US EMBASSY CABLES: INTENTIONAL PLAN TO DECENTRALISE KOSOVO WON’T WORK, SAYS EU OFFICIAL
guardian.co.uk
Thursday 9 December 2010 21.30 GMT
Article
historyThursday, 09 July 2009, 16:15
C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 06 STOCKHOLM 000418
SIPDIS
EO 12958 DECL: 07/09/2029
TAGS EUN, PREL, PGOV, IR, RS, SW
SUBJECT: EUR A/S GORDON’S JULY 3 MEETINGS WITH THE EU
POLITICAL DIRECTORS
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Classified By: CDA LAURA J. KIRKCONNELL FOR REASONS 1.4(B) AND (D)
Summary
The US embassy in Stockholm reports on a meeting of top US State
Department and European foreign policy diplomats which range over the
entire gamut of global hotspots. On Kosovo, the EU’s Robert Cooper
voices skepticism about the centerpiece of the UN settlement that
brought Kosovo independence – decentralization of local government
to enable Kosovo Serbs to run their own affairs and therefore reduce
the pressure for partition. Key passage highlighted in yellow.
Read related article ——-
SUMMARY
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1. (U) Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs
Phil Gordon met with the 27 EU Member State Political Directors in
Stockholm July 3. He then met with the EU Political Directors “troika,”
comprising Swedish PolDir Bjorn Lyrvall, EU Council Secretariat DG
Robert Cooper, EU External Relations Commission PolDir Karel Kovanda,
Spanish PolDir Alfonso Lucini, and EU Council Secretariat Policy
Coordinator Helga Schmid.
2. (C) On Iran, A/S Gordon emphasized that post-election developments
have not altered the Obama Administration’s fundamental approach to the
nuclear question, and UK PolDir Mark Lyall-Grant urged the EU to be
in position “to move rapidly” with new sanctions at the beginning of
the Spanish EU Presidency in January 2010. On the Middle East peace
process, the United States was focused on creating the conditions
necessary for peace before proposing full-scale negotiations. This
would require a stop to Israeli settlements and efforts to build up
Palestinian security capacity and an end to violence and incitement.
French PolDir Gerard Araud raised the possibility of an EU security
force in support of a possible agreement. Regarding the U.S.-Russia
relationship, Gordon said that the Russians are testing the Obama
Administration to see if it will compromise on its principles;
it won,t.
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IRAN
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3. (C) Swedish MFA Political Director Bjorn Lyrvall opened A/S
Gordon’s discussion with the EU 27 PolDirs by noting growing concern
over internal developments in Iran following last month’s presidential
elections. Terming as “outrageous” regime statements blaming the unrest
on foreign actors, Lyrvall discussed the importance of EU unity in
response to the detention of local employees of the British embassy
in Tehran and noted that the EU Political Directors had discussed
“possible responses” to the detentions during their meetings earlier
in the day. Asked to brief on the nuclear file, EU DG for External
and Politico-Military Affairs Robert Cooper replied that he had
little to say. The post-election unrest in Iran seemed to entail
“no new cooperation, perhaps rather less,” and the Iranian regime was
now weaker and less legitimate. Cooper continued that “the prospects
look difficult” for a meaningful Iranian response to the P5 1 offer,
and that we had always seen this year as the key year for addressing
this issue. Cooper concluded that, in the second half of this year,
we must have “the beginning of a breakthrough.”
4. (C) In his introduction, A/S Gordon expressed the importance
the Obama Administration attaches to working with Europe, stressing
that the U.S. realizes that it cannot handle matters alone and that
Europe is our most natural foreign policy partner. Concerning Iranian
election unrest, he said that the Administration’s policy had denied
the regime the opportunity to blame the U.S. so now it was turning to
the UK. Asked about links between the post-election domestic situation
and the negotiations on the nuclear file, A/S Gordon suggested that
the regime might pursue one of several options. It might decide to
engage the P5 1, which A/S Gordon (and other EU PolDirs) assessed as
unlikely. Or it could pretend to engage, while forestalling meaningful
action. Lastly, it could refuse any dialogue.
5. (C) While now is not the time for the USG to increase its
engagement, it is also not the time to reduce it, Gordon continued.
