavior toward the Palestinians.

Critics of the Turkish government argue that Ankara will pay dearly
for expelling the Israeli ambassador as the Israel lobby machine has
already started to roll in the US Congress and the administration —
for example, the Armenian “genocide” resolutions may be passed. What
will the repercussions be in the US? How do you think the Israel
lobby will react? How will the Obama administration react?

There is no question that the lobby will cause some problems for
Turkey in the United States, especially with Congress. That is life
in America today. Pro-Israeli forces assail anyone who criticizes
Israeli policy or America’s special relationship with Israel. But
in the end, there is not much that the lobby can do to hurt Turkey,
especially since Washington needs Turkey to remain an ally.

Do you see any connection between the departure of the Israeli
ambassador from Egypt and Turkey’s expulsion of the Israeli ambassador
after the report? Some argue that Turkey’s attitude has created a
chain reaction which will also effect others…

I think the two cases are very different and not connected. Turkey
expelled the Israeli ambassador, but Egypt did not. The Israeli
ambassador to Egypt left the country because protestors stormed the
Israeli embassy and he feared for his life. As I said above, I hope
that Turkey’s attitude toward Israel creates a chain reaction in the
region and moreover I hope that Israel’s growing isolation helps cause
it to change its policies toward the Palestinians. Unfortunately,
I don’t think that is going to happen anytime soon. But let’s hope
I am wrong.

Professor Walt: Hard-line defenders of Israel will undoubtedly try
to demonize Turkey and undermine US-Turkish relations In this part
of the interview, Professor Walt also answered our questions.

What is your assessment of the Palmer-Uribe report in which the
blockade on Gaza is characterized as “both legal and appropriate,”
contradicting the UN Human Rights Council fact-finding mission
which said both the attack on Mavi Marmara and the Gaza blockade
were illegal?

I believe the Palmer-Uribe report is mistaken about the legality of
the Gaza blockade. It is permissible for Israel to halt the shipment
of weapons into Gaza, but not to block delivery of other items and
not to prevent exports out of Gaza. These actions are punitive,
and should end immediately.

What do you think about Turkey’s reaction — lowering diplomatic
representation, expelling the Israeli ambassador, suspending all
military agreements, helping those to file a suit against Israel,
to take the blockade to the International Court of Justice and not
recognize the blockade? Is this excessive or striking the right
balance?

Turkey’s reaction is appropriate, insofar as it as peaceful and
diplomatic response in the context of an ongoing dispute. I do hope
that Turkey and Israel are able to resolve the disagreement, because
a more cooperative relationship would contribute to stability in this
volatile region.

Do you think following the Palmer-Uribe report conclusions it has
now become legitimate to attack civilian ships in international waters?

No. Whether such an attack would be legal or not depends entirely on
the specific context. It would be a grave mistake to interpret the
report as providing broad justification for such attacks.

One of the nine Turkish citizens killed on board was also an American
citizen. Yet there was almost no reaction at all from US on the deadly
flotilla attack. How can one explain the lack of any reaction? The
Israel lobby, maybe?

The weak US response to the incident is another sign of its inability
to act as an effective and even-handed mediator in this conflict,
and this is mostly due to the political power of AIPAC [American
Israel Public Affairs Committee] and other hard line groups in the
Israel lobby.

Many Turks believe US worked behind the scenes for a report that would
strongly support Israeli claims, which actually turned out to be the
case. Do you see any credibility in these claims?

I don’t know if this is true or not, but it certainly would not
surprise me.

With the report, Israel has “lost” Turkey. How do you think this will
affect regional politics?

I don’t think Israel has “lost” Turkey permanently, especially if the
Netanyahu government reconsiders its position and offers a formal
apology. I hope this occurs, because cooperation between Turkey
and Israel could be very helpful in dealing with other tensions in
the region.

With the democratic movements sweeping the Middle East — the Arab
Awakening– Israel has seen no problem in “losing” Turkey despite
many calls on the Israeli government to apologize. What sort of a
Middle East should Israeli brace for in the coming months and years?

If Israel continues the occupation, it will gradually become even
more isolated in the region and the world. On the other hand, if
it ends the occupation and allows the Palestinians to have a state
of their own, then its image will improve and it will have little
difficulty building strong relationships with its neighbors. I hope
that happens, and I hope that the United States, the EU, Turkey and
other major powers work together toward that goal.

Critics of the Turkish government argue that Ankara will pay dearly
for expelling the Israeli ambassador as the Israel lobby machine has
already started to roll in the US Congress and the administration —
for example, the Armenian “genocide” resolutions may pass. What will
the repercussions be in the US? How do you think the Israel lobby
will react? How will the Obama administration react?

