Author: Alex Jidarian

Asbarez: ARF Western U.S. Regional Convention Pledges to Assist Soldiers and Their Families

Alex Jidarian

December 29,  2020



Armenian Revolutionary Federation Western U.S.

The Armenian Revolutionary Federation Western United States convened its Regional Convention, during which the aftereffects of the Artsakh War became the lead topic of discussion.

The Convention unanimously decided that it will expend all its resources to assist our soldiers, and their families, in Armenia and Artsakh through specific programs and projects that will provide our heroes the tools to overcome the myriad obstacles created by the Artsakh War.

Of course, the current crisis facing Armenia, Artsakh and the entire Armenian Nation was compounded by the signing of the defeatist November 9 agreement by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan. The now infamous document ended the military hostilities in Karabakh, but forced the surrender of historic territories in Artsakh and Armenia to Azerbaijan.

Since then we have not only witnessed the surrender of historic Artsakh territories of Karvachar, Berdzor and Shushi to Azerbaijan, but also key outposts in Armenia-proper compounding the complexities facing our brothers and sisters in the homeland.

The Regional Convention also reaffirmed an earlier announcement by the ARF Western U.S. Central Committee, which declared the November 9 agreement treasonous against our nation. It also unequivocally asserted that the Armenian government, headed by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, bears sole responsibility for the crisis that has arisen from the signing of the document. In accordance to our organization’s position, the Convention also reiterated that the best way to mitigate further losses to our Nation, would be the prime minister’s immediate resignation followed by the forming of a National Accord government, which will be tasked to plan snap parliamentary election. The person whose signature appears on that disastrous document cannot lead the nation out of this crisis.

The Regional Convention also emphasized the need to unite all existing potential of Armenian life in the Western United States to collectively work together to not only better assist the homeland but to also chart a new course in Diaspora-Armenia relations. One of the key facets of this effort are the continuing advocacy work being done to advance the issue of Artsakh’s recognition in federal, state and local governments, as well as securing much-needed U.S. assistance for Armenia.

At its conclusion, the Regional Convention elected a new Central Committee, comprised of the following members, which is tasked with shepherding the organization for the next two years.

Sako Berberian
Vahan Bezdikian
Shahen Derderian
Garo Ispendjian
Toros Kejejian
Arto Keuleyan
Levon Kirakossian
Harout Mgrditchian
Dr. Carmen Ohanian
Alik Ourfalian
Koko Topalian

ARF 55th Regional Convention
December 28, 2020
Montebello, California




Sputnik V: Armenia reports no post-vaccination reactions

Alex Jidarian
Public Radio of Armenia
Dec 30 2020

The Armenian Ministry of Health reports no unexpected post-vaccination reactions among those vaccinated.

Russian Minister of Health Mikhail Murashko donated samples of the Russian Sputnik V vaccine to Armenia on November 21.

While the Sputnik V vaccine met the safety and efficacy requirements during the clinical trials, it was not registered at that time.

To build confidence among the population and to avoid possible manipulations, Health Minister Arsen Torosyan and the leadership of the Ministry were the first to get the vaccine.

The Ministry reports no post-vaccination reactions , and says all people that have received the vaccine “are feeling good.”

Reiterating the importance of the role of the vaccine in the prevention of coronavirus disease, the Ministry of Health expresses its deep gratitude to the Russian Federation for mutually beneficial cooperation in the fight against infectious diseases, including COVID-19, and looks forward to long-term cooperation for the benefit of public health in both countries.

https://en.armradio.am/2020/12/30/sputnik-v-armenia-reports-no-post-vaccination-reactions/


Putin’s good ties with Baku and Yerevan help to settle Nagorno-Karabakh crisis – Kremlin

Alex Jidarian
TASS, Russia
Dec 27 2020
In order to stabilize the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Putin spent “many and many days with a phone in his hand” and personally controlled the developments, Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov noted

MOSCOW, December 27. /TASS/. Russian President Vladimir Putin’s friendly relations with Baku and Yerevan helped to achieve a peace deal on Nagorno-Karabakh, Kremlin Spokesman Dmitry Peskov said in an interview with “Moscow. Kremlin. Putin” on Rossiya-1 TV channel.