The President’s approach would continue to highlight the path Iran
would need to take to address international concerns. But the clock
was ticking as long as enrichment continued, Gordon added, so he urged
the PolDirs to start thinking now about actions they might need to
take by the end of the year to increase pressure on Tehran. “Each day
that passes sharpens the binary choice between accepting a nuclear
Iran or a military strike, either by Israel or the U.S.,” Gordon
continued. The successful development of a nuclear capability by Iran
would spell the death of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, he concluded,
because the international community would not be able to maintain
credibility with other would-be nuclear powers.
6. (C) UK Political Director Lyall-Grant agreed that the prospects
for negotiations with Iran were not good, but
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argued that the P5 1 must persevere “because the alternatives
are grim.” If talks do not yield progress soon, then the EU must
“discreetly” think about additional sanctions even in the absence of
a UN Security Council resolution, which would be unlikely given the
Russian and Chinese positions. The EU should be in position “to move
rapidly” at the beginning of the Spanish EU Presidency (in January
2010) with a set of sanctions that are “very substantive” in the
areas of “trade, banking and possibly the hydrocarbons sector.” He
also expressed gratitude for U.S. and EU solidarity with the UK
concerning its local embassy employees in Tehran.
7. (C) Iran was turning into “a military dictatorship with an extremist
ideology,” stated German Political Director Volker Stanzel.
Therefore, the international community must not “play the game the
Iranian leaders want” and must not escalate in response to Iranian
escalations. Rather, engagement with the Iranian opposition should
continue where possible. Moreover, the international community should
press Tehran for a “yes/no” answer to the P5 1 proposal by the time
of the UN General Assembly in September. Efforts to keep Russia and
China “in the boat” would be important, but even without them the EU
and United States should “go ahead anyway” with additional autonomous
sanctions.
8. (C) Spanish PolDir Alfonso Lucini noted “consensus that we need
to prepare a Plan B,” but asked whether enhanced sanctions would “be
enough” if Russia and China were not on board. Saying he preferred
further UNSC action on Iran, A/S Gordon acknowledged that PRC leaders’
concerns regarding China’s internal stability*which requires sufficient
oil imports to maintain economic growth*was a key factor in PRC
policy on Iran. And while Russia did not want to see a nuclear Iran,
it might also be motivated by a desire to ensure that the United
States and the EU do not enjoy a major foreign policy success in the
Middle East. Indeed, some in Moscow might see advantages for Russia if
Israel or the United States used force against Iran, which in their
view would seriously damage U.S. standing in the region, as well as
dramatically increase the price of oil. Even if Russia and China
refused to support a new UNSC, joint U.S.-EU actions would have a
powerful impact on trade — and be a powerful statement with respect
to regime legitimacy. And if there were no new effort on sanctions,
that failure to act would send a message to the rest of the world
about the low risk of pursuing a nuclear program.
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MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS
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9. (C) Turning to the Middle East peace process, A/S Gordon noted that
after extensive consultations in the region, Special Envoy Mitchell
had concluded the time was not ripe for full-scale negotiations
between the Israelis and Palestinians. Rather, the conditions for
successful negotiations needed to be created first. The United States
had “visibly and publicly” called for Israel to halt all settlement
activity, which helped create an atmosphere in which we could ask
that Arabs do hard things as well. S/E Mitchell has been urging Arab
governments to support the Palestinian Authority’s security services
in an effort to enhance security in the West Bank and Gaza. The U.S.
saw no logic to engagement with Hamas until it renounces violence and
recognizes all past agreements, A/S Gordon continued. While the U.S.
and EU both need to remain engaged with both the Israelis and the
Palestinians, there might be benefits in Washington focusing its
efforts on getting a stop to settlement activity while the EU focused
on efforts to build security in the PA-administered territories.
10. (C) Lyrvall said the EU very much welcomed the U.S. approach
and the President’s Cairo speech. The gap between the Israelis and
Palestinians is very deep. Greek PolDir Tryphon Paraskevopoulos
stated that “no one in the Middle East thinks Iran will actually
use nuclear weapons against Israel.” Rather, they think Israeli
concerns over the Iranian nuclear program are motivated by a desire
to not lose their strategic dominance. He noted that whenever the
international community took actions against Iran, Iran responded by
firing up Hamas and Hizbullah to cause trouble. A regional approach,
therefore, was needed, including improved ties with Syria. The Greek
PolDir concluded elliptically that Qatar and Saudi Arabia needed to
“stop playing with fire.” A/S Gordon noted that Syria is the conduit
for Iranian arms into the region, and that U.S. diplomacy is focused
on weaning Syria away from Iran.
