Author: Ani Tigranian

Armenians start using Azerbaijani border post

Ani Tigranian
Lilit Shahverdyan Jun 15, 2023

When Azerbaijan first installed its border checkpoint in the Lachin corridor on April 23, the de facto authorities of Nagorno-Karabakh urged their citizens to refrain from using it as they “couldn’t ensure proper security there,” given Azerbaijan’s record of violence against Armenians. 

Indeed, during the first few weeks, few civilians crossed the checkpoint. Those who did – with Russian peacekeepers escorting them – risked being filmed and shown on Azerbaijani state TV as evidence of Karabakh Armenians’ willingness to accept Azerbaijani rule. 

A month and a half after the checkpoint’s installation, Azerbaijani media is still circulating these videos, which aim to highlight the mild attitude of the Azerbaijani border guards toward Armenians, as they communicate in Russian without any signs of violence or conflict.

The official news center in Karabakh released a statement on June 2 saying that any use of the checkpoint “cannot be interpreted as an act legitimizing the illegal control of Azerbaijan and accepting the non-existent Azerbaijani jurisdiction over these territories” and did not mean that the blockade of Nagorno-Karabakh was over. 

The thrust of the statement was that Karabakhi Armenians were now allowed to use the border post. 

A few days later footage was released that purportedly showed Armenians using the checkpoint without Russian peacekeeping escort for the first time. A bus with Armenian license plates can indeed be seen. But many Karabakhis were skeptical of the clip’s veracity as Azerbaijani media have been known selectively edit and blur out Russian trucks in such videos. 

Whether or not they are accompanied by Russian peacekeepers, Armenians’ entry to the region is strictly controlled by Azerbaijan, depending on their place of registration. 

On June 13, Karabakh’s ombudsman Gegham Stepanyan wrote that he knew of three cases of individuals leaving the region for medical reasons and being denied re-entry because they were registered as residing in Armenia, rather than Nagorno-Karabakh. “The Azerbaijani side allowed their exit from Artsakh and then arbitrarily and illegally prohibited their re-entry,” Stepanyan wrote.

Karabakhis’ initial response to the checkpoint back in April was sharp – they held demonstrations near the entrance to Stepanakert, the capital of the region, with signs reading “The checkpoint is a red line” and “We won’t accept it, we won’t pass.”

But they’ve had their access to the outside world greatly restricted for seven months now, and many of them are overcoming their reluctance to use the border post. (The checkpoint was set up over four months into a blockade organized by Azerbaijani government-backed “eco-activists”, who ended their sit-in demonstration after it was installed.)

Along with the videos appearing in Azerbaijani media, a local newspaper in Nagorno-Karabakh reported on June 9 that 150 civilians were transported to Armenia and 160 from Armenia to Karabakh through the Azerbaijani border post in the previous week.

As willingness to use the checkpoint grows, so does the countervailing social pressure.

Russian-Armenian billionaire Ruben Vardanyan, who briefly served as Karabakh’s state minister and is now a prominent critic of both the current de facto Karabakh authorities and the Armenian government, came out against use of the checkpoint.

His organization, the Front for the Security and Development of Artsakh, published a statement on June 6 telling the government to review its decision to allow travel through the corridor, which it called “crossing a red line.” 

The statement also urged the government to refrain from “making decisions of strategic importance without public discussions, without examining the dangers arising from those decisions.”

On June 13, Vardanyan posted on his social media that “we are told that we have no choice but to use Azerbaijan’s established checkpoint,” adding: “Thankfully, only a few in #Artsakh/ #NagornoKarabakh share this perspective.”

The border passage issue has become a hot topic of discussion on social media. In a Facebook post, one resident of Stepanakert criticized those crossing the border, saying their actions amount to “integration into Azerbaijan on a state level.” A woman from Stepanakert, currently living in Yerevan, responded that “One day, I will ultimately want to visit my parents in Stepanakert, or my parents will simply want to visit me in Yerevan. If the only way is through the checkpoint, then I can’t exclude the possibility of using it.”

“Integration” is the official discourse promoted by Azerbaijan regarding the fate of Karabakh Armenians. It considers their fate an entirely internal matter. 

Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, meanwhile, are seeking international guarantees for dialogue between Baku and the Karabakh Armenians. But Baku responds with ultimatums that the Karabakh de facto authorities should dissolve their governing structures and seek “amnesty.”

