RUSSIA, GEORGIA, AND THE RETURN OF POWER POLITICS
Washington
September 10, 2008
DC
Matthew J. Bryza, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European
and Eurasian Affairs Testimony before the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (U.S. Helsinki Commission)
Chairman Hastings, Chairman Cardin, Members of the Committee, thank you
for the opportunity to discuss with you today the situation in Georgia
following Russia’s invasion and occupation of Georgian territory.
I will focus my remarks on the events leading up to the conflict,
including Russia’s obstructionist role in the international mediation
efforts on Abkhazia and South Ossetia; Russia’s provocative actions
towards Georgia; and U.S. policy towards Georgia, Russia, and Russia’s
periphery in the aftermath of this conflict. My twofold goal is to
counter Moscow’s false narrative, which claims that Russia’s war with
Georgia began when Tbilisi attacked Tskhinvali, and to outline the
Administration’s thoughts on where we go from here.
I speak from the perspective of a U.S. official who has been engaged
in formulation and implementation of U.S. policy on Georgia and
its neighbors for the past twelve years. Throughout this period,
the U.S. Government has remained committed to working with the
citizens of Georgia and their elected leaders to advance democracy,
prosperity, and peace. Georgia has made remarkable pro gress over this
period from a fledgling state embroiled in multiple civil wars to a
young democracy with one of the world’s fastest reforming and growing
economies that is linked to global markets through industrious people,
energy pipelines, and a joint airport with NATO ally, Turkey.
President Eduard Shevardnadze launched Georgia’s drive toward
liberalization and independence from Moscow. President Mikheil
Saakashvili reinvigorated these efforts, guiding Georgia through
a period of remarkable reform that has brought close a compelling
dream: to restore Georgia’s historic ties to Europe that date back
to ancient Greece and to integrate Georgia into today’s Euro-Atlantic
institutions.
Since Georgia’s independence in 1991, each U.S. Presidential
Administration has tried to convince Russia’s leaders that a successful
Georgia will help Russia achieve one of its own enduring goals,
stability along its southern border. We believe constructive relations
between Russia and its neighbors can help advance the peace we assume
all people in the region seek. We also want Georgia to succeed as a
peaceful, prosperous, democratic, and free country.
During my tenure as the U.S. representative to the UN’s "Group of
Friends of the Secretary General on Georgia," the international body
charged with mediating the Abkhazia conflict, I have been struck by
Russia’s consistent refusal to discuss20any of the substantive issues
that must be resolved if there was ever to be a peaceful resolution
of the Abkhazia conflict. My mandate has been to tackle issues at
the heart of the conflict, such as return of internally displaced
persons and the terms of a political settlement. My Russian colleagues,
pleasant and professional as they may be, seemed to have a different
mandate; they continuously bogged down negotiations with our German,
British, and French colleagues on technical minutiae in a stall
for time.
Similarly, during mediation efforts on the South Ossetia conflict
under the OSCE’s umbrella, my Russian colleagues seemed to be
under instructions to block progress toward a solution. When the
U.S. proposed a 3-stage approach of security confidence-building
measures, economic rehabilitation, and a political settlement,
my Russian colleagues welcomed the first two elements but said they
could not discuss a political settlement of the conflict. When Moscow
complained about a lack of military transparency in South Ossetia,
(implying Georgia might be moving prohibited weapons into South
Ossetia’s Zone of Conflict), we proposed that we increase the number
of military observers beyond the eight already authorized by the OSCE;
my Russian colleagues said they were not authorized to agree. When
the United States and many of our friends insisted that Georgia be
able to co-administer the Roki Tunnel connecting Russia and Ge orgia
through South Ossetia, Russia consistently refused and warned it
could not ensure the security of OSCE observers who sought to deter
the movement of military equipment and contraband through the tunnel.
In short, we have continuously tried to work with Russia, acknowledging
its interests and proximity to Abkhazia and South Ossetia, seeking
to address its concerns, and to build confidence between the parties
through various projects big and small, ranging from attempts to
create inter-ethnic business linkages to facilitating trade and
communication across ethnic and administrative boundaries.
Yet from the time Russia got involved in the wars in Abkhazia
and South Ossetia in the early 1990s, it has taken steps out of
keeping with its claimed role as a mediator and a facilitator of the
negotiations. Russia has been handing out passports to the residents
of Abkhazia and South Ossetia for many years; Russian individuals
have invested heavily in property (especially in Abkhazia); and
Russian business has engaged in trade – both licit and illicit –
in the separatist regions.
