DIMITRI SIMES: FORCE SHOULD NOT BE AN INSTRUMENT OF WORLD POLITICS
RIA Novosti
17:10 | 27/ 06/ 2008
Interview with Dimitri K. Simes, president of the Nixon Center
Question: Mr. Simes, what could you say about the American presidential
race? Hasn’t John McCain been neglected as the Republican nominee
while Americans were watching the duel between Hillary Clinton and
Barack Obama?
Answer: Quite the contrary, McCain was very lucky that the Democrats
were engaged in self-destruction. Travelling across the country, he was
making speeches as if he were the official presidential nominee. But
McCain has much less money than his rivals because this year Americans,
including potential donors, are not too pro-Republican. He would have
had a very hard time if he had to compete against another Republican
candidate in the same way as his Democratic rivals. But in the event
he managed to outline his positions on major economic and national
security issues, while the two Democrats were shooting poison-tipped
arrows at each other. So he was not in a bad position at all.
Q: They say that ordinary Americans do not care much about foreign
policy and are a lot more interested in domestic problems. Is this
right?
A: To a certain extent, yes. At any rate, Iraq is the only
international issue on the agenda of this election campaign. This
is only natural, because it has a direct bearing on the domestic
situation. The war has cost at least $500 billion. Some authorities,
for instance Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz, maintain that the
real spending is up to $3 trillion. About 4,000 Americans have been
killed in the war. That is a very high price for the nation.
Free trade is another headache. American customers are ostensibly
supplied with cheap Chinese goods and bad Chinese food. This is a
major domestic issue. Problems unrelated to everyday life are given
minimal attention in the election campaign.
Q: It is said that you are well aware which American politicians
influence and advise the nominees.
A: McCain’s group of advisors includes realists who are advocate
a pragmatic foreign policy, for instance, Henry Kissinger and
Robert McFarlane. They support McCain but their influence on him is
limited. Neoconservatives have a much stronger impact on him, and
he has unequivocally veered in their direction. He has adopted their
approach not only to Russia but also to China. He believes that the
United States has the right to use force to spread democracy. He
also thinks that Iran should be threatened. This is a typically
neoconservative approach to foreign policy.
Obama is more pragmatic than McCain and is more open to international
dialogue. He wants to talk to all countries. His opponents criticize
him for this on the grounds that he may betray U.S. interests by
making unnecessary concessions. But Obama is not afraid of such
accusations. He believes that in international relations it is
not appropriate to tell the other side: "We are good and you are
bad," or that "we love your people and will outline your national
interests." Most of his advisors support this line.
Michael McFall, an expert on Russia, strongly criticized Moscow for its
domestic policy and enthusiastically supported the idea of advancing
democracy as the main direction of U.S. foreign policy. But even he
has toned down his language since he joined Obama’s team. McFall,
for instance, objected to McCain’s proposal to oust Russia from the G8.
Q: Speaking recently in Washington, McCain’s close associate Robert
McFarlane reassured his audience that if McCain brings hawks into his
administration and they quarrel with Russia, he will dismiss all of
them in a year. Do you think this is possible?
A: If McCain becomes president, collides with the real world and
America gets a rap on the knuckles as a result, he will not persist
with it. He will bring other, more pragmatic people into the cabinet
instead. McFarlane was not the only one to make this forecast. But
the fact remains that for the time being, McCain sounds more like
a neoconservative.
Q: Some analysts in Russia as well as Europe believe that if Obama
is elected, it will be easier for him and his Russian counterpart
to come to terms because the two young presidents are not burdened
with stereotypes.
What could you say on this score?
A: For starters, I think that Dmitry Medvedev is constrained by
commitments and circumstances. I don’t expect him to make major
concessions in the next few years. There is an idea in America and
Europe at the moment that Medvedev should prove his worth, and not
in Russia but in the West.
As for Obama, we should bear in mind that an American president is a
powerful man. There is no division of power between the president and
prime minister in America. Both positions are held by one and the same
person, which would give Obama a lot of room for maneuver. Moreover, if
he is elected he will be trusted by the Democratic-dominated Congress.
But not everything will be so easy for Obama. Many Congressmen favor
the expansion of NATO, in particular Georgia’s entry. I don’t think
that he would choose to start with this. It seems easier to win the
elections than to get out of this predicament.
Not everything is simple in Europe, either. The new Europe does not
speak with a single voice. I primarily mean new EU members. They
are louder than the others, and they want NATO and the EU to be
more anti-Russian.
