Democratic Prospects in Central Asia
SOURCE: World Affairs (Washington, D.C.) 166 no3 133-47 Wint 2004
Talk of prospects for democratization in Central Asia seemingly
represents the triumph of hope over experience. Nowhere in this region will
the requirements for and understanding of genuine democracy materialize
anytime soon, either in elite or mass practice. Moreover, both here and in
the Muslim world generally (and in Russia as well), the transplantation of
‘Western and democratic institutions paradoxically often has strengthened
authoritarian rule, not liberalism or democracy.(n1) Furthermore, if we are
honest with ourselves, we must realize that the demand to democratize the
former Soviet Union as a whole, and Central Asia in particular, amounts to a
call for a revolutionary transformation of those areas, especially when
perceived from local capitals. That transformation will probably not be a
quick nonviolent one unless its advocates and leaders take special care.
These bleak conclusions apply equally to issues of either economic or
political democracy. Arguably, one also plausibly could contend that
whatever impetus for democratization, or at least for liberalization that
ultimately concludes with some recognizable form of democratization, must
inevitably come from outside the region, as internal forces are too weak to
make the necessary transition without foreign assistance. But whatever
external impetus might develop, it cannot offer genuine democracy on its
own. It only can stimulate, support, or at best galvanize existing, even
latent, domestic impulses for reform in politics and economics.
Neither is this assessment confined to Central Asia, for nowhere in the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), including Russia, do we see
genuine democracy or its imminent advent upon the scene.(n2) Moreover,
Russia’s democratic deficits in Russia relate strongly to Central Asia. They
impel Russia’s elites to support Central Asian dictators for classic reasons
of state, not least the idea that this will somehow strengthen hopes of a
return to hegemony, if not empire.(n3) In turn, those rulers look to Russia
for support against pressures for reform.
Sadly, Russia, the most advanced of the CIS governments, manifests
disquieting and regressive efforts to restore the outlines of a police
capitalism, or it moves to frustrate such essential democratic rights as
free press, meaningful elections, and civilian democratic control of the
instruments of violence.(n4) Thus Russia resembles what Max Weber long ago
called pseudoconstitutionalism, hardly the same thing as
pseudodemocracy.(n5) Elsewhere, the situation is correspondingly worse. Thus
throughout the CIS the road to democracy will necessarily be long, winding,
and often tortuous. Indeed, Turkmenistan has deteriorated to a tragic and
yet farcical restaging of Stalinism’s worst excesses, representing almost a
paradigm, if not a caricature, of Weber’s category of sultanism.(n6)
But this well-founded pessimism does not render discussion of prospects
for democracy in Central Asia wholly futile. After all, it is never too soon
to think about how we may work toward democracy, practically or conceptually
or both. It is always appropriate to attempt to lay the foundations for
successful democratization, because only through that process can genuine
democracy eventually be consolidated at minimal civic cost, rather than
through intense civic violence. Moreover, discussion rather than
pronouncements from on high as to what those foundations are is essential,
because we ourselves are still debating the meaning of democracy. Some
writers even deny that the West has the skill, knowledge, or means to foster
democracy abroad or that it acts to promote authoritarian regimes in places
such as Saudi Arabia. Therefore, the West cannot and should not discuss
democratization of Central Asia and instead should leave it to Russia as a
sphere of influence.(n7) At the same time, some analysts of democracy and
comparative politics argue that either or both of those entities suffer from
various “democratic deficits” or else are perhaps excessively
democratic.(n8)
Similarly, despite the strong current of opinion that proclaims a
Western and American mission to be an evangel of democracy abroad, or at
least a force for democratization, there exists a powerful current of
opinion that criticizes equally strongly the efforts to bring Western
democracy to Asia, Africa, and Latin America.(n9) This line of argument
forcefully contends that efforts to bring the Western model of economic
liberalism and political democracy to the Third World ironically become a
force for destabilization, violence, and more anti-democratic
manifestations, or “illiberal democracy.”(n10)
POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ATTRIBUTES OF DEMOCRACY
Precisely because debate epitomizes democratic politics, an open
discussion about the prospects for democracy throughout the former Soviet
Union remains topical. Therefore, as it regards Central Asia, we should
inquire into the conditions needed to undergird and sustain the perpetual
and open-ended process of democratization. Although arguments still rage
over the requirements of democratic politics, certain attributes seem to be
held in common. Lincoln’s famous epigrammatic definition appears to be
widely accepted as a necessary attribute of a democratic government. So too
are the notions of a government subject to regular, free, and fair
elections; the rule of law; parliamentary control of the purse through
democratic and transparent means; official accountability to the legislative
branch; separation of powers; limits on the executive; democratic control of
all of the means of violence; full civil rights of speech, religion, press,
assembly, and petition; freedom from arbitrary police power (how to define
arbitrary power does need to be clarified, but the general idea that we need
a category of defenses against it seems to be well established); legal
equality of all citizens without reference to race, sex, ethnicity, creed,
and so on.
Furthermore, it also has been clear since Aristotle, if not more
recently Tocqueville, that a balance of economic power where there is a
strong middle class, civil society, and thus a sphere of social and economic
life free from state control, is essential. Unrelieved mass poverty and
democracy are ultimately incompatible. The prospect and reality of
broad-based sustainable growth must be visible to society at large for it to
sustain its own belief in building democracy and in liberal politics and
economics more generally. Thus a government whose policies consist of one or
another form of rent-seeking and of misappropriation of the nation’s wealth
cannot be considered a democracy. This principle also mandates the existence
of what used to be called intermediary orders or civil society, a body of
social associations and civic groups, free of state penetration, that offer
the individual a legally protected sphere of privacy and freedom. This is
because an inevitable corollary of economic growth is ever greater
specialization and division of labor, which creates new needs, roles, and
functions for citizens and encourages them to form associations with
like-minded citizens.
Equally obvious, what Henry Adams called the systematic organization of
hatred, whether directed at other religions, peoples, nationalities, or
races, is an unreliable foundation upon which to build democracy. America’s
experience testifies that racism and ethnic discrimination are ultimately
incompatible with genuine democratization and are sources of internal
violence. As Lincoln reminded us, a house divided against itself cannot
stand.
Ideologically as well, the polity and its elites must internalize the
need for political figures to desist from attempts to promulgate or impose
their own vision of moral or ideological truth on the populace for the state
to be considered democratic. Ideological monism and democracy, in both
thought and practice, are incompatible. Church and state, even if the
religion is a civil religion like communism, or a cult of personality as in
Turkmenistan or, to a lesser degree, Uzbekistan, must be separated
institutionally and cognitively. Whatever citizens hold about the extent and
nature of divine revelation of truth, democracy is founded on the
probability of human error, not theological, scientific, or any other
certainty. As democracy arose from the Enlightenment’s critique of revealed
religion that challenged the teachings and power of the church, such
philosophical pluralism is absolutely essential for civil and human rights
to be established. Today as well, debate over the proper place of religion
in a democracy continues throughout Western democracies such as America,
Israel, Poland, Russia, Serbia, France, and other states with a strong
religious foundation to their nationhood.
