Author: Babajanian Karo

WHY HAS PUTIN CHOSEN TO VISIT BAKU? – ARMENIAN ANALYST ON RUSSIAN LEADER’S UPCOMING TOUR

13:02 13.08.13

In an interview with Tert.am, the political analyst Alexander
Iskandaryan has talked of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s scheduled
trip to Baku. The expert has explained the reasons behind the Russian
leader’s choice of country and the timing of the visit. He also
addresses the upcoming presidential election in Azerbaijan.

Mr. Iskandaryan, why do you think Vladimir Putin has chosen Azerbaijan
as his first visit destination since being elected a president?

Notably enough, the visit is quite impressive in terms of the Russian
flotilla’s presence and the accompaniment of a big delegation.

Vladimir Putin is visiting Azerbaijan en route to Iran. As for the
context, Rosneft director Mr [Igor] Sechin was in Azerbaijan quite
recently, and the possibilities of working in Azerbaijan were very
probably discussed [in the course of the visit].

As the delegation includes the chief negotiator on the
Russian-Azerbaijani affairs, representatives of the Russian Ministry
of Emergency Situations, the Transport Ministry and the Ministry
of Defense, wide-profile agreements are going to be discussed. It’s
quite possible that the reported orders for acquiring flotilla will
be realized. It is necessary to keep in mind that the military base
on the Turkmenbashi port – the opposite side of the Caspian Sea –
will be completed in 2015.

In more general terms, there are two reasons making the visit
necessary, especially now. The first, as I said, is the trip en route
to Iran. Secondly, the Russian-Azerbaijani relations faced tensions in
the recent years due to the Azerbaijani radar stations in Gabala. So
there is a necessity to improve them.

It is also important to remember that Azerbaijan is conducting
[presidential] election; in this respect too, the visit has certain
components. The opposition in Azerbaijan has managed to unite around
Roustam Ibrahimbekov, the opposition leader, and the fact is being
perceived as a Russian project.

Even if this isn’t absolutely true, Ibrahimbekov is definitely a
Russian project in financial terms. Besides, Mr Ibrahimbekov is
a Russian citizen who has asked the Russian president to revoke
his Russian citizenship through rapid procedures because under the
Azerbaijani Constitution, citizens of other countries cannot nominate
themselves as candidates. And now Vladimir Putin can either revoke
his citizenship or choose not to do so.

The improvement of the Russian-Azerbaijani bilateral relations is
now on the agenda, the fact having been also confirmed by the Russian
presidential staff. Do you think the relations are likely to improve to
an extent to develop into a strategic [alliance] against the backdrop
of the Russian-Armenian relations which are said to be deteriorating
day by day?

Azerbaijan permanently collaborates with Russia in the arms supply
acquisition sector. I think Russia remains the main weapon supplier
for the countries on the post-Soviet area, with the exception of
those which are now NATO member states. As for Azerbaijan proper, it
purchases things from Ukraine and Israel as well. Russia, I repeat,
has been selling weapons to Azerbaijan since the very first years since
the country’s gaining independence. The same is the true in relation to
Armenia and other countries. I don’t think it is to Russia’s advantage
to disturb the balance in the South Caucasus. There are two things
Russia doesn’t need in the South Caucasus: the settlement of the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and a renewal of war.

Also it is important to keep in mind [Russian Foreign Minister Sergey]
Lavrov’s statement on the difficulty to maintain the status quo.

I am a political analyst familiar with hundreds of statement made by
different government bodies. And let me note that the important thing
in any statement is not what it says but where it is said and to whom,
with what purpose and in what circumstances.

Yes, things of the kind are said, but they have to be considered within
the general system of the information flow. The policies Russia has
been pursuing in the past 25 years remain to same.

There are six candidates [running for presidency] together with Ilham
Aliyev? Do you think the elections in Azerbaijan will be held the same
way as they have always been? And do you find the other candidates’
presence a ‘mob show’, as has been in Armenia if we believe the
radical opposition?

The situation in Armenia is not absolutely similar to that in
Azerbaijan. We do not have sultanates; nor do we have any problems
in terms of the hereditary transfer of power. Presidents here are
not elected for the third time after serving their second term.

Presidential elections in Armenia face a real competition. It’s a
different matter that people are probably weak or not powerful enough
to hold victory.

After all the March events following the 2008 presidential election
were not a show or a circus spectacle. They were a proof of a political
participation, be it though a very bad and unpleasant one.

The 40-percent votes garnered by [opposition candidate] Raffi
Hovhannisian in the recent presidential poll also testified to that.

The fact he didn’t manage to benefit from the results of a real
competition doesn’t mean it [the competition] didn’t exist.

It is, of course, difficult to compare Armenia with Switzerland or
France, but it shouldn’t be compared to Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan,
Azerbaijan, Russia and Korea either.

Hence, Aliyev will be the president. So why is the nominees’ number
six? He wanted that way. If he wanted 40, there would be 40. Mr.

Ibrahimbekov is the only exception for the simple reason he doesn’t
reside in Azerbaijan. The situation would be different if he did. And
I think Putin is now visiting Azerbaijan probably to prevent Mr
Ibrahimbekov from being registered as a candidate.

Should Aliyev and Putin fail to reach an agreement, Mr Ibrahimbekov
will not be registered. But if the developments take a different turn
to make the registration possible, they will have to beat the guys
after the election.

