Author: Badalian Vardan

The global grapevine

Last updated: April 21, 2012 12:12 am

By Jancis Robinson

Ecuador says it has a vineyard on the equator, while a Napa Valley
vintner will oversee Costa Rica’s first wine venture
©Jean-François Chaigneau
Syrian vintners Karim (left) and Sandro Saadé

Wine has become such a universal interest that I’m no longer surprised
when I hear of yet another country’s first commercial vineyard or
winery. In fact, a common phenomenon in more exotic locations for wine
production is for someone to plant a few vines, build a cellar door
(often without much of a cellar) and set up shop selling wine labelled
as though it were local, but which depends heavily on bulk imports
from wherever is cheapest at the time (often Chile, sometimes Spain or
Italy).

Yet there are one or two countries emerging as genuine wine producers
that are still capable of inflicting shock. I must say I did a double
take recently when I read that some Syrian wines were being launched
in the UK. Is this really the right moment? On the 30th anniversary of
the Falklands conflict, I picked an Argentine bargain – Viñalba
Cabernet Sauvignon 2010 Mendoza – as my website wine of the week. I
wonder what the correspondent who challenged my choice would make of
Domaine Bargylus in northern Syria?

It was in an attempt to recreate the vineyards established in the
hinterland of the port of Latakia in the Greco-Roman era that the
Beirut-based Saadé brothers, Sandro and Karim, began to plant
Bargylus’s 50 hectares of international vine varieties back in 2003.
They could hardly have predicted that Syria would now be hogging the
headlines in such an undesirable way. Asked by Decanter.com about the
impact of current events, Johnny Modawar, the Saadés’ head of
communications, maintained bravely, `day-to-day operations are not
affected by the situation. It is not risky, as all the conflict is
taking place close to Damascus and Homs [a hundred kilometres south]’,
although he did admit that the technical team, based at the Saadés’
Lebanese vineyard in the Bekaa Valley, is unable to cross in to Syria
and is having to make wine by conference call.

I tasted their current offerings and was particularly impressed by the
2007 Bargylus red, a blend of Syrah, Cabernet Sauvignon and Merlot
with real savour and depth of flavour. Stéphane Derenoncourt of
Bordeaux is consultant. The price is ambitious but not ridiculous.

As the best Lebanese and, increasingly, Israeli wines demonstrate, the
Middle East is capable of producing very good reds – especially at
higher elevations where temperatures fall at night.

I was amazed last year to be introduced to the wines of Zumot in
Jordan, whose star products, I thought, were white, made in the image
of Alsace’s best. At 15.5 per cent alcohol, Zumot, Saint George
Gewürztraminer 2010 was a heavyweight, but it was quite recognisably
made from this headily scented grape variety, even if I would be
inclined to drink it within a year of release. Bulos Zumot started out
as a vintner as long ago as 1954, with, reportedly, `a dream to give
Jordan its niche on the map of world-class, quality wine’.

I have already written at length here about the exciting progress in
winemaking in Turkey. Greece has been making world-class modern wine
for several decades. I am assured that Cyprus is at last making table
wines to be proud of, although I am yet to taste the evidence.

Further east, Georgia has one of the longest continuous and most
glorious viticultural traditions of all and has been making tentative
attempts at exporting to the west for many years – ever more necessary
since 2006 when it lost its most important export market, Russia. But
it is only now that fine wine is emerging westwards from Armenia.
Zorah is a project financed by a Milan-based member of the Armenian
diaspora who originally planned yet another winery in Tuscany but
realised that the country of his forefathers has its own highly
distinctive grape variety, Areni, and that the time had come for
amphora-aged wine. Italian Alberto Antonini is the consultant on this
particular project.

Vineyards behind what was the Iron Curtain are fertile ground for the
seeds of oenological wisdom sown by western wine consultants. The
developing Russian vignoble has called on foreign expertise, and many
of the projects mushrooming in eastern Europe have some input from a
western European country, often Germany.

The relatively conservative Wine Society in the UK has just taken on a
pair of very impressive Romanian wines, determinedly made from local
not international grape varieties, from the Prince Stirbey estate
revived by Baroness Ileana Kripp-Costinescu, German granddaughter of
Princess Maria Stirbey. The wines have improved considerably over the
past few years, with the fragrant dry white particularly distinctive.

Romania has a long tradition of wine production, nurtured by its
longstanding links with France. Much more exotic, in a sense, was the
collection of surprisingly convincing Dutch wines I was shown the
summer before last by some visitors from the Netherlands. Since then I
have tasted the competent, if not exactly thrilling, Danish wine
served at the famous Noma restaurant in Copenhagen, and have read
about the Riesling vines planted in Norway by Klaus Peter Keller of
the Rheinhessen. Is there no limit to the poleward spread of
viticulture?

Thanks to much more skilful techniques such as deliberately tricking
the vine into dormancy by cunningly timed pruning and leaf plucking,
viticulture has been spreading towards the equator too. The
Ecuadoreans even claim to have a vineyard that is actually on the
equator, while a Napa Valley vintner has just been hired to oversee
Costa Rica’s first wine venture.