In many of these cases, we see recognized political figures advocating a
state and social order based on a religious vision of political truth that
expressly articulates a coherent hostility to other religions.(n11)
Consequently, it is not altogether surprising that in countries where large
Islamic populations live, even as minorities, the determination of critical
clericopolitical elites and of societal sectors to impose their version of
Islam as law and truth shows the lack of democracy or a willingness to
entertain its requirements. Likewise, this insistence on an uncompromising
Islamic truth, even where Islamic communities are in a minority, reflects an
absolutism that then evokes a corresponding response.(n12) Even in a Muslim
state as secular as Kazakhstan, Islam’s historical intolerance of pluralism
will make demands for separating church and state and for dismantling all
institutional bases for ideological monism, both religious and civic, highly
contentious, if not violent, issues.
THE ROLE OF WOMEN
More recently, feminist thinkers also have argued that the emancipation
of women, as a category beyond mere citizenship and thus as a class of
citizens in their own right, is an essential attribute of democratic
polities. As Bernard
Lewis wrote:
The emancipation of women, more than any other single issue, is the
touchstone of difference between modernization and Westernization. Even the
most extreme and most anti-Western fundamentalist nowadays accepts the need
to modernize and indeed to make the fullest use of modern technology,
especially the technologies of warfare and propaganda. This is seen as
modernization, and though the methods and even the artifacts come from the
West, it is accepted as necessary and even as useful. The emancipation of
women is Westernization, both for traditional conservatives and radical
fundamentalists it neither is necessary nor useful but noxious, a betrayal
of true Islamic values. It must be kept from entering the body of Islam, and
where it has already entered, it must be ruthlessly excised.(n13)
This emancipation goes beyond according women all of the rights commonly
enjoyed by all citizens of the state to undertaking what Americans call
“affirmative action” to equalize their status in critical ways. Whether or
not female emancipation is an essential component of democracy, women’s more
emancipated role in the West long has been one of the most salient points of
difference between Western and Islamic civilizations. As Lewis noted, it
always has been one of the phenomena of Western civilization that has struck
Muslim observers most forcefully and negatively, and it is the touchstone of
the difference between modernization and Westernization.(n14) To the extent
that female emancipation is now seen as an essential attribute of democracy,
we must admit that when we advocate democratization, we are advocating a
revolutionary transformation of Islam and Muslim societies.
This tension between Western and Islamic societies’ views of women’s
roles suggests that the struggle for female emancipation is a critical and
wrenching barrier for Muslim societies to overcome if they are to resemble
democracies as understood by the West. The salience of this issue in Turkey,
the most progressive Muslim state, suggests the dynamite implicit in this
issue. Indeed, one way in which efforts to initiate a social revolution in
Central Asia historically took place was through the violent and
authoritarian imposition of female emancipation, a campaign whose results
were very limited. Still, this does not dissuade activists from urging
foreign support for a campaign pitched at the emancipation of women
today.(n15)
But equally important, to bring women more fully into society and
political life means reordering economic priorities to restore the social
safety net that has been shredded since 1991 throughout Central Asia. It
means redirecting real resources and money away from self-gratifying
rent-seeking for the elite to investments in urgent social, economic,
educational, public health, and ecological institutions to repair that
shattered network and to provide a basis for a better allocation of
resources throughout the country. That also entails pressures for
legislative accountability and oversight over even more areas of the state’s
economic policy, an indispensable prerequisite of democracy.
NATIONALISM, WAR, AND PEACE
The broader triumph of democracy in Central Asia must therefore go
beyond establishing its institutional prerequisites. Those societies also
must, and probably simultaneously will, undergo what inevitably will be a
wrenching institutional and ideological transformation. Western history
suggests that these transformations entail a prolonged and generally violent
crisis. This is especially tree when there has been no prior preparation for
liberalization or democratization and the old order suddenly collapses,
largely because of its own internal contradictions.
Consequently, to avert violence, a democratic or democratizing polity
has the added burden of shunning what Henry Adams described. His description
of modern nationalism also may be applied to attempts to suppress female
emancipation, which have themselves often been violent. Instead, the
democratizing state, not to mention the democratic one, must accept not only
the points listed previously but also the plurality of religious and moral
troths, and it must refrain from promulgating its own religion. A state
where ideological monism reigns or can be catapulted to power is a state
that will turn on those who are “alienated,” that is, made alien. Since all
states and societies today are multicultural and multiconfessional entities,
wherever we have a state church, whether civil or otherwise, there are by
definition outsiders, class enemies, racial enemies, or “unbelievers.”
Moreover, such a state must be an intrinsically intolerant one whose
intolerance easily becomes translated into militancy in word and deed
against all “others.”
This militancy is not accidental. Ideological monism only can be
enforced at the point of the sword. The state that proclaims an ideological
and hence political monism proclaims itself at war with itself and with
others. Turkmenistan’s and Uzbekistan’s prevailing tendency to shun
cooperation with their neighbors reflects some of this tendency and
strengthens the obstacles to liberalization across Central Asia. But the
monistic state does not only entail a refusal to cooperate with neighbors.
Indeed, it defines the world as being composed of enemies and supporters,
whether it does so according to ideological or philosophical categories
derived from anti-democratic thinkers such as Carl Schmitt, Lenin, or
radical Islam.(n16) This monism was an essential point of Communism,
Fascism, and Nazism, with their imperial and racial cults and various forms
of “fuehrerprinzip” that have decisively influenced the modern Middle East’s
political parties. It is also the essence of radical Islam. All of these
anti-democratic trends come together in the Moslem world’s authoritarian
one-party states that are the most successful Arab and perhaps Muslim
borrowing from the West.
For Lenin, Mussolini, Hitler, and others, their states were threatened
not only by capitalist encirclement, imperialism, and so on but also by
domestic enemies. The internal enemies and the external ones were
confederates or allies, thereby making the former enemies of the state, or
racial or class enemies. Thus the monistic state is by definition a
mobilizational or at least mobilized state whose raison d’être is war
against both internal and external enemies. War and the ensuing
aggrandizement of state power is a permanent project, the state’s Telos and
justification. Whether the enemy be another people, race, religion, or
social class, the monistic state cannot be secure until the other is
exterminated or can no longer defend itself. Such defenselessness inherently
entails a condition of oppression of those so situated. Hence the monistic
state is perpetually engaged in warfare against its own citizens, not to
mention against outsiders. In this respect, the monistic state ranges itself
against one of the cardinal points of the democratic project, namely that
the citizen inherently can defend himself against the state. Should
authoritarian projects persist in Central Asia or neighboring areas, war is
therefore the inevitable, not just likely, outcome.(n17)
Lenin “introduced a state of siege into Russian democracy” and then
globalized it. As Central Asian leaders have inherited those traditions,
they often have incorporated communist as well as other traditional
authoritarian forms of rule into their arsenal. Turkmenistan is the extreme
example of that incorporation. But it is not alone, as Uzbekistan and
Armenia indicate. These states exist in a permanent state of war, or at
least controlled tension, with all others and with key elements of their own
society. Internal and external enemies abound, along with permanent war
scares or heightened tension, and are permanent and necessary lodestars of
the state’s formation and development, whether they are real or imagined
enemies.