Georgia was not admitted to NATO, but it was promised membership, so
it has to be backed no matter what difficulties it has in relations
with Russia.
There is big bad Russia (this is not my position but the view of
many in NATO) and small democratic Georgia. NATO’s duty is to support
Georgia without going into the details of the squabble.
This is why I don’t expect rapid changes. Nobody in Washington is
going to fight Russia over Tskhinvali or Sukhumi. I told President
Mikheil Saakashvili this to his face at a Nixon Center event, and he
got a bit offended. But I told him the truth. There are forces in
America which are ready not only to support but even to encourage
him. But those same forces are not ready to use America’s military
might to resolve Georgia’s problems with the breakaway republics.
Q: But, as we all understand, Russia will not hold itself aloof,
and Georgia’s smoldering conflict with South Ossetia or Abkhazia may
develop into serious confrontation between the big powers. Couldn’t
this be a dangerous turn of event?
A: I do not expect a third world war, or a new war in Europe, or a
war in the Caucasus with serious international repercussions. But
I’m concerned that even minor hostilities in this region are bound
to trigger off political confrontation between Russia and the United
States and between Russia and NATO. This brinkmanship would destroy
all that they have achieved in the last few years. If this happens,
they are not likely to cooperate even on such crucial security issues
as the fight against terrorism or nuclear proliferation. Who would
help his potential enemy? If this happens, allies will be chosen not
according to where they are wanted but where they are available, be it
in Tehran or Caracas. I see this situation as dangerous not because
it may lead to a total war between Russia and the West but because
a local armed conflict may block Russia’s cooperation with the West.
Q: Why is the West supporting Ukraine’s NATO bid, whereas it is clear
that at a referendum the majority of Ukrainians would vote against
NATO entry?
A: Ukraine’s Constitution does not provide for a referendum on its
membership of international organizations. We can argue whether this
is right or wrong, and discuss the advisability of this step and
its aftermath.
This is what Ukrainian society is doing, but the Constitution does
not commit the government to a referendum. They have a legitimate
parliament, which is authorized to make decisions by majority vote
and procedures for endorsing any international treaty.
I recall that at one time Bulgaria wanted to join the Soviet Union. But
if someone wants to become part of your union, you don’t have to
accept this.
NATO was not established to defend its members against
Russia. Its mission is to promote peace, stability and political
predictability. I’m not quite sure how new invisible lines of conflicts
in Europe will enhance NATO’s security. It’s obvious that Russia poses
no military threat to NATO. Threats are emanating from quite different
directions, such as Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and al-Qaeda. It
is not in the interests of NATO to turn Russia from a partner into
an opponent.
Ukraine has its own motives, and NATO has the right to say: guys,
you’ll have to wait. In theory, any country can join NATO. This is
what Ukraine and Georgia heard at the summit in Bucharest. But this
does not at all mean that they will be part of NATO any time soon. As
for Georgia, its entry is not worth a serious discussion. It does not
control its own territory, or, to be more precise, the territories
which it claims. NATO’s Charter does not allow the admission of
countries with territorial conflicts. I believe that Georgia should
make up its mind – if it wants to join NATO it should give up on
Abkhazia and South Ossetia, or it should delay its application for
NATO membership until the problems with these breakaway republics
are resolved.
Q: There are many other formations with unresolved status on
post-Soviet territory, and they all want to be recognized both by
Russia and the world community…
A: Moldova’s President Vladimir Voronin gave Vladimir Putin a different
answer on NATO’s membership. Unlike Saakashvili, he said that Moldova
is not going to apply for it at this point, and Russia has become more
flexible in its approach to the republic’s territorial integrity. I
believe that in general Russia supports Chisinau’s efforts to resolve
the crisis by granting greater autonomy to Transdnestr within Moldova.
As for Nagorny Karabakh, it is not simply unrecognized
territory. Today, it is part and parcel of Armenia; and if Azerbaijan
does not regain it, I don’t see how it may be returned to Baku.
Saakashvili had a chance to launch a process of peaceful incorporation
for Abkhazia and South Ossetia when he regained Adzharia without any
objections from Russia. He had talks with Putin and promised him not to
rush with shutting down Russian military bases. But he did everything
he could to have them closed earlier than was envisaged by contractual
commitments, although they did not threaten Georgia militarily in any
way. Later on he started posing as the leading champion of "velvet"
revolutions and the expansion of NATO’s influence in a region which
Russia traditionally considered its sphere of influence. Finally,
he did not make any social or economic promises to Abkhazia or South
Ossetia. He went in the opposite direction, and eventually confronted
Russia.
Q: Do you think the point of no return has been passed?
A: I think it has been passed for Saakashvili.
Q: What do U.S. politicians think about Russian-European relations?
A: They are not viewed as in crisis. But there are many things on
which American politicians are not fully clear. Thus, they don’t
understand too well how the Medvedev-Putin political tandem will
work. But America will be ready for dialogue with either or both of
them. And any statements either of them makes will be perceived as
articulating Moscow’s position.
Q: Will the war in Iraq ever end?
A: All wars come to an end eventually. But nobody knows when. McCain
rightly said that the scale of war is a major issue. If the war costs
$10 billion rather than $100 billion per year, and if the losses
are brought down to less than 20 soldiers per month, there will be
no rush to stop it. But it cannot continue indefinitely. The war
will adversely affect the Muslim world and divert America from other
priorities. The U.S. administration will look for ways of quitting
Iraq, but it wants to make sure that Iraq does not fall to pieces,
descend into a civil war, or host al-Qaeda bases.
But in America, the president proposes but Congress disposes. It
controls the funds; and no matter what McCain decides to do about
Iraq, he will have to expect resistance from the overwhelming majority
of Democratic Congressmen, who will remember that they were elected
with a clear-cut mandate to end the war. McCain will have to confront
Congress and risk a defeat in Iraq, like in Vietnam, all the more so
because he will have to continue the war without aircraft, helicopters
and ammunition. But this is not even an option. So, he will have to
find some formula under Congressional pressure which would allow him
to do what Obama suggests, that is, start a gradual troop pullout
from Iraq. I’m sure that any president will have to do this.
Q: Does the United States still believe that democracy can be spread
by force of arms?
A: Personally, I have never favored imposition of any values by
force of arms. But the United States came to Afghanistan because of
9/11. By the way, in Afghanistan, America and Russia were partners,
and Russia cooperated with the Northern Alliance, which played a key
role in the Taliban’s downfall.
As for Iraq, it is very difficult to understand why the United States
intervened there. Apparently, some people had some motives beyond U.S.
security. George W. Bush had always wanted to take revenge for the
Hussein regime’s attempt to assassinate his father in Beirut. Some
neoconservatives believed that the war would help Israel. There were
many reports about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq. Although
Russia, France and Germany were not as convinced of this as the United
States, nobody denied that Iraq might have had them. The dictator
was playing highly suspicious games with inspectors. Sanctions were
not working and could not be prolonged indefinitely.
There were fears that this situation, which could be hardly described
as deterrence, a situation of neither peace nor war, could provoke him
into some desperate escapade with weapons of mass destruction. This
is why the majority of Congressmen and the U.S. foreign policy
establishment supported the idea of war. But it transpired later
that the United States was poorly prepared for the war. To be more
precise, Washington was not ready to deal with the aftermath. It
had no idea about the alignment of political forces in Iraq and had
no plan for post-war arrangements in the country. But for all this,
bringing democracy to Iraq was not America’s main goal. This is why
today neoconservatives say that events in Iraq do not discredit the
idea of spreading democracy.
But I believe that the very concept of installing democracy by force
is intrinsically flawed. Also, if we are convinced that by definition
democracy implies the electorate’s right to make mistakes, elect some
people today and kick them out of office tomorrow, we should respect
the right of other nations to make decisions, whether right or wrong.
I think that except in genocide or other extreme cases, armed
force should not be used for changing the domestic situation
in any country. Force should not be an instrument of world
politics. Otherwise, we won’t even know where we will land. The United
States is not likely to be the only country that would want the right
to intervene militarily. Most likely, many other countries would like
to press on with their own ideas, including those which the United
States finds objectionable.
Q: Will President Bush be rated as the worst U.S. president when
he retires?
A: History has it that contemporaries can never predict how history
will judge their rulers. Harry Truman was once rated as the worst
U.S. president, but now he is quite popular. I would be stunned if
Bush is called an outstanding president. But people will remember
that except for 9/11, there were no acts of terror against the nation
and that he did not draw America into any other war but in Iraq,
although some of his associates are tempted to do something about
Iran before they go.
Much depends on the economic situation which his successor inherits. If
the current recession is merely a stage of economic growth, Bush’s
image will be quite positive. After all, presidents are rated not
only for what they have done but also for what they leave behind.