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ARMENIANS OF FRANCE DEMAND A LAW AGAINST GENOCIDE DENIAL

Gibrahayer
Oct 7, 2008

Jean Eckian – Independent correspondent, Paris, October 1, 2008 –
About 300 Armenians gathered yesterday, October 1, in front of the
French Senate to require that the socialist bill, punishing with
one year imprisonment and 45,000 euros fine, the denial of Armenian
genocide adopted by The National Assembly (October 12, 2006), is
approved by senators as soon as possible.

Indeed, the past two years, France has been the scene of intense
denials with several desecrations of memorials and threats on the
individuals.

It’s with the slogan Â"Denial is a crime. For punishing it, I want
a Law! Â" chanted by the crowd, that several speakers of Armenian
organizations of France and French deputies have called the senators
to understand that civil security and public order are threatened
on French soil in the disrespect of the law of January 2001, which
stipulates:Â" France recognises publicly the Armenian genocide of
1915 Â".

Today, the Coordination Council of Armenian Organizations of France
(CCAF) which had joined film director Robert Guediguian and his wife,
actress Ariane Ascaride, request that senators put the sanction of
the Armenian Genocide in the agenda of their work.

On In October 2006, at the casting of the French positive vote,
Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, ha d declared in Erdine
(Turkey), Â" Because of certain limited representatives, France whom
we know as the country of freedom is obliged to live with this shame
Â", he had hammered. " If France does not cancel this text, It is
she who will lose and not Turkey ", he said.

Mourad Papazian, chairman of ARF Dashnaktsoutiu n Europe, in particular
announced another gathering in front of the French Senate on November
22 when nearly 10,000 people are expected to attend.

–Boundary_(ID_3a9HGfsh3ASd49/oachFsA)–

AZERBAIJAN, TURKEY GOING TO SPLIT GEORGIA INTO AUTONOMIES?

PanARMENIAN.Net
07.10.2008 14:18 GMT+04:00

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ According to some Turkish and Azeri sources, Baku
and Ankara intend to increase pressure on Georgia for "federalization"
of the country.

Turkey and Azerbaijan are going to urge Tbilisi to restore Ajaria’s
de facto autonomy, to grant a special status to the Azeri minority
of Kvemo-Kartli and repatriate Turks-Meskhetians to Georgia.

Ajarian autonomy has been actually abolished by Saakashvili’s
government in 2004. Pursuing a tough policy of "georgification",
Tbilisi forces Ajars to register as Georgian Muslims. Turks-Meskhetians
are urged to restore "their Georgian surnames."

Azeri media quoted a source in the Foreign Ministry as saying that
Baku launches the procedure of granting Azerbaijani citizenship to the
residents of Georgia’s Kvemo-Kartli (Borchaly). The source said that
upon completion of the procedure, Azerbaijan will demand a status of
autonomy for the region and in case of Georgia’s rejection will send
troops there, RBC-daily reports.

Meanwhile, Milliyet Turkish daily quoted a Turkish MFA official who,
on condition of anonymity, spoke of ‘guarantees of Turkic population
in Georgia.’ Creation of a federation is the only way to maintain
Georgia’s territorial integrity, according to him.

GOING FOR GAS
By Roberts, John

RedOrbit
Wednesday, 8 October 2008, 03:00 CDT
TX

Europe needs oil and gas from the South Caucasus and the Caspian. So
while the conflict between Georgia and Russia might appear to be
mainly about territory, the biggest practical effects are being felt in
energy supply. None of the solutions is especially appetising. a FEW
DAYS AFTER THE END OF THE GEORGIAN WAR, MAJOR flows resumed through
the twin arteries than carry Azerbaijani oil and gas to Europe:
the $4 billion Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the $1
billion Baku-Tbilisi-Erzerum (BTE) gas pipe. But the restoration of
the greater part of Azerbaijan’s export capacity masked a string
of underlying problems that will force companies and governments,
producers and consumers, to re-evaluate energy policy in general and
their reliance on routes through the South Caucasus in particular.

For companies, the problems range from the immediate to the long-
term. Chevron faces a particularly acute headache as it seeks a
way to get its increased oil production at Kazakhstan’s giant Tengiz
oilfield to market. This at a time when there were already constraints
on both pipeline movements across Russia and rail traffic via Russia
and Ukraine. Now it has to re-evaluate its plans for increased flows
through the South Caucasus.

Long-term problems include Kazakhstan’s scheme to ship up to half
a million barrels a day of crude oil to Azerbaijan – for input into
an expanded BTC and delivery to world markets via Ceyhan. Then there
are joint Azerbaijani and Kazakh plans to develop port facilities and
refineries on Georgia’s Black Sea coast as part of a broader effort
by their state oil companies to create a presence in the Black Sea,
Turkey and the European Union (EU).

But if oil is the immediate concern, perhaps the biggest long term
worries confront Europe as it grapples with the consequences for its
gas policy.

Before the war, the EU – and Turkey – had been looking to develop a
‘Fourth Corridor’ to carry Caspian and Middle Eastern gas from the
Caspian to Europe, thus matching existing corridors bringing gas
from Russia, Norway and Algeria. The Georgian war will make it much
harder for western companies to raise commercial finance for new gas
lines in the Caspian, the South Caucasus and the Black Sea and for
companies alone to secure the necessary commitments, both to provide
the gas upstream and to buy it downstream.

In effect, the EU and its principal gas consumers now have to consider
four very different options concerning gas policy. The first two
depend on whether the EU, by design or neglect, chooses to abandon
the Fourth Corridor concept.