In such states, the armed forces and police are generally arrayed in
multiple organizations, each spying on the other to defend the regime in
power and its various cultic phenomena. Thus a reliable guide to the level
of liberalization or democratization achieved by new states is the extent to
which there is only one regular army, police force, and intelligence
apparatus, with each having carefully delineated functions and transparent
systems of real accountability to democratic authorities under law. Where
these organizations have overlapping functions and are primarily tasked with
internal security, we can be reasonably certain that we are dealing with an
authoritarian and intrinsically unstable state. Given post-communist
regimes’ abundant failures in this domain, these are not only incompletely
democratized states, they also are tempted constantly, because of the
failure to exercise democratic controls on their “multiple militaries,” to
launch unending military adventures. Chechnya epitomizes the point both for
itself and for Russia.(n18) But any sober assessment of Central Asia and the
Caucasus locates this adventurism in Armenia and Georgia, as well as farther
afield in Pakistan.(n19) Nor is it surprising that this military adventurism
and absence of democratic controls is tied to an inflamed nationalism among
leaders of these states and to some degree their secessionist “others.” This
analysis would also discern all of the indices of rising militarization and
domestic repression in the last decade even before September 11, 2001.(n20)
Consequently, prolonged peace is essential to the inauguration of a
democratization process that will eventually culminate in what we could
recognize as democracy. This does not mean that pacifism is the only answer
if we want democracy. That assertion is absurd on its face. Rather, the
democratizing state, to consummate its long march to democracy as perceived
by itself and other states, must not be drawn into wars or initiate them.
Avoidance of the monism trap delineated above is therefore both an essential
aspect of this gradual pacification of the undemocratic state and of its
equally gradual democratization. But the avoidance of monism is not in and
of itself a sufficient guarantee that the state will escape either
initiating or being drawn into wars. This leads us to conclude that without
external and internal security–and not the security provided by
authoritarian police forces–these societies are permanently at risk, and
the experiences of the last five years confirm that.
This requirement for avoiding war also most certainly includes prolonged
civil wars. The relationship of war to democracy is not a linear one, but in
the early period of democracy building–a process often related to the
process of state building–the democratizing but incompletely realized
democracy is prone to conflicts that can derail it or provide ways for
atavistic elites to deflect or corrupt democratic possibilities.(n21) The
tendency of incompletely democratized polities to go to war has been
discerned for states as disparate as Hohenzollern Germany and Yeltsin’s
Russia, whose two wars in Chechnya undoubtedly served and were intended to
prevent democratizing trends from prevailing.(n22) The fact that many
functioning democracies have had to overcome internal civil wars as well as
make a revolution (which incorporated elements of such wars as well as
revolutionary wars against foreigners) suggests that such strife may be, or
at least was, a necessary phase of the democratizing process if the first
stages either fail to create a solid basis for progress or go too far and
lead to anarchy.
If this last observation is correct, then these states that have not
become completely democratic must undergo the trials of domestic or foreign
war to become democratic if their regimes fail to evolve. Therefore, to
avoid war we must contribute an impetus for continuing democratization.
Otherwise the accumulated tensions that arise due to blocked democratization
will explode into war. History suggests that it is then unlikely that only
one war then suffices for democracy to ensue.
For Central Asia, these observations point in two directions. On the one
hand, if democracy is to emerge from indigenous democratizing processes,
then to the greatest degree possible, wars, either external or internal,
must be avoided. The requirement for internal and external peace also
signifies that democracy cannot issue out of the ruins of a failed state by
the efforts of that state alone or by its citizens’ exclusive efforts. A
“society” entrapped in a Hobbesian universe of a failed or failing state
cannot begin to fashion a process of democratization, let alone a democracy
and even more urgently a functioning government, that is, a state.
Alternatively, if we are to follow the advice of the American radical
Randolph Bourne, who observed that “war is the health of the state,” we
should try to act and counsel others to act in such a way as to prevent the
undue strengthening of these authoritarian states. Thus, for Central Asia,
two indispensable prerequisites of a future democratic evolution are the
avoidance of either internal or interstate wars and the continuing external
pressure for reform to reinforce the efforts of domestic reformers and to
achieve a more broadly based, transparent, and legitimate basis for domestic
security. All of this must also take place while external security is
guaranteed as well.
Without continuing and combined internal and external pressure for
reform and more stable bases for security, it may only be possible for
democracy to develop because of a war or series of wars culminating in the
discrediting of the old order. However, as we want to spare societies the
terrors of war and the hardships of what might be war’s functional
equivalent, for example, cold wars, we must find or devise alternatives or
create an international environment that mitigates the possibility of war
and that also reduces the scope for local “bad actors” to start them. Thus
the paradoxical relationship between war and democratization provides no
easy answers, but it does seem to point to certain guidelines for action
that are at once moral and strategic in nature.
Specifically, the requirement for beginning a liberalization process
that will end in something recognizable as democracy, in part or in whole,
probably must be sparked by a deus ex machina, an external actor or actors
who reinforce and strengthen domestic trends within those societies. One
existing possibility is that the guarantees of security provided by the
presence of foreign forces in Afghanistan and Central Asia, specifically
NATO and U.S. forces, can provide a respite for terrorism and opportunities
for building security that also could contribute to the general pacification
and democratization of the entire area. Moreover, they are the only
effective barriers to either Russian or Chinese aspirations to hegemony.
Certainly, it is true that without security in Afghanistan, Central Asia is
at risk.(n23) But the converse also holds true, and therefore both ends of
this chain must be grasped simultaneously.
Thus the task of initiating a democratic process in Central Asia
equates, at least in some measure, to the perennial and ever difficult
business of making an existing political order a legitimate one beyond
simply using force. Subsumed in that issue is also the question of how to
use force that is already being deployed in ways that are legitimate and
that can bring about more positive outcomes than has hitherto been the case.
For democracy to evolve–and there is no other way known to us, short of
divine intervention–viable and secure states must precede it. For democracy
to emerge from the unfavorable conditions of Central Asia, those states must
not only avoid violence but also must form effective and viable states
amidst strong international rivalries and even violence. We cannot postulate
a halcyon state of nature from which democracy may evolve, because political
order is always contextual. States exist in a temporal and spatial, that is,
historical, context, a fact that is especially relevant to states that
emerged out of the Soviet collapse and whose nationality was in many ways an
invented or fabricated one.(n24)
Just as continental Europe underwent a long, historical, often
interrupted, and complex evolution before it could actually become
democratic, to begin democratization, Central Asian states probably also
must undergo long-term processes by which their evolving political orders
can attain true legitimacy beyond the simple coercion or bribery of elites.
There are no shortcuts to democracy, and the effort to devise or impose one
will inevitably lead to a catastrophe. Our responsibility is to create the
most auspicious conditions for that strengthening of societal capacity and
the evolution of conditions facilitating a legitimization of a political
process that steadily widens opportunity for economic and political
participation under law. In short, we must simultaneously concern ourselves
with both the internal and external conditions leading to security in these
states while preventing the international competition for influence in the
region from getting out of control.
