FRENCH MFA ON RUSSIA, BALKANS, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN
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Reference ID Created Released Classification Origin 10PARIS207
2010-02-22 14:02 2010-12-06 21:09 CONFIDENTIAL//NOFORN Embassy Paris
VZCZCXRO2986 PP RUEHDBU RUEHFL RUEHKW RUEHLA RUEHNP RUEHROV RUEHSL
RUEHSR DE RUEHFR #0207/01 0531431 ZNY CCCCC ZZH P 221431Z FEB 10
ZDK FM AMEMBASSY PARIS TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 8368 INFO
RUEHZL/EUROPEAN POLITICAL COLLECTIVE PRIORITYC O N F I D E N T I A
L SECTION 01 OF 04 PARIS 000207
NOFORN SIPDIS
E.O. 12958: DECL: 02/11/2020 TAGS: PGOV PREL RS GG SR BK AF IR AM FR
SUBJECT: FRENCH MFA ON RUSSIA, BALKANS, AFGHANISTAN, IRAN, CAUCASUS
PARIS 00000207 001.2 OF 004
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew R. Young, Reasons 1.4 (b),
(d ).
¶1. (C/NF) SUMMARY: During separate discussions with OSD Assistant
Secretary for International Security Affairs Alexander Vershbow
and EUR Deputy Assistant Secretary Spencer Boyer in early February,
Roland Galharague, MFA A/S-equivalent for Continental Europe, adopted
a defensive posture about the potential sale of Mistral class ships
to Russia; expressed skepticism about the depth and durability of
Russia’s support for sanctions against Iran; acknowledged Putin’s
dominance in Russia while proposing, as a means to strengthen Medvedev,
that we respond positively to his proposals for reforming European
security and holding an OSCE summit; asserted that Serbia cannot win
back Kosovo and also win entry into the EU; expressed pessimism about
the future of Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations and about the impact of
instability in Iran on Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Armenia; and
claimed that Bosnia and Afghanistan could become difficult issues
for trans-Atlantic relations this year because of the USG’s alleged
disengagement from Bosnia and its alleged failure to consult adequately
with European NATO allies on strategy in Afghanistan. END SUMMARY.
—————————————– MISTRAL: FRENCH ADOPT A
DEFENSIVE POSTURE —————————————–
¶2. (C/NF) When asked about the potential sale of Mistral class
ships to Russia, Galharague inquired as to why the USG seems to be
singling out France for criticism on this issue.
“I recently spoke to my Dutch counterpart,” he reported, “and he said
you have not approached him on this subject” despite recent Dutch
(and Spanish) efforts to make similar sales.
Furthermore, the Mistral is not “top end” military equipment,
Galharague argued, describing it instead as a combination between “a
truck and an oil ship” with some helpful navigation tools. It will not
contribute significantly to Russian military capabilities. Russian
leaders have been over-selling the military significance of the
Mistral in order to quell domestic opposition to its purchase from
abroad. Some Russians consider the sale a harbinger of the end of
shipbuilding in their country, and claim the ship could be built
at home but would simply take longer. The production and sale of
armaments is a major industry in Russia, possibly second only to oil
and gas. In his February 10 press conference, the Chairman of Russia’s
National Security Council, Nikolai Patrushev, seemed “very reticent”
about the possible sale, according to Galharague.
¶4. (C/NF) Asked about Georgia’s reaction to the possible
sale, Galharague insisted that France has maintained “very good”
relations with Tbilisi. The GOF “strategy” for Georgia to recover
its lost territory is to persuade the Tblisi government to engage
with the leaders of the secessionist territories and to continue
on their path toward EU accession. The demands of accession —
such as internal democratic reforms and good relations with their
neighbors — will serve Georgia and the region well. Nonetheless,
Galharague acknowledged that Tbilisi has good reason to fear Russia,
given their recent history. This ship will not, however, affect their
strategic situation, Galharague argued: “The Russians have already
invaded Georgia without the ship.”
¶5. (C/NF) While acknowledging that Georgia and the Baltic countries
feel threatened by Russia — with reason — Galharague concluded
that Russia is not a threat to us and there is no reason we should
not sell equipment to them which does not fall into the realm of
restricted armaments. The Mistral class ship does not contain high
end or sensitive technology, he insisted.
——————————————- RUSSIA’S COMPLICATED
RELATIONSHIP WITH IRAN ——————————————-
¶6. (C/NF) The Russians are currently benefiting from their helpful
statements on Iran while realizing full well that China will water down
any sanctions proposals, Galharague asserted. When praising Russia’s
new stance, he argued, we should be cognizant of their complicated
relationship with Iran. Russians have an interest in strong ties
with Tehran, especially because Iran is still a primary market for
Russian arms sales. On the other hand, were Iran to normalize its
relations with western governments, it could develop into a major
Russian rival for gas sales to the European market. To balance various
and competing elements of its relationship with Iran, Russia has an
interest in serving as a “go-between” in the conflict between Iran and
the west. In fact, Galharague claimed, Russian leaders were furious
when Turkey recently started to seize that mantel.