Karabakh Armenians considering going through the Azerbaijani checkpoint face a tough choice: On the one hand, there are security concerns and the risk of not being let back in, plus the censure they will face from many fellow Armenians.

But on the other hand, there is no other opportunity in sight for reuniting with long-unseen loved ones on the other side of the blockade.

Lilit Shahverdyan is a journalist based in Stepanakert. 

https://eurasianet.org/armenians-start-using-azerbaijani-border-post-0

How will post-election domestic dynamics in Turkey impact the region?

Ani Tigranian
 Yeghia Tashjian Tashjian’s Take, Columns 0

Second round ballot, May 28, 2023 Turkish presidential election (Kadı Kadı via Wikimedia Commons)

On May 28, 2023, Recep Tayyip Erdogan won the second presidential run-off against opposition candidate Kemal Kilicdaroglu. On his re-election day, President Erdogan congratulated not only the Turkish people but also Azerbaijan and Karabakh, hinting at the importance of Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus for Turkey’s foreign policy. To analyze the impact of the general and presidential elections in Turkey, first we will examine the political background of the new Turkish National Assembly, the impact of the elections on the Middle East and South Caucasus, and what the formation of the new Turkish cabinet may mean to the region.

Turkey’s New National Assembly

Nicholas Danforth, author of The Remaking of Republican Turkey: Memory and Modernity Since the Fall of the Ottoman Empire, in his recent article talks about the symbolism of Erdogan’s victory as it coincides with the 570th anniversary of the Ottoman conquest of Istanbul. But this year is also the centennial of the establishment of the Turkish Republic. Erdogan understood the importance of these dates for the Turkish people and he grasped how effectively they could be welded together. The voting behavior of the majority of Turks shows how symbols and national narratives can transcend financial realities. Erdogan, knowing this fact, concluded his electoral campaign by praying in the Hagia Sophia, the Byzantine cathedral-turned-mosque, and celebrated his victory on May 29 during the 570th anniversary of the Ottoman conquest of Constantinople, now Istanbul. 

Moreover, despite the fact that Turkey’s National Assembly now looks more diverse featuring members from 18 political parties, nationalist and conservative forces both from the ruling and opposition alliances now dominate the Parliament. According to Turkish journalist Fehim Tastekin, the electoral results show an increased nationalist-Islamist orientation among the working class and low-income groups in both urban and rural areas. 

Tastekin closely analyzes the voting decline of the Kurdish-led People’s Democratic Party (HDP). He argues that the party lost organizational strength amid a crackdown that resulted in the detention of around 10,000 of its members including its leaders. Moreover, many liberals and leftists in Istanbul and other western areas of Turkey who used to vote for HDP now voted for CHP and Kemalists. Another surprise was in Diyarbekir (Tigranagert), HDP’s stronghold, where a Kemalist CHP member was elected as an MP from the district. Meanwhile, Erdogan’s ally the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) gained 10-percent of the total vote. The main kingmaker was Sinan Ogan, another nationalist leader, from the Victory Party, whose main pledge was to send the Syrian refugees back to Syria. Ogan secured five-percent during the first round of the Presidential elections, and later endorsed Erdogan. 

The Cabinet of the “Kings”

On June 3, President Erdogan announced his new cabinet. Hakan Fidan’s and Yasar Guler’s appointments as foreign and defense ministers, respectively, illustrated the importance of Syria for Turkey. 

Fidan is one of Erdogan’s closest aides. He headed the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) since 2010, and before that he was an advisor of Erdogan when the latter was a Prime Minister. From 2003-2007 he headed Turkey’s Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), an international aid agency aiming to spread Turkish soft power around the globe. Fidan, who is of Kurdish background, took part in the secret negotiations with the PKK between 2009-2015. In 2016, in the aftermath of the failed coup attempt, he took the lead in purging Gulenists from the state bureaucracy. Later he cooperated with Israeli, Russian and Iranian spy networks to target Kurdish guerillas. Starting in 2019, he handled the Syrian file and engaged in dialogue with his Syrian and Russian counterparts to resolve the Syrian conflict. For Erdogan, Fidan is the key to normalization with Syria. According to Turkish journalist Ezgi Akin: “As a spymaster, he has engaged in back-channel diplomacy with the nation’s allies and foes across the globe.”  It is worth mentioning that upon his appointment as the chief of the MIT, many western and Israeli officials questioned his loyalty towards Turkey’s allies, claiming that he has close relations with Iran and citing the secret Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force file where Fidan has said that “Israel and US must be wiped out.” 