“Good and constructive relations based on mutual respect with Baku and Yerevan helped Putin to mediate this settlement [of the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh],” Peskov said.

In order to stabilize the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Putin spent “many and many days with a phone in his hand” and personally controlled the developments, he noted. Putin also held talks with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

“In 2020, active combat actions in Europe right near our borders are something that certainly the world community must not allow to happen. In this case Putin’s responsible position, his efforts to stop this are certainly worth a lot and it’s hard to overestimate them,” Peskov stressed.

Renewed clashes between Azerbaijan and Armenia erupted on September 27, with intense battles raging in the disputed region of Nagorno-Karabakh. Baku and Yerevan have disputed sovereignty over Nagorno-Karabakh since February 1988, when the region announced its secession from the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialist Republic. In the armed conflict of 1992-1994, Azerbaijan lost control of Nagorno-Karabakh and seven adjoining districts.

On November 9, Russian President Vladimir Putin, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev and Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan signed a joint statement on a complete ceasefire in Nagorno-Karabakh starting from November 10. The Russian leader said that the Azerbaijani and Armenian sides would maintain the positions that they had held, and Russian peacekeepers would be deployed to the region.

After the deployment of Russian peacekeepers, the situation in Nagorno-Karabakh has stabilized. Tens of thousands of Nagorno-Karabakh residents who had left their homes during the hostilities returned with the help of the peacekeeping force.

TURKISH press: ANALYSIS – EU and Upper-Karabakh: Recurrent mistakes

Alex Jidarian
Deniz Ünsal   |28.12.2020

*The author is an alumnus of Trinity College Dublin, specialized in Master of Laws (LL.M.) in International and Comparative Law. His main focus areas are Turkey-EU relations, Eastern Mediterranean and contemporary debates in Turkish foreign policy. He has a special interest in public international law, EU law and Late-Ottoman Era legal-political developments.

ISTANBUL 

Although 2020 will definitely be remembered as a tough and unprecedented year, Azerbaijan’s legendary victory over Armenia in Upper-Karabakh was not overshadowed by the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic. Overall, the Upper-Karabakh Ceasefire Agreement is not just an ordinary border agreement, yet it will also be marked as a manifestation of the reality that even the most complicated “frozen conflicts” can be resolved through diplomacy and/or use of military force.

Nevertheless, there are a number of actors that have underestimated the peaceful settlement of the Upper-Karabakh Conflict and are aiming to downplay Azerbaijan’s technological superiority by ignoring Turkey’s inclusion as a “game-changer” in the conflict. Unfortunately, the European Union (EU) is one of them. For instance, the EU top diplomat Josep Borrell’s recent statements on the possibility of the troop deployment of the EU in the region demonstrate how the Union is devoid of rational policymaking. Having perplexed by the decades-old delusions that emanated from Armenian claims, Borrell said that the EU will not deploy troops on the ground and will not do what Turkey did. Actually Borrell’s attitude could not hide the EU’s estrangement from its long-term objectives aiming to consolidate the EU’s position as a farsighted and credible actor.

With all due respect, even if the EU’s reluctance to intervene in a conflict in the South Caucasus can be understood under its diligence to remain a global soft-power, Borrell’s remarks on Turkey are unacceptable. After these mind-boggling remarks, Resolution 1597 adopted by the Belgian House of Representatives on Upper-Karabakh on Dec. 18 has also proved Belgian politics’ narrow-mindedness apparently caused by one-sided Armenian narratives. Meanwhile, the Belgian parliament’s reference to the events of 1915 constitutes a clear resemblance to the Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan’s baseless remarks, alleging that the Turkish-Azerbaijani operations in Upper-Karabakh were a continuation of the so-called “Armenian genocide”. It is saddening to observe that many Belgian parliamentarians pay so much attention to a defeated prime minister, who is being strongly criticized even by his own people. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the Belgian House of Representatives has been taken hostage by “narrow interests catering to domestic politics.” 