* Option One: Forge a new energy relationship with Russia to ensure
an increased flow of gas from or through Russia. This would have to
be done against a background of great mutual suspicion. Moreover,
Europe still has no answers to perhaps the most worrisome question of
all: is Russia putting in place the kind of gas investment plans that
would enable it to deliver, in a transparent and predictable manner,
the increased volumes on which European gas policy was predicated
before the Georgian war? Or is Moscow simply planning to secure the
additional gas Europe needs from Central Asia, buying at one price
and then selling Russian – or Central Asian – gas at quite another
to its European customers?

* Option Two: Drastically cut back the projected growth of gas
imports by switching rapidly to other forms of energy. This is a
painful choice since much of Europe’s hopes of meeting its climate
change targets depend on continued use of gas in preference to oil
and, especially, coal. It will be very expensive in the short run,
though beneficial in the long, to ensure that renewables – not oil
and coal – take the place of missing gas supplies and so ensure that
climate change targets remain attainable.

The last two options follow from a commitment to proceed with the
Fourth Corridor.

* Option Three: Turn to Iran. This not only requires resolution of the
Iranian nuclear dispute, but also a radical change of policy in Iran
to ensure production capable of filling a major 30 billion cubic meters
per year gas pipeline to Europe such as Nabucco. Iran’s gas development
programmes are running slow, while the vast majority of the gas is
earmarked for domestic use, not least to maintain oil production.

Moreover, so long as Iran stands to earn far more from oil sales than
it does from gas, it is unlikely to look for more than a token level of
exports – perhaps around the 10 billion cubic meters per year mark –
for delivery to European customers beyond Turkey. It is reasonable to
suppose, however, that Iraq might also produce an equivalent amount
for export to EU markets.

* Option Four: Push ahead with plans for increased gas purchases from
Caspian suppliers. But consumer countries – and particularly their
governments – may have to exert well over twice the effort to secure
perhaps only half of what they hoped to accomplish in their pre-war
energy diplomacy with Caspian gas producers. Governmental commitments
may tap into Azerbaijani gas, but, after the Georgian war, it is hard
to see them developing a trans-Caspian pipeline to reach Turkmen gas.

Azerbaijan’s dependence on existing infrastructure, and the role
played by major western companies in developing both its resources
and the accompanying export systems, make it possible to envisage
continued development of Azerbaijani gas resources beyond the Phase
Two expansion of the giant Shakh Deniz gas field that should produce
around 21 to 25 billion cubic meters between 2014 and 2016, thus
filling the BTE line to its designated 20 billion cubic meters per
year capacity, with some to spare for domestic needs.

But it will almost certainly require European governments, or the
EU, to underwrite long-term agreements. These would be not only for
the purchase of specific volumes of Azerbaijani gas and for gasline
security to bring them to market, but also, if necessary, for the
physical construction of new infrastructure projects, such as the 30
billion cubic meters per year Nabucco, designed to serve EU markets
as a whole.

Who else will underwrite the increasing political risk of projects in
the South Caucasus? It is hard to see commercial banks being willing
to invest in fresh schemes involving transit across Georgia while
the military situation remains, to say the least, delicate.

Even before the conflict, there was serious discussion about the
need for governmental guarantees on volumes, now they are absolutely
essential. Governments will have to play a far more active role while
anticipating smaller returns, since the Georgian war, and unrest in
Turkmenistan itself, are now prompting Ashkhabad to adopt a far more
cautious approach to a trans-Caspian pipeline.

Officially, Turkmenistan’s view is that pipelines across the Caspian
are purely a matter for the states at either end of the line;
in practice, it is likely to think twice before flouting Russian
beliefs that no trans-Caspian pipeline should be built without the
approval of all five Caspian littoral states. This would effectively
give Russia a veto on a potential gas pipeline from Turkmenistan or
Kazakhstan to Azerbaijan, or a prospective oil pipeline from Kazakhstan
to Azerbaijan.

ON THE PIPELINES

As EU energy officials ponder these issues – and the equally important
task of developing a proper Europe-wide gas distribution grid –
much will depend on Russia’s attitude. A full Russian withdrawal
from positions in Georgia outside the boundaries of South Ossetia and
Abkhazia would obviously improve the environment significantly. But,
at the time of writing, Russian troops still occupy undisputed parts of
Georgia that have immediate implications for regional energy security.

In mid-September, Russian forces were still close to and possibly
astride the 150,000 barrels per day Baku-Supsa line – which remains
shut by force majeure – and either on or beside key road and rail
routes routinely used for ferrying oil from Azerbaijan and energy
industry components. They were due to withdraw from such positions
under a September 8 agreement brokered by French President Nicolas
Sarkozy. And indeed some positions had been relinquished.

Near Gori, Russian troops were just 25 kilometres north of the giant
twin pipelines, BTC and BTE, which carry Azerbaijani oil and gas
across Georgia to Turkey.

At the same time, Russian-equipped Armenian forces hold positions in
the disputed territory of Nagorny-Karabagh just 15 kilometres south
of the BTC. At the very least, one consequence of Russian willingness
to use overwhelming force in support of its objectives should be
to make Azerbaijan think twice about considering a military option
to recover Armenian-occupied territory for fear of losing its main
energy export systems.

