Limitations and external challenges of Iran’s new strategy

If Iran aspires to form the position of an irreplaceable actor in the security system of Hormuz, it is equally important to assess what limitations and external challenges this strategy may face. Any geopolitical concept is not viable just because it is based on a favorable geographical location. Its effectiveness is determined not only by its own capabilities, but also by the external environment, the international legal system, and the strategic calculations of other actors.

The first limitation stems from Iran’s strategic dilemma. On the one hand, Tehran is interested in maintaining such a security environment that increases and strengthens its geopolitical influence. On the other hand, an excessively high level of tension hurts one’s own economy, stimulates the increase in military involvement of extra-regional powers and increases the likelihood of international backlash. For this reason, it is more likely that Iran will strive not to maintain a permanent crisis, but to keep the initiative of its management, without letting the situation go out of control.

The second limitation is the international legal system. Although the Strait of Hormuz is one of the key routes of maritime communication of international importance, its legal status does not eliminate the sovereign rights of the coastal states. International maritime law simultaneously ensures freedom of transit navigation and recognizes certain jurisdictions of coastal states. Therefore, the issue is not whether Iran can have legal influence in Hormuz, but where these rights end and where the guarantees of international freedom of navigation begin.

For this reason, any strategy of Iran has to act not with the logic of changing the international legal order, but with the logic of expanding the political influence within it. The experience of international relations shows that legal norms and political behavior do not always completely coincide. States, ship owners, insurance companies and energy markets are often guided not only by legal regulations, but also by practical risk assessment. If Iran’s possible reaction turns into a permanent factor in those assessments, then the legal status can be preserved, while the political behavior can be gradually adapted to the new reality.

The third limitation is formed in the external power environment. The security of Hormuz has long gone beyond the scope of regional importance, turning into a problem of global strategic importance. Therefore, any attempt by Iran to expand its influence in the security system of the strait will inevitably affect the interests of other major actors.

The United States has a key role in this picture. For Washington, Hormuz is one of the most important junctions not only of the Persian Gulf, but also of global maritime communication, whose security is considered a fundamental component of the current international order. At the same time, recent military developments have shown that even the US military presence does not eliminate Iran’s ability to influence the security environment around the strait. That circumstance has formed a new strategic reality, which Washington can try to change, but cannot ignore in its strategic calculations.

Therefore, the policy of the United States, logically, will continue to pursue two interrelated goals at the same time. On the one hand, to try to limit as much as possible Iran’s ability to turn its influence around the security of Hormuz into a long-term political lever, and on the other hand, to build its strategy, taking into account that the Iranian factor in the security environment of the strait has become a reality that cannot be simply avoided. For this reason, Washington will likely continue to combine military deterrence, coordination with allies, and crisis management in an effort to preserve free navigation while preventing a situation where the security of Hormuz becomes virtually solely dependent on Iran’s political decisions.

The Israel-Iran conflict is also an important component of this new strategic environment around Hormuz. This conflict is not just an external security background for Hormuz. It is one of the key components of the strategic environment, within the framework of which Tehran evaluates the value of the geographical position of the strait, forms its deterrence capabilities and determines the priorities for expanding its influence in the region.

Under these circumstances, Israel’s strategic calculations are also unlikely to be limited to the assessment of Iran’s direct military capabilities. If Iran’s influence around Hormuz turns into a more stable geopolitical factor, it can expand Tehran’s strategic maneuver area and complicate such approaches of pressure on Iran that are based solely on military superiority or external power pressure.

At the same time, the external power environment is not limited to the US-Iran and Iran-Israel conflicts. Those states whose economic and energy security directly depend on the stability of the Persian Gulf are also interested in Hormuz. China, India, Japan and South Korea occupy a special place in this group. Their common priority is the predictability of energy carriers and maritime communications, but that common interest does not mean identical strategic calculations.

China’s position is distinguished by its dual logic. On the one hand, Beijing has a strong interest in the uninterrupted flow of energy from the Persian Gulf and cannot support such developments that would turn Hormuz into a zone of prolonged instability. On the other hand, it is also in China’s long-term strategic interests to limit the unilateral influence of the United States in key regions and to create a more multipolar power environment. From that point of view, the strengthening of Iran’s influence does not in itself contradict Beijing’s interests, as long as it does not turn into instability that would endanger energy and trade communications. Therefore, the most acceptable for China may not be the isolation of Iran, but the formation of such a balance, where the level of Iran’s role increases, but does not turn into exclusive control over Hormuz.

