Vestnik Kavkaza, Russia
Sept 2 2014
Heiko Langner: “It is better to put bets on the ‘Moscow card’ in
resolution of the Karabakh conflict
2 September 2014 – 12:38pm
Interview by Orkhan Sattarov, the head of the European Bureau of Vestnik Kavkaza
A few days ago, the California State Senate passed a resolution
recognizing the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. The resolution
project was presented in January and actively promoted by senators
Mike Gatto, Kevin de Leon and Tom Berryhill. Many experts believe that
the document does not correspond to the U.S. approach to the
Nagorno-Karabakh peace process and was passed under pressure from
powerful lobbyists in the state. Heiko Langner, a German expert in
Berlin, expressed his opinion about the developments.
– Mr. Langner, how would you comment on the decision of the California
Senate? Does it undermine the peacekeeping role of the U.S. in the
Nagorno-Karabakh settlement?
– It is not the first such resolution passed by one American state or
another. Before the decision of the California Senate, there had been
similar decrees of the House of Representatives or senates of such
states as Maine, Louisiana and Rhode Island. This is first of all
associated with the successful campaign of the pro-Armenian lobby
groups that not only representatives of the Armenian diaspora belong
to. You should bear in mind that the U.S., despite or due to internal
social differences, often bases its policy on Christian identity or
missionary work. Even a superpower needs some ideological
justification for its own policy, whether it is Christian values,
democracy or human rights. Christian solidarity as an ideological
motive plays an important role in passing such resolutions.
In this particular case, I suppose that the main role was played by
the influence of the Armenian diaspora. Over 40% of Americans of
Armenian origin live in California, mainly in Los Angeles. The
Armenian diaspora settled there is undeniably the most important
economic factor, so it has colossal opportunities to affect
Californian policy.
The passing of the resolution, according to American laws, cannot be
repealed (its rationality, in political terms, is a different
question). For the U.S. foreign policy, however, such resolutions had
had almost no value until recently. American foreign policy is defined
by the administration in Washington, not states. Diplomatic
recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh as an independent state by the
administration of Barack Obama is not expected. Just as it is not
expected in Russia, though Armenia, as a military ally of Russia,
would certainly want it.
The geostrategic interests of both world states, Russia and the U.S.,
in the two South Caucasus republics are so great that they will not
pick one of the sides of the conflict. At the same time, this does not
stop Moscow and Washington from secretly or explicitly providing
financial or military aid to one or even both sides of the conflict,
without recognizing the independence of Nagorno-Karabakh. For example,
it is well-known that Russia, despite its military alliance with
Armenia, is far ahead in supplying Azerbaijan with weapons. That is
how the policy of the superpowers has been functioning so far.
– Although the U.S. co-chairs the OSCE Minsk Group, it is the only
country in the world that provides direct financial aid to the
unrecognized regime in Nagorno-Karabakh. Besides, the Section 907 of
the Freedom Support Act, according to which Azerbaijan is considered
the aggressor in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, is still in force.
What are the reasons for such a position of the U.S. and how can
American policy be characterized in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict?
– It is a fair and important question. The passing of Section 907, in
its time, was to a decisive extent conditioned by the major political
influence of the Armenian diaspora in the U.S. The section is a
sanction instrument aimed against countries that have not found favour
with Washington for some reason. But that does not explain why the
section has not been repealed. It should have been repealed in 1993,
when the Armenian armed formations in Nagorno-Karabakh started taking
over the 7 surrounding districts of the enclave and systematically
driving out the Azerbaijani population and supporting the Armenian
Armed Forces. An onlooker should have figured by that moment that the
Armenian side had fully switched from defensive to offensive, although
it had not always been defending before.
But Section 907 could not stop the economic development of Azerbaijan
or the modernization of its army. Its practical consequences have
never been especially essential. At the same time, the existence of
the section demonstrates the absolute inefficiency of the U.S. as a
mediator in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.
For many years, the U.S. has practically subjected Azerbaijan to
sanctions. It was happening despite the fact that, being mediators in
the conflict, the Americans, of course, were also supposed to
represent Azerbaijani interests so as to back a compromise decision.