What did Turkey do?

Ankara-based political analyst Ali Bakeer is of the opinion that “the outcome of the conflict and the constant Turkish political position in supporting Azerbaijan, not to mention the role of Ankara-made drones, show that Turkey is becoming stronger in the Caucasus ”. Bakeer’s approach is quite plausible because Turkey’s contributions to the settlement of the Upper-Karabakh conflict are versatile. Principally, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan summarized the newly established political order in the region: “Karabakh is no longer a frozen conflict, it now signifies a glorious victory”.

While evaluating Turkish achievements in the region, Azerbaijan’s decisiveness and rational policymaking under the administration of President Ilham Aliyev ought to be praised first. Unlike Yerevan, Baku has a well-rounded understanding of the nature of post-Cold War conflicts. Recalling the “Joint Vision 2020” report (2000) of the Pentagon, wars in the 21st century have long been foreseen as “network-centric wars” by the United States. According to this report, the American military strategy has to be based on “Full Spectrum Dominance” in space, high seas, air and information technologies. Apparently, Azerbaijan has had a certain perception of these expectations. Dr. Can Kasapoglu from Istanbul-centered think-tank EDAM thinks that besides diversifying her military arsenal, Azerbaijan also improved her military doctrine and military science knowledge. Moreover, apart from the fraternal solidarity between Turkey and Azerbaijan, burgeoning Turkish dronization trends in the Azerbaijani Armed Forces showed the vulnerability of traditional warfare, according to Kasapoglu. Kasapoglu summarizes these trends as a transfer of a complete robotic warfare doctrine and concept of operations to Azerbaijan. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the side which used the terrorist PKK and its regional affiliates on the front lines, namely Armenia, lost the war. This war, once again, proved that drawing on terrorism cannot be a choice for an independent state. Now, thanks to the Turkish aspirations to consolidate the Azerbaijani Armed Forces, “Karabakh is no longer a frozen conflict”.

In his renowned book On War, the German war theorist Carl von Clausewitz asserts that “war is simply the continuation of political intercourse with the addition of other means.” Although his state-centric arguments have been opposed and proved wrong quite a few times, they are still valid in many cases. In the Karabakh example, President Aliyev was of the view that peace can only be achieved by ending the Armenian occupation and cannot be ensured without Turkey. Under these principles, the possibility of a military intervention was surely on the table and was considered as the last resort to regain the occupied Azerbaijani territories. Thus, the determination of Azerbaijan and Turkey to carry out military operations in the region, once again, proved the Clausewitzian paradigm. These two countries continued to insist on a peaceful and law-abiding settlement of the conflict -as a political prerequisite- while military operations were successfully conducted on the field. Eventually, Azerbaijan’s use of her right to self-defense complemented her political and diplomatic objectives.

Turkey, Azerbaijan and European security: Need for updated EU policy

Recently, by safeguarding the narrow-minded interests of the Greek-Greek Cypriot duo, the EU has shown restraint in calling for the security of “European borders”. The ongoing refugee crisis between Turkey and Greece is a clear example of this. The EU is obviously faced with a serious dilemma, underlining, on the one hand, its priorities as maintaining European security and protecting “European borders”, and on the other hand, avoiding a direct involvement in the preservation of peace in such a critical region dominated by non-EU-member European actors. Meanwhile, downplaying and criticizing/condemning Turkish achievements in Upper-Karabakh will certainly deepen this dilemma.

Before the settlement, the EU tacitly promoted inconclusiveness and ambivalence in Upper-Karabakh by turning a blind eye to Armenian brutality in the occupied territories of Azerbaijan. However, in the absence of a common will with regard to the Upper-Karabakh conflict among the EU member states, the EU’s active neutrality policy in favor of Armenian “postponement diplomacy” has failed. The EU’s appeasing attitude towards Armenia’s well-known offensive mentality, which was once again solidified with the Belgian Parliament’s unfortunate resolution, is even more puzzling. Overall, the EU showed no intention to manage the Upper-Karabakh conflict in a proper and decisive manner. Now, the Union stands merely as a “passive observer”.

