Today’s Zaman, Turkey
July 5 2014
Azerbaijan and the two EUs
by Amanda Paul
Of the six countries in the European Union’s Eastern Partnership
(EaP), Azerbaijan is the only one that has not chosen to definitively
align itself with either the EU or Russia. With the signing of
Association Agreements with the EU on June 27, Ukraine, Moldova and
Georgia declared their strategic choice to further integrate with the
EU and, despite Russian opposition and aggression, stated full
membership as their goal. Meanwhile, Belarus and Armenia have taken
another path, choosing Russia’s Eurasian Union (EaU).
Azerbaijan has had a cautious approach, not wanting to openly confront
Russia. Baku has tried to balance between the two unions.
Nevertheless, when analyzing Azerbaijan’s relationships with the West
and Russia, it seems that Baku’s feet are increasingly under the
West’s table. In fact, this engagement is nothing new. It began 20
years ago when former President Heydar Aliyev signed the “Oil Contract
of the Century” with a consortium of Western energy companies. Over
the last two decades ties with Euro-Atlantic institutions have
gradually deepened, but Azerbaijan has no aspirations to join either
the EU or NATO. However, Baku wants Western “know-how” to work on
modernizing the country and educating the population, including of
vocational training, best practices for the energy sector and science
and technology.
For the EU, Azerbaijan is an important and reliable partner. While
energy is the backbone of the relations because of Azerbaijan’s key
role in the Southern Gas Corridor, European Commission (EC) President
Jose Manuel Barroso expressed a desire to deepen ties during a speech
at Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy on June 12. Today, the two partners
are moving ahead with a “Strategic Partnership for Modernization
(SPM)” along with ongoing Association Agreement talks. Negotiations on
the new SPM agreement have nearly concluded and the EU hopes its
signing will take place before the current EC term ends in autumn.
However, this relationship is not without difficulties. While on the
one hand the EU would like to see Azerbaijan take more steps towards
improving democracy and human rights, Baku on the other hand would
like the EU to have a more credible and consistent approach towards
recognizing Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, as it does with other
EaP countries that have territorial disputes — Georgia, Moldova and
most recently Ukraine. Unfortunately, the EU’s ongoing ambiguous
approach towards Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity is a thorn in its
relationship. In fact, all agreements negotiated between the EU and
EaP states should underline explicit support for territorial integrity
and put an end to the current selective approach.
Despite the fact that Azerbaijan has not expressed a desire to join
the EU, with Russian President Vladimir Putin fixated on “rebuilding”
the Soviet Union, Baku has come under increasing pressure from Moscow,
which would like to see Baku in the EaU. In recent weeks Moscow has
significantly increased its diplomatic activity with a number of
visits to Baku, including from Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov,
who arrived the day after Barroso left.
Azerbaijan wants good relations with Moscow, but it also wants to
maintain full control over its foreign and economic policies. Joining
the EaU would affect this independence. Not only would it have no
added value for Azerbaijan economically, it would also impinge on
Azerbaijan’s sovereignty. While Russia presently continues to be
focused on Ukraine and take steps to punish Moldova for its move
towards the EU, as with the other EaP countries in the region, Russia
may also try to impact Baku’s foreign policy choices by pushing on its
weak spots. Some 500,000 Azerbaijanis work in Russia; Azerbaijan is
home to a Russian-speaking Lezgin ethnic minority that Moscow has
tried to used as a tool to create tension; the Nagorno-Karabakh
conflict with Armenia, where Russia is key to any settlement and
frequently uses as tool; and Georgia. Georgia is important to
Azerbaijan because it is the transit state for Azerbaijan hydrocarbons
to European markets. Instability in Georgia could be disastrous for
Baku.
Fortunately, the majority of Azerbaijanis watch Turkish television
rather than Russian, so they have not been exposed to Russia’s
extensive propaganda campaign. Furthermore, there is also broad
dislike of Russia’s leadership, something that has been exacerbated
since the Russian occupation and annexation of Crimea. Deep resentment
also continues to exist over the role that Russia has played in the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Armenia.
So, while many people believe Moscow may try to make Baku a tempting
offer, I doubt that Azerbaijan will accept it.
http://www.todayszaman.com/columnist/amanda-paul_352182_azerbaijan-and-the-two-eus.html