Sometimes it seems that there is no Asian country without its own wine
industry. China is now a major wine producer. Thai and Vietnamese wine
are old hat. We came across a vineyard when visiting Cambodia last
year, and friends just back from a holiday in Myanmar report drinking,
and quite enjoying, the local Red Mountain Sauvignon Blanc. The third
International Symposium on Tropical Viticulture was held last November
in Chiang Mai, northern Thailand, with 43 papers given on various
aspects of wine production specific to the tropics.

I tasted a pair of wines from Kosovo the other day. `War-torn’ seemed
a suitable description.

Asharq Alawsat (English) – The Middle East
April 27, 2012 Friday

“Sunni” Turkey and the containment policy failure

By Adel Al Toraifi

When the Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan visited Tehran in
May 2010, to offer support for the Brazilian project regarding the
Iranian nuclear file, the conservative press in Iran described Erdogan
as an example of wise leadership in the region. Some newspapers also
devoted extensive column inches to Erdogan’s statements in support of
Iran, particularly his critical stance towards Israel and the Western
world’s view of Muslim states. Some commentators even considered
Turkish-Iranian relations to be a model of stability and cooperation,
arguing that since the signing of the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin – or the
Treaty of Zuhab as it is known in Turkey – in 1639 between the Ottoman
and Safavid empires, borders have continually been respected; this
agreement remains the basis for all border treaties between the two
countries.

Over the past ten years, the government of the Turkish Justice and
Development Party [AKP] has been able to converge with Iran and Syria,
to the extent that Iran supported Turkey’s military campaign against
the strongholds of the Kurdistan Worker’s Party [PKK] in 2006, and to
the extent that Syria retracted its position regarding the Iskenderun
region, and abolished the need for visas to travel between the two
countries. Furthermore, Turkey has strengthened its economic ties with
both Syria and Iran to exceed record figures in just a few years; even
obtaining Iranian concessions in the oil and gas sectors. Perhaps this
is what prompted Syrian President Bashar al-Assad to preach of a
pro-resistance Iranian-Syrian axis including both Turkey and Iraq, in
the face of what he considered to be the counter forces of Saudi
Arabia, Egypt and the Gulf States (al-Hayat newspaper, 26 October
2010).

In truth, Turkey let down the expectations of observers after the fall
of Saddam Hussein’s regime; it did not seek to fill the Sunni vacuum
caused by the rise of Shia political Islam to power in Iraq, nor did
it show any desire to restore its Ottoman heritage in old spheres of
influence. On the contrary, Turkey’s Islamists adopted a more
conciliatory tone with the Syrian Baathist party, and were less
sensitive towards Iranian revolutionary activities in the region,
perhaps because the “containment policy” [towards Syria and Iran] that
Erdogan and his party take pride in had reaped substantial benefits
for Turkey. However, in the last year, this policy has been exposed to
a sizeable tremor, forcing Turkey to significantly re-evaluate its
relations.

When the popular uprisings began in some Arab capitals in early 2011,
Turkey tried to wait before declaring its support for the masses, but
showed resistance to foreign intervention in Libya, and Erdogan
himself issued strong criticism towards NATO. Even when the uprising
began in Syria, Turkey dispatched its diplomats to Damascus in an
attempt to contain the situation and convince al-Assad to conduct
reforms, but with the rising death toll on the Syrian streets, Ankara
issued a series of statements condemning the regime of President
Bashar al-Assad. Not long afterwards, Turkey was compelled to
participate – logistically at least – in NATO operations in Libya, and
this damaged its relations with Tehran significantly. Turkey’s stance
seemed hesitant; while Erdogan was releasing statements threatening
direct military intervention, and threatening al-Assad with the same
fate met by Gaddafi, Turkey’s diplomatic apparatus appeared more
cautious and less zealous than the speeches of the Turkish leader.
This prompted many observers to say that Turkey was witnessing a
divide, either in the military institution or in the foreign affairs
department, regarding the danger of intervention or regime change in
Syria due to security reasons, and because of dimensions of ethnicity
and sectarianism, which could extend into Turkey itself if Syria
turned into a scene of sectarian warfare between Turkey, Iran and
other Arab parties.

In order to understand the shift in Turkish foreign policy, we need to
review some historical facts, and here I am alluding to three
historical stages:

First: It is not true that the history of Turkish-Iranian relations
has always been stable, as claimed by the Turkish advocates of
rapprochement with Iran, because Turkish-Iranian relations remained
troubled and unstable until the last decade. In his book “Islam,
Secularism and Nationalism in Modern Turkey” (2007), Soner Cagaptay
indicates that there is an illusion with regards to the Treaty of
Qasr-e Shirin, confirming that the tension inherent in Turkish-Iranian
relations is based on nationalist and sectarian reasons, which have
remained constant even after the emergence of a modern state in both
countries. In fact, the Turkish-Iranian clash goes far beyond the four
major wars between the two parties. It is true that Reza Shah was an
admirer of Ataturk’s secular nationalist project, but at the same time
both countries fought a war in 1930 that led to the amendment of the
border treaty between them. After that, Turkey broke off contacts with
Tehran, in order to orientate towards the West at the expense of the
region.

Second: The Turkish position was clear in its rejection of the Iranian
revolutionary model, and Turkey played a prominent role as a member of
NATO in addressing Iran’s aspirations to export its revolution.
Perhaps for this reason the Khomeini regime supported left-wing
Kurdish, Armenian and Islamist armed groups, such as the Turkish
Hezbollah, against Ankara during the 1980s, and the late Turkish Prime
Minister Turgut Özal led a clear policy in support of Pakistan during
the Afghan war with the Soviet Union. Turkey remained skeptical of the
intentions of the Iranian regime. The 1990s witnessed the
assassination of several secular Turkish intellectuals and
journalists, and Ankara accused Tehran of being involved.

