Turkish press: Russia and Iran want to return to an era where the great powers decide: Op-ed

Russian identity in the USSR was always the same as Soviet, and the Russian SFSR was the only republic of fifteen that did not have its own institutions. Russian nationalism has always therefore been unsure of what constitutes “Russia.” Is the territory of the former USSR the same as “historic Russia” as President Vladimir Putin recently said, or is “Russia” the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Russian-Belarusian union, Russian World, or Eurasia Economic Union? Most likely Russian nationalists see all of them as “Russia.”

Russian identity has important ramifications not only for Ukraine but also for the South Caucasus. Russia’s proposals for a 3+3 initiative and its draft “security guarantees” proposed to the U.S. reflect nostalgia for an era when the Soviet Union and the U.S. carved out spheres of influence.

Russia’s “security guarantees” also reflect the Kremlin’s Soviet stereotypes of NATO as a U.S.-puppet organization. In the same manner that Russia believes the former Soviet republics do not possess “sovereignty” and are de facto fake or weak states, so too does the Kremlin believe European members of NATO are pawns in the hands of Washington.

Russia is demanding “security guarantees” from the U.S. at the same time as it tore up the security assurances given by itself to Ukraine when it occupied Crimea and launched military aggression against the country. In 1994, Russia, the U.S. and the U.K. signed the Budapest Memorandum where they “reaffirm their commitment to Ukraine, in accordance with the principles of the CSCE Final Act, to respect the independence and sovereignty and the existing borders of Ukraine.” Ukraine gave up the world’s third-largest nuclear arsenal and signed the NPT.

The Kremlin is completely dismissive of the EU. In 1943, Soviet leader Joseph Stalin asked U.K. Prime Minister Winston Churchill “How many divisions does the Pope have?” The Kremlin is undoubtedly being asked the same question about the EU. When asked if the EU could become involved in discussions with Russia on security questions, Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov dismissed the organization and re-stated Russia was only interested in negotiating with the U.S. “We propose that the United States should conduct bilateral negotiations on this topic,” Ryabkov said, adding, “We will simply drown it all in debate and verbiage” if the EU took part.

Russia’s 3+3 initiative has four goals. The first would exclude be to cement the South Caucasus as a Russian-led sphere of influence shared with Turkey and Iran which would be partners but not equals.

The second would be to draw Turkey away from NATO and the U.S. in the pursuit of a long-standing Soviet and Russian goal of sowing divisions in NATO and the EU. The third goal, like the “security guarantees” ultimatum, is to reduce the ability of Azerbaijan and Georgia to independently ensure their military security by holding military exercises with the country or organization of their choice. This has no applicability to Armenia which is already, like Belarus, a Russian satellite state.

One can understand why Turkey and Azerbaijan are to some degree attracted by the 3+3 initiative. The U.S. has been AWOL from the South Caucasus for over a decade, and this does not seem likely to change under President Joseph Biden. In addition, Washington has foolishly gone out of its way to worsen relations with Turkey, a strategically important country with the second-largest army in NATO and important U.S. military bases. The West should calculate how the three South Caucasian states can be integrated into NATO and EU initiatives rather than creating dividing lines which allow Russia to formulate spheres of influence.

Azerbaijan and Turkey have given their tentative support to the 3+3 initiative because the West, and especially the U.S., exclude us from their initiatives. The recent summit for democracy did not invite Turkey and yet its democratic development is no worse than, for example, Ukraine, with the opposition allowed to stand in elections and in control of many cities across the country.

Iran will use the 3+3 framework to demand Azerbaijan no longer hold military drills with Turkey. Iranian leader Hossein Amir-Abdollahian repeated the common refrain from Tehran it would “not tolerate geopolitical and map changes in the Caucasus” – a similar demand made by Russia. Amir-Abdollahian also expressed “serious concerns about the presence of terrorists and Zionists” in the South Caucasus in an attack on Azerbaijan’s strategic partnership with Israel.

The fourth goal, which is tied to the proposed “security guarantees,” is to exclude NATO (and the EU) from the South Caucasus. Russia has opposed for three decades the use of U.N. peacekeepers and NATO enlargement into Eurasia. Since the launch of the Eastern Partnership in 2010, Russia has added the “EU enlargement” to its Eurasian exclusion zone.

Russia’s “security guarantees” demand the U.S. “deny accession to the alliance to the states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.” In the South Caucasus, only Georgia has sought NATO membership. Outside the Baltic states who joined NATO in 2002, only Ukraine has sought membership. With NATO membership only sought by two out of 12 Eurasian states, the Kremlin’s fixated with the issue is an outgrowth of Russia’s three-decade demand for Eurasia to be recognized as its exclusive sphere of influence.

Russian “security guarantees” also demand the U.S. not “establish military bases on the territory of the states of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.” This ultimatum is an outgrowth of the Kremlin’s paranoia and conspiracy thinking as the U.S. or NATO have never planned to establish military bases in any Eurasian country.