After the NATO summit in Bucharest in April, Russia backed away from
negotiations on Abkhazia and launched a series of provocations in
both Abkhazia and South Ossetia. On August 7, Russia demonstrated its
disregard for some of the fundamental principles of the UN Charter
and the Helsinki Final Act, including the principle of the non-us e
or threat of force and the principles of sovereignty, territorial
integrity, and inviolability of borders. There will be a time for
assessing blame for what happened in the early hours of the conflict,
but one fact is clear – there was no justification for Russia’s
invasion of Georgia.
This is the first time since the breakup of the Soviet Union that
Moscow has sent its military across an international frontier in
such circumstances, and this is Moscow’s first attempt to change the
borders that emerged from the breakup of the Soviet Union. This is
a troubling and dangerous act.
Today I will seek to explain how we got here, how we’re responding,
and the implications for our relationship with Russia, Georgia,
and the broader region.
Background to the Conflict
The dissolution of empires is frequently violent, and the breakup
of the former Soviet Union was no exception. The collapse of the
USSR was marked by ethnically-based violence, especially in the
South Caucasus. This involved clashes between Azeris and Armenians,
Ossetians and Ingush, Russians and Chechens, Abkhaz and Georgians,
and others. These clashes deepened into a series of wars in the early
1990s that ended without lasting solutions.
Uneasy truces followed, and the conflicts in areas outside Russia
became known as "frozen conflicts."
Two of the disputed regions lie within the internationally-recognized
0D territorial borders of Georgia: Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
In 1992, following two years of armed conflict between Georgians and
South Ossetians, an armistice was signed by Russian and Georgian
leaders. The leaders also agreed on the creation of a tripartite
peacekeeping force of 500 soldiers each from Russia, Georgia, and
North Ossetia, a territory which lies within the borders of Russia. In
practice, however, the North Ossetian peacekeeping contingent ended
up being staffed by South Ossetians. In Abkhazia, brutal fighting
among various armed factions – many of them outside state control –
resulted in large numbers of ethnic Georgians being expelled from their
homes. Before the fighting, the ethnic Abkhaz had been a minority –
approximately 17 percent – in Abkhazia, while ethnic Georgians had
been a plurality of roughly 45 percent.
The next year, 1993, South Ossetia drafted its own constitution,
and three years after that, in 1996, South Ossetia elected its own
"president" in an election in which mainly ethnic Ossetians – not
ethnic Georgians – voted. In South Ossetia, the Ossetian population
comprised about 65 percent of the tiny region, whose total population
was anywhere between 40,000 – 80,000.
In 2001, South Ossetia held another election and elected Eduard
Kokoity as president, again with most ethnic Georgians boycotting the
election. The following year, in 2002, he asked Moscow to recognize
South Ossetia’s independence and absorb it into Russia.
Throughout this period, Russia acted to support the South Ossetian
and Abkhaz leaderships, sowing the seeds of future conflict. That
support was not only political, but concrete, and never more so than
through the continued presence of Russian military forces, including
those labeled as "peacekeepers" from the early 1990s.
Georgia emerged from these post-Soviet wars in weak condition. While
then-President Shevardnadze deserves credit for helping end the
fighting, Georgia could not find its feet; its economy remained
weak and its government relatively ineffective. By the early years
of this century, Georgia was in danger of becoming a failed state,
with a deteriorating economy and a political system near collapse.
In July 2003, former Secretary of State James Baker traveled to
Georgia to broker a deal between then-President Shevardnadze and
his political opposition that aimed to defuse domestic tension and
keep democracy on track. I had the honor to join Secretary Baker for
that mission. Secretary Baker succeeded in negotiating an agreement
according to which Shevardnadze agreed to a set of guidelines to
ensure parliamentary elections would be free and fair and opposition
leaders agreed to abide by the rule of law and avoid violence. All
parties agreed to refrain from retribution, regardless of who won
the election. =0 AIn the end, when the elections were held in the
autumn of 2003, President Shevardnadze acquiesced in an attempt by a
local Georgian strongman – Ajaran leader Aslan Abashidze – to steal
Georgia’s parliamentary elections. This triggered a popular uprising
of hundreds of thousands of Georgians, leading to the so-called Rose
Revolution and Mikheil Saakashvili’s election as president.