Third: The idea of rapprochement with Tehran was the initiative of
Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Islamic Welfare Party, who is
considered the godfather of converging relations with the Islamic
Republic. He paved the way for the visit of President Mohammad
Khatami, and the signing of oil and security agreements between the
two countries. This approach was opposed by some leaders of military
and secular institutions, who saw it as an attempt by the Islamists of
Turkey to repeat the Khomeinist model in their own country. Perhaps
this explains Erbakan’s visit to Tehran after his political ban was
lifted in 2009, and also explains Ali Velayati, Iran’s former Foreign
Minister and adviser to the Supreme Guide, saying that Erbakan has
always been a friend of Iran.

Such historical milestones are important in order to explain the
Turkish shift from a policy of containment towards Iran and Syria
between 2003 and 2010, and the current state of verbal sparring
between the two sides. In recent months, Erdogan has received several
opponents of Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki such as President of
the Iraqi Kurdistan Region Massoud Barzani, [Iraqi Vice President]
Tariq al-Hashemi and Iyad Allawi. He has gone even further than this
and accused al-Maliki of adopting a dictatorial and sectarian trend,
whereby he excludes his opponents. In return, al-Maliki reacted to
Erdogan’s move by visiting Tehran, condemning what he termed the
‘sectarian’ – meaning Sunni – interference in his government in Iraq,
branding Turkey as a “hostile” state in the region.

There can be no doubt that Turkey is re-evaluating its relations with
Iraq and Syria. Yet, at the same time, I must emphasize that there are
two currents within the Turkish policymaking sphere: one is eager to
confront the Syrian-Iranian axis, and the other current – which
includes figures from within Erdogan’s own party – continues to warn
against abandoning the containment policy that has been adopted
towards these two countries.

Recent events have proven that the historical differences between the
two parties still exist; no matter how Turkey has tried to use its
containment policy, it has eventually been forced to resort to its
“Sunni” identity and “Turkish” nationalism, even if indirectly. This
is nothing new. When the Nagorno-Karabakh War broke out in February
1988 between the Armenians and the Azerbaijanis in the Southern
Caucasus, Iran and Turkey adopted contrasting positions towards the
crisis, which sparked a diplomatic row between the two countries. Iran
had sought to embrace the Azerbaijanis with open arms, welcoming them
as Shiites and revolutionaries, whilst Turkey was wary of the
expansion of Khomeini’s influence in the Southern Caucasus. This
prompted Prime Minister Turgut Özal to overtly declare, during his
visit to the US in 1990, that “the Azerbaijanis are Shia, unlike the
Turks, and hence, of more concern to Iran, since Turkey does not have
pan-Turkic ambitions.”

Today, Turkish-Iranian disagreements over Syria are being renewed. The
Turks have made no secret of their feeling that their interests will
be jeopardized so long as the Bashar al-Assad regime remains in power.
As for Iran, it considers the Turkish stance – especially Turkey’s
sponsorship of the Syrian Transitional Council and the asylum it is
granting to the displaced Syrian Sunnis – to represent a hostile
approach towards its strategic interest, namely the survival of its
Baathist ally.

There is no doubt that, for the most part, politics is governed by
interests, which may explain Turkey reconsidering its containment
policy towards the Iranian-Syrian axis, for its interests are now at
stake. The Turks fear the danger of the Syrian Kurds rising to power
after al-Assad is overthrown, and they fear that relations with the
Alawite minority in Turkey may become strained, and they are therefore
now seeking a Muslim Brotherhood alternative to rule Syria.

In 1985, Turgut Özal expressed his disappointment at the future of
Iran under the rule of the mullahs, and the Iranian press reacted by
saying “Turkey is nothing more than a pawn for US interests.” 25 years
later, Erdogan directed similar words of criticism towards Iran, and
this prompted the Iranian press to react by saying “Turkey is
implementing an American agenda to spread the Turkish model of
political Islam.”

Interfax, Russia
April 27 2012

Armenia tries to distract public attention from occupation of foreign
land – Baku

BAKU. April 27

The Azeri Foreign Ministry has denied Armenia’s accusations that it is
violating the ceasefire in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone.

“Official Yerevan is purposefully trying to mislead the international
community. Reality is such that Armenia is an aggressor recognized by
the entire world community that occupied part of Azerbaijan’s lands
and conducted massive ethnic cleaning with regard to peaceful Azeris,”
top spokesman for the Azeri Foreign Ministry Elman Abdullayev told
Interfax.

Earlier on Friday the Armenian media reported that three Armenian
servicemen had fallen victim to Azeri fire at frontier posts in the
Tavush region of Armenia.

“Yerevan is trying in every way to freeze the process of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict settlement and perpetuate the status quo
keeping the occupied territories,” Abdullayev said.

“However, the incumbent leaders of Armenia must realize that it is
impossible to change by force the borders of sovereign states
recognized by the international community,” Abdullayev said.

He said that the entire world community recognizes the currently
occupied Nagorno-Karabakh and seven districts around it as the
sovereign territory of Azerbaijan.