Any reaction by the world community will depend on that. But the
Azerbaijani elections will on average be declared neither good nor bad.

Observers will write in future that they didn’t see any competitiveness
in Azerbaijan. But repeating myself, I have to say again that
no one expects elections in Azerbaijan to be similar to those in
France. Let’s keep in mind that Azerbaijan is not a member of the
World Trade Organization, though it is involved in the [EU] Eastern
Partnership project. But it cannot conduct negotiations with the
EU over the Association Agreement. That is why Azerbaijan is what
it is. After all, Azerbaijan is rated as dictatorship in different
rankings. That’s something which, in general, is right.

LA POLICE AZERIE A ARRETE DES JOURNALISTES

AZERBAIDJAN

La police azerie a arrete plus d’une dizaine de journalistes qui
protestaient contre le renouvellement apparent d’une campagne de
chantage et d’intimidation contre une journaliste d’investigation de
RFE / RL Khadija Ismayilova.

Les journalistes ont ete liberes après avoir ete emmene dans un poste
de police dans la capitale, Bakou.

Les journalistes, en majorite des femmes, ont scande des slogans
tels que ” Khadija, nous sommes avec vous ! ” Le 1er août, RFE / RL
a appele les autorites azerbaïdjanaises a enqueter sur une nouvelle
video, qui contient des images intimes et obtenu illegalement de
Khadija Ismayilova.

mardi 13 août 2013, Stephane ©armenews.com

SURMONTER LES HANDICAPS : LA MENUISERIE TRANSFORME LA VIE D’UN HOMME HANDICAPE DANS UN VILLAGE A LA FRONTIERE ARMENIENNE

ARMENIE

Hrach Ghukasyan surmonte sa mobilite deficiente a l’aide d’un morceau
de bois – mais ce n’est pas un bâton de marche. Cela fait 13 ans que
ce resident de 32 ans du village frontalier de Nerkin Karmraghbyur
dans la province du nord-est du Tavush en Armenie travaille le bois
chaque jour afin de faconner divers articles.

Un simple morceau de bois devient un element significatif dans les
mains du maître et apporte des reponses a ses questions.

Hrach Ghukasyan, qui a vecu avec une incapacite au cours des
16 dernières annees, a reussi a surmonter son immobilite afin de
continuer a vivre et de creer, a quelque 220 kilomètres d’ Erevan dans
un endroit où les emplois sont rares meme pour des personnes valides.

” Je fais principalement des tables. Il me faut cinq jours pour
faire une table. Je fais aussi des armoires, des chaises, parfois
tout simplement faire une chaise est plus difficile et demande plus
de travail, et mes mains ne marchent pas bien “, dit Hrach.

Le bois a egalement joue un rôle tragique dans le destin de Hrach car
il lui a brise son cou et a endommage sa colonne vertebrale a l’âge
de 14 ans après un accident.

“Pendant les annees de guerre au debut des annees 1990, nous etions
dans les montagnes pour notre securite. Un jour d’automne où nous
faisions un retour dans le village, je suis alle dans la foret pour
du bois de chauffage et alors que je vous cherchait du bois je suis
tombe de l’arbre “, explique Hrach.

Il a fallu plus d’un an de chirurgie et de readaptation dans diverses
cliniques a Erevan pour que Hrach soit en mesure de remettre sur ses
pieds et commencer a marcher avec des bequilles. Il a decide qu’il
devait se lever et bouger malgre les recommandations des medecins de
rester immobile.

“La periode la plus difficile a ete les premiers mois. Je n’avais pas
ete malade toute ma vie avant et après l’accident, j’ai dû rester
a l’hôpital beaucoup de temps. J’ai passe ma première annee après
l’accident a l’hôpital. Ensuite, j’ai ete place dans un fauteuil
roulant, mais j’ai decide de ne l’utiliser qu’après un certain temps.

Je me suis ressaisis et j’ai repris la marche a nouveau “, explique
Hrach.

La maison où il vit avec ses parents est la dernière maison dans
le village qui est une cible facile pour les snipers azeris et
viennent souvent tirer des coups de feu. Hrach lui-meme dit moitie
en plaisantant, moitie en etant serieux qu’ils vivent plus près des
avant-postes azeris que le bâtiment de l’administration du village.

Ils ont commence a construire la maison en 1991, mais la guerre a mis
un terme aux plans et la maison est maintenant a moitie construite. Ce
qui ressemble de l’exterieur comme a un bâtiment de deux etages a
une seule petite pièce pour la vie quotidienne tandis que le deuxième
etage sert d’atelier.

Une odeur distincte de bois est tout autour de l’endroit où, dans un
coin il y a des tables et des chaises et dans un autre coin il y a
encore du bois non traite. Chaque outil et instrument est a sa place
et chaque detail a son sens pratique dans la boutique de Hrach.

Les avant-postes azeris sont clairement visibles depuis les fenetres
de l’atelier, mais Hrach, malgre l’apprehension du danger, n’apparaît
pas trouble par la menace imposante.

Après avoir monte les escaliers incommodes tous les jours avec l’aide
de sa mère, il se met au travail qui est enrichissant et a travers
duquel il gagne sa vie.

” J’avais probablement 17 ans quand je suis devenu fatigue de tout. Je
me suis retire, ne voulais pas voir quelqu’un. Pour tout oublier j’ai
commence a travailler le bois et lentement nous sommes devenus amis
“, explique Hrach.

Il y a plus de 186000 personnes vivant avec un handicap en Armenie
aujourd’hui, soit 6 pour cent de la population totale. Alors que plus
de 67 pour cent d’entre eux sont en âge de travailler (18-63 ans),
seulement 9 pour cent d’entre eux ont reellement un tavail.

Dans le cas du village de Nerkin Karmraghbyur, où le seul travail
est fourni par l’ecole maternelle locale, le centre medical et de
l’administration du village, et où l’agriculture est compliquee
par une menace constante des tirs de l’ennemi, avoir un emploi
remunere, et encore moins pour un personne handicapee, semble presque
impossible. Mais l’homme qui a surmonte ses handicaps a travaille
dur pour surmonter ces handicaps sociaux.

“J’ai toujours aime faire des choses par moi-meme. Je peux utiliser
l’ordinateur, j’ai appris des facons differentes de travailler le
bois provenant de sites Internet “, explique Hrach.

Les tableaux qu’il fait sont vendus pour une moyenne de 80000 drams
(environ 190 $) et malgre le fait que beaucoup dans le village achète
des meubles a credit, le menuisier ne se plaint pas.

Pourtant, Hrach considère que sa vie dans la ville serait plus facile
car les routes cahoteuses du village rendent la vie beaucoup plus
difficile pour lui. D’ailleurs, dit-il, les villes ont des centres
d’emploi pour les personnes handicapees, où il passera plus de temps
interessant a communiquer avec d’autres personnes.

“Sortir de la maison est un problème pour moi. Je ne peux pas
facilement me rendre au centre du village et donc je ne peux pas me
socialiser. J’entends souvent beaucoup de questions sur mon etat et
c’est aussi embarrassant “, explique Hrach, qui pense que les gens ne
devraient pas faire de discrimination fondee sur l’etat de sante. ”
C’est mon sort, mais j’essaie de ne pas perdre courage. J’essaie de
vivre de mon present. Quand je veille, je deviens triste, mais quand
je suis au travail, je n’ai pas le temps de me sentir deprime. ”

Par Gohar Abrahamian

ArmeniaNow

mardi 13 août 2013, Stephane ©armenews.com

SPONSORSHIPS NEEDED FOR CHILDREN AT BIRDS’ NEST ORPHANAGE IN LEBANON

SOCIETY FOR ORPHANED ARMENIAN RELIEF (SOAR)
1060 First Avenue, Suite 400, King of Prussia, PA 19406
Office: 610.213.3452 Fax: 610.229.5168
Email: [email protected] Web:

Birds’ Nest (Trchnotz Pouyn) Orphanage, located in Byblos, Lebanon,
has been home to thousands of Armenian children for more than 80
years. Founded by Maria Jacobson, known by Armenians throughout
the world as “Mama,” Birds’ Nest provides boarding, education,
spiritual guidance, and encouragement to help build self sufficiency
in preparation for life and integration into society. The orphanage
houses 36 children, all of whom come from broken families and are in
need of care and compassion.

The Sponsorship Program is the primary mechanism through which SOAR
provides support to specific orphaned Armenian children. Most of
the children at Birds’ Nest are of school age, and sponsorship funds
would be used exclusively for their childcare and education needs.

If you would like to sponsor a child at Birds’ Nest, please contact
George S. Yacoubian, Jr., at [email protected] or enroll through
the Sponsorship Program by selecting a child from Birds’ Nest.

Thank you in advance for your support!

The Society for Orphaned Armenian Relief (SOAR) is a 501(c)(3)
nonprofit organization dedicated to providing humanitarian relief to
orphaned Armenian children and adults. Working with a loyal donor
base and a trusted network of partners, SOAR distributes clothing,
educational supplies, medicine, and other essential resources to
orphaned Armenians throughout the world.

CSUN STUDENT CHOSEN BY GOV. BROWN FOR CSU BOARD OF TRUSTEES

Monday, August 12th, 2013

Talar Alexanian

LOS ANGELES-The California State University Board of Trustees
is responsible for the oversight of the system’s 23 schools. The
25-member group adopts the governing rules, regulations and policies
of the campus, and now Talar Alexanian, a student at California State
University, Northridge, has joined them.

Gov. Jerry Brown made the announcement of Alexanian’s appointment,
which will last for two years. Alexanian will serve as the non-voting
student trustee in her first year and assume the voting student
trustee position-which is currently being held by Cipriano Vargas of
California State University, San Marcos-in her second year.

At CSUN, Alexanian is pursuing a degree in journalism and public
relations. This year she was chosen as vice president of CSUN’s
Associated Students and was an upper-division senator from 2012
to 2013.

Alexanian has been a student representative for the CSU Admission
Advisory Council since 2012 and was an events assistant at the CSUN
Matador Involvement Center from 2011 to 2013.

She is a member of the National Society of Collegiate Scholars, the
National Society of Leadership and Success, and the Public Relations
Student Society of America.