India’s calculation is more cautious. Although New Delhi is also interested in maintaining relations with Iran and expanding its strategic independence in the region, energy security and predictability of maritime communications are paramount for it. Therefore, India is likely to avoid such developments that could deepen the security uncertainty around Hormuz, while trying to maintain a satisfactory level of relations with Iran.

The positions of Japan and South Korea are also conditioned by a double limitation. Both states are highly dependent on stable supplies of energy from the Persian Gulf, but at the same time are closely tied to the US in the field of security. For this reason, they are unlikely to be interested in the uncontrolled expansion of Iran’s influence, but they are also not interested in a military escalation around Hormuz that could disrupt energy and trade flows. For them, it would be more preferable to maintain stability without large-scale military involvement.

The calculations of the European Union are also based on such duality. For Europe, the stability of Hormuz is related not only to energy security, but also to the predictability of global trade and international maritime communications. At the same time, European states have limited interest in directly engaging in large-scale military operations against Iran. Therefore, the most acceptable approach for the EU may be a combination of diplomatic pressure, international legal mechanisms and crisis management tools, while maintaining freedom of navigation.

Russia’s position is formed by another strategic logic. Unlike the large economies of Asia and Europe, Russia does not directly depend on the energy carriers of the Persian Gulf, and the instability of Hormuz does not create the same economic danger for it. Instead, Moscow is interested in limiting the unilateral influence of the United States, strengthening the multipolar international system, and maintaining Iran’s position as an influential regional actor.

For this reason, Russia can more willingly accept the expansion of Iran’s influence around Hormuz, if it contributes to limiting the dominance of the USA in the region. However, uncontrolled instability, which could turn into a wide regional war, is not in Moscow’s interests either.

The logic of restrictions at the regional level is more complicated. At the same time, the Arab states of the Persian Gulf are interested in safe shipping, reducing regional tensions and maintaining their own security. The last war, however, showed that they can get involved in a military conflict even when they are not directly interested in its expansion. The use of American military infrastructures located in the region in operations against Iran, as well as Iran’s attacks on them, turned those states into direct bearers of the risks of the conflict.

This experience can significantly affect their future calculations. On the one hand, they do not want uncontrolled expansion of Iran’s influence around Hormuz and continue to rely on external security guarantees. On the other hand, they are not interested in getting involved again in a full-scale war that could threaten their economic and energy infrastructure, disrupt shipping and directly affect the economic stability of the region. Therefore, it may become more acceptable for them to create such a security balance that will simultaneously limit the expansion of Iran’s geopolitical influence and reduce the probability of a new large-scale escalation.

Under these conditions, the future security system of Hormuz may include elements not only of competition, but also of limited practical cooperation. For the states of the region, such cooperation may not be an expression of strategic solidarity with Iran, but a practical necessity to not turn their own territory and infrastructure into a scene of a large-scale conflict again.

Oman can play a special role in this picture. Its geographical position and long-standing balanced diplomacy enable Muscat to maintain diplomatic communication channels both with Iran and with Western and regional actors. However, the possible role of Oman is not limited to the mediating function. Deepening its involvement in the security system of Hormuz can also serve to increase its own geopolitical weight, especially if new regional security mechanisms are formed around the strait.

From this point of view, Oman may be interested not only in limiting the escalation of hostilities, but also in creating conditions in which the security of Hormuz will be built on the greater participation of regional actors. Such an approach can also create certain common grounds for cooperation with Iran, especially if it concerns the formation of new practical or legal mechanisms for the security of the strait. If in the future, new negotiation formats regarding the status or security of Hormuz are formed, then Oman can not only take on a mediating role again, but also strive to become an important participant in the formation and operation of this new system.

Thus, Iran’s new strategy will not develop in a political vacuum and will not face a single external front. In front of it, a complex system of actors with different, sometimes opposing interests is formed. The United States will seek to limit the strategic consequences of Iran’s influence, China may be more willing to accept Iran’s enhanced role, provided it does not undermine regional stability, major economies in Asia and Europe will prioritize energy and trade predictability, Russia will be interested in limiting US influence, and regional states in maintaining a stable, manageable situation.

Therefore, the viability of Iran’s strategy will depend not only on how effectively Tehran will be able to use its geographical and security capabilities, but also on how successfully it will be able to place them in this multi-layered external environment. The most difficult problem for Iran is here. to increase influence without causing a backlash that would neutralize the strategic value of that influence.

In this sense, the main limitation of Iran’s new strategy may not be military or geographical, but political. Tehran may strive to become an indispensable and decisive participant in the security system of Hormuz, but the more visible and systemic this role becomes, the greater will be the interest of other powers to balance or limit it. It is this interaction that will determine whether Iran’s geographical advantage will turn into a long-term strategic influence, or whether external opposition will limit that possibility.

Strategic scenarios for the future of Hormuz

The post-war future of Hormuz is difficult to assess with one possible development. The war has changed not only the security environment of the region, but also the framework of calculations by which the main actors assess the importance of the strait. For this reason, the upcoming developments may go in different directions, depending on how the interests of Iran, regional states and extra-regional powers will be rearranged.

Here, the scenarios should be considered not as predictions of the near future, but as strategic opportunities, each of which has its own preconditions, limitations and consequences of formation. The difference between them will mainly be determined by one question: will the security of Hormuz remain a matter of competition or will it gradually turn into a system where Iran’s participation will become a decisive structural component of its stability.

First scenario. Hormuz’s de facto new strategic balance

The simplest but at the same time the most realistic theoretical scenario can be the formation of such a situation where the legal status of Hormuz does not change, shipping continues, but the security perceptions formed during the war are preserved.

In this case, Iran does not get a new legal status and does not establish official control over the strait. Something else is changing: Iran’s possible response becomes a constant factor in the calculations of international actors. Shipping security assessments, insurance decisions, the behavior of energy markets, and regional military planning may gradually include greater weight in Tehran’s potential actions.

In such a situation, the growth of Iran’s influence does not require legal change. It can be shaped by actual behavior through a combination of strategic uncertainty, military capabilities, information involvement, and regional political influence.

However, the main limitation of this scenario is that it does not provide an exceptional position for Iran. The United States and other external actors will continue to seek to maintain freedom of navigation and their strategic presence, and the Gulf states will try to avoid a situation where their security depends on the decisions of a single state.

Therefore, the balance formed here may not be a result of a stable agreement, but a result of mutual restraint and adaptation. Iran’s influence will grow to the extent that other actors will have to take it into account, but without a full systemic fixation of that influence.

In this scenario, the main change in the strategic reality of Hormuz will be that difference: the legal order will remain the same, while the political calculations formed around it will become different.

Second scenario. a new regional security architecture

A deeper scenario can be formed in the event that the common interests of Iran and other Persian Gulf states begin to dominate the existing contradictions between them in some issues.

Such an approach can be based on a simple strategic calculation. No state in the region is interested in prolonged military instability around Hormuz, as its consequences directly affect energy infrastructure, trade, investment and their own security. The recent war can give additional weight to that calculation, showing that regional states can find themselves at the center of the immediate consequences of a great power conflict even if they do not want to become a party to that conflict.

Under these conditions, an ideological and political basis may emerge, around which Tehran has built its regional security approach for a long time: the security of the Persian Gulf should be ensured as much as possible with the participation of the states of the region, limiting the decisive role of extra-regional forces.

If this approach takes a practical form, then the security system of Hormuz can gradually turn into a wider mechanism of regional cooperation. It can be based on the exchange of information on the maritime situation, crisis communication channels, incident prevention mechanisms, navigation safety coordination and the gradual formation of mutual trust.

In this scenario, Iran’s interests also change. Tehran is no longer necessarily seeking to maximize its unilateral influence. It may be more beneficial to create such a system where Iran’s participation becomes necessary and decisive for the effectiveness of regional cooperation.

This does not mean that the states of the region will give up external guarantees of their security or cut ties with the US and other powers. The formation of a multi-layered system is more likely, where the functions of extra-regional and regional actors will be divided, and the role of regional states in the main security mechanisms of Hormuz will increase.

In the more advanced version of this scenario, the issue of new legal or systemic regulation may also arise. If practical cooperation turns into a stable system, the need for its long-term fixation can become a separate political agenda.

