FORUM 18 NEWS SERVICE, Oslo, Norway
The right to believe, to worship and witness
The right to change one’s belief or religion
The right to join together and express one’s belief
===============================================
Wednesday 4 May 2011
TURKEY: THE DIYANET – THE ELEPHANT IN TURKEY’S RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ROOM?
The Diyanet, or Presidency of Religious Affairs, is a state institution
reporting to the Prime Minster’s Office and exerts a very large influence
on the extent to which freedom of religion or belief can be enjoyed in
Turkey, Forum 18 News Service notes. Massive state financial and
institutional support of the Diyanet along with its activities – including
its biases against Muslim and non-Muslim beliefs it dislikes – make it
difficult for people inside and outside the Diyanet’s structures to
exercise freedom of religion or belief. This has been reinforced by the
latest law governing the Diyanet, which increases its influence without
addressing its current incompatibility with Turkey’s human rights
obligations. For a political party to propose removing the Diyanet from the
state’s structures would render that party liable to be closed down under
Turkish law. Despite the need for change in the Diyanet-state relationship,
civil society proposals for change have been described by the government as
“unjust” and “too assertive for such a sensitive issue”.
TURKEY: THE DIYANET – THE ELEPHANT IN TURKEY’S RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ROOM?
By Mine Yildirim, Researcher at the Institute for Human Rights at Åbo
Akademi University
The protection of freedom of religion or belief within Turkey, and the
Turkish version of secularism, has been receiving increasing attention in
public debates and in the media. Mainly this is in connection with possible
changes in a new Constitution, expected to be drafted after the 12 June
General Election. However, Forum 18 News Service notes that, for any
meaningful improvements to take place, there should be a close scrutiny of
the nature and role of the Diyanet, or Presidency of Religious Affairs,
which is a constitutional public institution. This scrutiny should examine
the Diyanet’s compatibility with Turkey’s international and national legal
and political commitments to implement freedom of religion or belief.
The current state financial and institutional support of the Diyanet, the
theological dominance given to Sunni Islam within its programmes, and the
Diyanet’s activities in relation to other Islamic traditions and other
religions combine to make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to
reconcile the Diyanet with Turkey’s international human rights obligations.
It is, for example, very difficult to reconcile the Diyanet’s activities
with European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) judgments obliging the state to
remain neutral and impartial.
Although the Diyanet has yet to directly fall foul of the ECtHR, Turkey has
already been criticised by the Court for failing in this duty. In a case
Turkey lost as compulsory Religious Culture and Knowledge of Ethics classes
do not meet this requirement, the ECtHR reiterated “that it has always
stressed that, in a pluralist democratic society, the State’s duty of
impartiality and neutrality towards various religions, faiths and beliefs
is incompatible with any assessment by the State of the legitimacy of
religious beliefs or the ways in which those beliefs are expressed” (see
F18News 5 January 2011
). As noted below, the
Diyanet’s activities are not compatible with this duty.
Massive organisation
The Diyanet is a massive organisation with a broad mandate, large budget
and vast sphere of influence. Under Law no. 633 of 1965 (“The Presidency of
Religious Affairs, Its Establishment and Obligations”), its mandate is to
operate affairs related to the belief, worship and moral principles of the
Islamic Religion, enlighten the public about religious issues and to
administer places of worship [mosques and mescid]. Operating under the
Prime Minister’s Office and with a President appointed by the Prime
Minister, the Diyanet has five main departments; the Higher Committee for
Religious Affairs, an advisory council; Education, including Koran courses
for children and adults; Religious Services, including services for
families, discipleship, mosque services and social and cultural services
with a religious content; and Publications and Public Relations (see
). Domestic activities are carried out via
muftis and religious personnel all over Turkey. Activities carried out
abroad are conducted by Diyanet religious counsellors, diplomatic attachés
and other personnel, with 1,350 people in 81 countries.
Since the Justice and Development Party (AKP) came to power in 2002, the
number of Diyanet personnel has increased from 74,000 to 117,541. During
this period, 2,000 Diyanet personnel have moved to positions in other state
departments. Currently its budget is about 2,500,000,000 Turkish Lira
(8,564,350,690 Norwegian Kroner, 1,097,538,190 Euros, or 1,626,694,770 US
Dollars). This is a larger budget than some full government ministries.