The Kremlin’s “security guarantees” also demand that new central-eastern European and Baltic NATO members and Eurasian countries do not “use their infrastructure for any military activities or develop bilateral military cooperation with them.” This part of Russia’s “security guarantees” ultimatum is more disconcerting as Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan and some Central Asian states have long undertaken military cooperation with NATO. In the case of Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan, this military cooperation has existed since the Partnership for Peace Programme was launched in 1994. NATO members cooperated with Central Asian states after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the fight against Al-Qaida and the Taliban in Afghanistan.

Iran would use Russia’s proposed 3+3 initiative to demand Azerbaijan reduce the number of its military exercises. Amir-Abdollahian said, “Azerbaijan has held six military exercises with foreign countries, I think these are provocative actions. Such a volume of exercises does not cause positive emotions. Iran held only one exercise inside its own territory and informed all countries of the region through diplomatic channels.” In the same way that the Kremlin claims Ukraine is the security threat, not Russia, which occupies Crimea, so too does Iran claims Azerbaijan is the security threat and not the theocratic regime in Tehran.

Also reflecting the Kremlin’s paranoia, its “security guarantees” ultimatum demands eastern European and Baltic NATO members and Eurasian states to “refrain from deploying their armed forces and armaments” in such a way as it would be viewed as a threat to its national security. Further, “the parties shall not use the territories of other states with a view to preparing or carrying out an armed attack against the other party or other actions affecting core security interests of the other party.”

In the 1990s Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova created the GUAM group to defend their new sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity. In all four countries, Russia managed separatist crises using Armenian or local proxies to destabilize the states, keep them weak and hinder their integration into structures outside Eurasia.

On the 30th anniversary of the disintegration of the USSR, Russia under Putin seeks to reverse the path to independence of its neighbors using direct military threats, as on the Russian-Ukrainian border, proxy states such as Armenia and Belarus, terrorist groups and the issuing of extreme ultimatums to the West. Dean of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation Alexander Yakovenko warned, “As before, in the event of a negative reaction from our partners, we will have to act unilaterally in defense of our security interests, which we have the right to formulate independently.”

Russia and Iran’s approaches to the 3+3 initiative and “security guarantees” are more befitting the imperialist era of the 19th century and the Yalta summit of great powers in 1945 – and not the 21st. Unlike Russia and Iran, modern-day Turkey is no longer the Ottoman Empire. This initiative and ultimatum would reduce the sovereignty and independence of Ukraine, Georgia and Azerbaijan.

*Taras Kuzio is a professor in political science at the National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy.





My Armenian Christmas reminds me how traditions are reinvented in times of crisis

Jan 6 2022

Armenians celebrate Christmas on 6 January – and this year we will make a virtue of necessity.

By Anoosh Chakelian

approached Christmas Day, as I imagine many New Statesman readers did, with my eyes smarting from a swab up my nose, and an imaginary two-metre force field around my 89-year-old Nana. It was a jollier, better-attended celebration than the inaugural St Scrooge’s Day of 2020, but the build-up was laden with doom. Not only did the memory of the previous year’s 11th-hour lockdown weigh heavy, but warnings of a Brexit/Covid mix of supply-chain bottlenecks, rising prices and food shortages “cancelling Christmas” haunted the headlines.

As a rush on petrol caused chaos, Boris Johnson promised the nation we would “get through to Christmas and beyond”. It was a myopic approach to planning. Emergency visas for foreign lorry drivers and poultry workers (“truckers and pluckers”) – vital for keeping shelves stocked and solving the poultry shortage that closed around 50 Nando’s branches in the summer – were supposed to expire on Christmas Eve. (Eventually, they were extended until 28 February and New Year’s Eve respectively.)

Urging the public to book their boosters to “save Christmas”, the Prime Minister appeared to be fixated on staggering on until the big day – and not much further.

For the first time, I found myself looking forward to Armenian Christmas more than “English” Christmas. Armenians celebrate Christmas on 6 January. Until the fourth century, so did all Christians. When the Roman empire adopted Christianity, the date was changed to replace a pagan feast day on 25 December known as “Saturnalia”, which marked “the birth of the sun” – the days growing longer. Armenia, the first country to adopt Christianity as its national religion (in AD 301), already had an established church calendar, so stuck to the original day.

All this really means for my family is more hoovering, as our Christmas tree stays up longer than everyone else’s (alas – my sister and I never managed to wangle two sets of presents).

Although as a baby I was fully baptised as Armenian Orthodox (and they really dunk you in; home videos show my English relatives looking politely concerned amid the incense and chanting of St Sarkis church as I’m immersed, wailing, in holy water), our celebration of Armenian Christmas was always an improvised hotchpotch of tradition.

We’d pull leftover crackers, eat home-made Lebanese mezze, barbecue lamb and chicken kebabs – my dad brandishing tongs in the snow – and for pudding share galette des rois, a pastry cake served mainly in France for the Epiphany.