Le catholicos Karékine II au banc des accusés

10 aout 2013

Classé dans : ARTICLES – denisdonikian @ 2:52
Tags: Ara K. Manoogian, Archevêque Zakarian, catholicos des Arméniens,
Eglise de Nice, Karékine II, Mesrop II Mutafian, Nourhan Manougian, Père
Vatché Hairabédian

Francis Bacon, Etude d’après Vélasquez : Portrait du Pape Innocent X, Detail
(1953)

– 08.08.2013

Face aux crises locales ou nationales, de nos jours, la plupart des
Arméniens réagissent de deux manières : « Ne lavons pas notre linge sale en
public » ou bien « Dénoncer est la première étape pour résoudre une crise. »
Ces derniers mois, un scandale – énorme, épouvantable, insupportable – a
éclaté au sein de notre communauté. Il ne s’agit pas moins que de la manière
d’administrer et de la réputation du catholicos de tous les Arméniens,
Karékine II. En tant que catholicos, il n’est pas seulement le chef
spirituel de l’Eglise apostolique arménienne, mais il est presque aussi
important aux yeux de la nation arménienne que le président de l’Arménie.
Toute atteinte au catholicos porte atteinte à notre nation – y compris les
fidèles de l’Eglise de Cilicie, les catholiques, les protestants… sans
parler des athées.

Les critiques adressées au catholicos Karékine II ont alimenté des
pétitions, donné lieu à des lettres ouvertes et à des articles, suscité des
rassemblements, fait l’objet de commentaires dans les médias en ligne,
d’aucuns allant même jusqu’à exiger la démission du catholicos. Ces
accusations sont de tous ordres : fraude, turpitude morale, corruption,
autocratie, déclin des m`urs et de la morale du clergé d’Etchmiadzine,
malaise parmi le clergé… La liste est longue… Sans oublier les sept péchés
mortels et quelques autres. Orgie de diatribes ? Complots de la part de ses
ennemis ou d’ennemis de l’Eglise ? Allégations tirées par les cheveux ?
Corbeaux ? Voici une compilation des échecs supposés du catholicos.

1 – Le catholicos Karékine II aurait été élu (1999) grce à une fraude
massive, avec l’aide de l’ancien président Robert Kotcharian et des
oligarques d’Arménie. Intimidations et pots-de-vin furent utilisés pour
obtenir des voix en sa faveur. De riches donateurs de la diaspora, dont une
famille célèbre, contribuèrent à un bakchich de trois millions de dollars.

Ara K. Manoogian [Manoukian], militant des droits de l’homme à Los Angeles,
a établi des données relatives à l’élection frauduleuse du catholicos. Pour
résumer le point essentiel de son argumentation, les délégations de Russie
et d’Arménie furent illégalement autorisées à disposer d’un nombre de voix
bien plus élevé que ne le justifiait le nombre de leurs fidèles. Neveu du
patriarche Torkom II Manoukian de Jérusalem, aujourd’hui disparu, Ara K.
Manoogian précise que son oncle le mit au courant de cette élection
frauduleuse et qu’il s’éleva contre cette manipulation grossière auprès du
catholicos Karékine II, mais en vain.

De même, un mois avant cette élection, plusieurs archevêques publièrent une
déclaration selon laquelle les autorités de l’Arménie « au plus haut niveau,
sont parvenues à un consensus en faveur d’un candidat, qu’ils tentent
d’installer sur le trône. » Se référant au futur catholicos Karékine II.

2- Le catholicos serait père de deux enfants. Une photo d’un de ses supposés
rejetons circule sur internet. Une rumeur ferait état de sa relation intime
avec une donatrice d’Amérique du Nord.

3 – Il serait peu versé en théologie ; ne connaissant guère l’histoire et
les traditions de l’Eglise arménienne. Bien qu’il ait fait des études en
Arménie et en Europe, son savoir universitaire serait superficiel. Il lui
arriverait de trébucher en récitant le Notre Père. L’on doute même qu’il
soit croyant.

4 – Il serait dépourvu de toute élégance ou dignité spirituelle. Oligarque,
en royale soutane de pourpre, il administrerait Etchmiadzine de manière
dictatoriale.

5 – En tant que juge suprême, chef du corps législatif, président du Conseil
Spirituel Suprême et chef du Collège des évêques, il monopoliserait tout le
pouvoir. Transparence et responsabilité sont autant de concepts qui lui
restent étrangers.

6 – Il serait grossier, fruste, vulgaire, capricieux, injuste, discourtois,
intempérant, incompétent, malveillant, infatué, injurieux, autoritaire,
avide de gloire et d’argent, dénué de spiritualité et cachottier… Il n’est
même pas sûr qu’il soit né en 1951 ou 1954.

7 – Sous sa direction, le Saint-Siège d’Etchmiadzine serait devenu un
cloaque d’intrigues, de soupçons, de peur, de jalousie, d’intimidation et de
népotisme. Son style stalinien à la Beria aurait fait d’Etchmiadzine une
fosse aux serpents.

8 – Sous ses yeux, d’éminents ecclésiastiques d’Arménie auraient engendré
des enfants et mèneraient des existences extravagantes. L’un d’eux –
l’archevêque Navassart Kjoyan, en charge du diocèse de l’Ararat – possède
une Bentley, une des voitures les plus chères existantes. Kjoyan serait
aussi accusé d’être impliqué dans une escroquerie financière off-shore.

9 – L’homosexualité au sein du clergé en Arménie et en diaspora
constituerait un autre point faible auquel le catholicos ne s’attèle pas.