There are about 85,000 mosques in Turkey and the Diyanet hopes to use some
of its increased numbers of personnel to staff vacant posts in these
mosques. Only the Diyanet can operate all mosques and mescit (see F18News 2
March 2011 ). Only the
Diyanet can provide imams, who are civil servants, for these mosques. Yet,
because the Diyanet does not have legal personality it cannot own these
mosques.
Indeed, no religious community – whether Muslim, Jewish, Armenian
Apostolic, Greek Orthodox, Syriac Orthodox, Catholic, Protestant, Baha’i,
Jehovah’s Witness, or any other – has direct legal entity status in Turkish
law. This is part of the Turkish version of secularism, under which there
is close supervision of religious activity, and less autonomy of religious
communities than in many other countries (see F18News 7 February 2011
).
Mosques are usually owned by either the public – through for example a
municipality, village legal entity – or by private persons. Mostly, they
are the property of the Diyanet Foundation, the Diyanet Vakfi. This is a
foundation (vakif) established in 1975 under the Civil Code, to foster
knowledge of the “true identity” [in the Diyanet’s Sunni Islamic view] of
Islam and religion, to build and equip mosques, to support people in need,
and other tasks. However as Article 101 of the Civil Code does not allow
the establishment of a foundation with a religious goal the Diyanet Vakfi
constitutes an irregularity in the application of law – but it is highly
improbable that any government will act on this (see F18News 13 March 2008
).
The Diyanet itself – as against the Diyanet Foundation – does not have a
mandate to build mosques, but these are often built by citizens who usually
establish associations for the building of mosques. The Diyanet’s 2009
report indicated that in that year it contributed 3,060,000 Turkish Lira
(10,482,505 Norwegian Kroner, 1,343,365 Euros, or 1,991,820 US Dollars) to
85 mosques for building expenses.
The Diyanet’s role
The Diyanet’s massive institutional and financial status makes it very
attractive as a vehicle for implementing government policies. This can be
benign, as in working with the State Minister Responsible for Women and
Family Affairs for the elimination of violence against women. This involved
preaching by the Diyanet’s imams against the use of violence toward women.
However, its large influence in Turkey can – and is – also used for
activities incompatible with the state’s human rights obligations.
The Diyanet maintains, according to its website, that it takes the
religious demands and traditions of people into account, and to provide
true and authentic religious knowledge as well as training and education in
scientific and sound religious knowledge. It’s a nice-sounding theory, but
in reality – as for example many Alevi and Caferi Muslims point out – it
promotes only Sunni Islamic theology (see Forum 18’s Turkey religious
freedom survey at ).
Similarly, the Diyanet has published books on, among other topics
‘Jehovah’s Witnesses’ and ‘Christian Propaganda and Missionary Activities’.
In these books missionary activities – or anyone sharing their beliefs in
line with the internationally-recognised right to freedom of religion or
belief – is an activity the Diyanet is hostile to. Currently the Diyanet
prepares Friday sermons preached by all imams, although Milliyet newspaper
reported on 11 March 2011 that the Diyanet will move away from this
practice and allow individual sermons. In an 11 March 2005 sermon – before
the murders in 2006 of a Catholic priest and in 2007 of three Protestants –
the Diyanet described sharing beliefs as “a scheme of foreigners to steal
the faith of the young”. Many in Turkey’s vulnerable groups think that such
thinking is a strong factor in the attacks they experience (see F18News 29
November 2007 ).
Defending the sermon, the Diyanet on 27 March 2005 published a document
claiming that: “History as well as contemporary developments have
demonstrated that missionary activities are not an innocent act of
communicating one’s religion or exercising religious freedom, but a highly
planned movement with political motives.” (..) “The Diyanet believes that
missionary activities aim to distort historic, religious, national and
cultural unity by leading to changes in the religious belief that lies at
the heart of the most fundamental values of our society, whereas our people
have cohabited peacefully in Anatolian territories for centuries by
upholding these same values. We also deem
it to be a violation of the most intimate freedom, the freedom of
religion.” (..) “Today, rather than Christian priests, missionary
activities are conducted by doctors, nurses, engineers, Red Cross workers,
human rights defenders, volunteers for peace, language teachers, computer
instructors, sports organizers, etc.” (..) “The Diyanet considers these
activities as separatist and destructive since they may create a basis for
a spiritual and cultural gap and distort our religious/national integrity
in the long run, and considers it necessary that our citizens notify the
Diyanet and all relevant government institutions about such activities.”