The EU’s top diplomat’s latest statement is a manifestation of this consequence: the EU leadership is seemingly committed to remain a passive observer.

In light of these circumstances, the need for an updated EU policy is evident. First of all, there are convincing reasons for the EU to take the view that Turkey is an undisputed game-changer and peace-broker in this conflict. Secondly, there are also convincing reasons for the EU to believe that Turkey’s moves have changed the “game” in favor of European and Western interests by creating a counterweight to Russia with Azerbaijan. Thirdly, Turkey has good neighborly and multifaceted relations with the countries in the region. In a political atmosphere where the EU is concerned about the Russian resurgence and where Turkey is welcoming the Union’s policies to build partnerships with the countries in the Caucasus, the EU should prioritize updating its ill-fated stance towards Turkey. Unless the Union changes its rhetoric on Turkey and the Turkish military presence, the tilting of the Russian dominance in the South Caucasus will merely remain a forlorn hope.

**Opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not necessarily reflect the editorial policy of Anadolu Agency.




Opportunity for durable peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan should be seized

Alex Jidarian
EurActiv
Dec 21 2020

DISCLAIMER: All opinions in this column reflect the views of the author(s), not of EURACTIV Media network.

By Vasif Huseynov


There are already signs for the potential transformation of the conflictual environment around Nagorno-Karabakh into one of cooperation and joint projects, writes Vasif Huseynov.

Vasif Huseynov is a senior adviser at the Center of Analysis of International Relations of Azerbaijan.

The collapse of the Soviet Union restored the independent statehood of the three countries in the South Caucasus – Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, but it took away the largely peaceful relations between or within them.

The region succumbed to extraordinary violence and dangerous instability thanks to often externally-guided separatist initiatives and irredentist policies.

Although the bloodshed was curtailed in Georgia following its 2008 war with Russia, it persisted in the southern part of the region due to the Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict over the occupied territories of the latter.

The conflict has been truly a handcuff for fully-fledged regional cooperation, dramatically increasing the costs of regional transportation and energy routes, and as such also alienating the two people increasingly more against each other.

The recent 44-day war (27 September- 10 November 2020) between Armenia and Azerbaijan has, in a certain sense, generated a unique chance for the restoration of peace between the two nations, who had lived peacefully in the past and continue to live so in other parts of the world where they are settled.

There are several reasons why the post-war situation in the region can be deemed as conducive to lasting peace and security.

First and foremost, the war did not end with a maximalist victory or total defeat of one side against the other. This was a potential scenario before the ceasefire as acknowledged by Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan who declared that Armenia “would be in a worse situation”, if the war did not end on 10 November.

Notably, in contrast to the calls of some nationalist groups, the Azerbaijani government demonstrated restraint and stopped the war immediately after Armenia agreed to withdraw its armed forces, as President Ilham Aliyev of Azerbaijan suggested from the very beginning of the war.

According to the ceasefire document signed on 10 November through the mediation of Russia, Armenians will continue to live in the territories of Karabakh and will be even provided with a corridor to maintain free communication with Armenia.

Azerbaijan has also agreed to the deployment of Russian peacekeepers to the Karabakh region who safeguard the ceasefire regime.

In stark contrast to the fate of ethnic Azerbaijanis of the Karabakh region who were forcefully expelled by Armenian forces after the war in 1990s and never allowed to return, Armenians are living in Karabakh region of Azerbaijan and Baku expressed the intention to accommodate them as citizens with rights and privileges just as all other minorities in the country such as Jews, Russians, Kurds and others.

Secondly, the Azerbaijani government has stated officially that it considers the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict as resolved. “We have entered the process of the restoration of peaceful coexistence stage in the resolution of the conflict”, Azerbaijan’s Foreign Minister Ceyhun Bayromov announced  in late November.

The consideration of the conflict as resolved without a total victory is extremely important to reach a peace treaty as it leaves room for reconcilation between the governments, and also between the people of the two countries.