It is important to note that Eduard Shevardnadze was a close friend and
partner of the United States and our NATO Allies, enjoying near-heroic
status for having supported democratization while Foreign Minister
of the Soviet Union. His ouster was not something the United States
favored. Yet, when the Georgian people spoke and demonstrated their
democratic right to protest peacefully the fraudulent elections,
we did not stand in their way.
We also did not encourage the protests. But Georgians’ thirst for
democracy ran its course, and we accepted and supported the outcome.
Following his 2004 election, Saakashvili and his government moved
swiftly and effectively to improve governance in Georgia, reducing
corruption, pushing through economic reforms, and welcoming foreign
investment. The Georgian economy started to grow rapidly. At the same
time, Saakashvili made clear his intention that Georgia follow the
path of other successful post-communist democracies and draw closer
to, and eventually join, NATO and the European Union. Although
the y have developed in the past few years, Georgian democratic
institutions remain weak and much work needs to be done to deepen
democratic practices, strengthen checks and balances, and continue
economic reforms; authoritarian practices still exist alongside more
democratic ones, as is the case in many transitional democracies. We
have made known privately, and made clear in public, our concerns
with some of these democratic deficits.
Georgia’s progress, however, was paralleled by increasing tensions
between Georgia and the Russian-supported breakaway territories.
After the Rose Revolution, more clashes occurred between Georgians
and South Ossetians, and between Georgians and Abkhaz. In 2004,
the Georgian side cracked down on an illegal market on the
administrative border of South Ossetia that was renowned as a
smuggler’s paradise. Tensions rose, and a few weeks later Georgians
confiscated a shipment of hundreds of missiles hidden in Russian trucks
bound for Russian "peacekeeping forces" near the regional capital of
Tskhinvali. More clashes ensued, and the fighting stopped only after
a ceasefire in late August. Then in 2006, South Ossetians voted for a
split from Georgia in a referendum that was, again, largely boycotted
by ethnic Georgians in South Ossetia. Although there were efforts to
resolve the differences through negotiations, by late 2007 talks had
essentially broken down.
As Georgia’s ambitions to draw close to Europe and the transatlantic
community became clearer, its relations with Russia deteriorated. In
the summer of 2006, tension increased between Tbilisi and
Moscow. Tbilisi conducted a police operation to eliminate organized
criminal groups operating in the Upper Kodori Valley region of
Abkhazia, which restored the rule of law and the Georgian Government’s
authority over this portion of its sovereign territory.
Georgia later arrested several Russian military intelligence officers
it accused of conducting bombings in Gori. Moscow responded with
a vengeance, closing Russia’s only road crossing with Georgia,
suspending air and mail links, imposing embargoes against exports
of Georgian wine, mineral water, and agricultural goods, and even
rounding up people living in Russia (including school children)
with ethnic Georgian names and deporting them.
At least two Georgians died during the deportation process.
Russia’s provocations escalated in 2007. In March 2007, what we believe
were Russian attack helicopters launched an aerial assault, combined
with artillery fire, on the Georgian Government’s administrative
offices in Abkhazia’s Upper Kodori Valley. In August, Russian fighter
jets violated Georgian airspace, then unsuccessfully launched a
missile toward a Georgian radar station. In September, a Russian
Lieutenant Colonel and Major who were in command of an Abkhaz unit
were killed in a clash on the Abkhaz admini strative border. Other
small skirmishes erupted periodically throughout the fall.
This past year, although Moscow lifted some of the economic and
transport embargoes, it further intensified the political pressure
by taking a number of steps toward establishing an administrative
relationship with both South Ossetia and Abkhazia. In March 2008,
Russia announced its unilateral withdrawal from Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) sanctions on Abkhazia, thus removing the CIS
prohibition on providing direct economic and military assistance. Then
in April, following the NATO Summit in Bucharest where NATO leaders
declared that Georgia would one day be a member of the alliance,
then-President Putin issued instructions calling for closer official
ties between Russian ministries and their counterparts in both of
the disputed regions.
Russia also increased military pressure as Russian officials and
military personnel were seconded to serve in South Ossetia’s de-facto
government in the positions of "prime minister," "defense minister,"
and "security minister."
