KOMMERSANT Dengi, JANUARY 17, 2005
Ever Farther from Moscow
Last year started with the presidential elections in Georgia and ended
with the third round of elections in Ukraine. Moscow looked at the CIS
with fixed attention all year and tried to prop up its waning
influence, while the former Soviet countries came closer and closer to
replacing their political elites.
Ukraine
The most important events for all of the CIS probably were those that
took place in Ukraine. The opposition, headed by Viktor Yushchenko,
accused the authorities of falsifying the results of the second round
of the presidential election on November 21, and called out hundreds
of thousands of people to the streets. The West backed the
opposition’s demands, as did all influential international
organizations. The Ukrainian government, which had already declared
its candidate, Viktor Yanukovich, the winner, was forced go to back on
its word. The Supreme Court nullified the second round of elections
and set a revote for December 26. At the moment when this went to
press, the results of that vote were not yet known, but we have
guessed it has opened the way for Yushchenko and marked the beginning
of a change in that country’s political elite.
The crisis in Ukraine was a serious setback for Russia’s position in
that country and all the CIS. Moscow had set all its hope on
government candidate Yanukovich. Putin himself even came to campaign
for him and had congratulated him twice on his victory. That has
complicated Moscow’s chances for normal relations with the new
political powers in Ukraine and alarmed the elite in all the former
Soviet republics.
Moldova
Russian-Moldovan relations took a heavy chill at the end of 2003 when
Moldovan President Vladimir Voronin refused to sign off on the
Kremlin’s proposal for regulating the internal conflicts in that
country. Their differences were not overcome in 2004. Voronin pointed
ignored almost all CIS activities and made efforts to improve his
country’s relations with the West. That course was also dictated by
Voronin’s attempts to withstand a quickly growing opposition that is
longing for a revolution of roses along the lines of Georgia’s.
Voronin’s westward turn has not strengthened his political position,
however, and the opposition sees big opportunities in this year’s
parliamentary elections.
Kazakhstan
Although relations between Moscow and Astana remain superficially
cheerful, Russian for the first time last year addressed lengthy
criticism to its key ally. This happened during Putin’s visit to
Astana in January. The main complaint from Moscow was about
Kazakhstan’s increasingly pro-Western orientation, especially in the
military and fuel realms, and the exclusion of the Russian-speaking
population of Kazakhstan from political and public life. Putin made it
clear to his Kazakh counterpart Nursultan Nazarbaev that relations
between their countries would be seriously complicated if those
problems continued.
A change of the political elite is Kazakhstan is looking ever more
likely. In spite of the seemingly solid victory of the
pro-presidential Otan party in September’s parliamentary elections,
Nazarbaev cannot feel completely secure. Western pressure to create
true democratic conditions is growing, the opposition is uniting and
the ruling party is divided. This last fact became glaringly obvious
when speaker Zharmkhan Tuyakbay mutinied, accusing the government of
falsifying the vote and becoming the leader of the opposition.
Belarus
Moscow’s discontent with Aleksandr Lukashenko’s Belarus is mounting as
well. The discord is mainly economic. Last fall, Lukashenko publicly
confirmed that there would be no common Russian-Belarusian currency,
which Moscow was pushing for. Lukashenko has still not ratified
documents passed by his parliament to give Russia property rights to
oil pipelines crossing Belarusian territory and he hasn’t been
cooperative about gas lines either.
There are been talk recently to the effect that Moscow has begun
examining Belarusian politicians in search of a successor to Poppa
Lukashenko, one more pliable and less repulsive. So, even though
Lukashenko was given the right to hold a third, fourth, fifth (and so
on) term in the referendum held in October, his future is still less
than rosy. This is even more so since the United States stated openly
for the first time at the end of the summer that it will make efforts
to remove the authoritarian Belarusian from power.
Georgia
The year 2004 began with presidential elections in Georgia, in which
Mikhail Saakashvili rode the tide of change to a victory with more
than 90 percent of the vote.
Relations between Moscow and the new powers in Tbilisi had overcome
their initial tension by the end of the year, but remain
unsatisfactory nonetheless. And they are far from any agreement on the
conditions under which they can normalize their relations. In Tbilisi,
they are insisting on absolute equality between partners in deciding
what compromises to make about what. Moscow agrees in general that
compromise should be mutual, but wants to make them with a view to the
actual situation: Georgia has more problems than Russia has, it should
be the more cooperative. Moscow’s hope for the destabilization of the
new government in Tbilisi didn’t pan out. Saakashvili is holding fast.
Moscow informed Tbilisi of its views on their bilateral problems in
the first half of last year. In October, Tbilisi responded, much to
Moscow’s displeasure. The Kremlin was especially annoyed with two
points: the demand that Russia close its military bases in Georgia by
January 1, 2006, and that the peacekeeping operations in South Ossetia
and Abkhazia be transferred to UN or OSCE control. Those operations
are now being overseen by Russia. These key issues that are holding up
the signing of an agreement on relations between the two states.
Armenia
Russia has been taking advantage of Armenian President Robert
Kocharyan’s need for its support. After the affairs in Georgian took
the course they did, the opposition in Armenia was vitiated. In April,
Kocharyan faced the most serious challenge from the opposition that he
has seen while in office. The government had to use force to break up
protests. Even though the situation was brought under control, the
president’s associates are concerned that that is not the last move by
the opposition.