THE PROBLEM OF STATE ORDER
Any assessment of prospects for democracy or democratization in Central
Asia must duly start from the problems of state order and of constructing
viable and legitimate states. Although this may be unpalatable because it
implies our seeming acceptance of the deformed regimes that presently exist
there, we have no choice. Certainly we cannot build democracy based on a
thoroughgoing rejection of reality. Since democracy only can arise as the
culmination of a democratizing process in the real world, that process only
can take place within a state, that is, a genuine political community,
however presently constituted. And it must be a political process from
within, not one imposed from without. Although there cannot be democracy
unless these states’ sovereignty and independence are consolidated, we can
then insist that this sovereignty must be consolidated legitimately.
Thus the domestic and external circumstances of Central Asia’s birth and
recent development oblige us to focus on both the domestic and international
context within which those states have evolved and are evolving. There is
much cause for anxiety concerning Central Asia, but it has avoided the wars
that have torn apart the Caucasus, Central Africa, and the former
Yugoslavia. Although troubled, these states still function; although we
cannot blithely assume that this sequence will continue uninterrupted, as
the prospects for stable domestic order in these states are under severe
challenge, without peace there would be no debate.
Many of those challenges are well-known. Apart from the dangers of
terrorist or otherwise incited insurgencies, these states must overcome
immature, authoritarian state apparatuses, which all bear to varying degree
the marks of their birth from a profoundly repressive, deformed, and
corrupting Soviet order. Moreover, there is reason to believe that their
level of competence has, if anything, declined since independence, often
because of capricious or misguided state policies.(n25) These strictures
apply not only to political issues and to the quality of the state
administration at the central and local levels but also to the profound
challenges of widespread poverty, some of the most severe environmental
challenges in the world, the lack of basic social infrastructures of all
kinds, geographic isolation from global markets, and potential internal and
external ethnopolitical challenges.
Even before September 11, 2001, these states had become central objects
of immense international competition and internal rivalry, for example, the
widespread fears of Uzbekistan’s potential for seeking to dominate the
region. Accordingly, Central Asia, and for that matter all post-Soviet
governments, confront enduring, dynamic, and difficult internal and external
challenges without any history of cooperation among them or of spontaneous
regional cooperation under the Soviets. Rather, they were parts of a
centralized administration that often deliberately strove to keep them from
being able to play complementary roles for each other. Therefore it is
hardly surprising that mutual cooperation has come only with difficulty or
that they also have found it difficult and often against their interests to
cooperate with Russian objectives, even if the latter were not specifically
aimed at curtailing their sovereignty and independence.(n26) But the absence
of regional cooperation also inhibits the growth among them and within them
of the division of labor that could facilitate demands for democracy within
them and in their interstate relationships. It also weakens their ability to
resist challenges to their security from within or without.
We also can follow other scholars’ assessments that the exigencies of
what the Soviets called state-building, under inauspicious and unexpected
conditions, is a major factor in facilitating the movement toward oil- and
gas-dominated rentier economies and authoritarian polities. Lacking much
else in the way of economic capability, and in many cases being under
immense pressure from neighbors, the short-term benefits, both tangible and
intangible, generated by playing the energy card seemed to many political
figures as perhaps the best or even only game in town, and they chose it.
Since then they have embraced the consequences and have built states based
on short-term, self-interested, rent-seeking policies.(n27)
Thus the situation in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus conforms to
Mohammed Ayoob’s penetrating observations that these states, like other
Third World states, simultaneously face the exigencies of both domestic and
external security without sufficient means or time to democratize or the
resources to compete successfully with other, more established states.(n28)
Not surprisingly, their primary concern is internal security, hence the
appearance of multiple militaries and their governments’ recourse to
rent-seeking, authoritarian, and clientilistic policies. Beyond the
foregoing observation, however, there is one more fact or perspective that
merits our analysis before passing on to prescriptive remedies. Bjorn
Moeller observes that
While in modernity the inside of a state was supposed to be orderly,
thanks to the workings of the state as a Hobbesian “Leviathan,” the outside
remained anarchic. For many states in the Third World, the opposite seems
closer to reality–with fairly orderly relations to the outside in the form
of diplomatic representations, but total anarchy within.(n29)
Yet, as contemporary events in Central Asia and the Caucasus indicate,
local governments cannot take foreign relations for granted. Too many of
their neighbors are more than willing to try and subvert them using force or
external agents who are supported from Moscow, Islamabad, or Kabul.(n30)
Therefore these states face the constant danger of either internal collapse
or externally induced pressure that can align with those internal forces.
Furthermore, their external relations are not confined to diplomatic
representations abroad, but they also embrace an ever wider network of
international financial institutions (IFIs) or supranational bodies such as
the UN, OSCE, or the EU. On top of that, they also have large and growing
NGO communities that are active within them and that are highly articulate
in their critical assessments of internal trends within those countries.
Consequently, for many post-Soviet states, foreign policy’s purpose is to
protect the internal regime from the domestic anarchy that lies inside of it
and that can be stimulated by the pressures of the outside world.(n31) As
described by Mikhail Alekseev, this is reversed anarchy, where the
international state system is not nearly as anarchic as the domestic
political scene is perceived to be.(n32)
If international relations are perceived by post-Soviet leaders to be
threatening to their internal capability to hold and wield power, then more
isolation will be likely. Interdependence or cooperative actions may well be
seen as a threat to domestic security, because in today’s world, where
processes described by James Rosenau as “fragmegration,” or what others call
globalization, are commonplace, greater foreign involvement reduces the
domestic government’s capacity to control events and trends.(n33) External
pressures for reform are resisted if they appear to contribute to pressures
for devolution or deconcentration of powers. If, on the other hand, foreign
support allows governments to suppress threats to their power, then it will
be welcomed.(n34) Uzbekistan’s efforts to extend Islam Karimov’s rule using
U.S. support exemplify this pattern, and we can find other examples
throughout the region where the sad state of democratization has led some
observers to claim that the situation has changed marginally, if at all,
since 1991.(n35)
We may fairly expect that under such conditions as reversed anarchy or
the picture painted by Ayoob and other similar theorists, these governments
will constantly seek to evade foreign relations that entangle them in a
perceived web of dependency that prevents the unbounded exercise of powers
at home. Personal, if not sectoral or factional, interest will thus tend to
supersede any concept of a national interest. Under those circumstances, and
given the obstacles to democracy that we now see, what can be done?
RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS
Despite many rulers’ best efforts, Central Asia cannot escape from the
world, particularly in today’s system of international economics and
security. This fact provides opportunities for external and internal
pressures for reform and for their synchronization, not unlike the efforts
of the Reagan administration to support changes in both foreign and internal
Soviet policy. However, we are not only speaking of state policies.
Certainly all manners of NGOs will continue to cast a harsh spotlight on all
manners of abuse in the post-Soviet world and finally will not be deprived
of the information necessary to publicize them or the means of doing so.
Private and public alliances, states, and institutions working separately
must continue to support those activities, and pressure must be placed on
governments to validate or actualize their claims that they are pressuring
Central Asian governments to reform.
Second, governments, IFIs, and private businesses seeking to invest in
Central Asia, whether the investment be an economic one or one of more
military instruments of power to achieve security, now can leverage their
influence and widen the sphere through which foreign and liberalizing
influences and social forces may enter these countries. But they must do so
intelligently. We must avoid the trap whereby institutions of reform in our
world, when transplanted abroad, become facades for more effective
authoritarianism. Two examples bear mentioning here, the expansion of
Western bilateral military programs and reform of laws so that foreign
direct investment (FDI) can flow more freely to these states. These do not
by any means exhaust the repertoire of instruments available to the West.
Certainly international organizations should try, wherever possible, to
promote regional cooperation among these states. But IFIs or NGOs illustrate
or could exemplify intelligent approaches to the problem of foreign
promotion of reform.
Obviously, the main purpose of bilateral military or mil-mil programs in
American parlance is to train forces in working with the United States and
NATO so that they are reasonably interoperable with those forces and can
augment U.S. and NATO capabilities for power projection and military
operations, including so-called stability or humanitarian operations, not
just war.(n36) But the other major purpose of such programs, as expressed
during NATO enlargement and the Partnership for Peace (PfP), to which all of
these states belong, is to provide a living and successful model of
democratic civilian control over the armed forces. In many of these
programs, too, most strikingly the PfP and European programs, the other
major purpose besides upgrading quality of performance and interoperability
is to create the basis for more democratic structures and behaviors with
regard to civil-military relationships.
In its military action programs (MAP), NATO guaranteed a continuing
process of close monitoring to ensure that aspiring members met its
conditions. Essentially, NATO and these governments entered into a
continuing process whereby NATO reviews their progress in all areas and
works with them to improve shortcomings or encourage further progress along
desirable lines. Aspirants must conform to the basic principles of
democracy, liberty, and so on as set out in the 1949 Washington Treaty, the
original documents of the 1994 NATO summit on the creation of the
Partnership for Peace (PfP), the 1995 NATO study on enlargement, and the
1999 NATO summit in Washington. They also must commit themselves to the
peaceful resolution of disputes; civilian democratic control of their armed
forces; desisting from using force in ways inconsistent with the purposes of
the UN; and being able to contribute to the development of peaceful
international relations and democracy and the various institutions of the
NATO alliance. They would commit to continuing participation in the PfP and
its planning and annual review processes (PARP) to maximize their ability to
contribute to their own and the alliance’s security and missions.(n37)
Although Central Asia’s programs are not nearly so advanced, they do
resemble the PfP programs. These programs should now become part of what the
United States professes to be its larger program of commitment to democratic
reform in post-Soviet states.(n38) We should advocate that both the U.S.
bilateral programs and the PfP therefore be broadened to obtain a more
pronounced democratic component with regard to Central Asia. Moreover, they
should aspire to create the basis for genuine security cooperation among
Central Asian states from the bottom up on the basis of perceived mutual
interest among local governments in marginalizing security competition and
fostering cooperation.(n39)
The current security situation and the unsettled regional security
situation, made worse by Russia’s efforts to obtain its own military bases
and to inject more rivalry into the area, ensure that U.S. and NATO
facilities and bases will remain much longer than anticipated. Indeed, it
would be counterproductive for them to leave unilaterally, as that would
consign the area to Russian military protection that is at once
insufficiently effective, supportive of reactionary domestic tendencies, and
prone to both adventurism and the fomenting of coups d’état against
local rulers. As S. Frederick Starr, director of Johns Hopkins University’s
Central Asia Institute, notes, a new Russian empire or hegemony’s
opportunity cost is CIS members’ modernization.(n40) Furthermore, Russian
suzerainty over the area consigns it to perpetual backwardness,
underdevelopment, and hence authoritarianism and conflict. If Washington and
Brussels are willing to stand their ground on this point, real progress
could be made regarding democratization and regional cooperation. Thus
pressure along such lines should be applied to Washington and Brussels along
with continuing pressure on Central Asian states.
The Impact of U.S. Policy and Presence
The American presence in Central Asia constitutes an opportunity for
radical movements in Central Asia. Still, this has not yet happened, and
many elites seem to welcome the U.S. presence because it not only prevents
terrorism but also is a check on Russian and Chinese designs and elevates
the importance of the region, making these elites feel that their countries
are key players at the center of world politics, rather than on its
periphery.(n41)
At the same time, America has incurred a responsibility due to its
enhanced presence in Central Asia. That presence has obligated U.S.
representatives to call more often and more publicly for further democracy
and reforms.(n42) But it also has obligated them to balance those calls with
an emphasis on the defense of the host state against terrorism and
insurgency, because this presence in some sense represents a defense of
local governments against terrorism. Because the first priority appears to
be the war, progress on getting dictators to democratize has been limited.
They clearly do not want to do so and see no reason or incentive for doing
so. It also must be said that the NGO community pushing for the use of U.S.
power to reform Central Asia all too often fails to realize how difficult it
is for anyone to persuade these governments to behave differently,
especially when they have nearby options of would-be protectors such as
Russia and China who are happy to have them continue in their established
ways. Very often major coercion is ultimately the only answer such dictators
understand, as with Milosevic or Charles Taylor. Although there are many
brave, courageous, attractive, and distinguished personages among the
opposition movements to these regimes, their future success or commitment to
democratic politics is by no means certain. We cannot teach the Central
Asians to elect good men or have democracy fall from the sky, especially in
current international conditions. Nevertheless, the United States is obliged
for reasons of interest and conscience to keep advocating reform.
The twin responsibilities of defense and arguing for reform are
facilitated by the opportunities for doing so that U.S. presence gives to
America. It also offers these regimes a chance to pursue options other than
that of being Russian or Chinese satellites, an option that consigns them to
perpetual backwardness. To be sure, that American presence also facilitates
opportunities for U.S. access to Caspian energy and other raw materials, a
major interest of the U.S. government.
Toward Economic Reform
That success in achieving a substantial economic foothold in the region
does, however, open up constructive opportunities for urging greater
economic liberalization to create conditions that work against an ultimate
explosion due to misrule and lack of opportunity. Specifically, that
economic success gives us opportunities to argue for property rights and
economic liberalization, without which no progress toward democracy is
sustainable.(n43) Beyond that, economic liberalization and the promotion of
more open trading regimes, leading to greater economic interdependence, may
be the key to unlocking the door to greater stability in Central Asia.
Although economic liberalization is indispensable and is indeed a necessary
condition for democracy, it is insufficient. Although international
experience shows that democracy is inconceivable without property rights,
establishing them is only a major step toward democracy, not the culmination
of the journey.
Similarly we must understand that to attract desperately needed FDI, it
is not necessary to have a big bang effect that legislates an end to the
obstacles to it or that imposes democracy in one fell swoop. FDI will enter
even authoritarian regimes if conditions for making money are improved to
the point of worthwhile risk. Although calculation of that point varies by
country, anyone familiar with the realities of legislation knows it comes
about only one step at a time and after a long legislative process that is
anything but direct.(n44) FDI’s liberalizing effects are inherently gradual,
but we can see how it has dramatically improved conditions inside China and
how it has forced considerable devolution of state power and even a more
liberalized regime compared with what existed in 1978.(n45)
But for FDI to take root, legislation must ensure the security and
sanctity of real property rights, without which no true middle class of an
independent civil society can grow. Even if FDI is not intended as a
democracy or liberalization project, the requirements for getting it, a
proclaimed goal of all of these governments, are profoundly subversive of
the status quo. Therefore, we must encourage these governments to pass the
necessary laws and then to promote the ensuing foreign investment.