On April 20, the Russian pressure took a more ominous turn when a
Russian fighter jet shot down an unarmed Georgian unmanned aerial
vehicle over Georgian airspace in Abkhazia. Russia also increased
its military presence in Abkhazia without consultation with the
Government of Georgia. In late April, Russia sent highly-trained
airborne combat troops=2 0with howitzers to Abkhazia, ostensibly as
part of its peacekeeping force.
Then in May, Russia dispatched construction troops to Abkhazia to
repair a railroad link within the conflict zone.
During this buildup of tension, the United States frequently called
on Moscow to reverse its provocative actions and to participate with
us and key European allies in a diplomatic process to resolve these
conflicts. In June and July, for example, the Friends of Georgia
group, which included the United States, Germany, the UK, and France,
urged fellow Friend Russia to engage in invigorated negotiations to
advance Georgia’s peace plan for Abkhazia, which proposed widespread
autonomy for Abkhazia, representation for Abkhaz in all government
ministries and judicial bodies, constitutional protections for the
Abkhaz language and culture, and a new post of Vice President for an
Abkhaz representative.
Russia downplayed these Georgian openings and resisted intensified
discussions, in one case even failing to show up for a mid-June meeting
in Berlin that President Medvedev promised Russia would attend. In
June, I traveled to Moscow to appeal for mutual de-escalation in
Abkhazia by Russia and Georgia; my Russian colleagues replied that
any de-escalatory first move by Moscow was not possible. In July,
Georgia accepted the Western Friends’ request that Russia and Georgia
join the Friends and the Abkhaz for discussions to reduce tension and
advance the peace process. But once again Russia’s Foreign Ministry
refused to send a representative, this time saying that "everyone
was on vacation."
During this time, we continued our efforts that stretched back
four years urging Georgian officials to resist the temptation of any
military reaction, even in the face of repeated provocations. In July,
Secretary Rice traveled to Tbilisi to intensify diplomatic efforts
to reduce tension. Working closely with counterparts from Germany,
France, and the UK, she called for intensified diplomatic efforts
on an urgent basis. While expressing support for Georgia, she also
cautioned President Saakashvili against any temptation to use force
to resolve these conflicts, even in the face of continued provocations.
Unfortunately, Russia resisted these European-American efforts to
intensify diplomatic efforts to stave off a wider conflict. After
Russian military aircraft overflew Georgian airspace in July, in
violation of Georgia’s sovereignty, while Secretary Rice was visiting
Tbilisi, President Saakashvili recalled Georgia’s ambassador to Moscow.
August began with two bomb explosions in Georgian-controlled territory
in South Ossetia, injuring five Georgian policemen. On August 2, a
firefight broke out in South Ossetia that killed six South Ossetians
and one Georgian policeman. On August 3, Russia declared that South
Ossetia was close to a "large-scale" military conflict, an d the next
day, South Ossetia evacuated hundreds of women and children to Russia.
On August 5, Moscow issued a statement saying that it would defend
Russian citizens in South Ossetia. It is important to note that
these so-called Russian citizens were mainly South Ossetians – that
is to say, Georgian citizens – to whom Russia had simply handed out
Russian passports.
On August 6, both Georgia and South Ossetia accused each other of
opening fire on villages in the region.
The Assault on Georgia
On August 7, Georgia’s minister for conflict resolution traveled to
South Ossetia for negotiations, but his South Ossetian counterpart
refused to meet with him and his Russian colleague failed to show
up, claiming his car had broken down. On the night of August 7,
those pressures rose to heights never before seen. Artillery and
rocket-propelled grenade fire broke out between Georgia and South
Ossetian armed forces in South Ossetia.
Georgia declared a ceasefire, but South Ossetian forces continued
firing.
The chain of command of those South Ossetian forces, though not
entirely clear, may have led up to those same Russian officials
mentioned above whom Moscow had seconded to South Ossetia’s
de-facto government. Thus, Russian officials may have indirectly
been involved in armed hostilities well before Georgian forces
attacked Tskhinvali. The Georgians told us that South Ossetians had
fired20on Georgian villages from behind the position of Russian
peacekeepers. The Georgians also told us that Russian troops and
heavy military equipment were entering Georgia via the Roki Tunnel
border crossing with Russia. In previous days, South Ossetian de facto
authorities had asked for "volunteers" to travel to South Ossetia.