In exchange for Russian support, Kocharyan has expressed his readiness
to increase that country’s economic presence in Armenia. Russia
received the bigger part of the Armenian energy sector in an agreement
to write off Armenian debt and now controls about 80 percent of
Armenia’s electricity production. Armrosgazprom, the Armenian natural
gas monopoly is also controlled by Russian structures. And Russia has
received stock packages in a number of Armenian defense enterprises.
However, Armenia’s significance as Russia’s strategic ally in the
Transcaucasus will be substantially diminished if Russia loses its
influence in Georgia.
Azerbaijan
Moscow made efforts to establish relations with Azerbaijan’s new
president Ilkham Aliev last year. The Kremlin is concerned that Aliev
Junior will lean further toward the West than his father had in order
to make Azerbaijan a regional leader. Moscow is unhappy that
Azerbaijan has avoided making a long-term on oil transit with it and
will in the future send its oil down the Baky – Tbilisi – Ceyhan
pipeline, that is, across Georgia to Turkey. Moscow is also concerned
about the lack of progress in military and technical cooperation with
Baku and suspects the new leadership of secret intentions to go over
to Western armament standards. These suspicions were confirmed by
Azerbiajan’s announcement of its plans to step up its integration into
NATO and its willingness to allow NATO military bases on its territory.
During Ilkham Aliev’s visit to Moscow in February, he was offered the
alternative of strengthening military ties with Russia, with close
ties with Russian forces and a place in the CIS Antiterrorism Center.
Baku has yet to give a firm answer. That is partially because Ilkham
Aliev has yet to consolidate his forces fully within the country.
Tajikistan
Russia was able to establish satisfactory relations with this
strategic CIS ally only at the end of the year. Before Putin’s visit
to Dushanbe in October, Tajikistani President Emomali Rakhmonov had
been hinting that Russia’s rent-free military base in Tajikistan was
no longer acceptable and that the Russians needed to open up their
wallet according to the example set by the generous Americans.
Dushanbe further demanded ownership of the Nurek space tracking
station, so that it could then rent it back to Russia. Moscow got the
picture. Tajikistan had decided to make some money off the Russian
military’s presence there, and good money at that. The Kremlin reacted
badly to that and began to think up strong countermeasures.
Setbacks in trade with the United States and fear of facing his
American-backed opposition alone made Rakhmonov think again about
relations with Moscow. During Putin’s visit to Dushanbe, an agreement
was signed giving the Russian military base legal status, turning
Nurek over to Russia in exchange for a debt write-off, finishing the
Sangtudin Hydroelectric Plant (with Tajikistan’s $50 million state
debt to Russia reinvested in the plant in the form of Russian-owned
stock) and the introduction of Russian border guards into Tajikistan.
Kyrgyzstan
Russian relations with this Central Asian state, like everything else
there, passed the year without strong jolts. The Kyrgyzstani
opposition is preparing for the presidential elections scheduled for
2005, and Kyrgyzstani President Askar Akaev has repeatedly stated that
he will not run for another term in office. During Akaev’s November
visit to Moscow, Akaev agreed to turn the most profitable parts of his
country’s military-industrial complex to Russia against its
$180-million debt to Russia. About the only stumbling block left in
Russian-Kyrgyz relations is the American plan to station several
American Air Force AWACs near Manas Airport. Moscow sees that as a
violation of Bishkek’s military and political obligations to it as
part of the Collective Security Agreement Organization.
Uzbekistan
Uzbekistani President Islam Karimov was badly shaken by the major
terrorist acts there in March and July 2004. He broke up his moderate,
liberal opposition several years ago, only to see a radical opposition
fill the vacuum. Karimov remains true to his motto, Better a hundred
arrested than a thousand killed. His intelligence agents conduct mass
arrests. It’s either me or the terrorists, and if I go, the Islamists
come in, the argument goes, although it is not too convincing. That is
why his position is looking shakier.
Karimov is reserved in his relations with Moscow. He doesn’t want to
spoil them, although he is also playing making advance to Washington,
which is interested in strengthening its position in Central Asia.
Turkmenistan
Turkmenistan, headed by Saparmurat Niyazov, is a model of stability.
Two years ago, Turkmenbashi crushed the opposition. But Niyazov is
still not completely calm. In February, a book appeared in the stores
of Turkmenistan entitled My Accomplices and I Are Terrorists, written
by former minister of foreign affairs Boris Shikhuradov, who has been
sentenced to life imprisonment for attempting a coup d’etat. In the
book, the former opposition leader tells how a a bunch of renegades
organized an assassination attempt on the great Turkmenbashi. Many in
Ashkhabad, and in the West too, have doubts about the authenticity of
the authorship of the strange confessional. Turkmenbashi has also
taken steps toward liberalization. In January, exit visas were
eliminated in Turkmenistan. That was seen as a gesture to Moscow,
whose support he is counting on if the United States should turn up
its pressure on Niyazov. Making it easier to leave the country is most
of all to the advantage of the ethnic Russians living there.
by Evegeny Sysoev
Russian Article as of Jan. 10, 2005
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress