US-AZERBAIJAN RELATIONS AT RISK OF FAILING?
news.az
July 27 2010
Azerbaijan
News.Az reprints from Today’s Zaman an article by Murad Ismayilov
Program Manager at ADA and Michael Tkacik from Stephen F. Austin
State University.
Though sometimes overlooked, Azerbaijan’s geopolitical status far
outweighs its size. Located just north of Iran and just south of
the volatile Caucuses, it sits on the Caspian Sea, astride major oil
and gas transshipment routes that avoid Russia. While not a perfect
democracy, Azerbaijan clearly presents an alternative to the theocracy
advocated by Iran and militant Islamists, as well as to the Central
Asian alternative of increasingly brutal authoritarianism. Azerbaijan
is therefore important geopolitically, in terms of energy access,
and as an acceptable if not perfect model of governance.
Yet, Baku has been moving away from the United States. Recently, Baku
cancelled joint maneuvers with the U.S. military. At the same time
Azerbaijan has been increasing its cooperation with Iran and Russia on
energy and other matters. Beyond this, rhetoric from high level Baku
officials has become progressively more anti-American. Though US policy
makers have sought to discount the significance of these signals,
there is little doubt that US – Azerbaijani relations are undergoing
a change for the worse. The questions are why and what can be done.
Azerbaijan’s post-independence quest for a closer relationship
with the U.S. was driven by at least two objectives. First, and
most importantly, Azerbaijan sought to reclaim territory lost to
Armenia in the Nagorno – Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and seven
regions adjacent to it. Second, Baku sought economic growth through
integration with the West. While Azerbaijan has made progress in
accomplishing this second goal, it has been bitterly disappointed on
the issue of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The hopes Azerbaijan pinned on its relationship with the US were
demonstrated in 1994 when the US signed an agreement for cooperation
in the energy sector. Though Baku sought economic benefits from
this deal, it realized the agreement had geopolitical ramifications
as well. Azerbaijan supported US interests by promoting the first
pipelines in the post-Soviet Eurasia that avoided Russian territory.
The Baku – Supsa and Baku – Tbilisi – Ceyhan oil pipelines and
Baku – Tbilisi – Erzurum gas pipeline are products of that era. As
demonstrated in Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, and other former
– Soviet republics, displeasing Russia can have severe ramifications
for nearby states. Yet Azerbaijan was willing to take the risk.
Following the Sept.11 attacks against the US, Azerbaijan cooperated
again. Baku opened its airspace for the transfer of coalition troops to
Afghanistan, contributed peacekeeping forces to Afghanistan and Iraq,
and supported US efforts to combat terrorism and the proliferation
of weapons of mass destruction.
Azerbaijan’s close engagement with the US in the energy and security
sectors satisfied many of Washington’s desires. But from Baku’s
perspective there was no quid pro quo – there was no progress toward
the resolution of its conflict with Armenia over Nagorno – Karabakh,
a key objective on which engagement rested.
There have been several disappointments in U.S. policy for Azerbaijan
over the last two decades. First, in 1992 the US Congress adopted
Section 907 of the Freedom Support Act, making Azerbaijan the only
country in the region following the dissolution of the Soviet bloc
deprived of the US financial assistance. Second, Washington has never
recognized Armenia as an aggressor state in the occupation of an
inalienable part of Azerbaijani territory and even voted against the
March 2008 Baku-sponsored U.N. General Assembly resolution reaffirming
the territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and “demanding the immediate
withdrawal of all Armenian forces from all occupied territories
there.” Third, the US Congress has repeatedly offered Armenia far more
aid than Azerbaijan even though Azerbaijan has diligently supported
US interests in the region. Even more disturbing, the US has been
offering separate financial support to Nagorno-Karabakh.
Since President Obama’s election, US policy toward the region has
been marked by increasing disinterest, as reflected in no less than
five policy shifts.
First, the replacement of Matthew Bryza by Robert Bradtke as a US
co-chair in the OSCE Minsk Group indicates a more passive approach
to both the Minsk Group and the Nagorno – Karabakh negotiation process.
France and Russia, the other two co-chairs in the Minsk Group, are
both involved in the Nagorno – Karabakh negotiation process at the
presidential level. Conversely, the US seems apathetic.
Second, the US has increased its criticism of Azerbaijan’s democracy
and human rights record, but has failed to apply a similar approach
to Armenia, especially given the protests and deaths in the wake of
the Feb. 18, 2008 Armenian presidential elections.
Third, since Anne Derse left Baku for Vilnius, the US kept the post
of its ambassador to Azerbaijan vacant for nearly a year, something
many in Baku have assessed as a sign of the US indifference toward
Azerbaijan. It took Washington over 10 months to finally name its
new ambassador to Azerbaijan.
Fourth, the U.S. failed to invite Azerbaijan to the nuclear security
summit Washington hosted on 12-13 April, the biggest international
meeting hosted by the US since 1945. This was also viewed in
Baku as a reflection of Washington’s growing neglect toward Baku,
especially given Azerbaijan’s potential role in non-proliferation
efforts. This sense of disappointment was even deeper given the
fact that Azerbaijan’s two regional neighbours, Armenia and Georgia,
did receive invitations to attend the summit.
Finally, the largest source of disappointment came as a result of
the Obama administration’s efforts in 2009 to push hard for the
Armenian – Turkish rapprochement. From Baku’s perspective, the
resolution of the Nagorno – Karabakh conflict should be linked to
this rapprochement lest the Armenian’s feel no pressure to settle
the matter. The Armenian – Turkish engagement deprives Azerbaijan of
the little leverage it possesses to encourage Armenia to withdraw
from the Azerbaijani territories it occupies. The US has seemingly
penalized Baku’s growing constructiveness in the Nagorno – Karabakh
negotiations and rewarded Armenia’s obstructionist approach. Unlike
Baku, Armenia has so far failed to approve the renewed version of
the Madrid principles regarding settlement of this conflict. In Baku,
this last policy shift is viewed as a victory for the Armenian lobby
and narrow domestic political considerations in the US
It is thus US reluctance to become more constructively involved
with Baku’s outstanding security problems, especially the Nagorno –
Karabakh conflict and its ignorance regarding the rationale driving
Azerbaijan’s quest to integrate with the West that have been key in
alienating Baku in recent months. To make sure that these tactical
shifts do not translate into a strategic transformation of Baku’s
foreign policy as well as into a deeply embedded mistrust of the
US amongst the society at large, the US should reassess its policy
toward a valuable partner on a key international fault line. The
recent nomination of Matthew Bryza as Washington’s new ambassador
to Azerbaijan is a first move in the right direction, but much more
remains to be done to salvage this important relationship.
Murad Ismayilov is the Program Manager for Research and Publications
at the Azerbaijan Diplomatic Academy. Michael Tkacik, J.D., Ph.D. is
a Professor of Government and Director of the School of Honors at
Stephen F. Austin State University.
The article was published in Hurriyet Daily News and Economic Review.
From: A. Papazian