UK Government Publication
Dec 9 2014
Armenia’s Diaspora ` its role and influence
From: Foreign & Commonwealth Office
First published: 9 December 2014
Part of: Foreign Office Research Analyst papers
A Foreign Office research analyst paper.
KEY POINTS
ï?· Armenia has, in proportional terms, the largest Diaspora of any former Soviet
state, much of it concentrated in Russia, the US and France. This has
been a huge source of support for the Armenian state. But it’s also
periodically acted as a brake on Yerevan’s scope for manoeuvre,
particularly over the Nagorny Karabakh dispute and relations with
Turkey. This is likely to remain the case in future.
ï?· The most politically active Armenian Diaspora community is the US
one, whose focus on achieving official US recognition of the 1915
`genocide’ is likely to intensify over the coming two years. By
contrast, the Armenian community in Russia remains largely disengaged
from political lobbying ` but might we see this change over time?
DETAIL
“We live different lives, Armenia and the Diaspora. Here it is real
politics, while the Diaspora lives with the ideas of unreal politics,
and they cannot change their ideas so quickly.” (Levon Ter-Petrosyan,
then-President of Armenia, 1993)
Of all the former Soviet states, Armenia has the largest global
Diaspora community, in proportion to the size of its national
population, by some margin. Whilst precise figures are open to debate
(given in particular the tendency of some Diaspora activists to
inflate the numbers), it is generally reckoned that there are around
8-10 million people of Armenian descent currently living outside
Armenia (whose own population is currently estimated at around 2.9
million). The largest Armenian communities are based in Russia (2.3
million), the US (1.5 million), France (400,000) and the Lebanon
(230,000), with sizeable populations (80,000 or more) also residing in
Ukraine, Syria, Argentina, Poland, Turkey1, Iran and Canada.
1 Estimates of the true size of the Armenian population of Turkey are
particularly problematic, given the reluctance of some ethnic
Armenians there to identify themselves as such, and also in view of
the seasonal fluctuations in the size of the Armenian migrant workers’
community in Turkey (often based there illegally).
The `gap’ between the size of the Diaspora and Armenia’s own
population is growing. It’s estimated that Armenia’s population has
shrunk by almost 1 million since 1992 as a result of an exodus of
Armenians to join these Diaspora communities. Most (70%) of these are
believed to have gone to Russia and other CIS countries, with only 10%
joining the Armenian community in the US. The latter remains largely
comprised of descendants of former residents of the Ottoman Empire who
fled the territory of modern-day Turkey during and after the
inter-communal violence of 1915 ` this was supplemented by a `second
wave’ of Armenian immigration into the US from the Middle East (Syria,
Lebanon, Iran) in the 1970s-80s.
Britain’s Armenian Diaspora remains fairly small (around 18,000), and
drawn from a wide number of other Diaspora communities (Cyprus, Iraq,
Syria, Iran, Lebanon).
What role does the Diaspora play in Armenian society?
Diaspora support has played a crucial role in Armenia’s economic
survival and development. Since 1991 Armenia has received several
billion dollars’ worth of financial support from US-based Diaspora
Armenians alone. Among the most prominent donors has been the Lincy
Foundation run by California-based magnate Kerk Kirkorian, which on
its own has invested nearly $300 million in Armenia since
independence. More recently, however, it has been the Diaspora
community in Russia that has provided the most significant financial
flows into the Armenian economy ` as of 2008, remittances from
Armenians working in Russia accounted for 15% of Armenia’s official
GDP (some believe the real figure, taking into account `shadow’
payments outside the official banking system, may in fact be twice as
high).
But the Diaspora’s contribution cannot be measured purely in terms of
investment and aid levels. It has arguably played an even greater,
although less easily quantifiable, role in terms of developing
Armenia’s `human capital stock’, providing generations of young
Armenians with training & study opportunities in the West, and
exposing them to a world outside the confines of the former USSR.
Diaspora Armenians have also made significant `in-kind’ contributions
to improving the Armenian economy, health and education systems
through technical advice and support. This also extends to the
unrecognised `Nagorny Karabakh Republic’, which has received
proportionally very high levels of Diaspora support since 1992 in the
form of both funding and technical assistance (e.g. Armenian Diaspora
doctors, teachers, engineers, etc. undertaking voluntary secondments
to institutions in NK).
The Diaspora plays a key role in leveraging support for Armenia from
foreign governments ` nowhere more so than in the US, which has
provided $2 billion in aid to Armenia since 1992, making it one of the
largest recipients of US aid per capita in the world. Lobbying of the
US government and Congress by Armenian Diaspora groups has been
crucial to securing this outcome. The most active of these are the
Armenian Association of America (AAA) and the larger Armenian National
Committee of America (ANCA), the latter being affiliated to the
Armenian Revolutionary Federation (Dashnaks), a nationalist Armenian
political party currently in opposition to the ruling regime.