10 – Sous ses yeux, d’éminents ecclésiastiques d’Arménie seraient devenus
hommes d’affaires et propriétaires d’entreprises. Outre Monseigneur Kjoyan,
citons l’évêque Abraham Mékertichian, de Vayots Dzor, autre
ecclésiastique-homme d’affaires. Lequel possède plusieurs mini-complexes
hydroélectriques.

11 – En tant qu’oligarque, le catholicos serait actionnaire d’une entreprise
de minibus à Erevan.

12 – Il s’est approprié des biens appartenant à l’Eglise.

13 – Il néglige de restaurer des édifices monastiques historiques en ruine,
alors qu’il dépense 309 000 dollars pour acquérir sept Toyota. Pour éviter
de payer la TVA, il a soutenu que cet argent lui fut donné par l’oligarque
Samvel Karapétian, propriétaire de la société Tachir. La « négligence » du
catholicos à l’égard des édifices historiques de l’Eglise a été décrite
comme un « génocide culturel à l’encontre des églises et des monastères
arméniens du Moyen Age. »

14 – Son attitude et celle de son clergé en Arménie ont jeté des milliers
d’Arméniens dans les bras de sectes telles que les Témoins de Jéhovah et les
Mormons.

15 – Il a défroqué au moins 160 archevêques, évêques, ecclésiastiques et
diacres. Jamais, au cours des 1 700 ans d’histoire de l’Eglise arménienne,
autant d’ecclésiastiques n’avaient été démis de leurs fonctions pour des
motifs autres qu’hérétiques. Son « défroquage » en masse a été décrit comme
« un règne de la terreur » et « un massacre spirituel de l’Eglise
apostolique arménienne. » Conséquence de cette frénésie de défroquage, il a
été critiqué par le patriarche d’Istanbul, Mesrop II Mutafian. Le patriarche
lui fit remarquer – tandis qu’un éminent ecclésiastique était défroqué à la
hussarde – que si l’accusation est claire et manifeste, « un conseil doit
alors être réuni et l’accusé avoir la possibilité de se défendre. » Le
patriarche l’accusa aussi d’interférer dans les affaires du Patriarcat
d’Istanbul.

16 – Après avoir défroqué l’archevêque Tigrane Kiouréghian, du diocèse du
Nouveau-Nakhitchévan, pour lui avoir soi-disant désobéi, le catholicos
Karékine II installa son propre frère – un prêtre – comme primat.

17 – Afin de dissimuler sa médiocrité et ses aptitudes intellectuelles
limitées, il éloignerait ses contemporains d’Etchmiadzine, aux dires d’un
groupe d’Arméniens du Canada.

18 – Loin de condamner les récentes élections présidentielles, entachées de
fraudes, il a accordé sa bénédiction lors de l’entrée en fonctions de Serge
Sarkissian.

19 – Son attitude grossière et immature, lors de sa rencontre avec le
catholicos Ilia II de Géorgie, a mis dans l’embarras l’Eglise arménienne,
l’Arménie, ainsi que les Arméniens de Géorgie. Il ne représente donc pas
dignement l’Eglise, ni la nation arménienne.

20 – Il commit un énième impair, dans le cadre de ses responsabilités
`cuméniques, lorsqu’il traita les patriarcats de Jérusalem et d’Istanbul
comme si ces augustes Lieux Saints constituaient des entités diocésaines
mineures. Irrité, le patriarche Nourhan Manougian de Jérusalem a déclaré, au
début de ce mois, qu’il ne se rendrait pas à un rassemblement de hauts
dignitaires de l’Eglise, organisé prochainement par le catholicos. Tout
comme le patriarche d’Istanbul, il a exprimé son mécontentement suite au
limogeage précipité – et inexpliqué de la part du catholicos – de
l’archevêque Norvan Zakarian, primat de longue date et très estimé des
Arméniens de France.

21 – Lors d’un séjour à Jérusalem, il y a quelques années, le catholicos
menaça ainsi d’éminents ecclésiastiques de la cathédrale Saint-Jacques : «
Je vous dépouillerai de tous vos postes ! »

22 – En Europe de l’Ouest (la Suisse, par exemple), il a tenté de
centraliser l’administration des diverses églises. La communauté arménienne
de France a publiquement condamné son ingérence d’une main de fer dans
l’administration interne du diocèse français.

23 – Il a apporté son soutien à un prêtre ayant commis un délit (le Père
Vatché Hairabédian) aux dépens de l’archevêque Zakarian. Tandis que
Hairabédian officiait comme pasteur de l’église arménienne à Nice, ses
ouailles en appelèrent au catholicos pour qu’il limoget cet ecclésiastique
peu recommandable. Appels qui furent ignorés.

En 1 700 ans d’histoire, à au moins quinze reprises, des catholicos
arméniens ont été limogés ou contraints de se démettre. Le premier à être
déposé fut Kristapor II Apahouni en 630 ; le dernier, Yéprem [Ephraïm] Ier
de Dzoraguègh en 1830. Nous ignorons si chacune des grotesques accusations
portées contre le catholicos Karékine II sont justifiées, mais si ne fût-ce
que 10 % de ces allégations étaient fondées, alors le catholicos de tous les
Arméniens n’a d’autre choix que se démettre. Plus cette plaie suppurera,
pire ce sera pour l’Eglise et la nation. Quant aux « bien-pensants » pour
qui nous ne devrions pas parler [« dzamots tartsank » en arménien] de ces
accusations, au motif que nous ferions le jeu de nos ennemis, nous leur
disons que l’époque n’est plus où l’on cachait la vérité. Le roi est nu.
Comment l’Eglise pourrait-elle survivre, si de telles accusations pèsent sur
la tête de son chef suprême ? Aussi bien, garder le silence contribuerait à
coup sûr à rendre l’Eglise et son clergé vains.