Even the language we use for the Armenian Christmas table is uniquely ours. Lamb kofte (spiced minced meat on a skewer) is “Armenian hamburger”, khobez (classic Lebanese flatbread) is “Arabic bread”. I describe lahmajun (a thin dough base topped with mincemeat, herbs and tomatoes) as “Armenian pizza”, and nickname loubia b’zeit (green bean and tomato stew) “bean surprise”. My dad’s signature aubergine dish is “the priest who fainted” (more commonly known by its Ottoman name imam bayildi, it is so delicious it supposedly made the imam/priest – delete according to heritage – who first tasted it swoon).

On 6 January 2019, the first Armenian Christmas after my dad died, we scrambled to establish a new tradition: I would now host the meal at my flat in east London. I lack winter barbecuing skills but I’ve taught myself some dishes over the years. Our smoke alarm regularly sends my boyfriend racing into the kitchen to find me charring four aubergines on the open flames of our gas hob, feeling connected to my roots but apprehensive about how net zero will affect the depth of flavour in my moutabal (smoky aubergine dip).

We had to skip this nascent tradition in 2021 during the January lockdown, so I’ve been tentatively planning a feast to make up for it this year, which includes both staples and innovations. Vegetarian and vegan guests mean no meat kebabs, and a huge pot of “bean surprise” becoming the focal dish. Tahini for hummus and pomegranate molasses for muhammara (a walnut and red pepper dip) will double up as ingredients for dairy-free brownies. As a stereotypical millennial observing Dry January, I’ll be toasting with Middle Eastern mint lemonade instead of the customary arak (a fiendishly strong aniseed spirit). Armenian coffee remains Armenian coffee: strong, thick and, once drunk, tipped upside-down to read fortunes in the grounds.

An estimated 700,000 Brits isolated over Christmas in 2021, resulting in new festive routines (I know a house-share of 30-somethings who made Mexican food together for “fajismas”). British Muslims have had to adapt to celebrating Eid al-Fitr and Eid al-Adha under restrictions, unable to break their fast with friends and family. Open-air prayer services established during lockdown continue in some local parks.

The “rule of six” in 2020 arrived days ahead of Rosh Hashanah (Jewish New Year), and some families attended an outdoor synagogue service, isolated in their cars, honking horns instead of the traditional blowing of the shofar(ram’s horn). Diwali fell in the second lockdown of November 2020, leaving Hindus, Sikhs and Jains to celebrate virtually – even turning to TikTok to watch and share Bhangra dances. Some parents, still fearful after restrictions were lifted, sent parcels of homemade Indian sweets instead of hosting their children the following year.

Customs change as we move away from home, lose those we love, or, nowadays, bump up against public health restrictions. Yet the old impulse to make a virtue of necessity thrives across Britain’s patchwork of communities. It is this spirit, every year, that saves Christmas, Eid, and maybe even Saturnalia, somewhere, too.

https://www.newstatesman.com/uncategorized/2022/01/my-armenian-christmas-reminds-me-how-traditions-are-reinvented-in-times-of-crisis

Armenians take dim view of deployment to Kazakhstan

EurasiaNet.org
Jan 7 2022
Ani Mejlumyan Jan 7, 2022

News that Armenia is deploying soldiers to Kazakhstan has not been received well among Armenians.

The Defense Ministry confirmed on January 7 that it had sent 100 soldiers from a peacekeeping unit as part of the Collective Security Treaty Organization peacekeeping mission to Kazakhstan

Since the protests began on January 2 in Kazakhstan’s western city of Zhanaozen, they have spread throughout the country and resulted in the deaths of dozens of civilians and police

The Armenian involvement in the CSTO mission is ironic on several levels.

For one, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan – who, as the current chair of the CSTO’s Security Council, formally announced that the organization had agreed to Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev’s request for military aid to defend him from street protesters – had himself come to power in 2018 as the result of popular street protests.

In those protests, the then-ruling authorities chose not to use force to suppress the protests. As part of the campaign to pressure the government to step down, Pashinyan urged supporters to surround government buildings. Armenia’s service members in Kazakhstan will now be “protecting important state and military facilities,” the ministry said in its statement.

Pashinyan initially gained prominence as one of the leaders of the 2008 protests against fraudulent elections, which the then-government violently suppressed in what eventually became known as the “March 1” events.

On top of that, the CSTO famously declined to come to Armenia’s aid in 2021 as Azerbaijan carried out incursions into Armenian territory, which Armenians argued should have triggered the CSTO’s mutual defense provision. 

And many Armenians perceive Kazakhstan, which shares Turkic roots with Azerbaijan, to be more sympathetic to their enemy.

“The people of any country must choose their own government; no other country has the right to interfere in its internal affairs. Today, the Armenian armed forces have a mission to protect the borders of our country,” a coalition of pro-Western NGOs said in a statement. “We condemn the short-sighted and irresponsible actions of the Armenian government.”

Armenian officials have tried to push back against the criticism.  

“The public has raised concern about why Armenia appealed for help [to the CSTO] and didn’t receive it, and is now providing it,” Armen Grigoryan, the secretary of Armenia’s Security Council, told public television. “First of all, it’s a matter of responsibility, if Armenia has an interest in the CSTO mechanisms functioning, and the answer is a clear yes,” he said. 