Abdullayev said that Azerbaijan today is not what it used to be in the
early 1990s. “Azerbaijan today is a very powerful state that is
capable of standing for itself and restoring its territorial integrity
and sovereignty. We will never reconcile ourselves with the
occupation. Territorial integrity is sacred for us and we will fight
for it to the end,” he said.

ml jv

Weltexpress, Deutschland
24 april 2012

Armenien gedenkt der Genozid-Opfer im Osmanischen Reich

Eriwan (Weltexpress) – In Armenien, Berg-Karabach und der armenischen
Diaspora im Ausland begeht man am heutigen Dienstag den Gedenktag an
die Opfer des Völkermordes an den Armeniern im Osmanischen Reich. Ende
des 19. – Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts hatten die osmanischen Türken
die Armenier systematisch unterdrückt und verfolgt. Im Jahr 1915 waren
über 1,5 Millionen Armenier ermordet worden.

In Jerewan fand am Montagabend der traditionelle Marsch zur
Gedenkstätte Zizernakaberd (arm. ?Schwalbenfestung’) statt. Während
des Umzugs verbrannten jugendliche Teilnehmer türkische Flaggen.

Am Dienstag besucht der armenische Präsident Sersch Sarkissjan mit
einigen weiteren hochrangigen armenischen Politikern, Diplomaten,
Auslandsarmeniern und vielen internationalen Politikern und
Kulturschaffenden das Denkmal für die Opfer des Genozids von 1915.

In der Kathedrale zum Heiligen Gregor dem Erleuchter in Jerewan fand
ein ökumenischer Gedenkgottesdienst statt.

Der Fakt des Genozids an den Armeniern im Osmanischen Reich wird von
vielen Staaten anerkannt. Als erstes Land tat dies Uruguay im Jahr
1965, es folgten Frankreich, Italien, Deutschland, die Niederlande,
Belgien, Polen, Litauen, die Slowakei, Schweden, die Schweiz,
Griechenland, Zypern, der Libanon, Kanada, Venezuela, Argentinien,
Brasilien, Chile und der Vatikan.

Auch das Europäische Parlament und der Weltkirchenrat hat den
Völkermord an den Armeniern anerkannt. Von den 50 US-Bundesstaaten
haben 42 den Genozid offiziell anerkannt und verurteilt sowie den 24.
April zum Gedenktag an die Opfer des Genozids am armenischen Volk
erklärt.

Die russische Staatsduma (Parlamentsunterhaus) hat im Jahr 1995 eine
Resolution ?Über die Verurteilung des Genozids am armenischen Volk in
den Jahren 1915-1922 in der historischen Heimat West-Armenien`
angenommen.

Die Türkei streitet die Anschuldigungen hinsichtlich des Völkermordes
beständig ab und reagiert in dieser Frage äußerst empfindlich auf die
Kritik des Westens.

Hurriyet Daily News, Turkey
April 28 2012

Armenian ‘G’ claims: A matter of balance and due process

by FERRUH DEMÄ°RMEN

We have just passed April 24, when Armenians of various walks of life
commemorate the anniversary of the arrest of the Armenian
intellectuals in Istanbul 97 years ago, alleged to have been the
beginning of `Armenian genocide.’ So the pundits chastise, woefully,
Turkey for `denying’ genocide, and demand that Turkey extend an
apology and offer restitution (meaning money and land) to the
Armenians.

This is no place to dwell on history to explain why such demands lack
rational basis, e.g., if the Ottoman Turks had intent to exterminate
the Armenian minority, why they gave Armenian citizens high positions
in the government, why they waited for more than 6 centuries – when
they were in much better position – to deliberately target Armenians.

Nor is this the proper place to elaborate why some critical pieces of
`evidence’ e.g., the Andonian files, that the proponents of genocide
cite to support their thesis, were forgeries, or that the orders
issued by the Ottoman central government to relocate Armenians
proscribed that all measures were to be taken to ensure the safety of
the deportees and meet their needs during and after relocation.

But there are two aspects the proponents of genocide conveniently
ignore, that call for special attention: balance and due process.

Regarding balance, no one denies that Armenians suffered during
relocation, and some lost their lives, in a time of war when chaos,
lawlessness and depravation prevailed. Surely we must mourn the
sufferings and loss of life. But do we ever hear about the sufferings
and loss of lives of non-Armenians? During that tragic period more
than half a million Muslims – and some Jews ` perished at the hands of
armed, marauding Armenian gangs that terrorized the countryside and
helped invading enemy armies.

Do the lost lives of Muslims not matter?

If we are to recall history, do Armenians carry any sense of guilt and
culpability for aiding the enemy and terrorizing the local civil
population?

And why do we not hear, one must ask, any remorse on the part of
Armenians for the killings by the ASALA organization of more than 40
Turkish diplomats in the 1970’s and `80’s?

As for due process, it must be emphasized that `genocide’ is a special
crime, and the term should not be used lightly. To quote the 1948 UN
Resolution on the Prevention of Genocide, determination on genocide
can only be made `by a competent tribunal of the State in the
territory of which the act was committed, or by such international
penal tribunal as may have jurisdiction.’ In the case of the alleged
Armenian genocide, there has been no such determination. No court
verdict; none, period. The U.N. resolution also makes no attribution
to `Armenian genocide.’

