Strategy Page
Sept 17 2010
The Cossacks Return
September 17, 2010: The Cossacks are back, once again coming to
prominence in Russia’s military affairs. The Cossack people are ethnic
Russians with a distinct language and culture (not Russian) and strong
ties to the Russian Orthodox Church, numbering around 7 million people
in Russia, Ukraine, and other portions of the former Soviet Union.
Their involvement in Russian wars goes back centuries. During Tsarist
times, Cossacks formed special cavalry units in the Imperial Russian
Army, as well as instruments of state repression. The Russian Empire
had a special arrangement with the Cossacks whereby, in exchange for
frontier land, greater political autonomy, and special social status,
Cossacks contributed military forces to the Tsar, providing their own
horses, weapons, and equipment. Unique, exclusively Cossack military
formations have been a staple of Russian history in one way or another
for many, many centuries.
Opinions on the actual military value of Cossack units is widely
divided, as are opinions of the Cossacks themselves. At many points in
Russian military history, the Cossacks have proven themselves to be
determined and fierce, sometimes to the point of recklessness,
warriors, and there are examples of entire Cossack units fighting to
the death against impossible odds. During the Napoleonic Wars and the
French invasion of Russia, Cossack units, mostly light cavalry,
operated extremely effectively as scouts and raiders, harassing the
retreating French army mercilessly. Their performance against regular
troops in open battle was less than great, but then that wasn’t their
role anyway.
On the other hand, Cossack units, from the days of Peter the Great
until modern time, have a well-deserved reputation for brutality,
anti-Semitism, and looting. They have always been notoriously
difficult to control, with Russian officers in past wars becoming
frustrated and enraged with drunken, mutinous Cossack soldiers. During
the Russian Civil War, Cossacks fought for both sides, especially the
anti-Communist White forces, but they were often divisive, unreliable,
and preoccupied with looting and burning. Also, many Russians regard
them as potential rebels, given their unruly history, large numbers,
and independent-minded spirit, and those familiar with history know
that for a two century period, every major rebellion against the
Russian Empire was led by Cossack troops. During the Soviet period,
Cossacks were among the many ill-treated minorities, having their
distinct culture and language suppressed by the Communist authorities.
Cossacks are once again involved in Russian conflicts during the last
decade. In an effort to bolster national pride and recover some of the
distinct Russian heritage that was suppressed during 70 years of
Soviet rule, Russia has officially brought back the formation of
exclusively Cossack military units, and in a big way. This has
accompanied a general explosion of Cossack culture in recent years.
Cossack military schools have been established in the country, where
student ages 10 to 17 attend classes in army fatigues and learn
military tactics alongside regular academic subjects. The Russian
Minister for Cossack Affairs, Gen. Gennady Troshev, is a Cossack
himself and has been instrumental in the remilitarization of the
Cossack society. An entire Kuban Cossack Army, headquartered in
Krasnodar, has been established and is incorporated as a unique, but
fully integrated, part of the Russian Army.
More recently, irregular Cossack paramilitaries, said by some reports
to have numbered in the thousands, fought on the Russian/separatist
side in the 2008 Russo-Georgian War, which saw South Ossetia taken
from Georgia and made a de facto part of Russia. Cossack volunteers by
the hundreds mobilized during the Georgian attack of South Ossetia and
crossed the border to engage Georgian forces. Cossacks in nearby North
Ossetia apparently organized a relatively efficient and rapid system
for clothing, equipping and transporting their paramilitaries into the
breakaway province to feed them into combat. Cossack fighters entered
South Ossetia by bus, having been issued combat uniforms and gear on
the way to the border, and were issued small arms and light weapons
once they arrived in theatre. Cossack volunteers formed the second
major paramilitary force in the war, the first being the South
Ossetian militias. According to reports, the Cossack forces fought
with dogged determination.
Paramilitary forces and semi-standing armies of “volunteers”, of
various ethnic and political lines, are a major part of armed conflict
in Russia and the former Soviet Union, particularly among Slavic
ethnicities. Such forces exist in disputed territories between Armenia
and Azerbaijan, where a majority of ethnic Armenians live in the
unrecognized Republic of Nogorno-Karabakh. The Nogorno-Karabakh
Defense Army is the formal defense force of the Nogorno-Karabakh
Republic. Similar forces exist in both breakaway republics of South
Ossetia and Azkaban.
The Georgian government, and the Azeri government for that matter,
would like to be able to dismiss these militias and irregular forces
that dot the Caucasus region as “bandits” or “illegal armed
formations” (the Russian military frequently used these terms to refer
to Chechen guerrillas during both of the Chechen Wars.) Unfortunately,
that is not necessarily accurate. For one thing, most of these
paramilitaries are well-organized, well-equipped (often with state
support), and often highly motivated by their separatist political
ideologies. Georgian forces found that, although tiny in number, South
Ossetian and Cossack paramilitaries fought bravely and with a high
degree of spirit during the 2008 war. Some of these irregular forces
even include aircraft and armored vehicles in their inventory.
Also, the paramilitaries, surprisingly, have the laws and customs of
war on their side to back them up to a certain extent. While their
enemies may wish to characterize these forces as criminal elements,
the Laws of Land Warfare, in fact, consider paramilitary forces to be
legitimate combatants in armed conflict. Chapter 3, Section 1, Article
61 of the Laws of Land Warfare state that legitimate combatants
entitled to rights and status as EPWs (Enemy Prisoners of War) include
“Members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a
Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory,
even if this territory is occupied”. According to international law,
the requirements for being categorized as a lawful combatant
incorporate four key criteria: 1) being commanded by a person
responsible for subordinates (a chain of command and structure), 2)
having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a distance (in other
words, making some kind of attempt at having uniforms, rank badges,
and insignia. Basically this part requires that “volunteer forces”
make an attempt to wear something that obviously identifies them as a
military formation.), 3) open carrying of arms (self-explanatory), and
4), conducting operations according to the laws and customs of warfare
(in other words, paramilitaries aren’t allowed to do things that are
illegal for standing, regular armed forces, like giving orders that
“no quarter be given” (a “take no prisoners order”).
This last part is where is gets tricky. During the conflict in 2008,
the Cossack and South Ossetian forces definitely met the first three
criteria: they wore uniforms, were well-organized, and openly carried
weapons. However, historically paramilitary forces have a poor
reputation for adhering to the laws and customs of war and usually
have a well-deserved reputation (especially in the former Soviet
Union) for committing violations of international law to a significant
degree.
Both Cossack and Ossetian forces violated the laws governing conduct
of armed conflict, which makes determining their exact status
difficult. But as it stands, for better or for worse, the Cossacks are
making a comeback, proud, armed, and thirsting for a fight.
From: A. Papazian
http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htpara/articles/20100917.aspx