If the Georgian war has sparked one overriding political change that
carries over into the energy sphere, it is that the time available
for taking decisions has shrunk phenomenally. After NATO’s military
intervention in Kosovo in 1999, NATO and the EU, in cooperation with
the United Nations, spent nine years trying both to rebuild Kosovo
and to secure an international consensus about its future. Russia,
on the other hand, took just nine days to move from the official end
of its military operations on August 17 to its declaration on August
26 that it was recognising the independence not only of the territory
that was the subject of its military intervention, South Ossetia,
but of another, Abkhazia, which had not even been directly involved
in recent fighting. RAPID MOVES

In practice, Russia demonstrated – under some provocation from Georgian
President Mikheil Saakashvili’s assault on South Ossetia – just how
rapidly it was prepared to use the full panoply of state power to
change conditions on the ground. In the wake of the war there are
major questions that only Russia can answer.

Does Russia worry that it may have overstepped the mark? How much is it
concerned that it has failed to secure support from its Central Asian
partners – and China – in the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation? How
much is it anxious about not being part of a wider world community,
staying out of the World Trade Organization, being sidelined in the G8
group of leading economies, developing what may prove to be little or
nothing more than an energy economy, not a broad based industrial –
let alone post-industrial – economy? Has Russia put all its eggs in
one basket?

One question in particular requires an answer. How much is Russia
concerned that European consumers fear it may not be able to produce
the kind of increase in energy exports that they expect? this factor
is all the more important if, as a result of the Georgian crisis,
there is less Caspian energy available for export to Europe and less
investment for new infrastructure inside Russia?

These are big questions and, in large part, the answers depend on
Russian actions in the Caucasus. Russia may not have started this
war, but it increasingly looks as if it is up to Russia to finish
it. The terms on which Russia does that will determine our common
energy future.

EUROPE’S NEED FOR GAS

No-one really knows just how much gas Europe will require over
the next decade or two, precisely because so much depends on policy
choices taken both by European consumers and by current or prospective
suppliers. But it is not disputed that – short of a radical change of
emphasis away from gas – the likelihood of a sharp decline in European
domestic gas production means there will be a need for increased
gas imports. Brendan Devlin, a senior EU official trying to develop
the Fourth Corridor concept, estimated in April that increased gas
imports between 2005 and 2020 were expected to range between 71 and
204 billion cubic meters.

John Roberts, ENERGY SECURITY SPECIALIST FOR PLATTS. HIS BOOK,
PIPELINE POLITICS: THE CASPIAN AND GLOBAL ENERGY SECURITY, IS

Copyright Royal Institute of International Affairs Oct 2008

(c) 2008 World Today, The. Provided by ProQuest LLC. All rights
Reserved.

MOMENTS OF UNCERTAINTY
Simon Birch

NY Arts Magazine
Oct 6, 2008
NY

Simon Birch, Painting at the Brink of Death 3, 2008. Oil on canvas,
152 x 152 cm. Courtesy of 10 Chancery Lane Gallery

I’m a U.K.-born artist of Armenian descent who’s been living in Hong
Kong for many years. I came there by accident, and was able to make
enough money, working construction, to finance the staging of my
own exhibitions of figurative oil paintings. Within a few years I
was selling well enough to quit the day job and signed with a great
contemporary gallery, 10 Chancery Lane Gallery, which I’m still
with today.

Though the bulk of my work is still figurative, large oil paintings,
over the last few years I’ve ventured into film and installation work
culminating in two particularly notable large-scale projects. They
are 2007’s Azhanti High Lightning at Singapore’s Nanyang Academy of
Fine Arts, an installation in seven parts squeezed into a 50-meter
long gallery, and This Brutal House in April of 2008 at 10 Chancery
Lane’s new project space in Hong Kong, a show spread over three
large galleries and divided into many parts. These large multiple
media projects included film, paintings, installation, sculpture,
and performance housed in many different spaces.

I’m interested in ideas of transition, the ambiguous moment between
an initiation and a conclusion. I choose to represent this in an
environment of theater and spectacle. I want the environment where
my works are housed to envelop the viewer, so the process of viewing
becomes experiential. Painting is the foundation of the multiple media
works. I find the labor and energy involved in the oil and pigment
informs those other visual processes. It’s exciting for me to live
in a time where all these mediums are so accessible and possible,
with my imagination only limited by money and space.

I try to give the viewer the experience that I would want from an
exhibition: overwhelming and complex, a spectacle, an adventure and a
visual aesthetic. I work obsessively in my Hong Kong studio spending
half my time painting and the other half, planning and scheming,
designing and coordinating production, or hunched over my Mac editing
film. I’m currently preparing work for a number of upcoming art fairs,
including the Melbourne Art Fair, Shanghai Art fair, and the Armory
show in New York City, as well as producing a large installation
for the Hong Kong Museum of Art, and planning my next solo show,
which will be another multiple medium spectacle.

Further to this I’m finishing an autobiography/documentation in
collaboration with a couple of Chinese photographers, which focuses
on my survival of cancer this year, a condition from which I was
not expected to live beyond a few months, which I’ve now gratefully
overcome.

THE SO-CALLED ‘GENOCIDE OF MOUNTAIN JEWS’ ALLEGEDLY COMMITTED BY ARMENIANS IS FICTION

AZG Armenian Daily
07/10/2008

National Interests

Despite the negative lessons of cultivating enmity around the South
Ossetian and Abkhazian conflicts and deliberations about Turkey’s
Platform of Stability and Security, the Azerbaijani special propaganda
continues poisoning the public conscience with misinformation",
Head of the Institute of National Strategic Studies of the Armenian
Defense Ministry, Major-General, Doctor of Political Sciences Hayk
Kotanjian said when commenting allegations in Azeri mass media that
the Knesseth has made decision to investigate the "genocide" against
Mountain Jews in the north of present Azerbaijan at the beginning of
the 20th century perpetrated by Armenians.

According to Kotanjian, the so-called "genocide against Mountain
Jews" is pure fiction imposed on the public conscience of Israel and
Jewish Diaspora by Azeri special propagandists and their foreign
partners. "These actions aim to undermine the friendship between
Jewish and Armenian peoples having very much in common in their
centuries-old history. Besides the gift to support their century-old
cultural and historical identity and develop the intellectual potential
of hundreds of generations, our people are united by the disastrous
hardship of Genocide and Holocaust, as well as by the experience of
heroic surviving and rebirth of statehood as the Republic of Armenia
and the State of Israel", he said.

One thing is clear: the falsifiers’ fuss is immoral, actually, it is
sneering at the memory of Armenians exterminated by gangs of Caucasian
Tatars in places of century-old friendly co-existence of Armenians
and Mountain Jews. Experts of invention of "genocide" are trying to
pass off the remains of these Armenians, victims of the massacre, as
the remains of Jews allegedly killed by Armenians. The matter concerns
the crimes of the gangs which at that time exterminated in the north
of Azerbaijan several thousands of Russian officers and soldiers who
were returning home from the Caucasian frontline, Kotanjian said.

SOUTH CAUCASUS: STABILITY PLATFORM AND CONFLICTS

International Analyst Network

05 Oct 2008
NY

RUBEN SAFRASTYAN ON TURKEY’S NEW UNDERTAKING IN SOUTH CAUCASUS

The five day long war in August between Russia and Georgia have
resulted important changes in South Caucasus. It is still early
to speak about the final results; however, it is already known the
main tendency – strengthening of Russia’s geopolitical position in
the region.

Displaying its political will and decisiveness and winning the war
Russia has reestablished its role in South Caucasus as the main power
center which it had lost at the end of the last century. It has not
only succeeded in furthering the establishment of the two new states –
South Ossetia and Abkhazia – in the region, but also in "legitimating"
deployment of its troops in their territories. Georgia, which in the
period of M. Sahakashvili’s presidency has became the main ally of
the west, namely the US, not only suffered irreversible loses in the
region, but also lost fighting capability of its armed forces and
efficiency of the military infrastructures.

Among the closest neighbor states of South Caucasus Turkey was the
first to respond the geopolitical changes in the region. That respond
appeared in the form of establishing South Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform (SCP). The author of the undertaking is Professor,

Racep Tayyip Erdoghan’s closest advisor, chief architect of the Justice
and Development party’s governing circle’s foreign policy course
who is also considered to be one of the leading geopoliticians and
strategists of Turkey. In particular, he is the author of a distinctive
geopolitical conception called "Turkey’s strategic depth" which aims at
theoretically grounding the necessity to develop geostrategy directed
at creating spheres of influence around Turkey so reestablishing
its privileges over its neighbors due to its favorable geography and
magnificent imperial history.

In the beginning stage Turkey’s suggestion was envisaging to include
the US into the structure, besides the three South Caucasian countries,
Turkey and Russia, however, later on, as a result of discussions among
the leaders of Russia and Turkey in Moscow, was elected 3+2 format –
Azerbaijan, Armenia, Georgia and Russia and Turkey.

In this case the situation was quite different: Turkey was responded
positively by all the possible participants of the Platform, besides
Georgia. The later one refused to take part in any undertaking
together with Russia, as Russian troops were on its territory, which
is politically quite perceptible. It is noteworthy that Azerbaijan has
not officially appeared with any suchlike objections in connection with
Armenia. It is clear that it is the result of Turkey’s tough pressure.

However, from the geopolitical standpoint it is much more important
that Turkey’s undertaking is supported by Russia. As a matter of fact,
this circumstance is conditioned by Turkey’s readiness to exclude
the US from the Platform participants. We think that Russia positive
approach to SCP is only of tactical character as it is difficult to
imagine that country’s geostrategic prospective involving another
active player in South Caucasus beside itself. This circumstance
makes a ground to characterize SCP’s plan as hardly realizable.

We suppose that if Turkey and Russia being well aware of that
circumstance, nevertheless actively further preliminary works of
founding SCP, they have an objective to use that process in favor of
their tactic interests. Turkey tries to assure its neighbors and the
world that the foreign policy it carries out is based on active and
multi-polar world order perceptions, just like it befits the successor
state of the Ottoman Empire. At the same time SCP processes provide
a chance for Turkey to have "privilege" in the centuries-old struggle
with its regional and historical rival Iran – wakening its positions
in Caucasus. Russia spares no efforts to hinder the US entrance into
South Caucasus.

As for us, our involvement into SCP processes will raise Armenia’s
geopolitical "value" in the region. Accordingly, Turkey will get
more interested in settling its relations with Armenia which will
further mollifying "enforcement" policy implemented by Turkey. As it
is known, the expression of that "enforcement" policy is the three
preconditions put forward by Turkey and for it settlement of diplomatic
relations and opening of borders are conditioned by realization of
these preconditions. By the way, the visit of Turkey’s president
to Armenian provided a favorable chance to develop dialogues over
normalizing the relations.

"Noravank" Foundation, 29 September 2008

CAUCASUS PLATFORM: REGION TO SHARE EXPERIENCE WITH RUSSIA

Turkey took an initiative to establish Caucasus Platform in the region
and in this regard Turkey is trying to create positive relations
with Armenia, said Ruben Safrastyan, the director of Eastern Studies
Institute of the National Academy of Sciences of Armenia. "Imagine
Armenia refuses to take part in the negotiations held in the frames
of the platform. Georgia has also rejected its participation. Hence
from Southern Caucasus countries only Azerbaijan remains which is not
preferable for Turkey," said Mr. Safrastyan and added that these are
our advantages to create communication with Turkey.

Panorama.am, 01/10/2008

Ruben Safrastyan: The Minsk Group remains the best format for
negotiations

During the Georgian conflict the Armenian diplomacy managed to be
on the height, preserving its role of an ally for Russia, the ties
with Georgia, the friendly relations with the UN and Europe. Armenia
did not only manage to formulae its national and state interests,
but also make those understandable for Russia, Georgia and the US,
Director of the Oriental Studies Institute of the National Academy of
Sciences Ruben Safrastyan told a press conference today. According to
him, Armenia proved that it’s committed to the strategic partnership
with Russia, and the Russian Federation does not conceal that the
importance of Armenia is growing.

According to Ruben Safrastyan the recent harsh statements of Turkey’s
President Abdullah Gul on the opening of the Armenian-Turkish border
are Turkey’s diplomatic tricks. For the first time in the recent
years Turkey is somewhat interested in continuing the negotiations,
first of all aspiring to get Armenia’s consent on participation in the
Caucasus Platform. Armenia’s having positive attitude is important
for Turkey. Armenia has two trump cards to resist the demands of
the Turkish diplomacy: Armenia can suspend the talks at any point,
which is not favorable to Turkey and Armenia can disagree with the
platform, thus making Turkey’s initiative senseless.

According to the Turkologist, Turkey will continue posing its
demands to Armenia: refusal from the policy of recognition of the
Armenian Genocide, unilateral concessions on the Karabakh issue and
recognition of territorial integrity with reconfirmation of the Kars
Agreement. However, according to Ruben Safrastyan, Armenia will make no
concessions. Ruben Safrastyan noted also that the Minsk Group maintains
its role as the best format for resolving the Karabakh conflict

Public Radio of Armenia , 01.10.2008

No Future in Turkish Initiative to Mediate Karabakh Conflict, Says
Safrastyan

YEREVAN (Combined Sources)–Turkey’s recent efforts to mediate a
resolution in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between Armenia and
Azerbaijan outside the Minsk Group format have no future, Armenia’s
top Turkologist, Ruben Safrastyan, told reporters on Wednesday.

The OSCE Minsk Group continues to be the best format for resolving the
Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, according to Safrastyan, who is the director
Oriental Studies Institute at the Armenian National Academy of Science.

Turkey’s recent overtures to Armenia on the opening of borders and
the establishment of relations are "diplomatic tricks," aimed at
consolidating Turkish influence in the Caucasus, he added. Safrastyan
explained that Armenia’s significance to stability in the region
has grown in the wake of the brief but devastating Russian-Georgian
conflict, which cut off the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline and hurt
Turkish energy revenues. This reality, he added, now compels Turkey
to seek Armenia’s participation in its proposed Caucasus Stability
and Cooperation Platform.

Official Ankara announced plans to create a Caucasus Stability and
Cooperation Platform that would include the three South Caucasus
countries plus two regional heavyweights, Turkey and Russia, following
the conflict. The regional framework, if realized, will allow Turkey
to extend its influence into the Caucasus at a level unseen since
the collapse of the Ottoman Empire.

According to Safrastyan, Armenia was able maintain its longstanding
policy of complimentarity, preserving its role as an ally of Russia,
its ties with Georgia, and friendly relations with the UN and Europe.

"Armenia not only managed to conceptualize its national and state
interests, it also l them clear to Russia, Georgia and the US,"
Safrastyan said. "Armenia proved that it is committed to a strategic
partnership with Russia, and the Russian Federation does not conceal
that the importance of Armenia is growing."

It is therefore important for Turkey that Armenia has a positive
attitude toward Ankara’s latest diplomatic initiative, he noted.

Armenia’s significance in the region, however, will not impel Turkey
to drop its longstanding preconditions for establishing relations
with Armenia, Safrastyan said. "Turkey will continue posing its
demands on Armenia: refusal from the policy of recognition of the
Armenian Genocide, unilateral concessions on the Karabakh issue and
recognition of [Turkey’s] territorial integrity with reconfirmation
of the Kars Treaty," he said.

But Armenia will not make concessions, according to
Safrastyan. "Armenia has two trump cards to resist the demands
posed by Turkish diplomacy," he explained. "Armenia can suspend the
talks at any point, which is not favorable to Turkey and Armenia can
disagree with the platform, thus making Turkey’s [Caucasus platform]
initiative senseless.

ALEXANDER SOTNICHENKO: I CAN’T NAME A POWER INTERESTED IN RECOGNITION OF NAGORNO KARABAKH

PanARMENIAN.Net
06.10.2008 12:47 GMT+04:00

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Both the U.S. and EU hope for successful
resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh conflict and normalization of the
Armenian-Turkish relations, a Russian expert said.

"Nevertheless, they want it to happen through their mediation. European
countries and organizations, such as NATO, EU and OSCE want to be
direct intermediaries in settling conflicts in the Caucasus in order
to expand their influence throughout the region," senior lecturer
at Saint-Petersburg State University, deputy editor at the Center of
Oriental Studies, Ph.D. in history Alexander Sotnichenko said in an
interview with PanARMENIAN.Net.