He also disputed the notion that what was happening in Kazakhstan was a legitimate protest. “It is not a revolutionary process but a terrorist one, you have seen the videos of armed men,” he said.

While officials in Kazakhstan (and Russia, which dominates the CSTO) have claimed that the unrest there is the result of external terrorist forces, that should not be taken seriously, said human rights advocate Artur Sakunts.

“In 2008, during the March 1 protests, people were robbing stores and they never found out who was doing it,” he told RFE/RL, suggesting that provocateurs could have been operating then as now in Kazakhstan. “Here we are dealing with a similar thing. There is a component of sabotage, and we can’t just call everything ‘terrorism.’”

“Pashinyan should have just voiced concern over a situation, but he tried to be more Catholic than the Kremlin and fulfilled the Kremlin’s command,” said Sakunts, referring to Pashinyan’s claim that the protests in Kazakhstan were the result of “external interference.” As for Grigoryan’s argument about the functioning of the CSTO, Sakunts responded: “Who are you to make it function, did you look at our resources? If you could make it function, you should have made it function for us.”

Some also wondered if Pashinyan could try to invoke the CSTO in case of protests against his government. Grigoryan, in his explanation, “openly confessed why Nikol was sending troops to Kazakhstan,” said military analyst Karen Vrtanesyan in a Facebook post. “If something threatens Nikol’s government tomorrow or the next day, Kazakhstan will send its troops to Armenia.” 

But Armenia, as a member of the CSTO and reliant on Russian help, has few choices, argued Maria Karapetyan, a member of parliament from the ruling Civil Contract party. She argued that critics want Armenia to leave the CSTO and “make a different geopolitical choice.”

“If we leave the CSTO, what [other bloc] should we join? They should propose the next step,” Karapetyan told RFE/RL’s Armenian Service. 

 

Ani Mejlumyan is a reporter based in Yerevan.

Turkish and Armenian special envoys to meet in January

Vestnik Kavkaza
Dec 31 2021
 31 Dec in 14:00

The special envoys of Turkey and Armenia are expected to meet in January in Moscow, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu said as the two countries are taking steps toward normalizing their ties.

“The date for the first meeting between special representatives of Turkey and Armenia has not yet been set but it is expected to be held in January,” Çavuşoğlu said in an interview broadcast live on 24 TV.

According to him, the envoys at the first meeting will exchange views to chart out a road map and accordingly take steps, including confidence-building efforts, Daily Sabah reported.

On Dec. 18, Çavuşoğlu announced that Moscow would host the first meeting between Turkish and Armenian special envoys to discuss steps for normalizing the bilateral relations.

On Dec. 15, Turkey appointed Serdar Kılıç, a former ambassador to the U.S., as its special envoy to discuss steps for normalization with Armenia. Three days later, Armenia appointed its special representative for dialogue with Turkey, National Assembly Deputy Speaker Ruben Rubinyan.

Turkish press: Govt signals action for Turkey’s Alevi community amid obstacles

Alevis attend a prayer in a cemevi in Istanbul, Turkey, April 3, 2008. (Reuters File Photo)

Amixture of emotions surrounds the issues faced by Turkey’s Alevi community, as there are high hopes that the new year may usher in new developments for them – as recent reports and sources indicate the government has been seeking to find permanent solutions – but some Alevis highlight obstacles and the importance of a genuine understanding in terms of any new regulations to meet their expectations.

Alevis, who make up the second-largest religious community in the country with approximately 20 million followers, have a list of concerns about various issues, including the public recognition of their identity, the legal status of cemevis – their houses of worship – and funding, as well as the prerogative for Alevi students to be excluded from compulsory religion classes in elementary and high schools.

The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party), hailed as the pioneer of ground-breaking reforms for the country’s religious and ethnic minorities, had taken steps before to address the issue, but no concrete solutions have been reached until now. But in recent months, officials have been making positive statements and have been expressing their intentions to solve the issue once and for all.

The cemevis are currently regarded as foundations under Turkey’s interior and culture and tourism ministries, rather than recognized as houses of worship, which would legally entitle them to receive state funding like mosques, churches and synagogues of recognized religious minorities in the country. Some 80% to 90% of all cemevis in the country were built during the successive AK Party governments since 2002, according to former Minister Lütfi Elvan.

In recent months, reports noted that the government is in the process of coming up with a solution after evaluating a report presented at a Cabinet meeting chaired by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in October.

The president had said that they discussed the “extensive” report prepared after visits to some 1,585 cemevis across the country. The visits came after Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu asked Alevi activist Dr. Ali Arif Özzeybek to visit cemevis and Alevi villages across Turkey to find the roots of the problems and to ensure that the issue was approached in a non-political manner. Özzeybek worked as an advisor to main opposition Republican People’s Party (CHP) Chairperson Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu – an Alevi himself – between 2011-2018 and joined the AK Party Central Decision-Making and Administrative Committee (MKYK) in March 2021. His visits to over 1,500 cemevis happened in the span of approximately seven months in 2021, according to the interior minister.