Hard-line defenders of Israel will undoubtedly try to demonize Turkey
and undermine US-Turkish relations, but Turkey can protect itself
by explaining its position carefully, maintaining its democratic
character, and emphasizing its desire for good relations with
Washington.

ON ISRAELI-PKK RELATIONS – I

Hurriyet Daily News
Sept 14 2011
Turkey

Tension between Turkey and Israel is continuing with conflicting
interpretations of events, as well as doses of verbal warfare. It is
remarkable that the debate is so structured as to provoke sensitivities
and deepen fears on both sides. While the source of traditional fears
and anxieties in Israel is the Palestinian question, Turkey’s source of
anxiety is the Armenian question and the outlawed Kurdistan Workers’
Party, or PKK. Although Turkey’s approach toward the Palestinian
question is well-known, the Israeli-PKK relationship is not so. This
article aims to contribute to the ongoing debate by focusing on
Israeli-PKK relations.

Of course, Israel, keeping a close eye on everything in the Middle
East, concerns itself with the Kurdish issue in general and the
PKK in particular. As a matter of fact, one of the first strategic
pillars of that interest was formed with the immigration of Iraqi
Jews to Israel in the post-1945 period and with Iraq’s approach
toward the Arab-Israeli wars in the early 1960s. Mulla Mustafa
Barzani’s rebellion against the Iraqi regime provided Israel with
an opportunity to conduct a proxy war against Iraq. Israel offered
the Barzani clan logistical support, military training and new
perspectives. The foundations of intelligence organization in the
Kurdistan Democratic Party were then laid down by Mossad. By these
means, Iraq was made to pay for the support it gave to the Arabs
during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars through Barzani’s guerilla
attacks. The Iranian shah’s support which helped Israeli intelligence
access northern Iraq must also be kept in mind. All these relations
were proper in the Cold War spirit. Nevertheless, Israel’s interest
continues in different guises. This interest has remained a question
in the minds of both the Turkish people and security circles.

Historically, Israel and the PKK were not on good terms. In 1971,
the Israeli consul in Istanbul was abducted and killed by Marxist
organizations. This caused Israel to focus on leftist organizations
in Turkey linked with Palestine.

Quickly, the search focused on Abdullah Ocalan and his organization,
the PKK. Ocalan fled from Turkey to Syria in 1979. Then, he settled
in Lebanon with the help of Syrian intelligence and the Marxist
organizations of Gibril and Havatme and George Habash, the late leader
of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, or PFLP. These
three entities were a source of trouble for Israel and started to
provide guerilla training to Ocalan’s militants.

In sum, Israeli-PKK relations have featured three phases. The first
phase covers the period from the PKK’s establishment to 1992. In
this phase, the PKK was a secondary problem which was to be closely
watched. The second phase was between 1992 and 2002, when the PKK was
subject to low-level diplomatic, but high-level “business” relations
within the progressing Turkey-Israeli relationship. The final phase
covers the period from 2002 onwards.

When Israel invaded Lebanon in 1982, it encountered “International
Marxist” resistance along with the Palestinian groups. As a Marxist
organization, PKK militants fought against the Israeli army, too,
losing 11 militants in the battles. An additional 13 militants were
captured, imprisoned and interrogated. This enabled Israel to lay
hands on a large number of PKK documents. Thus, from early on, Israel
has had important information about the PKK. Later, the imprisoned
PKK militants were released together with Palestinian Liberation
Organization, or PLO, members. They flew to Greece and then moved
to Iran. In this process, while Israel perceived the PKK as a threat
sponsored by Syria that was to be watched closely, it also shared a
large number of documents now in its hands with Turkish intelligence.

To be continued…

RUSSIAN, EU OFFICIALS MULL NAGORNO-KARABAKH ISSUE

Trend
Sept 14 2011
Azerbaijan

State Secretary – Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Karasin
has today received European Union Special Representative (EUSR) for
the South Caucasus and the crisis in Georgia Philippe Lefort upon
the latter’s request, the Russian Foreign Ministry reported.

The sides exchanged views on the South Caucasian issues, including
the EU co-chairing at the Geneva discussions. The meeting also mulled
the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the report reads.

The conflict between the two South Caucasus countries began in 1988
when Armenia made territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Armenian
armed forces have occupied 20 percent of Azerbaijan since 1992,
including the Nagorno-Karabakh region and 7 surrounding districts.