As part of the recommended broader program of continuing pressure on
governments and supporting NGOS and other activities such as those in the
defense or security sector, we must re-adjust our horizons and support
realistic efforts to ameliorate economic conditions by encouraging FDI,
especially investment that contributes to growth without despoiling the
population or the ecology. Doing so is obviously difficult, but not
impossible, as environmental and growth issues have been addressed elsewhere
with positive results. But this only can be done incrementally over time to
create a climate that leads to favorable conditions for investment. In turn,
once that investment enters, it stimulates further pressures for economic
liberalization and ensuing social change that must then be exploited to
widen the breach in the authoritarian wall. But again this must be done in
ways that channel the resulting dynamism into constructive nonviolent change
whose end point is a cumulative pressure for reform that cannot be resisted.
Nevertheless, recent research suggests that it is essential. One recent
study showed that not only is such openness more likely to work to prevent
ethnic cleansing and even genocide–clearly a risk in Central Asia–but it
also can work to forestall state failure.
The State Failure studies have consistently shown that countries with a
high degree of trade openness indexed by exports plus imports as a
percentage of the GDP–have been less likely to experience state failures.
The relationship holds when controlling for population size and density and
for productivity indicators. It also has the same effect at the global and
regional level. Moreover, trade openness is weakly correlated with other
economic and trade variables. The interpretation is that trade openness
serves as a highly sensitive indicator of state and elite willingness to
maintain the rules of law and fair practices in the economic sphere. In the
political sphere a high degree of trade openness implies that a country has
more resources for averting and managing political crises.(n46)
Fostering such strategic interdependence through expanded trade and
investment openness has, from the American standpoint, two other worthwhile
objectives, which have proven their utility since 1945 in Europe and Asia.
The first is to help activate and reward internal groups and factions
within the economy and society and strengthen their domestic position,
thereby giving a boost to political forces that favor democracy and a
pluralistic political system. The other objective of strategic
interdependence is to create within the country dependencies and “vested
interests” that favor stable and continuous relations. This is often seen
most clearly in the economic realm: International business leaders grow in
number and importance in the target country and raise their collective
voices in favor of political and economic openness and friendly
relations.(n47)
Such policies create formal institutional links between countries and
thus reduce incentives for future conflicts between them or within them.
Similarly, these programs create open and working channels of communication
that allow the United States to influence their policies.(n48) Thus,
These tactics and strategies work together. The more that trade,
investment, and political exchange work to open a country up to the outside,
the more opportunities there are to tie them down and bind them with other
states. This observation follows from a rather simple argument: the more
open a state is–democratic, liberal, pluralist, decentralized–the more
points of contact that a state can have with the outside world. Private
actors in society can directly connect to international organizations and
build extensive non-governmental relationships with similar actors in other
states. The more connecting points and institutionalized relationship, the
less arbitrary and sudden shifts in state policy are likely or possible.
Webs of interdependence are created that mitigate the security dilemmas,
lower the incentives to balance [against the United States] and render
shifts in power more tolerable.(n49)
Similarly, James Fearon and David Laitin conclude that,
[r]egarding prevention, our analysis suggests that while economic growth
may correlate with fewer civil wars, the causal mechanism is more likely a
well-financed and administratively competent government. In specific terms,
international and nongovernmental organizations should develop programs that
improve legal accountability within developing world militaries and police,
and make aid to governments fighting civil wars conditional on the state
observing counterinsurgency practices that do not help rebels recruit
militias.(n50)
These recommendations certainly track with each other and, if
implemented, might produce virtuous circles to strengthen state capacity,
economic openness, and liberalization in a host of areas. But we should have
no illusions that this will happen soon. Rather, this is a long-term
strategy that must begin now to avert what could otherwise be many cases of
state failure within a relatively short period of time. Clearly, domestic
forces in Central Asia are too weak to convince local regimes to launch the
necessary transformative measures to set this process in motion. Arguably,
whatever impetus there is for democratization, or at least for
liberalization that ultimately concludes in some recognizable form of
democratization, it must inevitably come from abroad, as internal forces
cannot launch the process without foreign assistance. But whatever external
impetus might develop cannot offer genuine democracy of its own. It only can
stimulate, support, or at best galvanize existing, even latent, domestic
impulses for reform. However, we must also grasp that the opportunities to
pursue the U.S. agenda of open markets, open polities, and security against
terrorism, not least through domestic reform, for which American
organizations consistently argue, also bring dangers in their wake.
Many of these dangers are well-known. First, a large and visible
American presence can be a target for and a goad to insurgents who can then
ratchet up the violence in the belief that U.S. leadership and the public
cannot stand the casualties and costs of what is admittedly a somewhat
peripheral theater. This belief that the United States has no stomach for
war and casualties dies hard among authoritarians even though there is no
evidence for it. We can be sure that radicals will try to derail any sign of
progress lest it undermine their hopes for power. Paradoxically, successful
reform that is then blocked from further consummation may initially create
more violence in areas that America has taken it upon itself to defend. A
second danger is that the United States, even if it tries valiantly to
impose reforms, will be seen as a pillar of an increasingly despised and
decrepit regime, as in Iran in 1978-79. If a Central Asian or Transcaucasian
ruler spurns U.S. pleas and arguments for reform, yet his country fails
further and further, radical insurgents, Islamist or others, will exploit
that situation against the United States and the government in power. After
all, if America is seen as the exemplar and driving force of the forces of
globalization and of a cultural invasion of the world beyond its shores,
then the perceived failure of globalization or the reaction against it–not
necessarily the same thing–will drive opposition to America and to the
ruling regime as a symbol of corruption, degradation, and so on.
This transformative presence of American culture, mores, sexual
standards, and economics is not something that is under any government’s
control. Certainly Washington cannot and will not try to prevent it. But it
clearly stimulates diverse, ambivalent, but often strong reactions in host
countries, and not only in Muslim ones. But to the extent that the
manifestations of that economic-social-sexual-cultural presence arouse
passions in already overly stressed societies, then all things American
could serve as a negative antipode for the entrepreneurs of identity-based
politics such as political Islam. Thus good governance is ultimately a
security issue, because it reduces the likelihood that the transforming
American presence will place excessive stresses upon a society that cannot
bear them.
To some degree, these risks are unavoidable. Nobody can control
globalization or its manifestations, and it simultaneously generates new
social patterns of both integration and fragmentation within and between
states and societies.(n51) But those who represent America in countries so
different from it must realize that they are constantly under a rather large
magnifying glass with more than enough observers on the other side of that
glass to make a real difference in local politics. Thus the conduct of
troops abroad also plays into this process if there are reasons for
unhappiness over their behavior among their hosts.