“We want to solve this issue without politicization, and we will continue to strive to do so. We are all brothers,” Soylu said during an interview in late November, adding that the Alevi citizens are “fundamental and inseparable elements” of Turkish society and the government will not allow anyone to discriminate against them.

“We are obliged to fulfill our duties,” Soylu said and alluded to the saying of the Prophet Muhammad: “Unity is a mercy and disunity is a punishment.”

Last week, Erdoğan inaugurated the Yunus Emre Cemevi in Turkey’s southeastern Gaziantep province near the Syrian border. The modern compound was built in the Şahinbey district in cooperation with the Alevi Cultural Association, the AK Party-led Gaziantep Metropolitan Municipality and the governor’s office after the community stated that a single compound was not enough for the province’s community.

Earlier in December, Justice Minister Abdülhamit Gül visited the Tunceli Cemevi, where he clearly signaled that the government is serious about taking action.

“We reject any policies that reject Alevi beliefs and our Alevi citizens. As the Justice Ministry, we have completed our work regarding the legal recognition of cemevis in terms of regulations,” Gül said.

Justice Minister Abdulhamit Gül (C) speaks to reporters during a visit to the Tunceli Cemevi in Tunceli, Turkey, Dec. 18, 2021. (IHA Photo)

Noting that the AK Party is sincere about responding to the demands of the Alevis, Gül said their demands are legitimate and valid, as he thanked cemevis’ spiritual leaders, dedes, for their cooperation.

“May we all work to ensure that our brotherhood lasts many thousands of years,” the minister added.

Meanwhile, AK Party sources told Daily Sabah that the party will continue to work for all citizens, as they highlighted that President Erdoğan, who almost always ends his public speeches by referencing Haji Bektash Veli’s famous words “Let us be united, let us be strong, let us be alive,” has the leadership skills to unite all citizens.

While the sources did not give a timeline or more details about the ongoing works, they said the Alevi community should rest assured that the government will take action for their needs.

They continued by pointing to the different opinions among the Alevi community regarding potential regulations, such as the idea of creating a directorate for Alevi affairs, similar to the Presidency of Religious Affairs (Diyanet). They noted that consensus among the community is imperative to determine the future of cemevis, one of the main concerns of the community.

In the past decades, AK Party governments aimed to reinstate the rights of minorities and help their survival as their numbers have dwindled over time. Long treated as second-class citizens, the Greek, Jewish, Armenian and Syriac non-Muslim communities have praised the return of their rights, though they have complained about it being a slow process. In 2018, all of them even came together to sign a joint declaration rejecting allegations that members of minority faiths in Turkey had been experiencing “pressure” on their communities, saying that they are free to practice their religion in the country.

But the situation is different for Alevis, as their faith is explained as a combination of Shiite Islam, Bektashi Sufi order and Anatolian folk culture, rather than a separate religion.

In 2009, the first Alevi initiative was launched during the term of then-Prime Minister Erdoğan. Alevi leaders and representatives attended several workshops with the government over a six-month period. Later in 2011, Erdoğan issued an unprecedented apology on behalf of the Turkish state for the Dersim tragedy, which took place in 1937, when 13,806 people were killed following a military campaign after the predominantly-Alevi Zaza Kurdish tribes opposed the 1934 Resettlement Law passed by the CHP during the single-party regime. The discussion process was interrupted during the Gezi Park riots in 2013, but an “Alevi opening” initiative was launched in 2014, and a council was formed to discuss issues in 2016, but there have not been any concrete developments since.

Highlighting the importance of coexistence among different cultures and beliefs in the country, Celal Fırat, the president of the Alevi Associations Federation, told Daily Sabah that it is the state’s responsibility to protect differences and prevent the suppression of minorities by the majority. But for him, what is even more important is the idea that the Alevi community is more independent than ever and does not want to be shaped or exploited by the ruling or opposition parties.

“The main question is about whether political parties will fulfill their pledges made to Alevis or not … And what the opposition thinks or would do is not on the Alevis’ agenda,” Fırat said, adding that each Alevi citizen has the will to vote for whatever party they wish to, for the sake of their individual freedom of belief.

He noted that the state’s “insistence” on defining beliefs and the exclusion of non-Sunni communities have historically led to an “insincere” relationship and said he does not believe any initiatives will produce results unless they take into consideration legal decisions and consider the expectations and sensitivities of all Alevis.

The Alevi community leader continued by expressing his community’s dismay on the failure of the implementation of European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) decisions, arguing that the status of Alevi houses of worship and cultural and social complexes need revision.

In 2016, the European court ruled in favor of Turkish Alevi community leaders and members in the case brought for the official recognition of cemevis as houses of worship.

Fırat also highlighted the importance of unity and the language of love for a better future for all in the country.

Another Alevi community leader, who asked to remain anonymous, told Daily Sabah that they were in favor of discussing their problems with the government, as they noted that there are political and ideological divisions among the community that have become obstacles. However, they noted that they are hopeful the issue can be resolved through dialogue if both sides are genuinely determined to find a solution and can openly discuss issues.

“The issue of the status of cemevis and revision of school curriculum to exclude Alevi students from religion classes are critical for almost all Alevis and require immediate attention when discussing the issue,” the Alevi community leader told Daily Sabah, adding that they are hopeful about the government taking action, based on their record with other religious communities in the past.

The common motif among remarks made by politicians and community leaders seems to highlight the idea that unity, compassion and determination are essential to solving the issue.

“We need to make sure that the rhetoric of love for humanity as told by Haji Bektash, Rumi, Yunus Emre and our poet-singers are cherished in this region,” according to Fırat.

We hope that in 2022 it will be possible to create completely new moods in Armenia and Artsakh – Nikol Pashinyan

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 20:43,

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 27, ARMENPRESS. Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan took part in a reception organized at the Central Bank on the occasion of the New Year and Christmas. Nikol Pashinyan congratulated the personnel of the Central Bank and the banking sector of Armenia on the coming holidays, wishing them success and all the best, ARMENPRESS was informed from the Office of the Prime Minister.

In his speech the Prime Minister particularly said,

“Distinguished Chairman of the Central Bank,

Dear representatives of the executive power and the banking sector,

Our economy has gone through very difficult times, I hope we can already say it this way, because the coronavirus pandemic hit since 2020, which was a strong blow to the financial and economic system, followed by the second blow in the form of the war, and then the third blow – the domestic political crisis. We should state that during this entire period the banking sector of the Republic of Armenia, which had previously been able to withstand serious trials, successfully overcame this challenge, and this is extremely important not only for economic, but also for political and psychological stability.

In this regard, I think we should express words of appreciation to the banking sector of Armenia, to the Central Bank for its policy during this difficult period. After all, following the war and the coronavirus we needed a great resource of resistance, serious professionalism in order to be able to maintain the stable situation we have. Especially given the next challenge that came after the coronavirus outbreak, the global challenge of inflation which continues to this day.

In contrast to the banking sector of other countries, our banking sector, in fact, went through double, triple shocks. It’s important to record that the banking sector is not only a very important partner for the Government, but also an indicator, because modern economies, especially the banking sector, are the mirror of moods and in many cases this is a guideline for the Government to develop and implement policies.

I think the dialogue that exists between the Government and the Central Bank is very important in terms of developing and implementing our future strategies. Yes, we should admit that, like in many countries, in many cases in Armenia attempts are made to create certain negative moods around the banking sector, because it is clear that people always take money with pleasure, but returning is not always a pleasant process, mostly due to interest rates.

I recently had the opportunity to say during a discussion about banking sectors. In fact, the modern world is the world created by banks, and this should be recorded with all its disadvantages and advantages. There are many projects that characterize modern civilization, which are growing, evolving, changing the world with huge steps. It should be noted that these mega-projects could not exist in the world if the banking system did not exist.

We have seen such effects in Armenia as well, but I hope that we will be able to implement an agenda of cooperation between the political, economic and financial systems, which will allow to make Armenia a country that meets all modern standards. In this regard, I attach importance to the agenda adopted by the Government to open an era of peaceful development for Armenia and the region, which, I must say, is cadjusted by signals coming from the economy and the banking system, which are often not expressed in texts, but are expressed in numbers, digital signs, statistical data. In this context, I would like to hope that the link between the Government policies and the financial and economic system will be more organic, because that system is the most sensitive indicator that senses risks the earliest, sees opportunities the earliest, which helps the Government to be more operative.

Once again, I want to thank you for the resistance shown over the last two years. I hope that at the state and national level we will finally be able to overcome this situation of survival, procrastination, or short-term thinking, and get out into an era of long-term, stable, peaceful strategic development. In this regard, of course, the role of the banking system is extremely difficult to overestimate. I reiterate, the Central Bank and the banking system are key and essential partners for the Government.

In terms of overcoming the problems caused by the coronavirus, the post-war situation, we have been in a very close partnership, I appreciate that partnership.

Congratulations to all of you, to your families on the coming New Year; we hope that in 2022 it will be really possible to create completely new moods in Armenia and Artsakh, which will be reflected in the reduction of interest rates, prices, exchange rate stability and better moods for investment, working and spending. The Government, of course, is willing to spend, to invest, to point out that strategic perspective by its own example. But all the same, the private sector, the banking system are a very important teammate in this respect, so that we all succeed in that team game and process.”

Turkey-Armenia normalization relies on Erdogan’s consistency

i24 News, Israel
Dec 20 2021

i24NEWS

December 20, 2021, 07:37 PM

Alterman says ‘The problem is… Recep Tayyip Erdogan is often, to say the least, not so consistent’

Turkey’s Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu announced that Ankara is taking steps towards establishing diplomatic relations with Armenia, but analysts are dubious on the prospects of the initiative.

i24NEWS Senior International Affairs Correspondent Owen Alterman sat down with anchor Benita Levin to discuss the implications this could have on the region, as well as the possibilities of normalization actually happening.

“Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been known to say one thing one day and something very different the next day,” Alterman told i24NEWS.