Azerbaijan and Armenia signed a ceasefire agreement in 1994. The
co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group – Russia, France, and the U.S. –
are currently holding the peace negotiations.

Armenia has not yet implemented the U.N. Security Council’s four
resolutions on the liberation of the Nagorno-Karabakh and the
surrounding regions.

KARABAKH FORMS COMMISSION TO STUDY SHOOTING DOWN OF AZERBAIJANI RECONNAISSANCE DRONE

news.am
Sept 14 2011
Armenia

STEPANAKERT. – Nagorno-Karabakh Republic (NKR) Defense Army’s press
service commented on Monday’s shooting down of an Azerbaijani drone
flying through NKR air space.

“In parallel with the ceasefire violation at the line of contact
between the Karabakh-Azerbaijani forces, the adversary’s air force
is likewise considerably active in recent periods, and it carries
out educational-military as well as reconnaissance flights.

According to the Defense Army’s latest data, in recent days the
adversary’s drones carry out fairly frequent reconnaissance flights
along the entire length of the border zone, and, in some cases, violate
Artsakh’s air space. The Defense Army’s air defense servicemen have
confirmed about such flights in the past 10 days, and corresponding
preventive measures are taken. On September 12 at 7:30 a.m., in
particular, and as a result of the special measures taken by the
Defense Army’s Air Defense and Radio Electronics subdivisions, a
drone from the Azerbaijani air force was disabled nearby Vazgenashen
village of Martuni region. Parts of the downed plane are kept at
the Defense Army’s respective services. A commission is formed to
study the details of the incident, and an investigation is underway,”
NKR Defense Army’s press service informed Armenian News-NEWS.am.

DEFROSTING CONFLICT: ALARMISM OVER RUSSIA’S ROLE IN TRANSDNESTR BELIES THE POTENTIAL OF AN UPCOMING MOSCOW CONFERENCE

Russia Profile
Sept 14 2011

Once again Transdnestr has become the focus of attention among
specialists across the post-Soviet space. On September 9, under the
auspices of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OECD), an international conference was held during which the Moldovan
Prime Minister Vlad Filat met the President of the Unrecognized
Transdnestr Moldovan Republic Igor Smirnov.

Contact between representatives of Tiraspol and Chisinau over the past
ten years has been fitful. In 2001 Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin
was reelected on a ticket of reintegrating the country. He criticized
his predecessors harshly for provincial nationalism and a lack of
flexibility. The Voronin of 2001 was even ready to legally acknowledge
aggression from Chisinau against the left bank of the Dnestr. However,
slogans and real politics do not always coincide. Rejecting a Russian
plan (known as the Dmitry Kozak Plan) to reunite the country on federal
principles, Moldovan leaders in 2003 gave up talks with Transdnestr’s
de-facto leadership as lost. It was only at the end of 2008 that the
conflicting sides made timid steps toward each other once again.

But the long-awaited meeting of the leaders of Moldova and Transdnestr
did not make the negotiating process irreversible, especially since
in 2009 the Moldovan political system suffered a crisis. A series of
parliamentary campaigns failed to result in the election of a head
of state (Moldova is a parliamentary republic). In this context, the
peace process was relegated to secondary importance. Since this time
there has been no official attempt to renew the “5 + 2” format, which
envisaged a resolution between the two conflicting sides and five other
interested parties – two guarantor-states – Ukraine and Russia, an
OECD mediator and two observer states – the United States and the EU.

At the latest meeting in Germany, the sides agreed to meet in
Moscow on September 22, 2011, to make provisions for a return to
fully-fledged talks. However, the very fact that Igor Smirnov agreed to
be drawn into the negotiating process (albeit half-heartedly) already
means a lot. Firstly, for many years he was forbidden to travel in
Europe. In September of 2011, this ban was lifted in the hopes that
the Transdnestr leader would take up constructive positions. Secondly,
in December 2011 presidential elections are set to take place in
Transdnestr, and Smirnov is expected to take part in what will be
his fifth election campaign. It is not hard to understand that for
a politician who has counted on separation from Moldova, taking part
in negotiations with Chisinau is not a simple choice.

And as often happens in such cases, experts are looking for “Moscow’s
footprint.” In reality, not long before the September conference
in Germany, Russian law enforcement agencies showed interest in the
business of certain members of Smirnov’s family. And the fact that
Russia is not interested in prolonging the leader’s time in power is
no secret. Recent announcements from representatives of the Russian
Consulate have also caused a stir: they have said that inhabitants
of Transdnestr applying for Russian citizenship can no longer do so
in Tiraspol and now have to go to the Moldovan capital. Those who do
not have Moldovan citizenship are also obliged to apply for a Moldovan
residence permit.