The American presence can serve to impel societies and states to
undertake the kind of reforms that Americans believe will avert failing
states and civil violence. The American presence also can ensure defense of
the realm against foreign insurgents, terrorists, and so on. Yet, on the
other hand, and particularly if the regime refuses to grasp the need for
reforms, that presence can become simultaneously a symbol of oppression, or
support for it, and a symbol of all of those forces that have brought about
a social situation where “all that is solid melts into air.” We have long
known that the whirlpool that is contemporary capitalism and globalization
is disorienting in the extreme. When vulnerable personalities are caught up
in it, the results are often tragic and their behavior often becomes anomic,
rootless, and even violent.
The Trans-Caspian states as a whole are experiencing that disorienting
process, and we can see the results in all of the myriad pathologies of
socio-economic-political life there now. But even if the United States might
be blamed for the disappointments of freedom and globalization, it cannot
and ultimately will not stand aside from the effort to bring both security
and liberty to the area. Ultimately, not only its values but also its
interests demand this. And although it will undoubtedly make mistakes and
even frequently fail to rise to the occasion or to understand it, that
failure does not absolve local governments from their obligations to their
peoples. Ultimately, America cannot be more of the Uzbek or Kazakh regime
than those leaders are now. Although it can pressure, cajole, and try to
persuade, it must first secure those regimes against violence from the
outside before it can persuade the leaders of those states to secure their
people, if not themselves, against violence from within.
Finally, one last item that our governments and NGOs can and should do
to encourage democratization in Central Asia and the broader post-Soviet
world is to increase pressure on Russia by our governments, the media, and
other institutions active in these fields. Despite its relative weakness,
Russia will always be a point of reference in Central Asia. There also is
little doubt that the support of dictators in the CIS is seen from the point
of view of strengthening Russia’s great power aspirations there and thus the
interests of the most unregenerate and antireform elements inside Russia.
And in fact, President Vladimir Putin has made clear his aversion to
“exporting democracy.”(n52)
To the extent that we are successful in fostering democratic reform in
Russian politics, that will promote democratization beyond Russia, for
example, in Central Asia, and will force rulers in both sets of states to
move away from the present undemocratic policies. It also will produce
greater security and fewer Russian efforts to impose neo-colonialist and
imperial policies there for empire and autocracy to go together. This also
will create strong incentives for local regimes to reform, as they will be
unable to hide behind Moscow and will have to reckon with the positive rise
in Russian economic power and stability that reform should stimulate. But it
also will reduce both Moscow’s ability to derail Central Asian reform and
its interest in doing so by situating Russian power in more globalized,
transparent, democratic, and international institutions.
Right now, international and domestic developments apparently are
pushing Moscow to strengthen its military-economic hold on the area.(n53)
But that policy embodies a paradox. Its result would be to encourage the
option of perpetual backwardness, misrule, and violence in the misbegotten
belief that this brings security to both Moscow and Central Asia. It also
strengthens the hand of antireform elements in Moscow and Central Asia,
which is contrary to the interests, security, and prosperity of those
states’ peoples. Consequently, Russian support for democratization at home
and abroad must be enlisted if the long-term project of Central Asian
democratization is to succeed.
The picture portrayed here and the steps recommended may seem too bleak
in the first case and too modest in the second. We may be accused of not
doing enough or of being too pessimistic and accepting of the realities that
now dominate Central Asia. However, to realize the dream of a democratic
progressive Central Asia, we must will it strongly enough through persistent
efforts so that it will not be forever a dream. Therefore we must start from
current realities and act intelligently and purposefully to transform them
so that this dream is realized and not deferred. In Central Asia, as we can
see all too plainly today, if we fail to act to translate the dream into
reality, if the dream is indeed too long deferred, it will soon become a
real nightmare.
NOTES
(n1.) Bernard Lewis, What Went Wrong? Western Impact and Middle Eastern
Response (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002).
(n2.) Lilia Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 2003); Taras Kuzio, “Back to the USSR?
Ukraine Holds Soviet-Style ‘Discussion’ of Political Reform,” Radio Free
Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline, 28 April 2003.
(n3.) Igor Torbakov, “Moscow Seeks to Take Advantage of Iraq Conflict to
Reassert Its Leadership in CIS,” <Eurasianet.org> 9 April 2003; Igor
Torbakov, “Russian-Turkmen Pacts Mark Strategic Shift for Moscow in Central
Asia,” <Eurasianet.org> 15 April 2003.
(n4.) Shevtsova, Putin’s Russia, passim.
(n5.) Max Weber, The Russian Revolutions, ed. Gordon Wells and Peter R.
Baehr (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995).
(n6.) Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed.
Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1964), 62-63, 347-48; Juan J. Linz
and H. E. Chehabi, eds., Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
University Press, 1998).
(n7.) Anatol Lieven, “The Not So Great Game,” National Interest 49
(winter 1999-2000): 69-80; Anatol Lieven, “Bobbing for Rotten Apples:
Geopolitical Agendas in Ukraine and the Western NIS” (paper presented to the
Project on Systemic Change and International Security in Russia and the New
States of Eurasia, Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, Johns
Hopkins University, Washington, D.C., 2000); Richard Sokolsky and Tanya
Charlick-Paley, NATO and Caspian Security: A Mission Too Far? (Santa Monica,
Calif.: Rand Corporation, 1999); Eugene Rumer, “Fear and Loathing in the
‘Stans,'” Christian Science Monitor, 2 August 2001; Ira Straus, “Wisdom or
Temptation in Central Asia?,” The Russia Journal, 22-28 February 2002.
(n8.) Robert A. Dahl, How Democratic is the American Constitution ? (New
Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2001); Margaret Thatcher, Statecraft:
Strategies for a Changing World (New York: Harper Collins, 2002).
(n9.) Amy Chua, World on Fire: How Exporting Free Market Democracy
Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability (New York: Doubleday, 2003);
Fareed Zakaria, The Future of Freedom: Illiberal Democracy at Home and
Abroad (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003).
(n10.) Ibidem.
(n11.) For example, Michele Cottle, “Bible Brigade: Franklin Graham v.
Iraq,” New Republic, <; 15 April 2003, discusses how Christian
evangelists in America view Islam and their influence on policy there.
(n12.) Thus France’s minister of interior, Nicholas Sarkozy, was forced
to state that “Imams who propagate views that run counter to French values
will be expelled” and that “Islamic law will be applied nowhere because it
is not the law of the (French) Republic,” Kim Housego, “France Threatens to
Expel Extremist Islamic Leaders,” Associated Press, 16 April 2003, retrieved
from Lexis-Nexis, Lewis, passim.
(n13.) Ibid., 73.
(n14.) Ibid.
(n15.) Belinda Cooper and Isabel Traugott, “Women’s Rights and Security
in Central Asia;’ World Policy Journal 20, no. 1 (spring 2003): 59-68;
Gregory J. Massell, The Surrogate Proletariat (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, 1974).
(n16.) Whereas Lenin’s views are well-known, for an introduction to Carl
Schmitt, see Mark Lilla, “The Enemy of Liberalism” New York Review of Books,
<; XLIV, no. 8, 15 May 1997, and the books cited there. Schmitt
was a major theorist and justifier of an approach to politics that
postulated politics as a struggle between enemies.