There are already signs for the potential transformation of the conflictual environment into one of cooperation and joint projects. This is noteworthy that such messages are given by both sides.

For example, Armenia’s newly appointed minister of economy, talking about the long-term possibilities for regional cooperation, did not rule out the establishment of trade relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

For the Azerbaijani government, there is a good opportunity to launch a larger cooperation platform including the countries of the South Caucasus and the countries neighbouring the region, namely Russia, Iran and Turkey.

Stating that he had already discussed the issue with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan of Turkey, President Aliyev said, in the press conference with his Turkish counterpart on 10 December in Baku, that “If the Armenian leadership draws the right conclusions from the war, renounces its unfounded claims and looks ahead, then they can also take a place on this platform. We are open to this… We must turn this page over, we must end the enmity.”

President Erdoğan did likewise support the initiative saying that this was supported also by Russia’s President Vladimir Putin. He made clear that the platform would include infrastructure, political, diplomatic and many other issues.

Babken Tunyan, the head of an Armenian parliament committee on economic issues from the parliamentary majority My Step alliance, did not rule out Armenia’s participation in the platform, noting that “If participation in any platform corresponds to [Armenia’s] interests, then it should participate”.

The peace messages from the conflicting sides and external stakeholders raises a hope that it can be eventually possible for the “Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict” to become as a matter of the past, as President Aliyev stated.

This all creates a new situation that should not be taken granted by anyone who is interested in building peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan and ending the longstanding hostilities often accompanied by violence.


The list of 62 Armenian soldiers captured in Hin Tagher-Khtsaberd section transferred to ICRC – Minister

Alex Jidarian
Public Radio of Armenia
Dec 21 2020

Minister of Defense Vagharshak Harutyunyan today provided clarifications to the parents and relatives of the servicemen who were taken prisoner by the Azerbaijani side in the Hin Tagher-Khtsaberd section of the Artsakh Republic.

The Minister of Defense noted that everything possible is being done for a quick settlement of the issue.

In particular, according to Vagharshak Harutyunyan, the list of 62 captured servicemen has already been transferred to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and their personal files have been sent to the European Court of Human Rights.

The issue is also in the focus of the leadership of the Russian peacekeeping contingent stationed in Artsakh.

Vagharshak Harutyunyan assured the relatives of the servicemen that the Ministry of Defense is doing its best to return the captured servicemen to the Homeland, that there are no misinterpretations in this issue.

A Look at the Military Lessons of the Nagorno-Karabakh Conflict

Alex Jidarian
The Moscow Times, Russia
Dec 21 2020
By Michael Kofman

Dec. 21, 2020

On Nov. 9, an armistice was signed to end the fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh between Armenia and Azerbaijan. The conflict was relatively short lived, lasting from Sept. 27 to Nov. 9, but it proved to be an intense inter-state conflict fought by two heavily armed opponents. Both sides employed advanced military technology, with Azerbaijan proving the decisive victor in the war. The implications of the conflict continue to reverberate well outside the region given its potential significance for regional and great powers alike, while further spurring debates on the character of modern warfare.

Azerbaijan’s successful use of drones proved a tactical sensation, although it broadly confirmed long standing lessons on the devastating effect airpower can have on a large ground force with relatively poor air defenses. The use of unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) in this conflict marks an evolution more so than a revolution in the applications of airpower.

Military establishments look to wars like Nagorno-Karabakh for insights about capabilities, doctrine, operational art and how their forces might fare against similarly armed adversaries or perhaps those with far more capable militaries. The United States is on a quest for defining conflicts, like the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, to shape the direction of its future investments, and consequently looks to wars such as the Russian conflict with Ukraine, or Armenia’s war with Azerbaijan, for lessons learned.

In terms of capabilities, it seems clear that remotely operated systems offer the advantage of airpower, sensors and precision-guided weapons to small and middle powers at a dramatically discounted price compared to the cost of manned aviation. This technology is diffusing much more rapidly than customized counters, or air defense systems designed to deal with it. The latter will eventually catch up, but in the interim, drones, especially loitering munitions drones, present a significant challenge for modern air defenses and ground forces. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict helped settle the question on whether legacy air defenses, such as the dated Soviet systems employed by Armenia, could be suitable or adapted to dealing with contemporary drones. The answer is decidedly negative, especially when combinations of drones are used for target identification and strikes, or via swarming tactics.