At that he noted that there is no system of international relations
which could regulate the world politics on the basis of universally
recognized international law. "Each event is interpreted from the
position of strength and benefit. Since 1991, the ideas of "state
sovereignty" and "right of nations to self-determination" have been
interpreted one-sidedly by the world powers. Both Nagorno Karabakh
and Transnistria can be internationally recognized if their longing
for independence will coincide with strategy of one or several world
players. The case with Nagorno Karabakh is demonstrative: I can’t name
a power which is interested in recognition of this territory," he said.

BAKU: KARABAKH STATUS AND LACHIN CORRIDOR ISSUES NOT COORDINATED YET

PanARMENIAN.Net
06.10.2008 14:09 GMT+04:00

/PanARMENIAN.Net/ Official Baku announced that both Azerbaijan and
Armenia still fail to agree on the key issues in the Nagorno Karabakh
conflict settlement process.

"The status of Nagorno Karabakh and Lachin corridor as well deployment
of peacekeeping forces have not been coordinated yet," said Novruz
Mammadov, Head of the International Relations Department at the
Azerbaijani President’s Office.

"When in Yerevan, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said that
Baku and Yerevan managed to agree on several principles. The statement
caused a stir, like other statements of the kind made by the sides
earlier. The point is that the conflict is being resolved step by
step and the agreements achieved earlier can be implemented only in
case the positions on key issues harmonize," he said.

"It is not easy to disclose the coordinated points and there is no need
to do so, since it can damage the ongoing process, according to him.

"The issues under discussion are most important ones. Their
coordination will affect other provisions," Mammadov said, Trend
reports.

U.S. Daily Press Briefing
Wednesday, 1 October 2008, 9:50 pm

Press Release: US State Department

U.S. Daily Press Briefing
Scoop.co.nz (press release), New Zealand

MR. WOOD: I don’t have anything for you, so why don’t we go right to
your questions.

Sir.

QUESTION: Could I ask for a reaction on the Belarus elections? Are you
guys planning to recognize —

MR. WOOD: Well, what I have is an initial read and I think we found
them to be well short of international standards. We certainly took
note of the OSCE report. But again, this is an initial take. We
obviously want to work with the Belarusian Government and we’ll be
looking for ways to do that. But again, this is just an initial read,
and hopefully, we’ll have some more details for you a bit later.

QUESTION: Can you go into why you think it’s well short of
international standards?

MR. WOOD: Well, I think, there were some issues with regard to the
vote count. But again, this is, as I said, an initial take. Let us get
back to you with a more fuller readout a little bit later.

QUESTION: What is Assistant Secretary Hill going to do this week?

MR. WOOD: Well, he’s leaving today from New York and he is going to go
to the region. He’ll be meeting with his counterparts in the Six-Party
Talks. He’ll arrive in Seoul tomorrow, Tuesday evening, where he’ll
meet with Kim Sook. Later in the week, he’ll visit Pyongyang before
going to Beijing, where he’ll meet with the Chinese Vice Foreign
Minister Wu Dawei. He is also scheduled to visit Tokyo for
consultations with the Japanese. I don’t have any more details on his
schedule. Sung Kim will be traveling with him, but that’s all we have
at the moment. So we’ll update you as we can.

QUESTION: So later in the week — you said Pyongyang.

MR. WOOD: Yeah, later in the week.

QUESTION: No specific date.

MR. WOOD: No specific date.

QUESTION: And he’s (inaudible) for Seoul?

MR. WOOD: He’s in New York now. He’ll be leaving for Seoul later
today.

QUESTION: And Tokyo follows his trip to Beijing?

MR. WOOD: To Beijing. That’s correct.

QUESTION: And just simply stated, can you tell us why he is making
this trip?

MR. WOOD: Well, obviously, we’re very concerned about some of the
reversal of disablement activities that the North has been in engaged
in. And he obviously wants to consult with his counterparts in the
region out there to see what our next steps are going to be with
regard to a response to what the North is doing. Again, we encourage
the North very strongly to submit that verification regime so that we
can move forward on the other aspects, positive aspects of the
Six-Party framework. And Assistant Secretary Hill will be obviously
out in the region looking for ways to work with our allies to bring
North Korea into compliance with its obligations.

QUESTION: Two things, Robert.

MR. WOOD: Yes.

QUESTION: One, on all the things you just described, I think are all
things that he could have done in New York this past week, or the
Secretary could have done, in other words, consult with your allies
and partners in this process. And I think the thing that is most
interesting to us is that he’s going to Pyongyang. Can you flesh out
at all what he hopes to do in Pyongyang? Is it to get a better feel
for why they have begun to roll back on the denuclearization steps? Is
it to see if there’s some kind of negotiating room on the nature of
the verification mechanism? I mean, what ` that’s probably the aspect
that’s most striking about this trip, so if you could try to address
that?

MR. WOOD: You know, I’ll do the best I can on that. The Secretary
obviously believes it’s important for Chris to go out to the region,
particularly to go to Pyongyang to get a sense on the ground as to
what’s going on and obviously to talk with North Korean officials
about why they’ve taken the steps they’ve taken. And obviously, as I
said earlier, to encourage them, once again, to submit this
verification package, which we have said is not an onerous task that
we have asked the North Koreans to undertake. It’s a standard, you
know, verification package that’s been done in other cases in the
international community. And so that’s, in essence, is why the
Secretary wants Chris to go to the region, so that we can get a
firsthand look at what’s going on.