“Obviously if this goes forward and it stands the test of time, and it proves to be sustainable, and he proves to be consistent, obviously it’s a very big deal for Turkey and Armenia to normalize relations.”

“The problem is, and who better to know this than those of us sitting here in Israel, is that Recep Tayyip Erdogan is often, to say the least, not so consistent,” Alterman explained.

“He may go forward with this normalization today, and may change his mind tomorrow, and it really raises the question of just how consistent he’s going to be.”

If the normalization actually does commence, analysts believe that the establishment of diplomatic ties could prove beneficial to Armenia.

“Armenia is almost entirely reliant at this point on Russia, and on Vladimir Putin, for their country’s defense and their country’s diplomatic standing. They’re not all that happy with this situation,” Alterman said.

Armenia names Vice Speaker Ruben Rubinyan as special envoy for dialogue with Turkey

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 22:25, 18 December, 2021

YEREVAN, DECEMBER 18, ARMENPRESS. Armenia appointed Vice Speaker of Parliament Ruben Rubinyan as the special envoy for the dialogue with Turkey, Foreign Ministry spokesperson Vahan Hunanyan said in a statement.

Last week Turkey had appointed Serdar Kilic, former ambassador to the US, as special envoy to discuss steps for normalization of ties with Armenia.

RFE/RL Armenian Report – 12/24/2021

                                        Friday, December 24, 2021
Pashinian Hopes For ‘Compromise’ Road Deal With Aliyev
December 24, 2021
Beglium - Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian, Azerbaijani President Ilham 
Aliyev and European Council President Charles Michel meet in Brussels, December 
14, 2021.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian expressed hope on Friday that he and Azerbaijani 
President Ilham Aliyev will iron out their differences on the status of a 
highway that would connect Azerbaijan to its Nakhichevan exclave through Armenia.
Pashinian confirmed that they failed to reach an agreement on the issue at their 
two meetings held in Brussels last week.
One of those meetings was hosted by European Council President Charles Michel 
and lasted for more than four hours. Michel said afterwards that the two leaders 
pledged to de-escalate tensions on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border and restore 
rail links between their countries. But he admitted that they still disagree on 
the Nakhichevan road link sought by Baku.
Speaking just hours before the December 14 meeting, Aliyev said people and cargo 
passing through that “Zangezur corridor” must be exempt from Armenian border 
controls. Pashinian swiftly rejected the demand.
Pashinian said on Friday that Yerevan’s “red line” on the matter has not changed 
as a result of the Brussels talks.
“Our fundamental position with regard to the highways remains the same,” he told 
a virtual news conference. “In Brussels, I and Azerbaijan’s president tried to 
go into details and understand the reason why we express such [different] 
positions because positions taken publicly are just the visible tip of the 
iceberg.”
“When we went into details … I saw an opportunity to find some solutions whereby 
both our positions and the purely practical issues raised by Azerbaijan could be 
resolved,” he said. “But we have no agreement on this score.”
“It’s just that after that meeting I saw some opportunities and we should try to 
use those opportunities so what we find a real compromise solution to this 
issue, which would not cross the red line regarding the highways which I have 
already mentioned,” added Pashinian. He said nothing about possible parameters 
of that compromise.
Aliyev described the December 14 meeting as “productive” before meeting with 
Pashinian again on December 15.
Aliyev, Pashinian and Russian President Vladimir Putin reported major progress 
towards opening Armenian-Azerbaijani transport links after holding talks in the 
Russian city of Sochi on November 26. Putin said a Russian-Armenian-Azerbaijani 
task force will formalize their understandings in the coming days.
However, the task force announced no agreements after meeting in Moscow on 
December 1. On December 6, Aliyev renewed his threats to forcibly open a land 
“corridor” to Nakhichevan. Yerevan condemned the threats and said they run 
counter to what they agreed on at Sochi.
Both Aliyev and Pashinian have confirmed their participation in a summit of 
ex-Soviet states that will take place in Saint-Petersburg on December 28. The 
Armenian premier said he expects to talk to Aliyev on the sidelines of the 
summit.
Court Blocks Election Of Vanadzor Mayor
December 24, 2021
        • Karine Simonian
Armenia - The building of the Vanadzor municipality,December 13, 2021.
A court blocked on Friday the first session of Vanadzor’s newly elected 
municipal council in what local opposition figures denounced as a government 
attempt to prevent their arrested candidate from becoming the mayor of Armenia’s 
third largest city.
Mamikon Aslanian, who ran Vanadzor until October, was arrested on December 15 
ten days after a bloc led by him all but won a local election with about 39 
percent of the vote. Aslanian is facing corruption charges rejected by him as 
politically motivated.
Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian’s Civil Contract party finished second with 25 
percent, the most serious of setbacks suffered by it in the local polls held in 
36 communities across Armenia on December 5.
Three other parties fared much worse but still won seats in the local council 