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While modern air defense appears to have a spotty performance record, the story should not be oversold. A number of Russian exported Pantsir-S1s have been destroyed in other conflicts, but Turkey has also lost plenty of its TB2 drones in places like Libya. It depends on the system, operator and context. Some perform much better than others. The same can be said of electronic warfare systems deployed in this conflict. System on system matchups are not especially revealing. These lessons should not be carelessly generalized to powers like Russia or China, fielding integrated air defense, automated systems of command and control and a much more robust air defense network. That said, saturation via loitering munitions and remotely operated systems is clearly a challenge for any air defense. The problem is hardly limited to legacy Soviet or exported Russian systems, as the Iranian attack on Saudi infrastructure demonstrated in September 2019. According to Stephen Bryen, those facilities were defended by U.S. Patriot, French Crotale (Shashine) and Swiss Oerlikon air defense systems, none of which were able to detect or engage the attacking Iranian drones.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict reiterated that individual air defense systems do not aggregate into a layered or integrated air defense, which requires short, medium and operational range systems working with a common picture and with sufficient density. In countries like Russia, ground-based air defense is also heavily integrated with tactical aviation.

It’s somewhat of a truism that air defense should be supported by electronic warfare and specialized counter-unmanned aircraft systems (C-UAS), but the key conversation is on force structure. The ratio of support to maneuver units across Western militaries is simply lacking compared to those of other powers, like Russia’s.

Armenia’s armor, artillery and infantry fighting vehicles were picked apart over the course of several weeks, while its limited air defense capacity suffered a similar fate. A smaller ground force, which is well-protected from air attacks, will prove a wiser investment than a large fleet of armor and artillery that lacks effective defense from the air. This is hardly a revelation. These trends in warfare were established decades ago, but it is now the case when facing even smaller powers with unmanned aviation.

The cost imposition curve is a significant factor, since drones are simply far cheaper and easier to replace than their targets, and they can be traded in a war of attrition. Armenia’s most expensive air defense systems, the older S-300PS, were easily destroyed by Israeli loitering munitions since the former were never designed to engage the latter. Similarly, tanks have come under fire in recent debates, even though there is no clear platform that offers a better combination of maneuver, firepower and protection.

The main takeaway for armor is that they will need protection systems against drones in the same manner that they are now equipped against anti-tank guided missiles (in some militaries). All vehicles will need C-UAS systems mounted. Survivability will once again have to catch up with lethality. While Western militaries may rely on aerospace dominance to shield ground forces, it increasingly looks like this will be at best a partial solution, and at worst misplaced optimism.

Another approach would emphasize the quantity of cheaper or disposable systems in Western militaries, trading out expensive boutique capabilities for numbers able to withstand attrition. However, legacy systems generate inertia in defense acquisition, and it is more likely that militaries will choose to better protect what they have than try to revamp their forces. A useful addition to standing militaries would be capabilities available in large quantities, based on cheaper or disposable systems.

Doctrinally, the war offers useful lessons, especially for Western audiences. Modern militaries tend to worship at the altar of maneuver warfare, and the U.S. in particular is vested in the cognitive effects of maneuver on enemy forces, or in doctrinal parlance, the ability to “impose multiple dilemmas.”

However, the diffusion of cheap, high-quality sensors on the battlefield negates many of the benefits of terrain and camouflage and can easily be backed by a reconnaissance-strike package. This raises doubts about the ability of maneuver to generate cognitive dilemmas for great or even middle powers. Similarly, dispersing forces may have negligible effects against loitering munitions, and as the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict illustrated, terrain offers fewer advantages against such systems. Dispersal makes sense tactically, but in terms of operational design, the proliferation of cheap means of surveillance suggests that forces will have to accept much higher levels of attrition, especially against firepower-heavy militaries like Russia’s.