U.S. policy in the South Caucasus is hypocritical and this can clearly
be seen in its double standards. For example, Washington has been
providing state financial assistance to the de facto unrecognized
regime in Nagorno-Karabakh, in addition to the financial assistance to
Armenia allowed by international law. This should be interpreted as
tendentious support for the Armenian side of the conflict. Thus, the
U.S. sends a political message: “Although we do not recognize you
officially, we help you directly.” The Kremlin has never dared do that
yet. In other words, the U.S. is not an impartial mediator.
Besides, the U.S. and Russia, formally being equal co-chairs of the
OSCE Minsk Group, have been pursuing contrary interests, not since the
start of the Ukrainian conflict, but earlier. Moscow and Washington
have strong geopolitical differences in the South Caucasus Region.
Consequently, a fair question appears: how can the co-chairs of the
OSCE Minsk Group mediate in resolving the conflict if they are
dissociated on the issue?
In my opinion, bets should be put on the ‘Moscow card’ in the
resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. Russia is the ‘first
among equals’ in the trio of co-chairs of the OSCE Minsk Group, to
which France belongs as well. Considering the balance of interests,
the Kremlin has an equidistant policy regarding both sides of the
conflict. This creates better prerequisites for a hopeful compromise
decision.
– The unrecognized Karabakh authorities declared plans to settle about
200 Yazidi Kurd families, that fled Iraq from the terrorists of the
Islamic State, in Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding occupied districts.
How do such plans correspond to international law, and does Azerbaijan
have any means to prevent their realization?
– The strategy is not new. The de facto authorities in
Nagorno-Karabakh settled Armenian refugees, though a small group, from
Syria some time ago. At this moment, 35 Armenian families from Syria
(about 130 people in total) live on the occupied territories, mainly
in the ‘corridor districts’ of Kalbajar and Lachin. To be just, it
must be noted that the Republic of Armenia has not assisted in
settling foreign refugees in Nagorno-Karabakh and the surrounding
districts. Maybe the Karabakh regime is acting on its own in the
issue.
Plans to settle Yazidi Kurds from Iraq are not a coincidence. Before
the start of the Karabakh war, the Yazidi and Muslim Kurds had mostly
lived in Kalbajar and Lachin. In the earlier Soviet period, the region
had been called ‘Red Kurdistan’ and had had the status of a separate
administrative unit as part of the Azerbaijani SSR for some time.
After the fall of the USSR and the Armenian occupation of the
territories, the Yazidi Kurds (the ones that wanted) managed to stay.
Since Kurds have often been discriminated against in Muslim states or,
as in Iraq today, terrorized and being exterminated by ISIS, the de
facto regime in Nagorno-Karabakh, following the logic ‘the enemy of my
enemy is my friend,’ obviously considers them natural allies and a
demographic resource. The unrecognized Nagorno-Karabakh regime hopes
to gain support in its efforts to achieve diplomatic recognition by
the international community, trying to position itself as a
responsible actor offering refuge to groups of people in humanitarian
crisis. The Karabakh regime has everything spinning about the issue of
its recognition.
Mass international support for the citizens of Iraq is needed, but the
districts occupied by Armenians are an inappropriate and unsafe
territory for refugees. There are better opportunities for that.
Besides, the unauthorized settling of refugees by the Nagorno-Karabakh
regime is a fundamental violation of international law. According to
the fourth Geneva Convention, occupying forces are not allow to make
any changes that would complicate or prevent the return of former
residents to their places. An active settlement policy is the case
described in the convention. The correct and first addressee for
settlement of the problem is certainly the OSCE Minsk Group. Moreover,
the UN could have assisted with it. Finally, the issue could have been
resolved within the framework of a confidential talk between Ilham
Aliyev and Vladimir Putin, especially considering the full mutual
understanding and respect between the two presidents. It should be
recalled that the launch of the airport near Khojaly in
Nagorno-Karabakh has not yet happened. It would have been a threat to
the peace process. Moscow does not need new active military trouble
spots.
From: A. Papazian
http://vestnikkavkaza.net/interviews/politics/59528.html