We had warned the Georgians many times in the previous days and weeks
against using force, and on August 7, we urged them to avoid armed
conflict with Russian military forces at all costs, as Georgia could
not win. We were blunt in conveying these points, not subtle. Our
message was clear.
Georgia’s move into the South Ossetian capital provided Russia a
pretext for a response that quickly grew far out of proportion to
the actions taken by Georgia. There will be a time for assessing
blame for what happened in the early hours of the conflict, but one
fact is clear — there was no justification for Russia’s invasion
of Georgia. There was no justification for Russia to seize Georgian
territory, including territory well beyond South Ossetia and Abkhazia,
in violation of Georgia’s sovereignty, or to attack and destroy
military infrastructure.
But that is what occurred. On August 8, the Russians poured across the
international border, crossed the boundaries of South Ossetia past
where the conflict was occurring, and pushed their way into much of
the rest=2 0of Georgia. Several thousand Russian forces moved into
the city of Gori and other areas far from the conflict zone, such as
Georgia’s main port of Poti, over 200 kilometers from South Ossetia.
Moscow’s pretext that it was "intervening" in Georgia to protect
Russian "citizens" and "peacekeepers" in South Ossetia was simply
false. It was soon revealed that the real goal of Russia’s military
operation was to eliminate Georgia’s democratically elected government
and to redraw Georgia’s borders. The continued presence of Russian
troops near the Black Sea port of Poti, 200 km from South Ossetia,
further undercuts Russia’s professed objectives in South Ossetia.
Moreover, in the midst of its attack in South Ossetia, Russia launched
a concurrent military assault, in cooperation with Abkhaz separatist
forces, on Georgian positions in the Upper Kodori Valley. By so doing,
Russia violated every existing international agreement relating to
Abkhazia, including the 1994 Moscow Agreement, as well as the letter
and spirit of the documents and discussions associated with the UN
Friends process, including numerous UN Security Council resolutions.
Russia’s attack on Georgia also resulted in the partial disruption
of the Southern Energy Corridor, which discomfited some investors and
suppliers interested in bolstering this supply route and circumventing
Russia’s attempts to assert monopolistic control over the supply
of oil and gas to Europe. The bombingof a strategic bridge near
Kaspi on Georgia’s only east-west railroad also disrupted the flow
of oil on the rail line from Azerbaijan to the Black Sea, while the
Baku-Supsa pipeline also shut down as a result of Russian military
operations. The good news is, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline
and South Caucasus Gas Pipeline continued functioning, thanks to the
foresight of engineers and government officials who designed safety
features and more secure routings into those projects.
The full story of the Russian assault, and of what occurred when
the Russian forces dug in and allowed "irregular" South Ossetian and
North Caucasus militias to rampage through the lands Russian forces
had seized, is still not fully known. We have received evidence of
the burning of Georgian villages in South Ossetia. Russia’s invasion
resulted in a large number of internally displaced ethnic Georgians
who fled South Ossetia to Tbilisi and other Georgian towns. Although
Russian forces attempted to prevent access to the area by humanitarian
aid workers, some Human Rights Watch researchers were able to reach the
area and reported that the Russian military had used "indiscriminate
force" and "seemingly targeted attacks on civilians," including
civilian convoys. They said Russian aircraft dropped cluster bombs in
populated areas and allowed=2 0looting, arson attacks, and abductions
in Georgian villages by militia groups. The researchers also reported
that Georgian forces used "indiscriminate" and "disproportionate"
force during their assault on South Ossetian forces in Tskhinvali and
neighboring villages in South Ossetia. The Georgian Defense Ministry
claimed in a letter to Human Rights Watch that cluster munitions
were used only against "military equipment and armament" (sic) moving
from the Roki tunnel to the town of Java. The letter also states that
cluster munitions were never used against civilians, civilian targets,
civilian-populated areas, or near civilian-populated areas. Senior
Russian leaders have sought to support their claims of Georgian
"genocide" against the South Ossetian people by claiming that 2,000
civilians were killed by Georgian forces in the initial assault. Human
Rights Watch has called this figure of 2,000 dead "exaggerated" and
"suspicious." Other subsequent Russian government and South Ossetian
investigations have suggested much lower numbers. We are continuing to
look at these and other reports while we attempt to assemble reliable
information about who did what in those days.
