August 14, 2026
Iraqi Kurdistan President Nechirwan Barzani’s meeting with Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa was a significant event in regional politics, reflecting Erbil’s growing role in regional affairs.
According to regional officials interviewed by Al-Monitor, the meeting was initiated by the Syrian leader as part of Barzani’s first official visit to Damascus. Photographs of a large Kurdish flag (compared to an Iraqi flag) indicated a friendly disposition on the part of the host country to overcome a long-standing internecine conflict (how well it succeeded is a separate question). Barzani was accompanied by a group of businessmen for negotiations on the development of economic ties between Syria and Iraqi Kurdistan.
In his public statements after the meeting, al-Sharaa said that the parties discussed ways to expand cooperation “for the sake of stability”, and Barzani called for the creation of a Syria where “the rights of all ethnic and religious communities will be protected”.
Nechirwan Barzani is the cousin of Massoud Barzani, a prominent politician who seeks to protect Syrian Kurds from attacks by Arab tribes in eastern Syria. Erbil played an equally important role in helping the United States broker a cease-fire between Damascus and the commander-in-chief of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) Mazloum Abdi (Kobani) in January, after weeks of intense fighting in which the Syrian Kurds lost more than 80 percent of the territory they controlled in Rojava.
The January 29 ceasefire agreement was supplemented by a document revising the terms of the March 10 integration agreement that al-Sharaa and Abdi signed last year. Under its terms, the Syrian Democratic Forces, the SDF, and the Kurdish Autonomous Administration must be disbanded by the end of the year, along with their integration into the new “post-Assad” Syrian government structure. On August 4, Ahmed al-Sharaa and Mazlum Abdi discussed this issue in Damascus. A Syrian Kurdish source told The National that Abdi understands the need to dissolve the SDF in the future, but would not agree to it unless militia commanders remain in the armed forces and the police force in northeastern Syria includes a large number of Kurds. “Damascus seems to want to cede some control over the police. But the main disagreements are about the position (status) of the SDU in the army. Ash-Sharaa wants to disband his fighters, Abdi doesn’t.” According to Kurdish media, Abdi was also supposed to meet with Barzani, but their meeting was apparently not planned later.One way or another, the scenery changes. The recent leader of “Al-Qaeda” welcomes world leaders, while the leader of the Syrian Democratic Forces, which defeated the “Islamic State” about 10 years ago, has clearly lost its influence and lost foreign support.
In Damascus, by inviting Barzani, they sent a clear signal to the Kurds and the governments of Western countries about the intention to resolve the disputes constructively. Most likely, al-Shara’a approves of the Kurdistan Regional Government’s role in Kurdish politics in Syria. The declining SDF is opposed by a coalition of parties called the Kurdistan National Council, which also includes the local Kurdistan Democratic Party, which is affiliated with the Iraqi party of the same name, traditionally led by members of the Barzani clan. Parliamentary elections were recently held in northeastern Syria that were ignored by SDF supporters in what critics say was a clear mistake.
In addition to Presidential Decree No. 13, which recognized the Syrian Kurds and promised to protect their cultural and linguistic rights, a number of steps were taken to integrate the SDF structures into the Syrian state. Those steps include the formation and training of several brigades staffed by the Syrian Democratic Forces, the inclusion of civilian employees on ministry rolls, and the recognition of high school diplomas and university diplomas issued by Rojava’s former administration. Damascus has also started the process of naturalization of stateless Syrian Kurds.
“However, in places, areas controlled by the Syrian Democratic Forces are largely not integrated into the overall system as before, and (Kurdish) institutions continue to manage daily life,” said one observer. The question is, how long will it last? For now, the Damascus authorities’ refusal to recognize teaching in the Kurdish language as an inalienable right and to integrate female Kurdish fighters into the “new” Syrian army remain obstacles. The highest-ranking Kurd in the government so far is Sipan Khemo, the former head of the People’s Self-Defense Forces, who has held the eastern post of defense minister since March. the post of regional deputy.
The integration process in Syria is closely linked to Turkey’s negotiations with Öcalan and the banned Kurdistan Workers’ Party in Turkey.: In May 2025, the rebels stationed in the Qandil mountains in the north of Iraq announced the cessation of the armed struggle against the Turkish state after the appeal of Abdullah Ocalan.
Barzani, who maintains close personal ties with Turkish President Recep Erdogan, called on Kobani to speed up the dissolution of the SCHR because the peace process in Turkey cannot continue without clear guarantees. After months of wrangling, there appears to be a breakthrough, and a bill on the peace process is expected to be tabled in Turkey’s Grand National Assembly before it goes into recess.
The law reportedly provides amnesty for PKK fighters who have not committed serious crimes against the state, as well as the creation of a body made up of representatives from the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, judiciary and Turkish intelligence to oversee the disarmament and repatriation of disarmed KKK fighters.
In a speech released by the People’s Democratic Party last week, Ocalan said that while the law is imperfect, it is a “key” that will “open the door” to future democratic reforms. It can be said that the prisoner of Imral Island follows the logic of the peace process, the course and sequence of which is determined by the Erdogan government, which is interested in supporting the Kurdish population on the eve of the next election cycle, which may not be excluded.
ALEXANDER GRIGOREV
Translation by Zhanna Avetisyan
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