It has to be noted, however, that the meeting of Filat and Smirnov,
as well as pressure from Moscow, can be interpreted as an attempt by
Russia to act to resolve an old conflict by diplomatic means. It is
not the first year that Russia has taken part in either relations with
Transdnestr (for example the March 18, 2009 meeting of the presidents
of Russia, Moldova and Transdnestr) or the Nagorno-Karabakh peace
process (three-way meetings between Armenia, Azerbaijan and Russia
have already become a regular occurrence). And although there have
been no obvious breakthroughs, the negotiating process in itself
can be seen as positive. But in the case of Transdnestr, in contrast
with Nagorno-Karabakh, Moscow’s diplomacy is frequently taken as a
sign of weakness. Recent events led to critical media response in
both Russia and Transdnestr. It is not the first time that this kind
of alarmism has emerged. Two years ago criticism was directed at the
joint statement issued on March 18, 2009, which stated that Russia was
ready to transform the current peace process to a “peace-guaranteeing
process.” This position was then described as a practical defeat for
Russian diplomacy, although Moscow only started talking about such a
transformation after achieving a compromise between the conflicting
factions, and not a day earlier!

In 2011 pressure on president Smirnov was called “a loss” and “a
defeat.” But if we put emotions aside, recent events have hardly
revealed anything new. Did Moscow really ever make public promises to
recognize a de-jure Transdnestrian state? The celebrated Kozak Plan
of 2003, which failed following the decisive participation of the
Moldovan elite together with Western diplomats, by no means suggested
secession. It was based on a suggestion to create a federative Moldovan
state (officially Chisinau prefers the autonomy of Transdnestr in a
unitary formation), but this did not encompass self-determination
of the disputed territory. The same is true of all the preceding
documents linked to the peace process that were prepared with Russian
participation.

Where is such alarmism coming from? Russia itself has certainly played
a role, with its policies in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Three years
ago Russia recognized their independence and today it is increasing
its military-political and economic presence in the two previously
autonomous Georgian states. But this move was necessary – it is not
the consequence of implementing an imperial plan, but a reaction to
the process of frozen conflicts thawing, which began in Tbilisi in
that year. Within the narrow corridor of possibilities Moscow took a
decision that created many potential political risks. But this does
not mean that the main aim of Russian politics in the post-Soviet
space should be direct clashes with all of the former republics of
the Soviet Union and their Western partners. Is this a priority for
Russian foreign policy? Hardly. Conducting a narrow diplomatic game,
maintaining its strong position in both Chisinau and Tiraspol is much
more promising. The rupture between Russia and Georgia only happened
when room for maneuver in the Georgian-Abkhazian and Georgian-Ossetian
conflicts had been exhausted.

But such possibilities do remain on the Dnestr! It’s also important to
remember that Russia is not the only player in the Moldova-Transdnestr
peace process. And if Chisinau fails to understand Russia’s moves,
or they spur an inadequate action from the Moldovan government, there
is always the option to freeze this or that diplomatic activity,
particularly as Moscow has shown more than once that it is ready for
one-sided concessions, which are not in its interests (such as the
rapid withdrawal of its troops from the area or agreeing to a Unitarian
Moldova, without taking into account Transdnestr’s interests.)

Therefore it is unreasonable to push Russian diplomacy toward a tough
choice: revisionism or maintaining the status-quo. It will be much more
productive for Russia to act based on the situation and not sticking
to one plan, maintaining the status quo where it is convenient and
breaking it where there is no alternative.

Sergei Markedonov, Ph.D., is a political analyst and a visiting fellow
at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),

ARMENIAN AIR CARRIER SUPPLIED ARMS TO LIBYA?

ArmeniaDiaspora.com
Sept 14 2011

Epress.am — The IL-76 that arrived in Moldova from Libya, with the
aim of picking up a regular shipment of arms (and it is presumed to
go back), belongs to “an Armenian civil air carrier,” said chief of
general staff of Moldova’s national army, General Iurie Dominic.

Press secretary of the Department of Civil Aviation in Armenia Nelly
Cherchinyan told Epress.am that “only [Armenian national air carrier]
Armavia can comment on this matter.” However, calls to Armavia press
secretary Nana Avetisova went unanswered.

General Dominic confirmed the fact that where the arms were going was
no secret to the air carrier. Citing a Moldovan TV channel’s public
report, Interfax reports that Chisinau (ChiÅ~_inÄ~Cu) sold old,
expired weapons to Libya.

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