Fût-ce dans les circonstances les meilleures, nous ne pouvons nous permettre
un catholicos indigne. Etant donné que la nation arménienne traverse des
temps précaires et troublés, nous ne pouvons souffrir un catholicos qui a
perdu sa boussole morale et n’est pas à sa place sur le trône
d’Etchmiadzine. Les défis existentiels qui se présentent à nous ne laissent
aucune place à un catholicos qui, au dire de ses accusateurs, se comporte
tel un moderne Rodrigo Borgia (le pape Alexandre VI).

La nation attend du catholicos Karékine II qu’il réponde à ces accusations.

*

Editorial de Geghart.com, avec l’autorisation de l’auteur : Dikran
Abrahamian

Source :

Xinhua General News Service, China
August 10, 2013 Saturday 10:55 AM EST

Russia invites western partners for tank biathlon competition

MOSCOW Aug. 10

Moscow has invited Western countries to participate in a newly created
sport-military crossover competition which will be held next year, a
high-ranking Russian military official said Saturday.

This year, the final competition for tank biathlon, the new sport,
will take place on Aug. 12-17 in the Alabino firing range of Moscow
region. Top tank crews from Russia, Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan
will participate in the game, Deputy Defense Minister Yuri Borisov
said.

“Next year, we would like to expand the list of participating
countries,” Borisov said, adding Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu has
already invited counterparts from Italy and Germany to participate in
the event.

Shoigu said Friday in Washington that the U.S. military would
participate in the tank biathlon championship in Russia in 2014.

“We have invited our counterparts to participate next year in the tank
biathlon, and they accepted gladly the invitation,” Shoigu said,
adding the invitation was accepted by the U.S. Secretary of Defense
Chuck Hagel.

According to Borisov, the new sport will demonstrate high quality of
Russian armored vehicles.

In the competition, every tank has to run some 20 kilometers at fast
speed while firing targets from all weapons. On the course, a tank has
to pass ford, fence, rut bridge, high-speed sections and overtaking
passages. During the whole process, the crew remains in the firing
position.

The competition requires crews to show professional skills such as
tank-driving, shooting and teamwork spirit.

The Moscow Times, Russia
Aug 11 2013

Armenia Hires International Banking Giants to Supervise $500M Bond Issue

11 August 2013 | Issue 5188

LONDON – The Republic of Armenia, rated Baa2 by Moody’s and BB- by
Fitch, has hired Deutsche Bank, HSBC and JP Morgan to lead the issue
of its debut U.S. dollar-denominated eurobond, according to the
country’s finance ministry.

It plans to use the proceeds to repay the country’s $500m debt to
Russia, which it received in 2009 to help it through the financial
crisis.

“The government approved the finance minister’s proposal about an
agreement with lead-managers to issue eurobonds. Three companies –
Deutsche Bank, HSBC and JP Morgan – have been selected as
lead-managers of the issue,” the finance ministry said in a statement
on its website.

In May, Prime Minister Tigran Sarksyan said the sovereign planned to
raise $500 million through its first eurobond sometime this year.

Mizo News
Aug 11 2013

Turkish wrestler banned for racist remarks

Ankara:Turkey’s Olympic medallist Riza Kayaalp was banned for six
months by the International Federation of Associated Wrestling Styles
(FILA) for his racist remarks against Armenians and Greeks three weeks
ago.

Kayaalp had targeted Greeks and Armenians in his tweets during the
Gezi Park unrest in Turkey, reports Xinhua.

European and World Champion Kayaalp, who had won a bronze at the 2012
London Olympics, advocated that `Armenians’ were at the root of the
Gezi protests, in a series of tweets he later deleted.

FILA president Nenad Lalovic said that Kayaalp was suspended for his
racist tweets from international matches.

`He was given an immediate suspension of six months by the FILA judge
and he has the right to appeal,’ Lalovic said.

Cinema Cover Ads! Kayaalp is one of the most famous sportsmen in
Turkey. He had been picked to bear the Turkish flag during the opening
ceremony of last month’s Mediterranean Games in Mersin.

Politkom.ru, Russia
Aug 8 2013

Fifth Anniversary of Five-Day War

by Sergey Markedonov, Visiting Fellow at the Centre for Strategic and
International Studies, Washington, USA

In the past five years, the subject of the Transcaucasus has
invariably been raised during August discussions. Today the heat of
emotions over the events of the “hot August” of 2008 has declined
significantly. Professional forecasters are no longer so busy with
their political weather-forecasting studies, that is, compiling
predictions of a repetition of the “five-day war” every August.
Caucasus issues have been squeezed out of the first few lines of the
news reports and the newspaper headlines by features and reports on
the state of affairs in the Middle East, Central Asia, and
Afghanistan…