PARIS 00000207 002.2 OF 004
——————— MEDVEDEV VERSUS PUTIN ———————
¶7. (C/NF) When discussing the comparative influence of President
Medvedev and Prime Minister Putin, Galharague claimed that Medvedev,
whose initial gut reactions to events clearly differ from those of
Putin, is trying to assemble his own power bases independent of the
former President. In the meantime, “power still rests with Putin,”
Galharague assessed. Putin, not Medvedev, constantly juggles and
balances competing domestic interests in Russia. As a case in point,
Galharague cited the Russian government’s reaction to the financial
crisis. After the government painstakingly established a mechanism
for determining how to divide stimulus funds among various economic
sectors and private interests, Putin simply decided unilaterally
who would receive state support. In general, Galharague observed,
Putin much prefers to focus on domestic issues rather than foreign
policy. Putin prefers cutting deals in the murky Russian business
world to delving into the complexities of international politics.
——————————————— ————-
STRENGTHEN MEDVEDEV BY RESPONDING TO HIS SECURITY PROPOSAL
——————————————— ————-
¶8. (C/NF) Galharague described the long-standing French effort to
strengthen Medvedev by respecting his official role as president of
Russia, regardless of Putin’s competing power and influence. “We treat
Medvedev as president and address presidential issues with him.” They
also seek to validate Medvedev’s initiatives, regardless of the
substantive content, in order to reward his efforts to put new ideas
forward. As an important example, Galharague mentioned Medvedev’s
proposal for revamping European security architecture. Medvedev
invested a lot of political capital in this effort, Galharague argued,
and we should provide a positive response, even if we do not accept
the proposals.
For this reason, President Sarkozy sent Medvedev a letter of
acknowledgment after receiving the proposal. Tying this approach to
USG policy toward Russia, Galharague several times asked how the USG
plans to measure the success of the “reset” with Russia? The French,
he said, would like to know whether the USG has established benchmarks
for progress, and they wonder how START negotiations might fit into
this equation.
——————————————- EUROPEAN SECURITY: GOF
SUPPORTS OSCE SUMMIT ——————————————-
¶9. (C/NF) Galharague stated that the French largely agree with us
about how to address questions of European security, except in one
area: they support the idea of an OSCE summit.
While Paris concurs with the USG analysis that the Russian proposals
for reforming Europe’s security institutions contain a number of
“unacceptable” elements, he argued that we must understand that
“we’re playing a game of judo — we do not want to give the Russians
a pretext to claim they’re being ignored.” He added that the Russians
are adept at manipulation. “We constantly feel like we have a better
hand but they’re playing a better game — it’s the same in business
and economic arenas.” Claims of disrespect by western nations resonate
in Russian domestic politics, to our detriment, he warned. Therefore,
we must emphasize the positive elements of the Russian proposal and
communicate a sincere willingness to engage. An OSCE summit can help
with these aims, Galharague argued, and at the same time support
the Corfu process. A summit would need to involve at least a minimum
number of substantive issues, such as regional conflicts or the status
of conventional forces in Europe, but by agreeing to move ahead with
the summit we would put the onus back on Russia.
——————————————— —–
BALKANS: SERBS CAN’T WIN IN BOTH KOSOVO AND THE EU
——————————————— —–
¶10. (C/NF) Galharague asked that the USG work together with the EU
to discourage the Serbians from proposing a new U.N.
resolution on Kosovo, stating that Serbian Foreign Minister Jeremic
“seems to believe Serbia can win on Kosovo and win EU entry. We need
to let him know this is not true.” Right now, Galharague reported,
“the Serbs are furious with us (the French)” in response to the
demarche the GOF delivered in Belgrade in early February (reftel)
about Serbia’s possible plans for a U.N. resolution. “We delivered
the message in very forceful terms.” In fact, the Serbs interpreted
the demarche as a major change in position, Galharague reported.
PARIS 00000207 003.2 OF 004
The EU had thus far maintained the position that the issues of Kosovo
and Serbian entry into the EU were not formally linked. “There was
no formal conditionality,” Galharague said, adding that the Serbs
now understand that to be a member of the EU they must eventually
recognize Kosovo. “We told them we do not want another Cyprus,” he
explained, referring to Cyprus’ controversial EU accession in 2004
as a divided island where EU legislation remains partly “suspended”
in the northern part of the island which is outside of the government
in Nicosia’s control. Nonetheless, Galharague predicted the Serbs
will likely go ahead with the U.N. resolution in any case, and the
USG and the EU will be forced to oppose it.