A parliamentary body, often beholden to special interests, and acting
as both the prosecutor and judge, is no substitute for a duly
authorized court of law.

So, one must ask, without a court verdict, how can the Turks be
accused of the `g’ crime? Where is the respect for due process?

In fact, the only judicial proceeding that comes close to being an
international tribunal on the Armenian case is the Malta Tribunal,
held by the victorious British after WWI. The proceedings,
investigating charges against 144 high-ranking Ottoman officials
accused of harming Armenians, failed to bring about a single
conviction. Even searching through the U.S. State Department files in
Washington D.C. failed to produce any incriminating evidence. Off went
the dispatch from the British Embassy to Foreign Secretary Lord Curzon
in London: `I regret to inform Your Lordship that there was nothing
therein which could be used as evidence against the Turks who are
being detained for trial at Malta.’ All the detainees were set free
and returned to Turkish soil.

Armenian genocide allegations, apart from being legally unsustainable,
create discord and animosity in society. Nearly a century has passed,
and it is time to move on toward greater inter-communal harmony.

Will the Armenian Diaspora take note?

Fars News Agency , Iran
April 28 2012

Azerbaijan’s Growing Ties with Israel Worrying Many in Middle-East

TEHRAN (FNA)- The burgeoning relationship between Israel and
Azerbaijan is raising eyebrows throughout the Middle East, not least
of all because Azerbaijan is Iran’s neighbor to the north and shares
close cultural and demographic ties with Iran.

Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman’s visit to Azerbaijan
underscores growing ties, including a $1.6 billion Israeli deal to
supply Iran’s neighbor with a wide range of military equipment.

Trade between Israel and Azerbaijan now totals $4 billion annually,
the highest figure for Israel’s business with any of the
now-independent countries that were part of the former Soviet Union,
and there’s a frequent exchange of officials – most recently Israeli
Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman, who visited Azerbaijan’s capital,
Baku, this week.

“Our relationship is very intense,” Mr. Lieberman said, according to
Christian Science Monitor.

Azerbaijan’s position between Iran and Russia has long made it a
diplomatic “den of spies,” where Israel and the US are seeking hard to
gather intelligence on Iran and Russia.

But it’s the nature of Israel’s trade with Azerbaijan that’s drawn the
most interest. In February, Azerbaijan agreed to pay state-run Israel
Aerospace Industries $1.6 billion for a wide range of military
products, including drones and anti-aircraft and anti-missile defense
systems. That’s nearly a quarter of the money Azerbaijan’s government
takes in each year, $7.8 billion. Azerbaijan also provides about 30
percent of Israel’s energy needs.

“Baku has an important role in Israel’s regional aspirations,” said an
Israeli diplomat who has worked on several trade deals that involved
Azerbaijan. He couldn’t be named because he wasn’t authorized to
discuss the subject with a reporter.

Speculation on how far the relationship goes is rampant. Israel, after
all, has been threatening to take military action against Iran’s
nuclear program. A recent report in Foreign Policy magazine alleged
that, in addition to the commercial ties, Israel has acquired access
to airfields in Azerbaijan’s north that might be used in any attack on
Iran.

Azeri and Israeli officials have denied the story. In recent news
report on Israeli preparations for a possible strike on Iran broadcast
by Israel’s Channel 2, unnamed Israeli officials said there were
“better, more practical options” than airfields in Azerbaijan. The
program didn’t elaborate on what those might be, however.

That hasn’t made Iranians any happier about the Azeri-Israeli
alliance. Azerbaijan’s growing ties with Israel have jeopardized its
relations with Iran, and earlier this year Iranian officials summoned
Azerbaijan’s ambassador to Tehran to the Foreign Ministry over reports
that the Azeri government was allowing Israeli Mossad agents to gather
intelligence along the Azerbaijan-Iran border.

In Azerbaijan, military analysts have speculated that access to Azeri
airfields could be intended for drone missions over Iran, rather than
a strike.

“There have been Western powers looking at the airfields in Azerbaijan
for a long time and wanting to use them. Israel may have found a way,”
said Arastun Orujlu, a former Azeri counterintelligence officer who’s
the director of the East-West Research Center in Baku. He said it was
well-known that Israel produced some parts for its drones in
Azerbaijan and kept a large fleet outside Baku.

Azerbaijan has had Israeli drones since at least 2008, when they were
first seen in a public parade. In September 2011, an Azeri drone of
Israeli origin was shot down over Nagorno-Karabakh, a territory that’s
the subject of a dispute between Azerbaijan and Armenia. That same
month, the Azeri government announced that Israel’s Aeronautics
Defense Systems had licensed it to build drones based on the Israeli
model.

Under a deal struck this February, Azerbaijan is expected to acquire
60 Israeli-designed unmanned aerial vehicles.

Speaking to the Azeri news station News.Az, Azerbaijani political
expert Rovshan Ibrahimov said Lieberman’s visit to Baku this week was
the most recent in a long line of moves by Israel to threaten Iran
through Azerbaijan.

“The arrival of Lieberman is part of the situation escalated around
Iran by Israel. Here are some aspects of the fact that Israel is
trying to show Tehran that it can at any time strike Iran, and for
this makes certain steps to ensure the support of its allies in this
plan,” he said.

Lieberman denied that his trip was meant to intimidate. He said his
meetings with top officials in Baku, including President Ilham Aliyev,
focused on bilateral relations, although his office released a
statement that said Iran also had been on the agenda.

ONE OF ORANGE SUBSCRIBERS TO BECOME THE VIP GUEST OF CANNES FILM FESTIVAL

Story from Lragir.am News:

Published: 18:09:09 – 27/04/2012

Starting from today till 7 May all Orange voice and internet
subscribers will be provided the chance to get a package for two to
be present as a VIP guest at 65th Cannes Film Festival. Subscribers
will just need to participate in the original contest of “statuses”,
organized on Orange Armenia’s page on Facebook and become the author
of the best status.

“I belive that each cinema fun dreams of appearing at such a reputable
international festival like Cannes Film Festival is and stand next to
live legends of the world cinema. Dreams become true with Orange. Our
winner subscriber will be welcomed in Cannes as a real star. And
as far as our subscribers go to cinema and watch films not alone,
the lucky winner will also choose his/her parter this time to go to
Cannes. Looking forward to original and passionate statuses,” said
Bruno Duthoit, Orange Armenia General Director.

To participate in the contest subscribers will need to post their
status relating to them, Cannes Festival, films in general and Orange
under the relevant statement, posted on Orange Armenia’s official
web page () on Facebook.

Immediately after being posted the status will participate in the
online vote. After posting, the subscriber will also need to send
his/her status through private message immediately from Facebook
indicating his/her phone number in the text. The ten “statuses” with
maximum Facebook-votes (Like) will be presented to Orange Jury for
the latter to choose the best one.

Name of the person who has posted the win status will be published
on 8 May.

For more details please visit

Orange is the official partner of Cannes Film Festival since more
than 10 years. In Armenia, it’s already the third year Orange offers
its customers the possibility to participate in the festival as a
VIP guest.

ANCA-WR ENDORSES CHRISTOPHER HOLDEN FOR STATE ASSEMBLY
Chris Holden

asbarez
Friday, April 27th, 2012

GLENDALE-The Armenian National Committee of America – Western Region
announced late last week its endorsement of Chris Holden for the 41st
State Assembly District. The decision came after a thorough candidate
selection process, which included several meetings with candidates,
an examination of each candidate’s track record with regards to issues
of concern to the Armenian-American community as well as their position
on key issues facing the State of California.

“I have always valued my relationship with the Armenian-American
community in Pasadena. I want to thank the Armenian National Committee
of America for its endorsement, and I look forward to working with
you in the important months and years ahead,” stated, current Pasadena
City Councilmember and State Assembly candidate Chris Holden said.

Born July 19, 1960 in Pasadena, California, Christopher Holden is a
former Mayor of Pasadena, California, serving from 1997 to 1999.

Having been a council member since 1989, Holden is also the second
longest-serving member in the history of the Pasadena City Council.

A graduate of Pasadena High School and San Diego University,
Holden’s accomplishments include the creation of a living wage
ordinance, charter reform through which the City Council created
the position of elected Mayor and compensation for Councilmembers,
Utility Deregulation, redevelopment of the City’s civic center,
and chair of the Charter Reform Task Force for schools.

As the champion of Pasadena’s slumlord ordinance and drug-free zones,
Holden has regional interests as well, serving as an officer on
the Burbank Airport Authority. He lives in Pasadena with his wife,
Melanie, his four children: Nicholas, Alexander, Austin, Mariah,
and his stepson, Noah.

“We welcome the ANCA-WR’s endorsement of Chris Holden as he is a
viable candidate for Assembly 41st District with extensive public
service experience and proven leadership qualities in the City of
Pasadena. His accomplishments as a City Council member and a former
Mayor give us the confidence that he is capable of representing the
interests of the local communities throughout the 41st District and
the interests of the Armenian community in the State of California. We
encourage our community to support and vote for Chris Holden in the
upcoming June 5th primary elections,” stated ANCA-Pasadena Chairwoman
Shoghig Yepremian.

The Armenian National Committee of America-Western Region is the
largest and most influential Armenian American grassroots advocacy
organization in the Western United States. Working in coordination
with a network of offices, chapters, and supporters throughout the
Western United States and affiliated organizations around the country,
the ANCA-WR advances the concerns of the Armenian American community
on a broad range of issues.

UNGOR: TURKEY HAS ACKNOWLEDGED THE ARMENIAN GENOCIDE
by Ugur Ungor

The Armenian Weekly Magazine

April 27, 2012

“Turkey denies the Armenian Genocide” goes a jingle. Yes, the Turkish
state’s official policy towards the Armenian Genocide was and is indeed
characterized by the “three M’s”: misrepresentation, mystification,
and manipulation. But when one gauges what place the genocide occupies
in the social memory of Turkish society, even after nearly a century,
a different picture emerges. Even though most direct eyewitnesses to
the crime have passed away, oral history interviews yield important
insights. Elderly Turks and Kurds in eastern Turkey often hold
vivid memories from family members or fellow villagers who witnessed
or participated in the genocide. This essay is based on countless
interviews conducted with the (grand-)children of eye witnesses to
the Armenian Genocide. The research results suggest there is a clash
between official state memory and popular social memory: The Turkish
government is denying a genocide that its own population remembers.