It is significant that the Diyanet listed activities that it claimed are
opposed to national unity and religious integrity as a threat, for example
in its 2009 Activity Report. It is hard to see how, in the Diyanet’s view,
Turks who are atheists, agnostics, Jews, Christians, Alevis, Caferis,
Baha’is, Jehovah’s Witnesses, or in other vulnerable groups can have any
part in the nations unity and its identity.
Such an extremely narrow definition of national unity and Turkish identity
– ignoring the diversity found among Turkey’s citizens – continues. For
example, demands backed by a ECtHR judgment for an end to compulsory
religious education classes are characterised by the Diyanet as a threat
(see F18News 5 January 2011
).
If the Diyanet were not an institution of the state such views would still
be problematic. But as part of the state the Diyanet plays an active role
in influencing the extent to which freedom of religion or belief can be
enjoyed in Turkey.
One example is that the state accords a de facto authoritative status to
formal Opinions from the Diyanet on religious or belief communities outside
the Diyanet’s structure. This is even though such Opinions are not legally
binding. The Baha’i faith is not recognised as a religion, so for example
Bahai’s cannot record this on Identity Cards if they wish, because of a
Diyanet Opinion that it is a sect and not a religion (see F18News 8 October
2010 ). Similarly, the
decision not to recognize Alevi cemevi as places of worship is based on a
Diyanet Opinion that the common place of worship for Muslims is mosques –
run by the Diyanet (see F18News 2 March 2011
).
Paying twice
All Turkish taxpayers – whatever their religion or belief – finance all the
Diyanet’s activities. No other religious or belief community, such as
non-Sunni Muslim communities of the Alevi and Caferi, Christians, Jews,
Baha’i, Jehovah’s Witnesses, atheists or agnostics receives any state
funding. There is no system allowing exemption from tax revenues allocated
to the Diyanet, so anyone in a non-Diyanet community pays to support two
sorts of beliefs – their own community’s activities, buildings and
personnel and the opposing activities of the Diyanet.
Communities that do not receive services from the Diyanet do not benefit
from privileges given to the Diyanet either. They are not given the
possibility to have broadcasting time on national state television, for
example. Diyanet personnel can provide religious services in state
institutions such as hospitals and prisons, but this possibility is not
officially recognized and facilitated for ministers or volunteers of other
groups.
What next for the Diyanet?
In July 2010 a long awaited new Law on the Diyanet was adopted (Law No.
6002 “On the Establishment and Duties of the Presidency of Religious
Affairs” amending Law No. 633). Yet this seems to multiply the
possibilities for the Diyanet without addressing or eliminating its aspects
that seem problematic for Turkey in implementing its international human
rights obligations. The new Law allows the Diyanet to establish its own
radio or television channel. National radio and TV frequencies will be
provided free of charge to the Diyanet by the RTUK (the National Radio and
Television Agency). The establishment of a Religious High Education Centre
for specialized professional training is permitted, and Diyanet personnel
will receive greater employment benefits than previously. The mandate for
religious service provision is broadened to include religious services
outside the mosque such as in prisons, juvenile correction facilities,
hospitals, and old people’s homes.
It is difficult to predict the long-term effects of granting greater
capability and possibilities to the Diyanet to involve itself in the
religious lives of people. Indeed it is not readily apparent in Turkey that
there has been a public demand for this. But there is a need to monitor the
effects of the new Law, to assess its compatibility with Turkey’s freedom
of religion or belief commitments.
What needs to be done?
For any improvement, the Diyanet and its activities must be carefully
assessed for problematic elements in the light of both freedom of religion
or belief and non-discrimination. Human rights law does not prescribe any
one way of establishing state-religion relations. But, as the then UN Human
Rights Committee’s General Comment 22 on Article 18 (“Freedom of thought,
conscience and religion”) of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights puts it: “The fact that a religion is recognized as a
state religion or that it is established as official or traditional or that
its followers comprise the majority of the population, shall not result in
any impairment of the enjoyment of any of the rights under the Covenant
(..) nor in any discrimination against adherents to other religions or
non-believers”. Massive state support for the Diyanet – with restrictions
on non-Diyanet religious communities – combine together to form a disparity
between communities that must be corrected.