¶11. (C/NF) Furthermore, Galharague asserted, before the Serbs
join the EU, they will need to resolve key issues with Kosovo in the
fields of justice, police, customs, transport, agriculture, and also
any differences over names and terminology. The best way for Serbia
to address issues related to Kosovo is by working with the European
Union Rule of Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX). “At the end of the day,
though,” he reiterated, “Serbia must recognize Kosovo if it wants to
join the EU.”
—————————— PESSIMISTIC ABOUT THE CAUCASUS
——————————
¶12. (C/NF) The Nagorno-Karabakh negotiations appear to be at a
“dead end,” Galharague averred, adding that “Minsk (The Minsk Group)
is going nowhere fast.” He noted that the French government is not in
a position to push the Armenians at the moment because French citizens
of Armenian origin “represent about 500,000 votes” and French regional
elections will take place in March. Other factors may soon impact
the Caucasus region, he warned, such as instability in Iran.
Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkmenistan all have important trade
and energy ties with Iran and they could be immediately affected
by the Iran sanctions bill currently making its way through the
U.S. Congress. At the same time, the effort to impose harsher
U.N. sanctions may offer us an opportunity to further engage with
those three countries about their approach to Iran.
——————————————— —-
FUTURE USG-EU FLASHPOINTS: BOSNIA AND AFGHANISTAN
——————————————— —-
¶13. (C/NF) When assessing potential issue areas where the USG and
EU may differ during 2010, Galharague focused first on Bosnia. He
said the French are disappointed that the USG appears to have put all
plans and actions on hold pending the elections in October. Indeed,
he implied that U.S. and EU officials have differing assessments of the
need for continual engagement with the conflicting parties in Bosnia.
Bosnian parties will not make progress without unity between the
U.S. and the EU. When the Americans disengage, even temporarily,
Galharague claimed the Bosnians perceive it immediately and react
accordingly: “The Americans are giving up, so why should we do this
(make compromises)?” The USG, the Spanish EU presidency, and High
Representative Ashton should lead the charge in engaging this year —
“we need U.S.
backing now,” he urged. As a lever to press the Bosnians forward
on constitutional issues, the EU may be able to use the ruling by
the European Court of Human Rights, which declared that the Bosnian
Constitution does not conform with European human rights standards.
¶14. (C/NF) Galharague described Afghanistan as the second potential
trans-Atlantic flashpoint in 2010: “There is an emerging feeling the
war is not jointly owned and managed.”
President Obama waited eight months to make a decision and, during
that period, at no point did European opinion factor into his
deliberations, according to Galharague. DAS Boyer firmly disagreed,
citing USG consultations and discussions with French officials in
Paris and in Washington, DC.
Galharague acknowledged these discussions took place, but claimed the
question Americans posed to their European NATO allies was not “What
do you think?” but “How many troops can you put on the ground?” More
recently, he said, the USG has begun contemplating engagement with
elements of the Taliban without consulting European NATO allies. The
French would like to know, for instance, what this engagement might
mean for our future relations with Pakistan and India.
¶15. (C/NF) In purely political terms, Galharague explained that
Afghanistan has developed into a difficult issue, especially in
France. With the French death toll in Afghanistan having reached 40, he
noted, local politicians have found themselves increasingly faced with
grieving families, to whom they must explain the purpose of the war.
PARIS 00000207 004.2 OF 004
“The perception is that we’re there because the Americans are there,”
he said. “We’re not sure where we’re going and we’re not being asked or
consulted.” Initially, the majority of Europeans supported the war in
Afghanistan, invoking Article Five of the NATO Charter and committing a
“fairly high” amount of troops and resources. But now “no one knows the
purpose” of the war. “Perhaps the French government should have made
a better show of the consultations” that did take place, Galharague
admitted, “but to display them you have to have them.”
¶16. (C/NF) EMBASSY COMMENT: Galharague is not ultimately responsible
for the Afghanistan-Pakistan region, which is handled by a separate
cell within the MFA, so his comments may not reflect the views of
those who regularly engage with the USG on this issue. Notably, when
discussing public and official perceptions of the war in Afghanistan,
he made no mention of SRAP Holbrooke’s two visits to Paris in the
last three months, or post’s constant exchanges about Afghanistan
with French officials at the senior and working levels.
Galharague focused on a perception of minimal consultation, which he
admitted could persist regardless of reality. END COMMENT.
¶17. (U) ASD Vershbow and DAS Boyer have cleared this cable.
RIVKIN
From: A. Papazian