11. (C) French PolDir Araud said that we should not get into any
prolonged negotiations with the Israelis on settlements;
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the core issue is negotiations between the Israelis and Palestinians.
The Knesset is unable to act. We already know the parameters of the
peace agreement. If there is no strong international commitment to
working this, the parties will not negotiate, he said. Nothing will
be possible if the U.S., the EU, and the Arab states are not united in
pressing both sides. He also raised the possibility of an EU security
force in support of a possible agreement. A/S Gordon agreed with Araud
on settlements, but said that we need to improve the context for real
negotiations by making progress on smaller issues, and that the U.S.
call for stopping settlements resonates with the Arabs, and helps
with asking them for funding for the PA and reaching out to Israel.
——————–
AFGHANISTAN/PAKISTAN
——————–
12. (SBU) A/S Gordon outlined the significant steps the Obama
Administration was taking in Afghanistan: 21,000 additional troops,
the appointments of SR Holbrooke, LTG McChrystal, Amb. Eikenberry,
as well as certain changes in strategy such as on narcotics. He asked
that European governments do more to explain to their publics that the
EU is not helping the Americans with “an American war.” Afghanistan and
Pakistan are global problems with serious security and humanitarian
concerns for Europe. Lyrvall agreed, pointing to ongoing discussions
within the EU on doing more on the civilian side, and noting that the
upcoming Afghan elections were crucial. European Commission PolDir
Kovanda stated that the EU will deploy 250 observers from Member
States, PRTs and local missions to monitor the elections along
with 8,000 Afghan observers, and expressed gratitude for NATO,s
indispensable in extremis support.
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RUSSIA
——
13. (C) At Lyrvall’s request, A/S Gordon offered some impressions to
the group on U.S. relations with Russia. He said that we are looking to
restore relations while also stressing our core principles; e.g., no
spheres of influence, democracies have the right to choose alliances,
and non-recognition of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The Russians,
for their part, are exploring U.S. willingness to compromise in the
name of better relations, which we will not do. A/S Gordon said that
with regard to the Medvedev proposals, the U.S. is not prepared to
compromise on European security. Lyrvall asked about expectations for
the Moscow Summit. A/S Gordon said we were not trying to overstate
expectations, but we are talking seriously with the Russians on arms
control and Afghanistan. Lithuanian PolDir Eitvydas Bajarunas urged a
common U.S.-EU approach on Belarus and Georgia, and A/S Gordon replied
that we can only interpret the Zeltser release as an expression of
Belarus’s interest in better relations, and that he was planning
to go to Belarus himself. He said Georgia was a good example of the
U.S. not compromising its principles in the name of better relations
with Moscow– in fact, Russia had been isolated on decisions regarding
OSCE and UNOMIG ) and he noted the Vice President’s upcoming trip to
Georgia and Ukraine.
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TROIKA MEETING
————–
14. (U) After his meeting with EU27 PolDirs, Gordon held a smaller
meeting with the EU Political Directors “troika,” comprising Swedish
PolDir Bjorn Lyrvall, EU Council Secretariat DG Robert Cooper, EU
External Relations Commission PolDir Karel Kovanda Kovanda, Spanish
PolDir Alfonso Lucini, and EU Council Secretariat Policy Coordinator
Helga Schmid. This smaller discussion focused on Russia, the Eastern
Partnership region, the Western Balkans, and non-proliferation.
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RUSSIA
——
15. (C) A/S Gordon conveyed that the U.S. may be making some progress
with Russia on START follow-on negotiations, and may also be making
progress with regard to cooperation on Afghanistan. We have little
to no progress to report regarding Georgia. The Russians are testing
the Obama Administration to see if it will compromise; it will not.
Lyrvall commented that there have been no breakthroughs in EU-Russia
Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) negotiations, and noted
that the Russians see the EU’s
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Eastern Partnership initiative through a zero-sum lens; if it
encourages closer EU ties with six former-Soviet states, it must
be anti-Russia. Lucini recommended engaging Russia in the Eastern
Partnership through cooperation on concrete projects. Helga Schmid
praised the OSCE Ministerial in Corfu for its emphasis on the
indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic security.
