BY LUSINE BARSEGHIAN
Special to Asbarez


The earliest use of the term “Western Azerbaijan” identified by political scientist Simon Maghakyan dates to 1996. It appeared in a speech by Azerbaijan’s president Heydar Aliyev following his visit to Germany. Despite the term’s current expansionist meaning, the reference had nothing to do with territorial claims, let alone Armenia.

The revelation that three decades ago “Western Azerbaijan” was an imaginary capitalist counterpart, akin to “West Germany,” was part of Simon Maghakyan’s September 19 lecture, “Deconstructing ‘Western Azerbaijan’: Synthetic Memory and the Politics of Perpetual Conflict,” hosted by the National Association for Armenian Studies and Research. Maghakyan, a postdoctoral associate at the University of Oxford, examined the evolution of the concept through archival research, official speeches, and state-backed publications, tracing how an initially economic metaphor rapidly changed into an expansionist narrative against Armenia, especially following Azerbaijan’s 2020-23 conquest of Artsakh or Nagorno-Karabakh.

To trace and explain the construction of the expansionist narrative of “Western Azerbaijan,”, Maghakyan turned to political scientist Frederick Barghoorn’s theoretical concept of “synthetic memory,” developed in the latter’s studies of Soviet Russian nationalism Maghakyan showed through “synthetic memory” the adaptability of “Western Azerbaijan” for various Azerbaijani state goals:: reframing historical and territorial claims, reinforcing the Azerbaijani government’s domestic legitimacy, and remaining available as a political instrument as regional circumstances change.

In Maghakyan’s analysis, the concern therefore does not depend on every reference to “Western Azerbaijan” immediately translating into territorial action. Rather, a state-backed narrative can normalize a particular understanding of territory, history and identity while remaining flexible enough to be intensified, modified or temporarily set aside when political circumstances change.

Synthetic Memory and a “Usable” Past
Maghakyan used Barghoorn’s concept of synthetic memory to describe a state-shaped understanding of the past in which selected historical facts are assembled into a broader narrative serving present political purposes. Crucially, “synthetic” does not mean entirely fabricated. Some elements incorporated into such a narrative may be historically accurate. Maghakyan noted, for example, that Turkoman confederations, such as as the Aq Qoyunlu and Qara Qoyunlu, ruled Armenia and other parts of the region during periods of medieval conquest and that Azerbaijani communities lived in Armenia before the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

What makes the memory “synthetic” is the way those elements are selected, combined and given new political meaning. As Maghakyan put it, “the synthetic quality lies in the opportunistic assemblage of memory,” connecting the process to Barghoorn’s idea of attempting “to remake the future by altering the past.” Applied to “Western Azerbaijan,” the concept helps explain how memories of former Azerbaijani communities, periods of Turkic rule and territorial history can be reorganized into a contemporary political narrative against present-day Armenia. The issue, in other words, is what happens when selected pieces of the past are assembled into a politically usable version of history.

Constructing “Western Azerbaijan”
Maghakyan identified 1996 as the earliest use of the phrase he was able to locate. But only two years later after noting the lack of an imaginary capitalist partner, Heydar Aliyev used “Western Azerbaijan” in a markedly different context.

Speaking at a December 1998 symposium on Islam in the Caucasus, Aliyev referred to areas of present-day Armenia as “Western Azerbaijan,” saying that the Iravan, Goycha, Zangibasar and Zangezur districts “were all lands inhabited by Muslim Azerbaijanis.” Around the same period, Sabir Asadov’s 1995 book The Historical Geography of Azerbaijanis of Armenia was translated into Russian and republished under the title The Historical Geography of Western Azerbaijan. 

Maghakyan also highlighted the symbolic overlap between the construction of the “Western Azerbaijan” narrative and the destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in Nakhichevan. He noted that December 5–6 carries significance in this context: December 5, 1988, marked a Soviet resolution later interpreted by Azerbaijani national narratives as anti-Azerbaijani, while December 6, 2005, marked a decree preceding the final destruction of Armenian monuments in Nakhichevan. While Maghakyan cautioned that the direct relationship between these events requires further investigation, he argued that their symbolic connection illustrates how historical events can be assembled into broader political narratives. This symbolic overlap also coincided with the 1997–2006 destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in Nakhichevan, which Maghakyan’s previous research has documented.

A second stage in the narrative’s development emerged in 2007, when Aziz Alagbarli’s The Monuments of Western Azerbaijan was published with the involvement of Azerbaijan’s Ministry of Culture and Tourism. The book went beyond documenting former Azerbaijani communities in Armenia: it recast portions of Armenia’s early and medieval history within an Azerbaijani-Turkic framework and incorporated Christian churches and well-known examples of Armenian architecture into that scholarship-lacking narrative.

Maghakyan also noted that these first two stages of the constructing “Western Azerbaijan” broadly overlapped with the 1997-2006 destruction of Armenian cultural heritage in Nakhichevan, which Maghakyan’s previous research has exposed, while cautioning that the relationship between the two developments requires further investigation rather than assuming direct coordination.

After years of comparatively limited public emphasis, Maghakyan argues that the narrative gained renewed momentum following the 2020 war and developments surrounding Nagorno-Karabakh in 2022 and 2023. New websites and publications appeared, while Ilham Aliyev increasingly connected “Western Azerbaijan” to the post-Karabakh political agenda. In December 2022, speaking to members of the freshly-renamed “Western Azerbaijan Community,” Aliyev stated, “Now that the Karabakh conflict has been resolved, this is the issue on our agenda.” He also described the proposed “return” as a peaceful process pursued through international conventions. 