QUESTION: And, just one other related one. Forgive me, I wasn’t here
on Friday, so I don’t know to what extent you addressed this. But the
Post on Friday said it had obtained a copy of ` a four-page copy of `
that essentially laid out the verification procedures that the Bush
Administration wanted to see. It quoted David ` well, being a former
weapons inspector David Albright as saying that this was a very
extensive one. And The New York Times in an op-ed today says, I think
` excuse me, an internet editorial says that it was so extensive that
only a vanquished ` a country vanquished in the war might submit to
the verification measures that the United States is seeking of North
Korea. One, are — was The Washington Post report correct in terms of
the verification document? And two, how would you ` since I assume you
would dispute the notion that this was, in fact, a very intrusive and
extensive set of verification measures?

MR. WOOD: Well, for one I’m not going to comment on the Post story
that referred to a document that wasn’t to be made public. But again,
as I said on Friday, I believe it was July 10 ` 12 ` there was a heads
of delegation meeting in which the verification principles were agreed
to by the parties. And so again, this call from us and from others in
the international community for the North to submit this verification
package is not new and we have made the case over and over again that
this needs to happen before we can take any steps with regard to
delisting.

And as I said, we’re talking about a standard verification
package. This is not onerous. It’s not unusual in terms of trying to
verify activities that may have taken place. So you know, the North
cannot expect that after submitting over 19,000 pages that, obviously,
we, the other parties to the framework ` we need to be able to verify
what they’ve submitted. And so again, Chris Hill will be going to the
region, trying to look for ways that we can encourage the North to
live up to its obligations.

Kirit.

QUESTION: Just a follow-up on that: When you say that the Secretary
wants Chris Hill to go and get a sense on the ground in Pyongyang with
what’s going on over there, do you mean to say that you’re trying to
understand who is calling the shots now with the reports or the
indications that Kim Jong Il is sick? And given their turnaround since
that time, is there an effort to find out who is in charge right now?

MR. WOOD: I think the effort is to find out why North Korea has taken
the steps that it’s taken. And we want to see those steps reversed.

And again, Chris is not just going to Pyongyang, although that’s a
very important stop, obviously, on the trip. He is going to meet with
his counterparts in other capitols in the region to talk about how we
can get the North back on the path to what it’s committed to
doing. And so I think it’s more trying to get a sense as to why they
took the steps that they took.

QUESTION: In a general sense, is it fair to say that you know that
it’s partly because of the delisting issue and the verification issue?
That they find it too stringent, the verification? Can you say that at
this point?

MR. WOOD: Well, you know, all I can say is that they haven’t submitted
a verification package. Hopefully, we’ll be able to find out better
why they have not done so. And again, in conversations with his
counterparts, Chris Hill is going to try to see what ways we can work
with our allies in the region to get the North to submit this
verification package.

But again, I want to stress this is not something that’s out of the
norm. It is a standard verification package. The North knows that it
is supposed to present the Six-Party ` the other members of the
Six-Party framework with this verification package. And again, Chris
will be making those points when he goes to the region.

QUESTION: Can I follow up with one more on this, Robert?

MR. WOOD: Sure.

QUESTION: You know, the North Koreans are known to be sticklers on
written agreements. I don’t believe that any of the agreements — any
of the written agreements ` flowing from the September 2005 agreement
actually explicitly addresses verification or explicitly requires the
North to submit a verification package. I think that the key document
referred to their making a complete and correct declaration, but I
don’t think it said anything of their nuclear programs ` but I don’t
think it said anything about submitting a verification package.

And the Singapore agreement ` again, an agreement on verification
principles ` is different from a specific agreement to, sort of,
produce a package or to accept the package that the United States has
proposed. So from the North Koreans point of view, they may feel that
they gave you a declaration. They may regard it as complete and
correct, and they may not feel obliged to accept your definition of a
verification regime.

MR. WOOD: Well, all I can say is that the North knows exactly what it
has to do. The verification package ` they’re quite aware that we need
to have that in place, a verifiable one, so that we can move forward
on other aspects of denuclearization. I can’t tell you why the North
is saying what it’s saying, but let me just again reiterate the fact
that this is not new. The North Koreans know exactly what’s required
of them. And you know, the idea that they couldn’t possibly ` or a
verification package is not something that they believe that they
needed to submit. That’s just not the case.

All the other members agree that we need to be able to verify the
declaration that the North submitted. And in order to do that we need
a verification package.

Let me try to ` go ahead, Kirit.

QUESTION: This is follow up on Arshad’s question Is there a ` can you
say whether Chris Hill is leaving the U.S. with any sort of idea or
compromise in mind to try to break the logjam?

MR. WOOD: Well, if he is, I’m not going to reveal anything here.

QUESTION: Could you say if he has ` I mean, is there something ` he’s
had a lot of meetings — the Secretary has, as well — over the past
week in New York. Can you say whether in those conversations ` the
consultations with the other four members, whether they’ve been able
to come up with some sort of proposal that they’re going to present at
Pyongyang?

MR. WOOD: Well, again, I’m not going to go into the substance of any
message or proposal that Chris may be carrying to the region, except
to say that we are going ` he is going to the region to try to look
for a way to move this process forward. And obviously, Chris will have
some ideas about how to do that. And we’ll just have to wait and see
where we go from there.

Please.

QUESTION: The process has been going precipitously backward for a few
weeks now. And going to the region is pretty much standard operation
for Chris Hill, but going to Pyongyang is not. Is this a — an effort
to try to salvage the process? Because he’s only gone to Pyongyang at
critical moments of the process. Is this an effort to try to salvage
the process right now?

MR. WOOD: Well, we want to get the process back on track. You know,
the fact that the North has taken these steps at reversing disablement
is of concern, major concern to us and the other members of the
Six-Party framework. So obviously, this is an important visit. And as
I said, Assistant Secretary Hill is looking to see what the reasons
are that the North took ` or what the reasons are for the North taking
these steps to reverse disablement. So that’s about the best I can say
on that at this moment.