empowered to appoint the next head of the municipality comprising Vanadzor and 
nearby villages. Another party, Bright Armenia (LHK), got 3.97 percent, narrowly 
failing to clear the 4 percent threshold to enter the council.
The LHK challenged the official election results in court, saying that 
irregularities and inaccuracies artificially reduced the number of votes 
garnered by it.
Armenia’s Administrative Court rejected the appeal earlier this week, paving the 
way for the Vanadzor council’s inaugural session scheduled for Friday.
The LHK asked the Court of Appeals to overturn the ruling. An Administrative 
Court judge responded by issuing an injunction that bans the council from 
meeting and electing the mayor pending a Court of Appeals verdict on the lawsuit.
The injunction was made public just minutes before the start of the council’s 
session. It was condemned by members of Aslanian’s bloc and the opposition 
Hayrenik party allied to it.
Hayrenik’s local leader, Vahe Dokhoyan, accused the ruling party and the LHK of 
trying to steal their victory.
“Bright Armenia is assisting in the theft of our votes,” Dokholian told 
journalists. “This is the opinion of the vast majority of Vanadzor residents.”
The LHK, which was represented in Armenia’s former parliament but fared poorly 
in the June snap elections, denied cutting secret deals with Prime Minister 
Nikol Pashinian’s party.
Armenia - Former Vanadzor Mayor Mamikon Aslanian.
Aslanian’s bloc and Hayrenik will hold 15 and 2 seats respectively in the 
33-member council, putting them in a position to install the head of a large 
community comprising Vanadzor and nearby villages in Armenia’s northern Lori 
province. However, the ex-mayor’s continuing detention deprives them of their 
razor-thin majority.
It was not clear whether Civil Contract, which will control 9 council seats, 
hopes to strike a deal with the two other parties to be represented in the 
council. Lori Governor Aram Khachatrian, who led the ruling party’s list of 
local election candidates, insisted on Friday that it has not yet nominated or 
endorsed any mayoral candidate.
Meanwhile, Aslanian urged Vanadzor factions to avoid “trampling electoral 
processes underfoot.” In a written appeal issued from jail, the ex-mayor said 
they must “make a choice stemming from the will of the people.”
Artur Sakunts, a human rights activist based in Vanadzor, last week described 
the criminal proceedings launched against the ex-mayor as “political 
persecution.” He said the Armenian authorities are trying to distort local 
election outcomes in these and other communities.
Armenia’s human rights ombudsman, Arman Tatoyan, likewise accused the 
authorities of resorting to arrests and intimidation to gain control of 
communities where the ruling party failed to win outright.
Pashinian’s political allies deny the accusations.
Government Sticks To Mandatory COVID-19 Tests After Court Ruling
December 24, 2021
        • Naira Bulghadarian
Armenia - Health Minister Anahit Avanesian visits the Armenian company Liqvor 
producing Sputnik Light vaccine, Yerevan, December 6, 2021.
The Armenian government insisted on Friday that workers refusing vaccination 
will have to continue to take mandatory coronavirus tests despite a 
Constitutional Court ruling hailed by critics of the requirement.
Health Minister Anahit Avanesian imposed the requirement on October 1 in an 
effort to speed up the slow pace of vaccinations in Armenia.
Her initial directive obligated virtually all public and private sector 
employees to get inoculated against COVID-19 or tested twice a month at their 
own expense. Such mandatory testing now has to be done once a week.
The requirement has been denounced by Armenians reluctant to get vaccinated as 
well as some opposition groups. A group of opposition parliamentarians 
challenged its legality in the Constitutional Court.
Armenia - Anti-vaccine campaigners demosntrate in Yerevan, September 19, 2021.
In a ruling publicized late on Thursday, the court party said the measure is 
partly unconstitutional. Citizens cannot be forced to pay for their tests, it 
said.
Aram Vartevanian, a lawmaker from the opposition Hayastan alliance who led the 
appeal, welcomed the ruling. He said it means that the government must exempt 
ordinary workers from what he regards as exorbitant testing fees.
The Armenian Ministry of Health offered a different interpretation of the 
court’s decision, however.
“The Constitutional Court’s decision did not create any obligation for the state 
or the employer to pay for an employee’s PCR tests,” Anna Mkrtumian, the head of 
the ministry’s legal department, told reporters on Friday. Nor did the court 
scrap the testing requirement for anti-vaxxers, she said.
In a separate statement on the ruling, the Ministry of Health likewise insisted 
that unvaccinated “workers will have to undergo tests in any case.”
The government’s vaccination campaign accelerated significantly after the 
testing requirement took effect on October 1. Officials say this is one of the 
reasons why coronavirus infections in Armenia have fallen dramatically in recent 
weeks after reaching record levels this fall.
Even so, the country’s vaccination rate remains low by international standards. 
Ministry of Health data shows that only some 643,000 people in the country of 
about 3 million were fully vaccinated as of December 19. More than 260,000 
others received one dose of a coronavirus vaccine.
Health Minister Avanesian said on Thursday that Armenian health authorities have 
not yet detected any cases of the new Omicron variant of the virus.
Reprinted on ANN/Armenian News with permission from RFE/RL
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