The Ceasefire, Russia’s failure to honor it, and recognition of South
Ossetia and Abkhazia
In the days that followed the Russian invasion, our attention
was focused on halting the violence and bringing ab out a
ceasefire. President Bush spoke with a number of European leaders
as well as with President Saakashvili, President Medvedev and Prime
Minister Putin in an effort to halt the fighting. At Secretary Rice’s
request, I traveled to Tbilisi to maintain contact with the Georgian
leadership.
Working with Ambassador John Tefft, we helped our Georgian colleagues
think through the ceasefire proposal taking shape. Meanwhile, Secretary
Rice worked with the Georgians and Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, and
with key Europeans including the French as EU President, and Finnish
Foreign Minister Stubb, in Finland’s role as Chairman-in-Office of
the OSCE, to seek to halt the fighting.
On August 14, Secretary Rice flew to France to consult with President
Sarkozy, and then flew to Georgia to seek – and successfully obtain –
President Saakashvili’s signature on a ceasefire agreement.
President Sarkozy had negotiated a six-point agreement which included
the following:
No resort to force.
A definitive halt to hostilities.
Provision of free access for humanitarian assistance.
Georgian military forces must withdraw to the places they are usually
stationed.
Russian forces must withdraw to their positions prior to the outbreak
of hostilities. While awaiting an international mechanism, Russian
peacekeeping forces will implement additional security measures.
Opening of international discussions on security and stab ility
modalities in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.
The U.S. role in this process was central and timely. The Georgians had
questions about the ceasefire agreement, so we worked with the French
who issued a clarifying letter addressing some of Georgia’s concerns.
Secretary Rice conveyed the draft Ceasefire Agreement and the letter
to President Saakashvili the next day. Based on these assurances,
additional assurances from the French, and the assurances of our
support, President Saakashvili signed the ceasefire agreement on
August 15.
The Ceasefire Accord provides for the withdrawal of Russian forces from
Georgia to their positions before the hostilities began, and allows
for peacekeepers in South Ossetia, limited to the numbers allowed
under previous agreements, to conduct patrols a few kilometers from
the conflict zone in South Ossetia, not including any cities and not
in ways that impede freedom of movement.
But, the Ceasefire Accord does not establish a buffer zone; it does
not allow the Russians to set up checkpoints around Georgia’s ports
or along Georgia’s main highways and other transportation links;
and it does not allow the Russians to have any forces whatsoever in
places such as Poti, 200 kilometers from South Ossetia.
This agreement was signed – and should have been honored immediately –
by Russian President Medvedev, who had promised to French President
Sarkozy Russia8 0s immediate withdrawal upon President Saakashvili’s
signature of the Ceasefire. Yet Russia has still not lived up to the
requirements of the Ceasefire Agreement. In these circumstances,
with Russia’s having failed to honor the terms of the Ceasefire
Agreement and its promise to withdraw its forces, Secretary Rice
flew to Brussels for an emergency NATO meeting on August 19 and, with
our Allies, produced a statement in support of Georgia’s territorial
integrity and sovereignty – a statement that was stronger than anyone
thought possible.
Russia, still failing to honor the Ceasefire Agreement, again escalated
the conflict on August 26 when it recognized the independence of
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It did so in defiance of numerous United
Nations Security Council resolutions that Russia had approved and
that explicitly affirmed Georgia’s territorial integrity and that
the underlying separatist conflicts must be resolved peacefully,
through international negotiations.
This outrageous and irresponsible action was condemned by the European
Union, NATO’s Secretary General, key Allies, and – in an unprecedented
move – the foreign ministers of the G7 countries. Other than Russia
and the South Ossetia and Abkhazia separatist regimes themselves,
only one other country, Nicaragua, has recognized these territories
as independent countries.
President Sarkozy traveled to Moscow on September 8 to again seek20
Russia’s compliance with the Ceasefire. President Medvedev agreed to
withdraw forces from areas that Russian troops currently occupy outside
South Ossetia and Abkhazia by October 1 based on the condition that
an international monitoring mechanism to include no fewer than 200
EU monitors deploys to the areas adjacent to the breakaway republics
and a pledge signed by Georgia and guaranteed by the EU to not resort
to force.