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GEORGIA
——-
16. (C) Schmid commented that the Geneva process is useful because it
is the only venue which includes all parties to the Georgia conflict.
She encouraged the U.S. to press Georgia to work with the Abkhaz;
the Abkhaz have been rebuffed in their overtures to the Georgians,
and are left with no option but to seek Russia’s support. Kovanda
similarly urged outreach to the Abkhaz; they are looking for some
daylight with the Russians, and we should help. EU negotiations on
visa facilitation with Georgia are not going well. Lucini said we
need to let Georgians know we support them without giving Saakashvili
“a blank check.”
17. (C) A/S Gordon said the Georgians have shown reasonable restraint
with protesters lately, marking a departure from previous behavior.
Vice President Biden’s upcoming trip to Georgia will emphasize the
need to strengthen democratic institutions. A/S Gordon inquired about
potential U.S. participation in the EU’s Georgia monitoring mission.
An American contribution*either official USG or via NGOs–would
showcase our commitment, and could potentially deter future Russian
misbehavior. Schmid noted that U.S. participation would also mean
opening the mission to Turkey and Ukraine; U.S. political support
might be preferable. Cooper agreed that it would be hard for the EU to
resist Turkish participation in the EU monitoring mission if the U.S.
participated, as Turkey is an EU candidate country. Turkish
participation would not necessarily be a bad thing, but it would
“need some thinking about.”
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BELARUS
——-
18. (C) Schmid said the Belarusians are under huge pressure from
Russia to recognize Abkhazia and South Ossetia; the Belarusian FM
told her so personally at Corfu. Belarus is bankrupt, and therefore
vulnerable to Russian exploitation. The EU is looking into possible
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and IMF support,
on the order of two to three billion dollars. Schmid said “I don’t
like Luka, but(” the Zeltser release was clearly intended as a signal.
——————-
EASTERN PARTNERSHIP
——————-
19. (C) A/S Gordon said the U.S. understands this; we would like to
associate ourselves with the EU’s Eastern Partnership initiative.
Lyrvall said an EU-Ukraine FTA is looking increasingly unlikely due to
Ukrainian squabbling; Moldova is likewise “a mess.” It is difficult
to anchor those countries into the European integration process. On
Armenia, A/S Gordon said that resolving Nagorno-Karabakh is the key to
unlocking Turkish-Armenian relations, and consequently regional energy
supplies. The Russians have been reasonably productive on this account,
but it is unclear whether they are just going through the motions or
are seriously engaged, particularly as a Nagorno-Karabakh solution
would facilitate a Southern Corridor gas route. Cooper asserted
that if the Russians really wanted to resolve Nagorno-Karabakh,
they would have done so already. On Ukraine, A/S Gordon asserted
that the U.S. does not want to unconditionally bail Ukraine out of
its economic troubles. We should let IFIs (particularly the IMF) help
Ukraine. The U.S. and EU need to urge Ukraine’s unwilling government
to take difficult steps in this regard.
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WESTERN BALKANS
—————
20. (C) Pointing to EU High Representative Solana/Vice President
Biden’s and Swedish FM Bildt/Deputy Secretary Steinberg’s recent joint
engagement in the Balkans, A/S Gordon said the more high-level U.S.-EU
cooperation we can organize in the Balkans, the better. Lyrvall said
that Sweden wants to keep the EU’s enlargement agenda moving
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during the Swedish Presidency. Montenegro’s application is with the
Commission, and Macedonia may receive a relatively positive EU progress
assessment. Fairly or unfairly, Macedonia may have to compromise on
the name issue in order to move forward on EU accession.
In Serbia, implementation of the interim agreement is “deadlocked,”
and Dutch FM Verhagen’s recent trip to Serbia is unlikely to assuage
the Netherlands’ concerns.