Children in Mush (photo by Khatchig Mouradian) Oral history in Turkey

Oral history is an indispensible tool for scholars interested in
mass violence. A considerable collection of Armenian and Syriac oral
history material has been studied by colleagues.1 The existing body
of oral history research in Turkey, though gradually developing,
has hardly addressed the genocide. A potential research field was
politicized by successive governments and the Turkish Historical
Society. Several documentaries about the victimization of Ottoman
Muslims in the eastern border regions have included shots of elderly
Muslims speaking about their victimization at the hand of Armenians
(and presumably Cossacks) in 1918. It seems unmistakable that the
Turkish-nationalist camp fears that the local population of Anatolian
towns and villages might “confess” the genocide’s veracity and disclose
relevant details about it. For example, the 2006 PBS documentary “The
Armenian Genocide” by Andrew Goldberg includes remarkable footage
of elderly Turks speaking candidly about the genocide. One of the
men remembers how his father told him that the génocidaires had
mobilized religious leaders to convince the population that killing
Armenians would secure them a place in heaven.

Another middle-aged man recounts a recollection of his grandfather’s
that neighboring Armenian villagers were locked in a barn and burnt
alive.2

In the past decade, I have searched (and found) respondents willing to
relate their personal experiences or their family narratives related
to the war and the genocide. In the summers of 2002 and 2004-07, I
conducted up to 200 interviews with (grand-)children of contemporaries
in eastern Turkey, all semi-structured and taped. Needless to say,
oral history has its methodological pitfalls, especially in a
society where the memory of modern history is overlaid with myth
and ideologies. Many are unwilling to reflect about their family
histories because they have grown accustomed to ignoring inquisitive
and critical questions, not least on their own moral choices in the
face of their neighbors’ destruction. Others are reluctant to admit
to acts considered shameful.3

But while some were outright unwilling to speak once I broached the
taboo subject, others agreed to speak but wished to remain anonymous,
and again many others were happy to speak openly, with some even
providing me access to their private documents. Even though direct
eyewitnesses to the crime have most probably passed away, these
interviews proved fruitful. Elderly Turks and Kurds often remember
vivid anecdotes from family members or villagers who witnessed
or participated in the massacres. My subject position as a “local
outsider” (being born in the region but raised abroad) facilitated
the research as it gave me the communicative channels to at once
delve deeply and recede at the appropriate moments. It also provided
me with a sense of immunity from the dense moral and political field
in which most of this research is embedded.

Turkish and Kurdish eyewitness accounts

A.D., a Kurdish writer from Varto (MuÅ~_), recalled a childhood memory
from 1966 when an earthquake laid bare a mass grave near his village.

The villagers knew the victims were Armenians from a neighboring
village. According to A.D., when the village elder requested advice
from the local authorities on what to do, within a day military
commanders had assigned a group of soldiers to re-bury the corpses.

The villagers were warned to never speak about it again.4

Interviews with elderly locals also yielded considerable useful data
about the genocide itself. For example, a Kurdish man (born 1942)
from Diyarbekir’s northern Piran district, had heard from his father
how fellow villagers would raid Armenian villages and dispatch their
victims by slashing their throats wide open. As they operated with
daggers and axes, this often led to decapitations. After the killing
was done, the perpetrators could see how the insides of the victims’
windpipes were black because of tobacco use.5 Morbid details such as
these are also recorded by the following account from a Kurdish man
from the Kharzan region, east of Diyarbekir:

My grandfather was the village elder (muhtar) during the war. He told
us when we were children about the Armenian massacre. There was a
man in our village; he used to hunt pheasants. Now the honorless man
(bêÅ~_erefo) hunted Armenians. Grandpa saw how he hurled a throwing
axe right through a child a mother was carrying on her back. Grandpa
yelled at him: “Hey, do you have no honor? God will punish you for
this.” But the man threatened my grandfather that if he did not shut
up, he would be next. The man was later expelled from the village.6

Here is another account from a Turkish woman (born 1928) from Erzincan:

Q: You said there were Armenians in your village, too. What happened
to them?

A: They were all killed in the first year of the war, you didn’t know?

My mother was standing on the hill in front of our village. She saw
how at Kemah they threw (döktuler) all the Armenians into the river.

Into the Euphrates. Alas, screams and cries (bagıran cagıran).

Everyone, children and all (coluk cocuk), brides, old people, everyone,
everyone. They robbed them of their golden bracelets, their shawls,
and silk belts, and threw them into the river.

Q: Who threw them into the river?

A: The government of course.

Q: What do you mean by ‘the government’?

A: Gendarmes.7

These examples suggest that there still might be something meaningful
gained from interviews with elderly Turks and Kurds. Needless to say,
had a systematic oral history project been carried out in Turkey much
earlier, e.g. in the 1960’s or 1970’s, undoubtedly a wealth of crucial
information could have been salvaged. Besides the excellent research
conducted in Turkey by colleagues such as Leyla Neyzi, AyÅ~_e Gul
Altınay, and others, interviews by individual researchers are at
best a drop in the ocean. A measured research project with a solid
book as output would be a memorable achievement for the centenary of
the genocide.