Ahead lies the reformatting of the NATO (in effect, American-British)
Afghan operation, which gives rise to far more questions than
ready-made answers. Many heroes or antiheroes (it all depends on your
angle of vision) of those five days five years ago have either left
their jobs or are close to leaving big politics. Eduard Kokoiti no
longer leads South Ossetia; second President of Abkhazia Sergey
Bagapsh has departed this life. One of the main “hawks” and eminences
grises of Georgian politics, former Internal Affairs Minister and head
of government Vano Merabishvili, is in prison. Another member of the
Georgian president’s “inner circle,” ex-Minister of Justice Zurab
Adeishvili, has been sentenced to imprisonment in absentia. And
Mikheil Saakashvili himself is awaiting the presidential elections and
his departure from the post of head of state after the significant
curtailment of his powers and their redistribution in favour of the
prime minister. The American administration headed by Barack Obama,
unlike George Bush Junior’s team, does not regard the Georgian
president as a model democratic reformer. On the contrary, in fact,
despite the significant help in the Afghan operation (the contingent
from the Caucasus republic is the largest of the subunits from
countries that are NATO’s allies but not members of the Alliance),
Washington is setting Tbilisi new tests again and again. First
parliamentary, then presidential elections. And in Russia too the
Putin-Medvedev “tandem” is seldom recalled. And then for the most part
only by experts or journalists. Although it is Dmitriy Medvedev’s name
on the edict recognizing the independence of the two former autonomous
formations of the Georgian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic].

However, interest in the geopolitical dynamics in the South Caucasus
is still strong. And consequently, referring to the “hot August of
2008” in the context of today’s events appears justified. To what
extent are the events of five years ago continuing to determine the
present agenda? What has changed since that time and in what direction
are these changes developing?

Many authors, assessing the significance of the “five-day war” hot on
the heels of that event, jumped to conclusions and tried to present it
as some kind of geopolitical surprise that shook and shocked the whole
world. In reality the five days of the “hot August” were only links,
admittedly important ones, in a chain by the general name of the
“transformation of the regional status quo.” The first status quo in
the Greater Caucasus reflected the realities of the breakup of the
Soviet Union. Only an incorrigible optimist could ever have considered
that this disintegration and the formation of new nation states out of
the ruins of a once united country could take place strictly in line
with the borders sketched out by party and Soviet leaders. The borders
disappeared along with the CPSU [Communist Party of the Soviet Union]
as a system of power and governance (which had guaranteed their
observance), leaving behind, instead, contentious sovereignties,
disputed borders, and conflicting civil, political, and ethnic
identities. Proclaiming independence turned out to be by no means the
same as ensuring the loyalty of the new citizens of the new state
formations. As a result, in the South Caucasus, instead of the three
states recognized by the international community, a further three
unrecognized republics emerged, and for six years a fourth also
existed in the North Caucasus – the “Chechen Republic of Ichkeria,” to
say nothing of the failed attempts at self-determination on both sides
of the mountain range.

Naturally this first status quo had not only its adherents but also
its ardent opponents, who sought a revision of this legacy. In
1999-2000 Moscow took its revenge for the Khasavyurt Accords of 1996,
although to this day the problem of the integration of Chechnya into
the Russia-wide space is far from being resolved. In 2004-2008 Georgia
pinned its hopes on a total review of the conditions that completed
the hot phase of the two ethno-political conflicts in Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. The latter republic was regarded as the “weak link” and
the process of reviewing the rules of the game set out in the Dagomys
Accords (1992) proceeded at an accelerated pace compared with the
Abkhazian line. The “hot August” of 2008 virtually completely
overshadowed the start of the “unfreezing” of the conflict in May
2004. Meanwhile the road to the August tragedy of five years ago began
with the deployment of subunits of the Georgian MVD [Ministry of
Internal Affairs] that were not stipulated in the earlier accords,
followed by the first military confrontation between the Georgian and
South Ossetian side since the 1992 cease-fire (8-19 August 2004). It
was after these events and over the next four years that the “minor
foul” tactics became an everyday reality in South Ossetia, until
quantity turned into quality.

The “unfreezing” of the conflict, threatening Moscow’s exclusive
interests, forced the Russian leadership to make up its mind clearly,
and ultimately gave rise to tough retaliatory actions, the recognition
of the two former autonomous formations of the Georgian SSR, and the
participation in the destruction of the old status quo.

However, over the subsequent five years Russia has not carried out any
offensive geopolitical operations either within the limits of the
Caucasus or in the post-Soviet space in general, although there was no
shortage of predictions on that subject in August 2008. In this
context it may be recalled that an escalation of the interstate
standoff with Ukraine, which sympathized openly with Georgia, did not
happen. In fact the Grand Treaty between Kiev and Moscow was extended.
In 2010 even Moscow’s Western partners were prepared for some degree
of intervention by the Russian Federation in Central Asia (the
situation in Kyrgyzstan), but the Kremlin did not make up its mind to
this. Also in 2010 the Russian Federation reached an agreement on the
demarcation and delimitation of the state border with Azerbaijan
despite the fact that this decision had and still has its critics,
first and foremost with regard to the “price paid” (the Dagestani
enclaves in Azerbaijani territory). In effect Moscow played the role
of a selective revisionist reacting in a tough way to being squeezed
out of its sphere of interest but not proposing a fundamentally new
agenda. Integrationist ideas (the Customs Union and the Eurasian
Union) were an attempt to escape from the post-Soviet greatcoat in
which ideas of a common past supplanted pragmatic factors. The extent
to which these ideas were thought through, were considered, and were
attractive to the potential partners is another matter. But their very
existence attests not to “re-Sovietization” but to attempts to build
relations with the former republics of the USSR not by a common
yardstick but on an individual basis.