Many analysts, including myself, had expected terrain to be a significant factor in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict and, in early analysis, for Armenian forces to fare much better in the conflict. In some ways this was accurate, given that Azerbaijan advanced in the south where it was easiest for ground units, but not in the north. Yet on the whole, this thesis was proven incorrect, and expectations that Armenia might fight to a stalemate seem incredibly rosy in retrospect. Azerbaijan was able to attrition Armenia’s defending forces with airpower. They in turn were ill-prepared for the war, lacking good lines to fall back to. 

There was considerable lag between the degradation of Armenian forces and Azerbaijani territorial advances, but momentum quickly shifted two weeks into the conflict. Early on, Azerbaijan appeared unable to translate tactical success into significant gains, which explains in part the surprise (including my own) at how quickly they were able to put Armenian forces into a precarious and untenable position a few weeks into the war.

Could Armenia have fought differently and won this conflict? The short answer is probably not, although it most certainly could have fared better. Armenia was disadvantaged from the outset given the quantitative and qualitative superiority on the Azerbaijani side, together with considerable Turkish support for Baku. Armenia’s political leadership appeared to be delusional about the military balance and the potential course of a war, while insufficiently investing in the right capabilities, force structure and prepared defenses. The problems were structural. For example, rather than buy more advanced air defense or electronic warfare systems, they invested in old and used OSA-AK air defense systems from Jordan. Azerbaijan had used drones and loitering munitions against Armenia in the four-day war of 2016, yet over the four years separating these respective conflicts, the Armenian military failed to adapt in almost every respect.

The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict is a reminder about the need to link military power, and military strategy, to state policy. The conflict continues to illustrate the gap between political leaders’ perceptions and military reality. While planners often believe that what matters for deterrence is the military balance, assessed military potential, etc., Armenia’s and Azerbaijan’s decisions proved once again that perception is the supreme qualifier. The qualitative or quantitative advantage often does not translate meaningfully into political calculus, and it is what leaders choose to make of it. Yerevan appeared to act as though it was the stronger power in the equation, perhaps buoyed by the mythos of earlier victories in 1992. Chauvinism and war optimism continue to be pernicious problems in decision making, often misleading the aggressor, but in this case, misleading the defender. This is something Western militaries should take to heart given the degree to which they subscribe to being the best, especially at the tactical level.

The traumatic postmortem will continue to unfold in Yerevan as recriminations abound regarding the course of the conflict. Armenia’s policies and rhetoric in the run up to the conflict appeared out of touch with the reality of a country outmatched in every single respect. Yes, it had a sizable military, but Armenia’s investments simply did not match political strategy. They were not prepared for this war and steadily marched toward a military disaster.  

The use of autonomous or unmanned systems is simply the latest evolution in the modern character of war. They hold implications for the survivability of ground forces, the efficacy of contemporary air defense and the need to think differently about terrain and maneuver.

The diffusion of drone power continues to outpace viable counters and defenses. Undoubtedly some lessons from this conflict will be overhyped, as is always the case; however, it would be a mistake for great and middle powers to ignore the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. It is no 1973, but it will suffice until a more defining conflict gets here.

This article was first published by Russia Matters.

Armenians take to streets of Yerevan to call for PM’s resignation

Alex Jidarian
France 24
Dec 22 2020
 
 
Armenians take to streets of Yerevan to call for PM’s resignation
 
 
Thousands of people took to the Armenian capital’s streets again Tuesday, demanding the prime minister’s resignation over his handling of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict with Azerbaijan.
 
 
Armenian opposition politicians and their supporters have been calling for Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to step down for weeks since he signed a peace deal that halted 44 days of deadly fighting at the cost of territorial concessions to Azerbaijan.
 
Crowds of protesters on Tuesday besieged government buildings in Yerevan, chanting “Nikol, go away!” In other parts of Armenia, protesters were reported to have blocked several major roads. Several hours into the rally, opposition supporters erected tents on Yerevan’s main square.
 