Discussion

When I was traveling from Ankara to Adana in the summer of 2004, I
stopped by the friendly town of Eregli, north of the Taurus mountain
range. My friend, an academic visiting his family, had invited me
along. Strolling through the breezy town, we came across one of my
friend’s acquaintances, an “Uncle Fikri.” The old man looked sad,
so we asked him what was wrong. He said, “My father has been on
his deathbed for a few days now.” When we tried to console him, he
answered: “I’m not sad because he will die, he has been sick for a
while now. I just cannot accept that he refuses to recite the Kelime-i
Shehadet before he passes on.” (Shahadah, the Muslim declaration of
belief: “There is no God but Allah and Muhammed is his Prophet.”) The
man looked deep into our eyes, there was an awkward silence for four
seconds, we understood each other, and we parted.

In this example, only two generations separated us from the eyewitness
generation. Therefore, I believe there might still be avenues for
oral history research on the genocide. Father Patrick Desbois is a
French Catholic priest who travels to Ukraine in a concerted effort to
document the Shoah through the use of oral history. His team locates
mass graves and interviews contemporary witnesses about the mass
shootings of Jews, which often took place just outside the Ukrainian
villages they visit. The elderly respondents usually remember the
slaughter in vivid detail.8 Desbois’ work on Ukraine has proven helpful
in completing the already comprehensive picture historians have of
Nazi mass murder in that region. During a private conversation, Desbois
intimated that he would be interested in launching a similar project in
Turkey, if a viable initiative was proposed.9 It might be worthwhile to
gauge what place the Armenian Genocide occupies in the social memory
of Turks and Kurds, even after nearly a century. The conclusion would
undoubtedly warrant my introductory comment: The Turkish government
is denying a genocide that its own population remembers.

Endnotes

1. Donald E. Miller and Lorne Touryan-Miller, Survivors: An Oral
History of the Armenian Genocide, Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1993; David Gaunt, Massacres, Resistance, Protectors:
Muslim-Christian Relations in Eastern Anatolia during World War I,
Piscataway, NJ: Gorgias Press, 2006, appendix; AyÅ~_e Gul Altınay
and Fethiye Cetin, Torunlar (Istanbul: Metis, 2009).

2. Andrew Goldberg, “The Armenian Genocide,” Two Cats Productions,
2006.

3. For parallel problems in Russian history, see Orlando Figes, The
Whisperers: Private Life in Stalin’s Russia, London: Penguin, 2007, p.

XXXV.

4. Interview conducted with A.D. (from Varto district) in Heidelberg,
Germany, Nov. 24, 2009.

5. Interview conducted with M.Å~^. (from Piran district) in
Diyarbakır, July 15, 2004.

6. Interview conducted with Erdal Rênas (from the Kharzan area)
in Istanbul, Aug. 18, 2002.

7. Interview conducted with K.T. (from Erzincan) in Bursa on June 28,
2002 and Aug. 20 2007, partially screened in the documentary “Land
of our Grandparents” (Amsterdam: ZeloviÄ~G Productions, 2008).

8.Patrick Desbois, Porteur de Mmémoires: sur les Traces de
la Shoah par Balles, Paris: Michel Lafon, 2007. Also, see

9. Personal communication with Patrick Desbois at the conference “The
Holocaust by Bullets,” organized by the Amsterdam Center for Holocaust
and Genocide Studies at the Nationaal Museum Vught (Netherlands),
Sept. 11, 2009.

BAKU ASKING FOR TROUBLE AMID MEDIATORS’ DIPLOMACIES AS ARMENIA’S PATIENCE RUNS OUT
Marina Ananikyan

PanARMENIAN.Net
April 27, 2012 – 21:16 AMT

PanARMENIAN.Net – Azerbaijan, having gained full confidence of its
impunity has long stopped pretending to work towards peaceful
settlement of Karabakh issue, openly ignoring the urges of
international mediators.

Over the last few days, Azeri army has repeatedly violated ceasefire
at the border with Armenia as well as the line of contact with
Karabakh forces. The “neighbors” haven’t restricted themselves to
opening fire at military positions. On April 24, Azeris opened fire
at ambulance car on the line of contact. On April 25, Azeri army
has been shelling a school and a kindergarten in Doveg village,
Armenia’s Tavush province. On April 27, VAZ 2107 car belonging to an
Armenian serviceman was shelled on the road to the village of Aygepar
in Tavush. The attack left 3 servicemen dead.

Immediately after the incident, Armenian Defense Ministry informed
Personal Representative of the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, Ambassador
Andrzej Kasprzyk on the deaths of 3 servicemen in Armenia’s border
region. As was revealed later, Azeri saboteurs entered the territory
of Armenia, trespassing the border, and opened fire at the servicemen.

Following the attacks, President Sargsyan stated that Armenia will
retaliate for Azeri actions; the country won’t allow the adversary
to use electoral fuss in Armenia to gain its own ends.

OSCE Minsk Group co-chairs gave a prompt response to the attacks.

However, their reaction was traditionally restricted to a statement
with general formulations of non-acceptability of ceasefire violation
and urges for peacefully negotiated settlement of the conflict.

However, as proved in practice, the more diplomatic are the statements
issued, the more aggressive and insolent Baku grows, openly ignoring
the urges of OSCE MG co-chairs.

Isn’t it time to pass from words to deeds? Could the superpowers,
for just a moment, forget about petrodollars Baku is using to buy its
impunity? Isn’t it time to stop turning a blind eye to Azeri outrage?

It has to be done, sooner or later. To all appearances, Armenia will
have to be the one to do it, just like it did 20 years ago.