TURKEY AND ISLAMISM: THE DEBATE
ThreatsWatch.Org
Oct 23 2006
The primary rubbing point between the United States and Turkey right
now is not related to radical Islam. Quite the opposite – it is related
to the Marxist Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a Kurdish terrorist
group which has taken refuge in Iraqi Kurdistan. Yet as Turkish Prime
Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling Justice and Development
Party (known by its Turkish initials, the AKP) continue to dominate
Turkey’s political scene, there are rising concerns on both sides of
the Atlantic about the rise of Islamism in Turkey.
The two sides of this debate were on feature in two recent op-eds
in the Wall Street Journal. The first, Mr. Erdogan’s Turkey, Michael
Rubin, a Middle East scholar, argued that the AKP posed a threat to
Turkish democracy, and was slyly and slowly but steadily eroding the
country’s independent institutions. Rubin argues:
…Over the party’s four-year tenure, Mr. Erdogan has spoken of
democracy, tolerance and liberalism, but waged a slow and steady
assault on the system. He endorsed, for example, the dream of Turkey’s
secular elite to enter the European Union, but only to embrace
reforms diluting the checks and balances of military constitutional
enforcement…
The assault on the secular education system has been subtle but
effective. Traditionally, students had three choices: enroll at
religious academies (so-called Imam Hatips) and enter the clergy;
learn a trade at vocational schools; or matriculate at secular high
schools, attend university and pursue a career. Mr. Erdogan changed
the system: By equating Imam Hatip degrees with high-school degrees,
he enabled Islamist students to enter university and qualify for
government jobs without ever mastering Western fundamentals. He also
sought to bypass checks and balances. After the Higher Education
Board composed of university rectors rejected his demands to make
universities more welcoming of political Islam, the AKP-dominated
parliament proposed to establish 15 new universities. While Mr.
Erdogan told diplomats his goal was to promote education, Turkish
academics say the move would enable him to handpick rectors and swamp
the board with political henchmen…
Such tactics have become commonplace. At Mr. Erdogan’s insistence and
over the objections of many secularists, the AKP passed legislation
to lower the mandatory retirement age of technocrats. This could
mean replacement of nearly 4,000 out of 9,000 judges. Turks are
suspicious that the AKP seeks to curtail judicial independence. In
May 2005, AKP Parliamentary Speaker Bulent Arinc warned that the AKP
might abolish the constitutional court if its judges continued to
hamper its legislation. Mr. Erdogan’s refusal to implement Supreme
Court decisions levied against his government underline his contempt
for rule of law. Last May, in the heat of the AKP’s anti-judiciary
rhetoric, an Islamist lawyer protesting the head scarf ban shouted
"Allahu Akbar," opened fire in the Supreme Court and murdered a
judge. Thousands attended his funeral, chanting pro-secular slogans.
Mr. Erdogan was absent from the ceremony.
There have been other subtle changes. Mr. Erdogan has replaced nearly
every member of the banking regulatory board with officials from the
Islamic banking sector. Accusations of Saudi capital subsidizing AKP
are rampant…
Rubin also takes aim at U.S. diplomacy, noting that U.S. Ambassador
Ross Wilson has publicly taken the side of the AKP against its secular
political opponents, describing domestic criticism of Erdogan’s
Islamist policies as "political cacophony."
Matthew Kaminski, a member of the Journal’s editorial board, took the
opposite point of view (although without criticizing Rubin by name).
Writing in Turkish Tiger: Freedom Thrives Even Under an ‘Islamist’
Government, Kaminski argues:
…The recent troubling news here, from Kurdish terrorism to the rise
of political Islam and anti-Americanism to tensions with Europe, can’t
take away from Turkey’s economic renaissance. New and old industries
powered a 7% expansion in 2005, the fourth consecutive year that growth
approached double digits; this year, it’ll be around 5%. Inflation,
an old Turkish non-delight, is under control. Inside the European
Union’s free-trade area since 1996, Turkey has done especially well
with export-driven manufacturing. More than half of Europe’s television
sets are made here. Investors are taking notice; Citigroup last week
bought 20% of the third-largest bank for $3.1 billion. Though the
economic gap with Europe remains wide, Turks are spending their way
to bourgeois respectability, buying, in the past year, $3.5 billion in
imported cars. Consumer loans are up 120% in that time, housing 300%…
The good times have made for a richer civil society. Since the last
military-led regime in 1980-83, notes author Hugh Pope, 27 private
universities have been founded, mostly courtesy of tycoons like the
Koc and Sabanci families. Sabanci University’s art gallery last year
put on a popular Picasso exhibit, a first in Istanbul; Rodin followed
this summer. Associations and lobby groups are mushrooming; they are
giving voice to competing interests and providing counterweights to
the Islamists in charge, even as opposition parties remain weak.
Turkish democracy has never been stronger…
While Turkey continues "talks" with European governments about
entering the European Union, that prospect is all but dead. The
major governments remain in support, but across Europe the publics
are opposed, and their governments are starting to bend. Recently
the French parliament passed the first reading of a bill that would
make it a crime punishable by prison to deny that the Turks committed
genocide against the Armenians in the First World War. As this is in
fact denied by virtually all Turks, not simply the nationalists, many
very mainstream Turkish public figures would be inviting prosecution
by travel to France if the bill becomes law. While such a law would
serve no practical purpose for France, it would ensure that Turks
know they are not welcome.
No, the real issue is whether or not Turkey will maintain its
democratic institutions, or else make a U-turn toward history. There
is no need to assume a choice between extremes; there is a middle
ground in which Turkey could stay outside the EU, but maintain strong
economic, military and diplomatic ties with the West, and be a force
for peace and a non-threatening current of Islam. Yet that middle
ground cannot be assumed, either.
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