It is also vital that all religious communities – Muslim and non-Muslim –
must have the possibility to manifest their religion or belief by acquiring
an adequate form of legal personality, establishing and maintaining places
of worship, training clergy and teaching their religion or belief outside
of the Diyanet’s structure or influence (see F18News 7 February 2011
).
Legal obstacles preventing free discussion and advocacy for removing the
Diyanet from the state apparatus must be abolished, so that this can be
freely discussed in the National Assembly. The April 1983 Law on Political
Parties (Law No. 2820)) – a remnant of the 1980 military coup – in Article
89 prohibits any activity by political parties that would contradict the
existence of the Diyanet in the state administration. If the government or
any political party wanted to take steps to remove the Diyanet from the
state structure, it could be closed down by the Constitutional Court. But
it is difficult to imagine that any party – especially in government –
would want to deny itself the great possibilities the Diyanet offers a
governing party to influence public opinion.
Freedom of religion or belief and non-discrimination problems stemming from
tax funding of the Diyanet could be addressed in a number of ways. A
special tax for the Diyanet budget may be instituted, with an opt-out
possibility for anyone who does not want to support the Diyanet’s
activities. Or if Turkey chooses to support financially a certain
community, the same support should be made available to other communities –
for example financial support for their religious personnel, building their
places of worship, publication of books and other material, etc.
In a 2006 public opinion survey, over 49 per cent of those polled agreed
that the Diyanet should be financially supported by voluntary contributions
of individuals and not by the state (see Carkoglu, A. and Toprak, B.
(2007), Religion, Society and Politics in a Changing Turkey, Istanbul,
TESEV, p. 87,
). Possibly
the German Kirchensteuer (Church Tax) system offers an example of how such
voluntary contributions might be administered. Other possible models also
exist.
Some of the Diyanet’s teaching currently contributes to fostering prejudice
against members of certain beliefs, yet as a public institution it has the
responsibility to uphold religious freedom for all. Its teaching must
change to reflect its responsibilities. On the other hand, if the Diyanet
wishes to maintain its current teaching, it should be gradually excluded
from the state structure starting with more autonomy and less financial and
institutional support from the state.
“Too assertive for such a sensitive issue”
While there is clearly a need for a drastic change in the Diyanet-state
relationship, the AKP does not see this as desirable. A March 2011 draft
Constitution proposal prepared by two prominent academics, Ergun Özbudun
and Turgut Tarhanlı, with funding from the Turkish Industry and
Business Association (TÜSIAD), described abolishing the Diyanet as
unrealistic (see in Turkish
).
But it did note that the Diyanet’s current structure is not compatible with
the Turkish version of secularism. The proposal suggested that those who
want to be represented within the Diyanet structure should be allowed this,
and that the establishment of religious associations with similar
activities should be allowed outside the Diyanet structure.
However State Minister Faruk Çelik – who is responsible in the AKP
government for the Diyanet – on 25 March called the proposal “unjust” and
“too assertive for such a sensitive issue”. Claiming that the Diyanet has
been instrumental in enlightening the public with accurate religious
information, and preserving national unity, he stated that abolishing the
Diyanet – which TÜSIAD did not propose – would create new problems.
The adoption of the July 2010 Law on the Diyanet increasing its mandate and
powers, along with Faruk Çelik’s statement, strongly indicates that the
Diyanet will retain its current structure and approach. It is hard to see
how this will improve Turkey’s implementation of its freedom of religion or
belief commitments for all. (END)
For more background, see Forum 18’s Turkey religious freedom survey at
.
More analyses and commentaries on freedom of thought, conscience and belief
in Turkey can be found at
.
A compilation of Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe
(OSCE) freedom of religion or belief commitments can be found at
.
A printer-friendly map of Turkey is available at
.
PDF and printer-friendly views of this article can be accessed from
. It may freely be
reproduced, redistributed or quoted from, with due acknowledgement to Forum
18 .
(END)
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