(n17.) Olivier Roy, The Failure of Political Islam, trans. Carol Volk
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994).
(n18.) Miriam Lanskoi, “War of the Russian Succession: Russia and
Chechnya between the Wars” (Ph.D. diss., Boston University, 2003); Dmitry
Trenin and Aleksei Malashenko, Vremya Iuga: Rossiya v Chechne, Chechnya v
Rossii (Moscow: Carnegie Center, 2002).
(n19.) Ahmad Faruqui, Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The
Price of Strategic Myopia (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing, 2003);
Stephen Blank, “Central Asia’s Strategic Revolution” (paper presented to the
Conference on Caspian Sea Basin Security, Seattle, Wash., April 2003).
(n20.) Mark Eaton, “Major Trends in Military Expenditure and Arms
Acquisition by the States of the Caspian Region, in The Security of the
Caspian Sea Region, ed. Gennady Chufrin (Oxford: Oxford University Press and
SIPRI, 2001), 83-118; Stephen Blank, “Central Asia’s Strategic Revolution”
(paper presented at the NBR Asia/U.S. Army War College Conference on Caspian
Sea Basin Security, Seattle, Wash., April 2003).
(n21.) Edward Mansfield and Jack Snyder, “Democratization and the Danger
of War,” International Security 20, no. 1 (summer 1995): 5-38; Jack L.
Snyder, Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991); Jack L. Snyder, From Voting
to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Violence (New York: W. W.
Norton, 2000).
(n22.) Lanskoi, passim., Malashenko and Trenin, passim.
(n23.) Central Asia and the Post-Conflict Stabilization of Afghanistan
(London: International Institute for Security Studies, 2002).
(n24.) Martha Brill Olcott, Central Asia’s New States: Foreign Policy
and Regional Security (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1996).
(n25.) For example, Robert C. Rickards, “Business, Bureaucrats, and the
EU in Turkmenistan,” in Asian Economic and Political Issues, ed. Frank
Columbus (Commack, N.Y.: Nova Science Publishers, 1999), II, 212.
(n26.) Martha Brill Olcott, Anders Aslund, and Sherman W. Garnett,
Getting It Wrong: Regional Cooperation and the Commonwealth of Independent
States (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1999).
(n27.) See the essays in Robert Ebel and Rajan Menon, eds., Energy and
Conflict in Central Asia and the Caucasus (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1999).
(n28.) Mohammad Ayoob, “From Regional System to Regional Society:
Exploring Key Variables in the Construction of Regional Order” Australian
Journal of International Affairs 53, no. 3 (1999): 247-60; Idem.,
“Inequality and Theorizing in International Relations: The Case for
Subaltern Realism,” International Studies Review 4, no. 3 (2002): 127-48,
and the works cited therein.
(n29.) Bjorn Moeller’s quote is located in Mikhail Alekseev, Regionalism
of Russia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s: A Case of “Reversed Anarchy,”
Donald W. Treadgold Papers, University of Washington, Henry M. Jackson
School of International Studies, no. 37 (2003): 12.
(n30.) See Faruqui, 2003; Blank, 2003.
(n31.) Alekseev, passim.
(n32.) Ibid.
(n33.) James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier, Governance
in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and
Idem., Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).
(n34.) Alekseev, 12-19.
(n35.) Bruce Pannier, “State Department Sees Little Improvement in
Rights Situation,” <Eurasianet.org> 5 April 2003; Ibragim Alibekov,
“Nazarbayev Embraces Reform, Seeks to Undermine Support for Political
Opposition in Kazakstan,” <Eurasianet.org> 15 April 2003.
(n36.) Roger W. Barnett, Extraordinary Power Projection: An Operational
Concept for the U.S. Navy, Strategic Research Development Report 5-96, U.S.
Naval War College, Center for Naval Warfare Studies, Occasional Papers,
Newport, R.I., 1996, 7-8.
(n37.) “Membership Action Plan (MAP),” Press Release NAC-S (99) 66, 24
April 1999, <;. See also Ambassador
Klaus-Peter Kleiber, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs,
“The Membership Action Plan: Keeping NATO’s Door Open” NATO Review Web
Edition 47, no. 2 (summer 1999) <;.
(n38.) Speech by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
Affairs, Beth Jones, “U.S. Engagement in Central Asia and the Caucasus,
Staying Our Course Along the Silk Road,” University of Montana, Missoula,
Montana, 10 April 2003, U.S. Department of State Washington File.
(n39.) General (Ret.) Sir Garry Johnson, “Security Cooperation in
Central Asia Post-11 September,” Central Asia and the Post-Conflict
Stabilization of Afghanistan (London: International Institute for Security
Studies, 2002): 19.
(n40.) S. Frederick Starr, “Russia and the Neighboring Countries,”
Presentation to the Kennan Roundtable at The Council on Foreign Relations,
Washington, D.C., 24 January 2001.
(n41.) Ravshan M. Alimov, “Central Asian Security and Geopolitical
Interests,” Marco Polo Magazine no. 1 (2003): 3-9.
(n42.) Speech by Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian
Affairs, Beth Jones, “U.S. Engagement in Central Asia and the Caucasus,
Staying Our Course Along the Silk Road;’ University of Montana, Missoula,
Montana, 10 April 2003, U.S. Department of State Washington File.
(n43.) Richard Pipes, Property and Freedom (New York: Random House,
2000).
(n44.) John Hewko, Foreign Direct Investment: Does the Rule of Law
Matter? (Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Democracy and Rule of
Law Project Working Paper no. 26, 2002).
(n45.) Merle Goldman, Sowing the Seeds of Democracy in China: Political
Reform in the Deng Xiaoping Era (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press,
1994); Kenneth Lieberthal, Governing China: From Revolution Through Reform
(New York: W. W. Norton, 1995).
(n46.) Barbara Harff, “No Lessons Learned From the Holocaust? Assessing
Risks of Genocide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955,” American Political
Science Review 93, no. 1 (February 2003): 65.
(n47.) G. John Ikenberry and Jitsuo Tsuchiyama, “Between Balance of
Power and Community: The Future of Multilateral Security Cooperation in the
Asia-Pacific” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 2, no. 1 (2002):
77-78.
(n48.) Ibid., 78.
(n49.) Ibid., 79.
(n50.) James Fearon and David Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil
War,” American Political Science Review 93, no. 1 (February 2003): 88.
(n51.) James N. Rosenau, Along the Domestic-Foreign Frontier: Governance
in a Turbulent World (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); and
Idem., Turbulence in World Politics: A Theory of Change and Continuity
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990).
(n52.) “Putin Speaks Out Against ‘Exporting Capitalist Democracy,'”
ITAR-TASS News Agency, 11 April 2003, retrieved from Lexis-Nexis.
(n53.) Torbakov, Ops. Cits.
ADDED MATERIAL
Stephen Blank is a professor of national security affairs at the
Strategic Studies Institute, at the U.S. Army War College. This is a revised
and expanded version of a paper presented at a conference sponsored by the
Swedish Research Institute in Istanbul, Istanbul, 1-3 June 2003.
From: Emil Lazarian | Ararat NewsPress
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