RUSSIA BOOSTS MILITARY ALLIANCE WITH ARMENIA
Emil Danielyan
Georgiandaily
Sept 8 2010
Georgia
Russia and Armenia have agreed to deepen their already close military
ties, signing a deal that will strengthen Russian influence in the
South Caucasus and could have profound implications for the unresolved
Karabakh conflict.
Amendments to a bilateral 1995 defense treaty were signed during
Russian President, Dmitry Medvedev’s, visit to Yerevan on August 19-20.
The amendments, publicized by both sides, extended Russia’s lease
on a Soviet-era military base headquartered in the northwestern
Armenian city of Gyumri by 24 years, until 2044, and enhanced its
role in the South Caucasus state’s security. The approximately 4,000
troops stationed there will now not only protect the “interests of the
Russian Federation,” but also “ensure the security of the Republic
of Armenia” jointly with the Armenian army. According to Armenian
President, Serzh Sargsyan, this agreement will expand their “sphere
of geographical and strategic responsibility.” “The activity of the
Russian military base was until now confined to the external border
of the former USSR. That restriction has now been removed from the
treaty’s text,” Sargsyan told a joint news conference with Medvedev
(Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, August 21).
Sargsyan also emphasized that the amended treaty commits Moscow
to supply the Armenian armed forces with “modern and compatible
weaponry and special military hardware.” A separate memorandum
signed on August 20 by the Russian and Armenian defense ministers,
Anatoliy Serdyukov and Seyran Ohanian respectively, envisages the
creation of joint ventures specializing in repairs and maintenance of
military hardware (presumably Russian-made) located in Armenia. The
latter document apparently resulted from a visit to Armenia in July
by a team of Russian military officials led by Nikolay Bordyuzha,
the Secretary-General of the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty
Organization (CSTO). Following discussions with senior Armenian
security officials in Yerevan it was announced that the Russian and
Armenian defense industries will soon forge much closer links within
the CSTO framework. Bordyuzha told journalists that the two sides have
already launched an unspecified “pilot project” aimed at integrating
Armenian defense enterprises into the Russian military-industrial
complex (Regnum, July 20).
Armenian officials and pro-government politicians admit that the
new defense accord with Russia is, in large measure, a response to
Azerbaijan’s ongoing military build-up and growing threat to resolve
the Karabakh issue by force. These individuals claim the deepening of
bilateral military cooperation with Russia will discourage Baku from
unleashing another war for the Armenian-controlled disputed territory.
Some Armenian officials even claim that the Russian military is
now obliged to openly back Karabakh in case of such a war. In an
interview on August 25 with Radio Free Europe’s Armenian service,
Ohanian, expressed confidence that Moscow would intervene in the event
of an Azeri assault on Karabakh becoming “a threat to the Republic
of Armenia.”
Expert opinion in the region and beyond is divided over the credibility
of such statements. Some analysts argue that Karabakh is not an
internationally recognized part of Armenia and therefore cannot be
covered by the Russian-Armenian pact. Others say that it will now
be easier for the Kremlin to find an excuse for intervening in the
conflict on the Armenian side. In what might be a further sign that
Russia is strongly disinterested in renewed fighting in Karabakh,
Medvedev noted in Yerevan that the deal extending the Russian military
presence in Armenia will help to maintain “peace and order” in the
region. “We have allied obligations to CSTO member states. Armenia is
also a member of the CSTO,” Medvedev said in that context (Armenian
Public Television, 20 August).
The Russian president discussed the issue with his Azeri counterpart,
Ilham Aliyev, when he visited Baku two weeks later. He seemed to
downplay the significance of the deal after their talks, saying that
it “means only one thing: the term of the base will be prolonged by a
number of years” (ITAR-TASS, September 3). Russian Foreign Minister,
Sergei Lavrov, likewise assured Azeri media ahead of Medvedev’s trip
that the Russian-Armenian agreement will not alter “the balance of
forces in the region.”
Moscow raised additional questions about its regional agenda earlier
in August when it pointedly declined to deny a Russian newspaper
report that it plans to sell two batteries of sophisticated S-300
air-defense systems to Azerbaijan. Whether the $300 million sale
would have a primarily commercial significance for Moscow or marks
an attempt to placate Baku while keeping Yerevan even more dependent
on Russian military aid remains to be seen.
The prospect of such a deal, effectively acknowledged by Armenian
officials, has sparked controversy among opposition politicians and
experts in Yerevan. They believe that the surface-to-air missiles
would seriously limit Armenia’s ability to strike Azeri military
facilities as well as its oil and gas infrastructure. Ohanian
dismissed such fears, insisting that S-300’s would not give Baku a
“strategic advantage” in the Karabakh dispute. “We are very familiar
with those systems, we have been exploiting them for quite a long time,
and we know the possibilities to reduce their effectiveness,” Ohanian
said. The Armenian defense minister also reaffirmed his government’s
plans, announced on August 10, to acquire long-range precision-guided
missiles that would be aimed at “strategic facilities” among Armenia’s
hostile neighbors. He refused to clarify whether this is the kind of
“special” weaponry which the Russians will deliver to Armenia under
the new pact (Hayastani Hanrapetutyun, August 21).
The Armenian military has already received large quantities of Russian
weapons at knockdown prices or even free of charge since the early
1990’s. Additional arms deliveries, coupled with the new mandate for
Russian troops in Armenia, will put Moscow in a better position to
maintain the Karabakh status quo in the years ahead. For its part,
Moscow is securing a long-term military foothold in the region and,
assuming that the sale of S-300’s occurs, gaining more leverage
against Azerbaijan. Whether or not that will facilitate a peaceful
Karabakh settlement is unclear.
From: A. Papazian
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/edm/