Full Implementation of the Ceasefire
Working with our European allies, we demand that Russia fully implement
the commitments President Medvedev made when he signed the Ceasefire
document and the supplementary September 8 agreement. Russia must
withdraw all of its military forces that entered Georgia after
August 6. We are working fast with the European Union to put in
place the international mechanism that will replace Russian troops:
a combination of Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) and EU monitors. Twenty additional Military Monitoring
Officers (MMOs) have already been deployed to Georgia by the OSCE,
part of a group of 100 new MMOs authorized by the OSCE Permanent
Council. The United States has strongly supported these efforts,
spearheaded by Finnish Foreign Minister Stubb, with both political
and material assistance. International discussions on South Ossetia
and Abkhazia will commence on October 15 in Geneva and we will again
work closely with our European partners t o ensure that we not lose
sight of Georgia’s territorial integrity.
Support for Georgia
In the face of this Russian assault on Georgia, the United States is
pursuing four key objectives: (1) supporting Georgia; (2) blunting
Russia’s strategic objectives of dismembering Georgia and undermining
the Southern Energy Corridor; and (3) bolstering our friends and
partners in the broader region.
First, we must support Georgia. We seek to address humanitarian
concerns; sustain confidence in Georgia’s economy and restore economic
growth; preserve the Georgian people’s democratic right to elect and
maintain their leaders, and assist them in strengthening the country’s
internal political checks and balances.
We have already taken immediate steps to address Georgia’s humanitarian
needs. The United States has provided over $38 million worth of
humanitarian aid and emergency relief, including food, shelter, and
medical supplies, to assist the people of Georgia. U.S. aircraft made a
total of 59 relief flights to Georgia from August 13 through September
3, and on August 24 and 27, 115 tons of emergency relief commodities
arrived in Batumi on the USS McFaul and the USCGC Dallas. In addition,
a third ship, the USS Mount Whitney anchored in Poti on September 5,
delivering an additional 17 tons of emergency relief commodities that
will be delivered by USAID non-governmental organization partners. On=2
0 September 3, UNHCR reported that 90,500 individuals have returned
to places of origin, following the August conflict. However, UNHCR
staff note that the number of returnees may be significantly higher
due to the passage of time, as well as the difficulty of accurate,
in-field returnee counts. According to UNHCR, approximately 30,000
individuals may be displaced in the long term.We have been working
with the Government of Georgia and seven relief organizations to
ensure that our assistance gets to internally displaced people and
other conflict-affected populations.
On September 3, Secretary Rice announced a major effort to help meet
Georgia’s pressing humanitarian needs, repair infrastructure damaged
by Russia’s invasion, sustain commercial confidence, and restore
economic growth. $570 million, the first phase of a $1 billion United
States economic support package, will be made available by the end
of 2008 and will include emergency direct support to the Georgian
Government. While this funding works to sustain Georgia’s near-term
economic viability and offset the public financing gap and revenue
decline caused by the crisis, ongoing U.S.
programs will continue to strengthen Georgia’s democratic
institutions, including through support for judicial independence,
government transparency and accountability, and stronger checks and
balances between Georgia’s branches of government. We will be working
extensively with Congress in th e days to come to fine tune how the
assistance will be delivered. We are hopeful that there will be strong
bipartisan backing for a second phase of support, an additional $430
million to be provided in future budgets.
Georgia, like any sovereign country, should have the ability to
defend itself and to deter renewed aggression. The Department of
Defense has sent an assessment team to Tbilisi to help us begin to
consider carefully Georgia’s legitimate needs and, working with our
Allies, develop our response. For several years, the United States
has played a significant role in preparing Georgian forces to conduct
counterterrorism missions, first as part of an effort to help Georgia
rid its Pankisi Gorge of Chechen and other extremists and then as part
of multinational coalition efforts. NATO’s North Atlantic Council
decided on August 19 to develop a NATO-Georgia Commission aimed at
supporting Georgia’s relations with NATO. NATO has also decided to
help Georgia assess the damage caused by Russia’s invasion, including
to the Georgian Armed Forces, and to help restore critical services
necessary for normal public life and economic activity.
NATO has sent an advisory support team to Georgia and its Special
Representative for the Caucasus and Central Asia. The North Atlantic
Council Permanent Representatives plan to visit Georgia in the
near future.
Finland’s Foreign Minister Alexander Stubb, the OSCE Chairm
an-in-Office, showed strong and effective leadership in working with
French Foreign Minister Kouchner to lay the diplomatic foundation
for the ceasefire agreement and activate the OSCE’s crisis response
mechanisms.