The “Synthetic Happiness” of Western Azerbaijan
This adaptability also forms the basis of Maghakyan’s domestic explanation for the narrative. He describes “Western Azerbaijan” as a potential instrument of what he calls “regime rationality,”  a theoretical concept Maghakyan has introduced in The Journal of Genocide Research, securing the regime while presenting it as the security of the nation.

Maghakyan connects this dynamic to what he calls the Aliyev regime’s “self-styled messianism,” the presentation of the ruling leadership as an indispensable solution to Azerbaijan’s national challenges. “Western Azerbaijan,” in this reading, can function not only as an external political narrative but also as a domestic resource: it provides a continuing story of threat, protection and unfinished national purpose through which the government can reproduce its own political necessity. This is where Maghakyan’s concept of synthetic memory becomes particularly important.

Because synthetic memory is assembled from selected elements rather than bound to one fixed meaning, it is adaptable. Maghakyan calls this quality “modular,” a narrative that fades when it is politically inconvenient, returns when circumstances become favorable, and is reshaped around new objectives without abandoning its underlying political function.

He connects that flexibility to another concept introduced at the beginning and returned to at the end of his lecture by introducing a new theoretical explanation of “synthetic happiness,” which he had hinted to in the beginning of his lecture.

Maghakyan began with an Ilham Aliyev interview in which the president spoke of Azerbaijanis’ happiness alongside pride in national history, culture and prominent figures. For Maghakyan, that rhetoric raises a broader question about the relationship between political legitimacy and collective well-being: can victory, historical pride and an external national mission themselves be offered as sources of political satisfaction?

In Maghakyan’s interpretation, synthetic memory can support a kind of top-down political bargain in which the ruling dynasty presents itself as the guarantor of security, victory and national fulfillment. “Western Azerbaijan” can then become another unfinished mission through which that sense of necessity continues even after the Karabakh conflict has been declared resolved.

Maghakyan ultimately describes the contemporary narrative as a “multi-directional synthetic shield and an offensive weapon” capable of serving regime security while also functioning as a flexible instrument toward Armenia and potentially other neighboring states.

Yet, he cautions against assuming that a government-promoted narrative necessarily reflects popular demand. Maghakyan cited the research of Azerbaijani scholar and peace activist Bahruz Samadov, who he said found substantial support for the 2020 war but considerably less enthusiasm for further confrontation with Armenia. Samadov is currently imprisoned in Azerbaijan, having been sentenced to 15 years in 2025 on a treason conviction criticized by international academic and human-rights organizations.

That distinction reinforces an important part of Maghakyan’s argument: the political usefulness of “Western Azerbaijan” does not require the narrative to emerge organically from Azerbaijani society. Its usefulness can instead lie in the state’s ability to construct, promote and continually adapt it. “Synthetic memory is useful because it is modular,” Maghakyan said. It can disappear when necessary and reappear when conditions change. And, as he emphasized in concluding the argument, “Just because something is synthetic does not mean that it cannot be experienced as real.”

Following Maghakyan’s lecture, NAASR’s Director of Academic Affairs, Marc Mamigonian, led an audience Q&A, where discussion moved from the historical construction of “Western Azerbaijan” to questions about how the narrative should be understood and addressed today.

One of the first questions focused on how to respond to a narrative that has increasingly entered political discourse, and Maghakyan emphasized that ignoring the issue would not make it disappear. He argued that studying, qualifying and deconstructing the narrative does not legitimize it; rather, understanding how such narratives are constructed is necessary for evaluating their political significance. He added that “Western Azerbaijan” should not be viewed solely as an internal matter of Azerbaijan, as narratives with implications beyond domestic politics require broader attention. He also noted the difficulty of distinguishing between statements intended primarily for domestic consumption and those reflecting broader political objectives, emphasizing the importance of continuous observation and documentation.

Another question examined whether contemporary Azerbaijani territorial narratives have historical parallels with Azerbaijan’s claims during the 1918–1920 period. Maghakyan noted that while earlier territorial claims were broader and extended into areas of present-day Georgia, Turkey and Iran, they did not correspond exactly to the current formulation of “Western Azerbaijan.”

The discussion also turned to the possible relationship between “Western Azerbaijan” and Turkish denialist narratives concerning the Armenian Genocide. Maghakyan cautioned that establishing a direct connection would require further archival evidence. However, he expressed concern about the increasing number of possible publications in which nationalist historical narratives are presented through the appearance of academic scholarship, describing the broader phenomenon as the presentation of propaganda in a scholarly form.

The final part of the discussion addressed possible paths forward. Maghakyan emphasized that stability requires preparation for both peace and conflict rather than relying solely on political rhetoric. He expressed hope through the work of independent Azerbaijani scholars, including Bahruz Samadov, whose research suggests limited public appetite for further confrontation. For Maghakyan, continued engagement between Armenian and Azerbaijani scholars, alongside honest discussions of historical trauma and cultural destruction represents one possible foundation for future coexistence.

Lusine Barseghyan is a Political Data Analytics and History student at New York University. Her academic interests include security studies, historical memory, Armenian history, and contemporary politics. Through her academic work and independent research, she examines how history, identity, and political narratives shape societies and contemporary realities.

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