Particular mention should be made of the fact that after recognizing
the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, Russia did not start
manoeuvring with a view to further weakening Georgia, whether it be
scenarios of destabilization in Armenian-inhabited Samtskhe-Javakheti
or the cultivation of certain pro-Russian forces. Once again, in 2008
there was no shortage of predictions on this subject. At the same time
Moscow has no constructive programme for Tbilisi. But Tbilisi also has
no programme that might suit Moscow. The recognition of Abkhazia and
South Ossetia makes such programmes impossible. However, a general
demand for the pragmatization of relations, the desacralization of
conflict, and the lowering of the level of hostility exists. Georgia
is trying to avoid Saakashvili’s foreign policy extremes and return to
more balanced relations with its northern neighbour. The plan to turn
Tbilisi into a magnet for North Caucasus national movements did not
work, despite the ostentatious recognition of the “genocide of the
Cherkess” (May 2011), the abolition of visas, and the regular
conferences on the subject of Caucasian unity under Georgia’s
auspices.

Furthermore last year’s events in the Lopota Gorge showed
unequivocally that a Russian failure in the North Caucasus is fraught
with risk for the Georgian state itself. If the Russian Federation
could theoretically “stop feeding the Caucasus,” Georgia simply has no
geographical space, owing to the absence of a Urals or Siberia of its
own. In the event of Russia’s collapse in the North Caucasus these
problems would almost automatically become Georgian domestic and
foreign policy challenges. For all the complexities in relations with
the Kremlin, the West also did not welcome Georgia’s North Caucasus
manoeuvreings. On the contrary, it treated them rather with caution.
Let us add to that the decline in personal support for the third
president of Georgia, which admittedly does not negate political
support for the Caucasus republic itself and its territorial
integrity.

The consequence is the attempts by Ivanishvili’s new Georgian
Government to establish communication by means of contacts with the
primate of the Georgian Orthodox Church, the start of direct bilateral
diplomatic meetings (Grigoriy Karasin and Zurab Abashidze), and the
opening of the Russian market to Georgian goods. Normalization without
concrete results. After the “unfreezing of the conflicts” and the
cessation of diplomatic relations, this is not the worst possible
result. Its future trajectory is hard to predict, because the actual
configuration of “Georgia after Saakashvili” is none too clear. Too
many questions still have no answers. Will Bidzina Ivanishvili keep
his promise and leave the post of prime minister after the
presidential election? How successful will the constitutional reforms
be? What will happen to Mikheil Saakashvili himself? At the same time,
the realization of each of the above points in one direction or
another (all together or individually) carries the risk of serious and
unpredictable reverses.

All of this is also making the United States and the EU exercise
caution. On the one hand, in 2013, like five years ago, the West
supports Georgia on such basic issues as the territorial integrity of
the country, its cooperation with NATO, and European integration. On
the other hand all this support is not tantamount to an unlimited
confidence in Saakashvili. Both the United States and the EU are today
interested not so much in the personal fate of the Georgian head of
state as in the political predictability of an ally and peaceful
regime change in the country. It should not be forgotten that
throughout the post-Soviet period Georgia has never experienced the
peaceful replacement of one top leader by another. Hence the absence
of concrete guarantees of admission to NATO. There is the rhetorical
status of “aspirant to the Alliance,” but there is no clarity
regarding the time scale for granting the MAP (Membership Action
Plan). The story of the Association Agreement with the EU is
developing largely according to a similar scenario. In November 2013
at the summit of the EU and the Eastern Partnership countries in
Vilnius this document will only be initialed, although the Georgian
president has repeatedly made out that it will be a question of
signing it. But initialing and signing are not the same thing. After
the initialing of the agreement in the Lithuanian capital, the
procedure for approval of the agreement by the parliaments of the EU
member countries is launched, and that means not the “end of the
story” but a new stage on a long path.

On the “Georgian point” the interests of Russia on the one hand and
the United States and the EU on the other still differ. However, today
it is by no means Caucasus issues that are creating the main
difficulties in relations between Moscow and the West. In 2013 much
more importance is attached to the Syria situation, the domestic
political dynamics within Russia, and the new spy scandal surrounding
former CIA and NSA staffer Edward Snowden, who has been granted
temporary asylum in the Russian Federation (we will soon have an
opportunity to verify the truth of the expression that there is
nothing more permanent than the temporary). And although the idea of a
boycott of the Sochi Olympics has only been put forward thus far by
Republican Senator Lindsey Graham, it is worth pointing out that this
politician was one of the authors of the 30 July 2011 Senate
resolution. This document said that support for Georgia’s territorial
integrity should be the starting point in establishing US relations
with Russia in the sphere of the Caucasus. The resolution also
emphasized the rights of refugees and displaced persons to return to
their former places of residence and called on Moscow to implement in
full the cease-fire agreements concluded in August and supplemented in
September 2008. In this connection it cannot be ruled out that
Caucasus issues may be exploited in wider international contexts, even
if only as a second-ranking issue.

[Translated from Russian]