“We have pitched the tents and intend to stay as long as possible, including overnight. Pashinyan needs to resign,” Ishkhan Saghatelyan, a member of the opposition Dashnaktsutyun party, was quoted by the Russian state news agency Tass as saying.
 
The opposition also called on Pashinyan’s My Step coalition, which currently has the majority of seats in the parliament, to sit down for talks on Tuesday. My Step so far has not commented on the proposal.
 
Nagorno-Karabakh lies within Azerbaijan but was under the control of ethnic Armenian forces backed by Armenia since a separatist war there ended in 1994. That war left Nagorno-Karabakh itself and substantial surrounding territory in Armenian hands.
 
 
Heavy fighting erupted in late September in the biggest escalation of the decades-old conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, killing more than 5,600 people on both sides.
 
>> The human cost of Armenia’s defeat in Nagorno-Karabakh
 
A Russian-brokered peace agreement that took effect Nov. 10 stipulated that Armenia hand over control of some areas it holds outside Nagorno-Karabakh’s borders. Azerbaijan also retained control over areas of Nagorno-Karabakh it had taken during the conflict.
 
The peace deal was celebrated in Azerbaijan as a major triumph, but sparked outrage and mass protests in Armenia where thousands repeatedly took to the streets. Pashinyan has defended the deal as a painful but necessary move that prevented Azerbaijan from overrunning the entire Nagorno-Karabakh region.
 
(AP)
 
 
 

Russian peacekeepers have cleared 238 hectares of land in Nagorno Karabakh

Alex Jidarian

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YEREVAN, DECEMBER 21, ARMENPRESS. The specialists of the International Mine Action Centre of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation continue demining works in Nagorno Karabakh, the Russian defense ministry reports.

In total, during the peacekeeping operation in Nagorno Karabakh, engineering units cleared more than 238 hectares of terrain and about 93 kilometers of roads, 423 residential buildings. More than 8.3 thousand explosive objects were found and neutralized.

In the course of demining and clearing the territory of explosive objects in Nagorno Karabakh, Russian peacekeepers use modern robotic systems that allow them to maintain a high rate of demining in mountainous terrain and deteriorating weather.

Discovered explosive objects and unexploded ammunition are removed and destroyed at a specially equipped landfill. Ammunition that cannot be evacuated is destroyed on the spot with the necessary security measures in place.

VoA: Armenia Mourns Karabakh War Victims

Alex Jidarian
Voice of America
Dec 19 2020
By AFP
04:58 AM
YEREVAN, ARMENIA – Armenia on Saturday began three days of mourning for the victims of clashes with Azerbaijan as the opposition kept up pressure on the country’s leader to resign over the handling of the conflict.

More than 5,000 people including civilians were killed in Armenia and Azerbaijan when clashes erupted between the ex-Soviet enemies in late September over the breakaway region of Nagorno-Karabakh.

The war ended in November with a Moscow-brokered peace agreement that saw the Armenians cede swathes of territory to Azerbaijan, which has been backed by close ally Turkey.

The deal sparked fury in Armenia, with the opposition urging Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to resign.

On the first day of the national mourning on Saturday, Pashinyan was expected to lead a procession to a memorial complex in the capital Yerevan where victims of the conflict are buried.

The opposition planned to hold a separate march later in the day. Pashinyan’s critics have called on supporters to stage a national strike, starting Tuesday.

“The entire nation has been through and is going through a nightmare,” Pashinyan said in a video address ahead of the memorial march.

“Sometimes it seems that all of our dreams have been dashed and our optimism destroyed,” he added.

The 45-year-old former newspaper editor was propelled to power in 2018 after he channeled widespread desire for change into a broad protest movement against corrupt post-Soviet elites.

But after six weeks of clashes with Azerbaijan, many have called Pashinyan a “traitor” for agreeing to what they say is a humiliating deal with Azerbaijan. He has so far refused to step down.

As part of the peace deal Russia deployed nearly 2,000 peacekeeping troops to Karabakh.

Moscow said on Friday that a Russian mine clearer was killed by a blast in Karabakh when an explosive went off earlier this week.