The second important appointment is Guler, the chief of general staff of the Turkish army, as defense minister. Guler is replacing Hulusi Akar. The new minister was the military chief during Turkey’s military incursions into Syria in 2019 and 2020, and also conducted military operations against the PKK in Northern Iraq. Guler tried to convince his NATO allies many times to support Turkey’s efforts in establishing a “safe zone” in Northern Syria.

Finally, Erdogan appointed his former spokesperson Ibrahim Kalin as head of MIT. Kalin is seen as one of the closest people to Erdogan. He was one of the founders of the SETA, a government-affiliated think tank based in Ankara, and has led several diplomatic efforts shaping Turkey’s foreign policy, mainly towards the Middle East. 

Turkish journalist Levent Kemal, commenting on the announcement of the new cabinet, tweeted: “President Erdoğan’s new cabinet is generally a soft cabinet (in terms of domestic policy), but the appointment of Hakan Fidan as foreign minister and Yaşar Güler as defense minister shows that Turkey’s position on security and foreign policy will not change much. The appointment of Ibrahim Kalin as head of the National Intelligence Organisation (MIT), as reported in the Turkish media, will not change Turkey’s lines on sensitive security issues. Turkey will better balance diplomacy and the field and will be more competitive. Hakan Fidan’s ministry seems designed to make Turkey’s regional negotiations more effective and solution-oriented.  Less joint patrols, more results.”

What will be the implications of these appointments on Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy? Will the outcome of the elections give President Erdogan a “green light” for new military interventions against Kurdish groups in Syria and Iraq, as well as a push to expand Turkish influence beyond the region?

Regional Implications

Ryan Bohl, a Middle East and North African analyst at the risk intelligence company RANE said to The New Arab that Turkey after the elections will continue to diversify its foreign policy and distance itself from its traditional western allies. According to the analyst, “Turkey is looking to take advantage of the slow drawdown of US forces and influence in the Middle East. As the world becomes more and more multipolar, Turkey under Erdogan has full intention of becoming a great power in this new geopolitical order.” Moreover, the rift between the West and Russia has provided Ankara with a unique opportunity to assert its diplomatic independence and gain political leverage aiming to balance the two conflicting poles. Hence, Turkey no longer sees itself as a regional bridge, but as a key rising power in a region where both the West and Russia strive to contain each other. 

As seen from the recent appointments, Syria is a priority for Turkey. Ankara will engage in rapprochement with Damascus to contain the Kurdish entity in the northeast of Syria. Many analysts argue that Turkey could carry out military operations against the YPG (Kurdish-led ‘People’s Defense Units’). This will be seen as a “win-win” solution for Ankara, Damascus, Tehran and Moscow, where Turkey will aim to destroy the Kurdish political entity on its border, preventing a “spill-over effect” into Turkey. Syria would be happy to see the weakening of the Kurds to force them to surrender to Damascus’ will and give up any autonomy aspirations, while Moscow and Tehran would reach their regional objectives by kicking the US forces from Syria, a key element in their regional geopolitical and geo-economic aims. 

The Gulf is the “golden treasure box” for Turkey. According to Sinem Cengiz, a Turkish researcher at the Gulf Studies Center of Qatar University, the Gulf states adopted a “wait-and-see” approach, and given the current atmosphere of regional reconciliation, Ankara will continue prioritizing its relations with the Gulf. The analyst argues that relations between Turkey and the Gulf have a personal background where Erdogan has used personal relations to engage in the power of personal diplomacy. Cengiz argues that it is expected that Erdogan will soon visit the Gulf and Egypt will sign new trade relations to boost Turkey’s domestic finance and economic position in the region. 

Finally, the South Caucasus is another priority for Turkey as it is the main arena to push its political and economic influence beyond its borders. Starting on May 14, the first round of presidential elections, the Azerbaijani President and officials congratulated Erdogan. President Ilham Aliyev called Erdogan and congratulated him “for winning the majority vote in presidential and parliament elections” (AKP and its allies won 322 of the 600 seats in the National Assembly). On June 4, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Jeyhun Bayramov had a telephone conversation with Fidan, and both ministers discussed regional issues. Azerbaijan’s FM also invited his Turkish counterpart to visit Baku. This clearly shows that both countries will continue exerting pressure on Armenia so that the latter makes additional concessions in Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) and allows for an extraterritorial route in Syunik connecting Azerbaijan to Nakhichevan and Turkey.

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Yeghia Tashjian is a regional analyst and researcher. He has graduated from the American University of Beirut in Public Policy and International Affairs. He pursued his BA at Haigazian University in political science in 2013. In 2010, he founded the New Eastern Politics forum/blog. He was a research assistant at the Armenian Diaspora Research Center at Haigazian University. Currently, he is the regional officer of Women in War, a gender-based think tank. He has participated in international conferences in Frankfurt, Vienna, Uppsala, New Delhi and Yerevan. He has presented various topics from minority rights to regional security issues. His thesis topic was on China’s geopolitical and energy security interests in Iran and the Persian Gulf. He is a contributor to various local and regional newspapers and a presenter of the “Turkey Today” program for Radio Voice of Van. Recently he has been appointed as associate fellow at the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut and Middle East-South Caucasus expert in the European Geopolitical Forum.


“Property or money for weapons not supplied to Armenia”: about Russia’s debt

Ani Tigranian
June 8 2023
  • JAMnews
  • Yerevan

Russia’s debt for the supply of weapons to Armenia

“Armenia is looking for alternative solutions until the problem of arms supplies that has arisen in relations with Russia is resolved,” Armen Grigoryan, Secretary of the Security Council, said in Minsk, where a meeting of the Committee of Secretaries of Security Councils of the CSTO military bloc, acting under the leadership of Russia, is taking place. No details from Minsk have been reported yet.

It is not known whether Grigoryan had a meeting with his Russian counterpart Nikolai Patrushev nor whether the issue of arms supplies was discussed. He announced such an intention before leaving for Minsk on television.

Political analyst Hovsep Khurshudyan believes that even if negotiations on the issue of arms supplies take place, they will not result in anything. In his opinion, the issue can be resolved only in an international court.

  • “Armenia is not Russia’s ally in the war with Ukraine” – Pashinyan interview with CNN
  • Pashinyan-Aliyev dialogue in Moscow: signing of documents didn’t happen
  • “The territorial integrity of Azerbaijan includes Nagorno-Karabakh,” and other statements by Pashinyan

For several months now, Armenia has been discussing the story of Russia’s debt for the supply of weapons for which it was paid. The Prime Minister of the country was the first to talk about this, without specifying which country he was talking about:

“We have cases where hundreds of millions of dollars have been paid, but the obligations for deliveries to Armenia are not fulfilled, including by the allied countries.”

This statement was made after the hostilities on the border of Armenia in the fall of 2022, called the “September War”. Against the backdrop of reports of “the invasion of the Azerbaijani Armed Forces into the sovereign territory of Armenia and numerous casualties,” this statement caused a stormy response in society.

Then it became known that the partner who received the payment but did not deliver the weapons was Russia. Since the authorities and the entire society of Armenia were outraged by the inaction of Russia and the CSTO military bloc, to which the country turned for help to protect its borders, the topic of arms supplies became one of the most discussed.

However, so far neither the Prime Minister nor any of his team have provided details on how negotiations are progressing over the undelivered weapons, and whether the return of the amount paid is expected.

Armenia’s possible withdrawal from CSTO has been actively discussed, according to Deputy Foreign Minister Mnatsakan Safaryan

The Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia made such a statement on a possible meeting with his Russian counterpart Nikolai Patrushev and discussing the issue of arms supplies.

“Taking into account the existing reality, namely: the Russian-Ukrainian war, the ability of Russia to serve its needs during these hostilities, as well as the lack of resources in order to also export, we have chosen the path of finding other resources.”

Grigoryan assured that there are many countries with which Armenia is conducting intensive negotiations on the issue of arms purchases.

“On the one hand, we have results [on the supply of weapons from other countries], on the other hand, negotiations [with Russia] are ongoing,” he said.

Novaya Gazeta Europe published Armen Grigoryan’s opinion on issues of acute public concern

Political analyst Hovsep Khurshudyan believes that returning several hundred million dollars is not a problem for Moscow:

“They deliberately do not return it. They could well return the money, this is a small amount, we are talking about several hundred million dollars. We see how the Russian Federation is transferring tens of billions of dollars to Turkey, including for the construction of the Akkuyu nuclear power plant.”