QUESTION: If he comes away empty handed, is that very damaging for
this process?

MR. WOOD: Well, let’s not speculate. Let’s let him get to the region
and have him begin his diplomacy there.

Please.

QUESTION: Thank you. Very recently there was a meeting between
Armenian President and —

MR. WOOD: Can we stay North Korea and then we can come back to that?

Charley.

QUESTION: Okay.

QUESTION: Just briefly, you said he’s going at the direction of
Secretary Rice. Did he receive an invitation from the North Koreans?
Did he seek an invitation? Is there anything you can give us about the
timing of that?

MR. WOOD: I don’t know the details of that. I just know that he is
going to the region, and he’s going to obviously meet with
representatives of the North Korean Government. But I don’t know the
background of that, Charley, as to —

QUESTION: Do you have any update on the activities in Yongbyon? Like,
do you have any information?

MR. WOOD: No, no new information.

QUESTION: What’s going on?

MR. WOOD: No new information, but again, Chris will be going there and
hopefully will be able to get a better read on what’s happening there.

QUESTION: The (inaudible) are still there?

MR. WOOD: Yes, our monitors are still there.

QUESTION: He’s not going to go to (inaudible) — he’ll stay in
Pyongyang, right?

MR. WOOD: I don’t know. I just know that he’s going to Pyongyang. His
schedule isn’t, you know, finalized yet and there’ll obviously be more
details and we’ll try to fill you in on those as they become
available.

QUESTION: Do you know how long he will be ` his trip to North Korea?

MR. WOOD: Don’t know. Don’t know. Anything else on North Korea?

QUESTION: Did you —

MR. WOOD: Oh, I’m sorry, was there one more? Okay. Please, go.

QUESTION: I’m sorry. Did you say that ` who he’s going to meet in
Pyongyang?

MR. WOOD: No.

QUESTION: You don’t have that information?

MR. WOOD: We don’t have the information.

Okay, sir.

QUESTION: Thank you. Yeah, there was a meeting between President of
Armenia in New York with Condoleezza Rice, the United States
Secretary. I’d like to ask if you can provide any information how the
meeting passed? And maybe we can broaden the topic of how you estimate
U.S-Armenia relations during the last period, especially after the
Ossetian crisis when there was cooperation between Armenia and the
United States concerning U.S. citizens who were coming from Georgia to
Armenia for ` leaving the region? Thank you.

MR. WOOD: Yeah, our cooperation with the Government of Armenia is very
good. I’ll have to refer you to the ` our people up in New York for a
more detailed readout of the Secretary’s meeting, because I don’t have
them here. Sorry.

QUESTION: Okay.

MR. WOOD: Anything else?

David.

QUESTION: Did you have anything on the Ecuador election that passed,
the constitutional changes that would sort of solidify the position of
the president there?

MR. WOOD: Yeah. We offer our congratulations to the people of Ecuador
on the successful referendum and we reaffirm our commitment to build
on our successful cooperation with Ecuador, consistent with our
commitment to supporting Ecuadorian efforts to strengthen democratic
institutions and the prosperity of its people.

QUESTION: You’re not at all concerned about the provisions there that
would allow the incumbent president to stay in office?

MR. WOOD: Well, again, this referendum is something that was decided
on ` or the results of the referendum were decided on by the
Ecuadorian people and it’s a decision for them to make.

Charley, were you going to ask some more? No, okay.

QUESTION: This ` the weapons on this Ukrainian ship that was hijacked
by Somali pirates on its way to Sudan, apparently — does the
U.S. interpret this sort of arms shipment as a violation of the UN
arms embargo?

MR. WOOD: Well, right now, I understand the Pentagon has a ship that’s
monitoring the situation out there right now. I don’t have any other
details about it, other than to say that, obviously, we’ve been
concerned about piracy in this part of the world for a very long
time. We’ve had travel warnings in the past about the situation off
the coast there. And ` but beyond that, I don’t have anything for you
on that. I’d probably refer you to the Pentagon for more details on
that.

QUESTION: Do you have lawyers who are examining whether this was a
violation of the UN —

MR. WOOD: I’m sure people will be looking at those aspects of it. But
right now, they’re obviously trying to resolve a standoff in the area,
first and foremost.

QUESTION: Could you say whether the U.S. is concerned or welcomes a
Russian ship that is also heading towards this, apparently, hijacked
ship?

MR. WOOD: Well, the Russians, I believe, are trying to lend their
support to the ship that was hijacked. So I don’t have anything to say
beyond that on it. They’re obviously concerned about it as we are.

QUESTION: Thank you.

MR. WOOD: Okay, thank you.

ENDS

Armenian prime minister: In the conditions of not simple geo-political
situation human resources gain strategic significance for Armenia

2008-10-04 14:24:00

ArmInfo. In the conditions of not simple geo-political situation human
resources gain strategic significance for Armenia, Armenian Prime
Minister Tigran Sargsyan said at the opening ceremony of the annual
ArmTech IT congress. limited because of different reasons. This means
that intellectual potential of our citizens is our main resource. I
would like to assure you it will become the main privilege in the world
economic competition over the next years. The countries which will
manage to gain maximal efficiency of their economy, will become the
winners. Effective economy cannot but be science-driven based on
innovations. Our country can build a science-driven economy. This will
require much efforts, but we own the most important – internal
potential and the will to act>, – Tigran Sargsyan concluded.