21. (C) On Bosnia and Herzegovina, FM Bildt and Deputy Secretary
Steinberg planned to meet the following week to discuss the Prud
process. It is critical that BiH takes ownership of the 5 2 process,
Lyrvall said. The EU is enthusiastic about a transition in BiH as
long as the conditions are met. There has to be recognition that the
EUSR mission would be less “intrusive”; rather, the EU would present a
“pull factor” for reform, he added. EU enlargement policy has been a
successful incentive for reform elsewhere in the region. A significant
shift in the Althea mission should not take place until transition is
secure on the civilian side, Lyrvall concluded. Cooper said there might
come a point where we need to “force the issue” of state property;
if we do not resolve this before the autumn PIC, then we’ll lose two
years because of the Bosnian elections. Cooper added that after a
“miserable” PIC, we should insist on conditionality. BiH Croats have
gotten the message from Zagreb to be productive.
22. (C) A/S Gordon asked whether the Swedes might invite the parties
and the U.S. to Stockholm to resolve the state property issue. The
U.S. agrees that OHR is not doing well, but we are reluctant to
take away the crutch and make a leap of faith. He recounted a side
conversation with French PolDir Gerard Araud, who said that if we
wean the Bosnians off of the “drug” of OHR, then the EU can be the
“methadone.” Furthermore, to conduct a military transition at the
same time as the OHR/EU transition would send the wrong signal and
might invite problems. Lucini said EU member states are talking to
their militaries about the need to stay in BiH, but militaries are
pushing back. Lyrvall conceded the need for “a comfort blanket.”
23. (C) On Macedonia, A/S Gordon said the U.S. is still letting UNSR
Nimetz lead, and noted that Deputy Secretary Steinberg has talked to
the Greeks. While the Macedonians need to “climb down” on issues such
as naming their airport, they have a reasonable case on other topics
such as their language, the name of their citizenship, etc. Some
“climbing down” is needed on both sides.
24. (C) On Serbia, A/S Gordon said that while we haven’t spoken to
ICTY prosecutor Brammertz, the U.S. is trying to provide further FBI
and forensic assistance. The U.S. is trying to determine what Serbian
steps are required in order to get the Dutch on board with Serbia’s EU
accession process. What is the gap between “full Serbian cooperation”
and what the Serbs are currently doing, and how can it be filled?
Cooper said we are caught in a vicious circle with Brammertz, who
feels he cannot utter the words “full cooperation” but is trying to
indicate as much in other terms.
25. (C) On Kosovo, Lyrvall noted the sensitivities raised by the fact
that five EU member states do not recognize Kosovo’s independence.
However, even these recalcitrant member states would like to move
forward with Kosovo’s Euro-Atlantic integration. Lyrvall noted the
issue of visa liberalization in the Balkans, and said the EU has
leverage on the Serbs in this regard. Cooper stated that we have had
some small successes in Kosovo and some failures. The Battle of Kosovo
Polje anniversary passed without incident, with the Serbian royal
family making some usefully anodyne speeches. But decentralization in
Kosovo will not succeed. Serbian President Tadic has said that Serbia
cannot call on Kosovo Serbs to vote in Kosovo,s elections. EUSR for
Kosovo Pieter Feith thought we should think of 2011 as a deadline for
bringing the ICO process to an end: according to Feith, once a state
is up and running, the international community should step back. The
“six point” agenda is largely dead. A/S Gordon relayed that Deputy
Secretary Steinberg told Kosovo leaders that their comments on UNMIK
were not helpful.
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NON-PROLIFERATION
—————–
26. (C) Lyrvall said that the EU was very encouraged by the Obama
Administration’s approach on non-proliferation. A/S Gordon said
that the Administration is serious about the goal of a world free of
nuclear weapons, but realistic. If the international community hopes
to promote a Fissile Material
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Cut-off Treaty and create an international nuclear fuel bank,
we must back the IAEA with resources. The Administration will try
to get the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty ratified; the prospects
for ratification are uncertain, but are better now than before, in
part due to improvements in scientific modeling over the past ten
years. Regarding START talks with Russia, the Administration seeks
a framework that permits fewer weapons than the Moscow Treaty and
that also includes delivery vehicles and warheads. Both sides want
an agreement, but ratification is always a question. Raising Iran,
Cooper pointed out that a nuclear-armed Iran would “blow the NPT
out of the water.” If we allow Iran to develop the bomb, how can we
credibly say “no” to the Egyptians and the Saudis?
27. (U) Assistant Secretary Gordon has cleared this cable. KIRKCONNELL
From: A. Papazian