These lobbying organisations are highly instrumental in maintaining
international political support for the `Armenian cause’, particularly
in the US, where their goal remains to secure official US government
recognition of the 1915 `Genocide’ against ethnic Armenians in the
Ottoman empire.
Relatively small numbers of Diaspora Armenians have returned to
Armenia to live permanently, and of these few have risen to prominence
in politics. The most notable exceptions are Raffi Hovannisian
(Californian-born leader of the opposition Heritage party) and Vartan
Oskanyan (Syrian-born Harvard graduate, Armenia’s Foreign Minister
from 1998-2008, now Head of the Civilitas think-tank in Yerevan).
Is the Diaspora’s influence welcome within Armenia?
Yes ` and no. Successive Armenian governments have been fully
conscious of the vital asset that the global Armenian Diaspora
represents for a country lacking in mineral resources. Under President
Sargsyan, a separate Ministry for Diaspora Issues has been created,
charged with promoting even greater interaction between the Republic
of Armenia and the global Armenian Diaspora. Significantly Armenian
Diaspora organisations have shown relatively little interest to date
in internal governance/democracy-building issues within Armenia.
However, a view among some members of the global Diaspora is that the
Armenian government over the last ten years has signally failed to
harness the Diaspora’s potential to rebuild the economy or promote
democratisation. Economic policy in particular has remained parochial
and oligarch-bound, and some significant Diaspora investors have
retreated with fingers burned. The political elite have also been
dominated by a narrow group of largely Karabakh veterans, whose main
international links are mostly focused on Russia (through previous
service in the Soviet military, for example).
In the area of foreign policy, there have periodically been pronounced
tensions between ruling administrations in Armenia and the global
Diaspora, most notably over policy towards Turkey and the NK conflict.
This was most visible under the leadership of Armenia’s first
President, Levon Ter-Petrosyan (1991-1998), whose relationship with
the more nationalist elements in the Diaspora was always an
uncomfortable one, given the latter’s distrust of his perceived
readiness to make excessive concessions on these issues (in particular
his refusal to prioritise `genocide’ recognition by Turkey as a
pre-condition for the normalisation of bilateral relations). Under Ter
Petrosyan, the Dashnak party was banned in Armenia, and his eventual
downfall in 1998 was at least in part triggered by furious Diaspora
criticism of his support for an `unacceptable’ compromise solution on
NK. For his part, Ter Petrosyan criticised the Diaspora’s
`unrealistic’ view of Armenia’s policy priorities, and more recently,
in his reincarnation as an opposition leader, has bemoaned the
Diaspora’s lack of focus on Armenia’s retreat from democracy under his
successors. President Sargsyan has, by contrast, attracted less ire
from the Diaspora (in part in recognition of his Karabakhi roots and
his direct role in securing NK’s `liberation’): whilst the ANCA
strongly opposed his signing of the abortive Protocols with Turkey in
2009 on the normalisation of relations, the main focus of their
criticism was the US (for allegedly `pressurising’ Yerevan into
signing), rather than Sargsyan himself.
Another important impact of Armenia’s Diaspora, of particular
relevance at present, is on its stance towards regimes such as Iran
and Syria, where sizeable Armenian minorities remain. The
vulnerability of these minorities is felt keenly by the Armenian
government. In addition to Armenia’s need, as a small, blockaded
country to remain on good terms with other neighbours, this explains
why it has been found voting against, abstaining or absenting itself
during voting for UNGA or Human Rights Council Resolutions on Iran and
Syria.
Outlook & Conclusions
The positives in Armenia’s relationship with its global Diaspora will
continue to outweigh the negatives from Yerevan’s standpoint. The
support the Diaspora provides will remain crucial to Armenia’s
economic survival in a hostile neighbourhood. On foreign policy,
however, sentiment within elements of the Diaspora will remain a
significant obstacle to achieving compromise-based solutions over the
NK dispute and Armenia’s relations with Turkey.
An interesting issue to track will be the position of the Armenian
Diaspora in Russia, by some margin the largest Armenian community
outside the country itself. In contrast to the longer-established
Diaspora communities in the US and Europe, Russia’s Armenians have
hitherto shown little interest in lobbying their host country’s
authorities to take a stronger line on e.g. `Genocide’ recognition.
Given the nature of the Russian regime, its relationships with Turkey
and Azerbaijan, and the generally `apolitical’ nature of many Armenian
labour migrants working in Russia, it is unlikely that this picture
will change soon. Over time, the possibility that this community could
also be mobilised as a political lobbying force in support of the
Armenian `cause’ should not be entirely discounted, However, for the
time being the public stance of organised Armenian groups in Russia is
focused on proving its loyalty to the Russian state ` a similar
dynamic for a vulnerable minority as in Iran and Syria.
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/armenias-diaspora-its-role-and-influence