Blunting Russia’s Strategic Objectives
Our second key objective is to prevent Russia from drawing a line
through Europe and declaring that nations on the wrong side of
that line belong to Moscow’s "sphere of influence" and therefore
cannot join the great institutions of Europe and the transatlantic
family. President Medvedev’s recent statement of Russia’s foreign
policy principles implies such a claim.
The United States does not believe in or recognize "spheres of
influence." Since 1989, the United States – under the leadership
of Presidents George H. W. Bush, President Clinton, and President
George W.
Bush – has supported the right of every country emerging from
communism to chose the path of its own development, and to choose the
institutions – such as NATO and the European Union – that it wants
to associate with and join. Each country must show itself ready to
meet the standards of the institutions it seeks to join. That is
its responsibility, and Georgia and Ukraine should be treated no
differently than other European countries seeking to join European
and transatlantic institutions.
NATO and EU enlargement has been20the institutional embodiment of the
slogan, "Europe whole, free, and at peace." A Europe whole, free, and
at peace has been good for Europe, good for the countries on Europe’s
periphery, and, I would argue, good for Russia, which now faces the
most benign set of countries to its west in all of its history.
Europe whole, free, and at peace should include Russia; and throughout
this process the United States and Europe sought to deepen ties with
Russia in parallel with the growth of Western institutions throughout
all of Europe.
But Europe whole, free, and at peace certainly does not mean that
Russia gets to veto the right of independent countries to choose their
future, and especially not through intimidation and threats. We want
to respect Russia’s legitimate interests. But we will not sacrifice
small nations on the altar of great power expediency.
Shoring Up Friends on the Periphery
Third, we need to explore ways to shore up other countries on Russia’s
periphery, and take advantage of some possible opportunities offered
by the fallout from Russia’s invasion of Georgia. Above all, we
need to remove other opportunities for Russia to fish in troubled
waters. The best way to do so is to redouble our efforts to ease
tensions and resolve conflicts throughout the region. This past
weekend, the leaders of Turkey and Armenia took an important step
toward reducing the long-standing tensions that have kept their border
closed for the past 15 years. We applaud the initiative of Armenian
President Sargsyan to invite his Turkish counterpart to Yerevan, and
Turkish President Gul’s willingness to accept the invitation. Their
meeting has not resolved their countries’ bilateral problems, but
it has created a new atmosphere in the relationship, and given hope
that a long-overdue thaw has begun. The normalization of relations
between Turkey and Armenia would not only ease Armenia’s isolation,
but would help open up trade and transportation routes for the entire
South Caucasus.
Closely connected to the question of Turkish-Armenian rapprochement
is resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The consequences of
this unresolved conflict have weighed like a millstone around the
neck of the entire South Caucasus. Its costs can still be counted
in terms of refugees and internally displaced persons- nearly a
million altogether – provinces denuded of population, lost economic
opportunities, and disrupted trade. It is hard to identify any
real winner in this situation, and the shock of Russia’s assault on
Georgia might have the unintended effect of encouraging the parties
to show greater flexibility and creativity in their negotiations. The
U.S. Government will do all it can to encourage such flexibility. We
will do everything possible to promote a just and lasting settlement
of the Nag orno-Karabakh conflict that proceeds from the principle of
our support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity, and ultimately
incorporates other elements of international law and diplomatic
practice.
The Russian assault on Georgia should also serve as a wake-up call
to strengthen the southern energy and transport corridor from the
Caspian region to Europe. Russia’s past willingness to use energy
as a means of coercion had already cast doubt upon its reliability
as a supplier. The new willingness to use force to change borders on
its periphery makes Russia an even more dangerous and unpredictable
partner. Russia might have hoped that its war on Georgia would frighten
away investors and disrupt pipelines. If the various players along
the southern route draw the appropriate lessons from the invasion
and show the requisite wisdom and flexibility, Russia’s actions might
actually forge a stronger consensus on the importance of a southern
corridor. The good news is, the corridor through which large volumes
of Azerbaijani and other Caspian gas will run to Turkey and the rest
of Europe were unscathed by Russia’s military operations.
Working closely with our Allies, we can ensure this corridor expands
and continues to attract the investment required to help Europe
diversify its supply of one of its most important commodities,
natural gas.
Thank you. I look forward to taking your questions.