Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan evidently is taking the menacing tone of recent Russian statements seriously. It appears the price of keeping the Kremlin at bay for now is the suspension of a nuclear cooperation deal with the United States and an accompanying commitment to have Rosatom, Russia’s nuclear energy entity, build Armenia’s next-generation reactor.

Armenia over the past two years has grown increasingly defiant of Russia, Yerevan’s traditional geopolitical overlord. Pashinyan’s government downgraded security ties with Moscow, while taking steps to reorient the Armenian economy away from the Russia-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) toward the European Union.

Russia presently is Armenia’s dominant trade partner and clearly does not want to lose its influence in the South Caucasus. Officials in Moscow have maintained that Yerevan cannot be a member of both the EAEU and EU, and have adopted a carrot-and-mostly-stick approach to steer Armenia back into a stable Russian orbit.

To pressure Armenia, Moscow has imposed bans on a variety of Armenian imports in apparent violation of the spirit of EAEU’s free-trade rules. Russian officials at the same time engaged in a fleeting charm offensive. Until recently, everything that Russia tried had failed to dissuade Pashinyan from pursuing EU accession.

But an autumn intimidation blitz by top Russian officials appears to have gotten Pashinyan’s attention.

On October 4, Dmitry Medvedev, the erstwhile Russian president who now is a member of Russia’s Security Council, issued a far-from-subtle threat that if Russia cannot get its way with peaceful means, it may consider a resort to force. 

“The current Armenian leadership decided it was right to change the direction of its development,” Medvedev said, referring to the Pashinyan government’s EU intentions. “I am certain that this, too, will lead to nothing good. The worst thing that could happen to Armenia is its transformation into a new Ukraine.”

Even with the Russian army bogged down in Ukraine, and the Russian economy in tatters as it struggles to absorb the costs of war, the Kremlin retains the means to wreak havoc in Armenia. The Russian military maintains about 5,000 combat-ready troops at a base outside Gyumri, Armenia’s second city. Moscow also controls the country’s energy and electricity supply systems.

Medvedev’s comments may have been designed to reinforce a message delivered in late September by Rosatom’s chief, Alexei Likhachev, whose visit to Yerevan was clearly aimed at reviving the company’s chances of securing a contract to build a new nuclear plant to replace the aging Metsamor facility. Citing a looming electricity deficit in the coming years in Armenia, Likhachev asserted that a large-scale Rosatom reactor was Yerevan’s best option to close the gap.

A state-aligned Russian media outlet also opined that Armenia’s opting for Rosatom “could contribute to improving Russian-Armenian relations.”

Since signing a nuclear cooperation pact with the United States during Vice President JD Vance’s February visit to Armenia, Pashinyan’s government had been leaning towards replacing Metsamor with one or more American-built small modular nuclear reactors (SMRs).

Likhachev’s sales pitch apparently contained an offer that Pashinyan found hard to refuse, however. A day after Likhachev’s departure from Yerevan, Pashinyan’s stance on the nuclear plant issue made an abrupt u-turn.

On October 1, Pashinyan seemed to parrot Likhachev’s position that SMRs would be insufficient to meet the country’s fast-growing electricity needs, given the government’s ambitions to transform the country in the South Caucasus’ digital hub. He added that a 1-megawatt plant based on Russian VVER-1000 technology might be a better solution. A final decision should be made in the coming months, Pashinyan indicated.

Pashinyan’s political position now stands to become increasingly complicated as he tries to thread a geopolitical needle, keeping Russia content while maintaining his pursuit of EU membership and a lasting peace with Azerbaijan.

On October 7, EU Commissioner for Enlargement Marta Kos offered encouragement for Armenia’s accession bid, telling journalists in Brussels that “Armenia is really moving a lot toward the European Union. At this point, it is the only country with which we are negotiating visa liberalization.”

Meanwhile, the Armenian government’s dissatisfaction with the EAEU shows no signs of easing. Pashinyan aired grievances about the EAEU during an October 2 Eurasian Intergovernmental Council session. 

“Restrictions and administrative barriers remain in place, which continue to significantly hamper the full and effective functioning of the single market,” the official Armenpress news agency quoted the prime minister as saying. He called for “constructive dialogue aimed at eliminating existing barriers to the export and transit of Armenian products in accordance with EAEU law.”

In the event that Yerevan hands the nuclear plant contract to Rosatom, it is difficult to predict how the Trump administration might respond. A fundamental building block of Armenia’s economic development strategy is TRIPP, a US-backed transit corridor project that is also the centerpiece of the Armenian-Azerbaijani peace process. Losing out on the nuclear plant contract could potentially diminish US interest in TRIPP’s development, or potentially prompt Washington to accelerate efforts to build out the transit route. At the same time, both Russia and Iran oppose TRIPP.

On October 1, Alexey Shevtsov, another member of Russia’s Security Council, assailed TRIPP as an initiative designed to establish an American military presence in Armenia.

“In Armenia, in full accordance with classical post-colonial models, yet another ‘state within a state’ is being established, of which Westerners created many in the former Soviet republics,” the Russian broadcaster RTV1 quoted Shevstov as saying.

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