He thinks that the situation with “non-delivered weapons and non-return of money indicate the intention to use the current situation as another way of sabotage.”

According to the analyst, Yerevan should take tough measures:

“The final decision on the return of this money will be made in the international court. Just as Ukraine is now demanding compensation for the destroyed economy and cities, Armenia must demand this compensation. And get at least property for debts.”

He recalled the “Property Instead of Debt” agreement signed in 2002 and stressed that at that time the Russian Federation “acquired Armenian enterprises for pennies”:

“Now we are talking about a sum of several hundred million dollars, but we gave away huge enterprises to Russia in exchange for a debt of only 96-97 million dollars. So we can easily return all this property by applying to an international court.”

Under the “Property Instead of Debt” agreement, four Armenian enterprises were transferred to the Russian Federation in exchange for a debt of 98 million dollars: the Hrazdan Thermal Power Plant and three electronic industry enterprises.

https://jam-news.net/russias-debt-for-the-supply-of-weapons-to-armenia/

Estonian experts join European Union civilian missions in Armenia and Moldova

Ani Tigranian
EUROPEAN INTEREST
June 6 2023
By European Interest

–

Käsper Kivisoo will become the Strategic Adviser on Hybrid threats and/or Cyber Security in the European Union’s new civilian mission in Moldova (EUPM Moldova), and Enn Kooskora will join the European Union’s new civilian mission in Armenia (EUMA Armenia) as an observer.

EUMA Armenia will monitor the security situation on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan to contribute to the stability of Armenia’s border regions. Estonian expert Enn Kooskora has worked on numerous missions, including the OSCE mission OSCE SMM in Ukraine.

The focus of EUPM Moldova will be on strategic expertise and operational support to reinforce Moldova’s internal security. Käsper Kivisoo, who will work as a short-term expert, previously worked as an adviser at the Government Office.

Estonia is posting experts to international civilian missions to help prevent and manage international conflicts. Estonian experts are posted to European Union missions in Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Iraq and Somalia, and the UN mission in Kosovo. Eight experts posted by Estonia are currently working with various international civilian missions. The civilian missions are coordinated by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Armenia-Azerbaijan border situation ‘relatively stable’, says deputy minister of defense

Ani Tigranian

 11:51, 7 June 2023

YEREVAN, JUNE 7, ARMENPRESS. Deputy Minister of Defense Arman Sargsyan said Wednesday that the situation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani border is relatively stable.

“The situation is relatively stable, there were shootings yesterday that were reported. We immediately respond in case of intensive shootings by the adversary,” Sargsyan told reporters.

Azerbaijan releases disinformation in attempt to substantiate its ceasefire violations, warns Nagorno Karabakh

Ani Tigranian

 11:11, 6 June 2023

STEPANAKERT, JUNE 6, ARMENPRESS. The Defense Ministry of Artsakh (Nagorno Karabakh) warned on Tuesday that Azerbaijan is spreading disinformation in an attempt to substantiate its ceasefire violations.

“The Azerbaijani Ministry of Defense has spread a usual disinformation, falsely claiming that it has disrupted reinforcement works in the Askeran, Martuni and Karvajar regions and about reinforcement works being carried out by the Defense Army. The Azerbaijani Defense Ministry is once again distorting reality in an attempt to substantiate the regular ceasefire violations committed by its units,” the Defense Ministry of Artsakh said in a statement.

PM Nikol Pashinyan attends inauguration of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan

Ani Tigranian

 21:44, 3 June 2023

YEREVAN, JUNE 3, ARMENPRESS. Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan attended on June 3 the inauguration ceremony of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Ankara.

Prime Minister Pashinyan was welcomed by Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu at the presidential complex.

Leaders and high-ranking representatives of other countries were also present at the event.

EU-mediated Armenia-Azerbaijan summit underway in Moldova

Ani Tigranian

 18:11, 1 June 2023

CHISINAU, JUNE 1, ARMENPRESS. The meeting between Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, President of the European Council Charles Michel, French President Emmanuel Macron, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz and Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev is underway in Chisinau, Moldova.

[see video]

The meeting is taking place on the sidelines of the 2nd European Political Community Summit.

The Armenian and Azerbaijani leaders met most recently in Russia, on May 25, and in Brussels on May 14.

AraratBank unveils a special offer and competitive terms at Leasing Expo 2023

Ani Tigranian

 16:38, 2 June 2023

YEREVAN, JUNE 2, ARMENPRESS. At Leasing Expo 2023 exhibition, AraratBank has come forward with a new initiative, offering competitive terms to individual entrepreneurs and legal entities.

Leasing Expo 2023 was launched today at 12:00 in the Karen Demirchyan Sports and Concerts Complex. During the three days of the Expo, our leasing experts will welcome visitors at the bright yellow booth of AraratBank, ready to offer advice and respond to inquiries on financial lease.

“Leasing as a financial instrument is a flexible and affordable option for the acquisition of fixed assets, which allows the lessee to spare a huge amount of its own funds. Today, the instrument has become more attractive as lessees can take advantage of up to 10% state subsidy under the Production Capacity Modernization Measure adopted by the RA Government,” the bank said in a news release.

“AraratBank’s participation in the event provides a good opportunity for networking with the business community, highlighting the importance of leasing and sparking new partnerships for mutual benefit. With AraratLeasing financing, you will be able to purchase equipment including but not limited to vehicles, construction and agricultural machinery,” said Vahan Gharibyan, Deputy Head of Corporate Business Lending Department of AraratBank.

AW: Letter to the Editor | An economic benefit to human rights violations

Ani Tigranian
 Edna Antonian Letters to the Editor 0

By now, there have been newspaper publications and plenty of social media discussions of Azerbaijan’s blockade of the independent Republic of Artsakh in the South Caucasus.

No concrete international efforts have been made to provide relief to the 120,000 Christian Armenians, who for the past six months living on their native land, have been deprived of access to the internet, electricity, gas, medicine, food supplies, pharmaceuticals and critical medical care by the dictatorial regime of Azerbaijan.

We hear about human rights violations, yet from all the failed international negotiations and the February 22, 2023 International Court of Justice ruling in favor of Armenians, Azerbaijan has shown total disregard of this order. It has further constricted the “Road to Life” by installing a government checkpoint on the Berdzor (Lachin) Corridor requiring native Armenians to have Azeri passports to go back and forth to the Republic of Armenia. Four villages within Artsakh are completely cut off from the outside world. Concerns for human rights violations are valid when there is subjugation, domination and exploitation of such people. 

The hidden reason behind why such crimes have been ongoing for so long has to do with the economic forces driving it. Why did Israel, a Holocaust surviving nation, continuously sell weapons to Azerbaijan which were used in the 2020 attack against Artsakh Armenians and continues to sell them weapons to this day as tracked by military cargo flights? Israel has established new bases in the newly-occupied, previously Armenian-inhabited villages, bordering Iran. This is a way to keep Iran in check.

The Pandora Papers, which unmasks the hidden owners of offshore companies, revealed on October 4, 2021 the extent of money laundering Ilham Aliyev and his family have been conducting in British real estate and institutions. The day before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Aliyev and Putin signed an Agreement of Cooperation. Russian gas is laundered through Azeri pipelines all the way to Turkey and Italy. Europe thinks there are sanctions on Russian oil and gas, but there really are not with actors like this.

Turkey sold military drones to Azerbaijan which were used for the first time on Armenians in the 2020 war. Their effectiveness opened the market for Turkish drones. Turkey and Azerbaijan are both trying to expand their lands and create physical connections at the expense of the Republic of Armenia. Azerbaijan has been attacking and taking land from the sovereign Republic of Armenia and taking over precious pasture lands where farm animals grazed, rerouting agricultural water flow and controlling precious mines that Armenia has for metals like gold, molybdenum and copper. Several of these mines belong to a US-based company, Anglo Asian Mining, which is partially owned by former Governor John H. Sununu, whose son may be interested in bidding for the 2024 US Presidency.

There is an economic benefit for the perpetrators of human rights violations, ethnic cleansing and genocides. That is why “Never Again” referring to the crime of genocide is just a slogan and not truly taken to heart by the human rights agencies. Artsakh has not received any concrete aid from the United States or Europe despite the billions of our tax dollars that are pouring into our government’s satellite war in Ukraine. It is not the knowledge of human rights violations that make people react but exposing the microeconomics that drive it.

Edna Antonian
New Jersey