Thus, the more prospective version of the second scenario may lead to the formation of such a system around Hormuz, where regional cooperation will become the main pillar of security, and Iran’s participation will be a key and decisive, but not exclusive, component of that system.

Third scenario. The new geopolitical structure of Hormuz

A more complex and theoretical scenario can be formed in the event that the new security reality created around Hormuz goes not only to the regional, but also to a wider geopolitical level.

Here, Iran can try to connect its strategic calculations with the interests of China and Russia, seeking to form such political, economic and security connections that will increase its resistance to external pressure and limit the possibility of another power forming a dominant position around Hormuz.

This approach does not imply that China and Russia will simply accept Iran’s agenda. Both states have their own strategic priorities and will try to maintain freedom of action. However, if the security of Hormuz begins to be considered as a matter directly related to their economic, energy or geopolitical interests, such an overlap of interests can be formed that will strengthen Iran’s position.

For China, such involvement can be linked to the stability of energy supplies, limiting US influence in the region, and expanding its own economic presence. For Russia, it can be combined with the interests of maintaining its political influence in the region, counterbalancing Western pressure and deepening strategic relations with Iran.

If these interests are combined with regional cooperation at a certain stage, then a multi-layered system can be formed around Hormuz, the participants of which will have different but complementary interests.

In the most developed version of such a system, the question of revising the legal and systemic status of Hormuz may also arise. This can happen not through a unilateral change by one state, but as a result of long-term negotiations, in which Iran, Oman and other Persian Gulf states can play a key role.

In this case, the possible change will fundamentally differ from the classical logic of control over the strait. The problem may not be who controls Hormuz, but who participates in the formation of the rules for its security and normal operation.

However, this is also the most complicated scenario. For its implementation, it will be necessary not only a high level of mutual trust between Iran and the states of the region, but also such a combination of the interests of China, Russia and other actors that will allow forming a generally acceptable system. The US and its partners will naturally react to any process that can limit their strategic presence in Hormuz.

Therefore, this scenario should be considered not as a possible development in the near future, but as a borderline option of such a strategic possibility, in the event of its implementation, the issue of Hormuz can be transferred from a regional security issue to the level of a wider geopolitical realignment.

The strategic importance of scenarios

These three scenarios are not mutually exclusive predictions. In fact, theoretically, they can also be consecutive stages.

In the first phase, Iran’s influence can be strengthened through actual behavior and adaptation of international actors. In the second stage, that influence can turn into a more systematic form of regional cooperation. And in more favorable and at the same time more difficult conditions, this process can be involved in the wider geopolitical system with the participation of China, Russia and other actors.

The general logic of these developments shows that the main issue for the future of Hormuz may not be the control of the strait. The nature of the security system within which the strait will operate may become more important.

If that system continues to be based solely on the mutual logic of external deterrence and Iranian countermeasures, then Hormuz will remain a zone of constant strategic competition. If, however, regional cooperation mechanisms are formed, it will be possible to make a transition from competition to controlled interdependence. And if broader geopolitical interests join that system, then Hormuz can turn into an important hub of the new international security structure.

Thus, the possible future developments of Hormuz are not limited to one predictable direction. They can vary between the actual maintenance of a new balance, the formation of a new security structure based on regional cooperation, and the deepening of competition. The choice between those options, however, will not be determined solely by the political will of Iran or any individual actor. It will depend on a combination of mutual interests, risk perception, power capabilities and willingness to cooperate.

In this sense, the long-term significance of the war may be manifested not by an immediately visible change, but by the process during which the new relations formed around Hormuz will acquire a more stable and predictable character. If that process leads to the formation of a new balance or cooperation mechanisms between regional actors, then Hormuz can gradually turn into not only a competition, but also a key platform for the formation of a new regional security architecture.

Conclusion

Today, the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz can no longer be assessed only by its geographical location, international legal status or its role in global energy communications. Recent military developments have shown that the true significance of the strait is formed in such a geopolitical environment, within which it turns into a key platform for regional security and global power competition. For this reason, the assessment of the ongoing processes around Hormuz requires leaving the traditional naval or energy perceptions of the strait and considering it as a component of a wider geopolitical system.

The war of 2025 did not change the legal status of the Strait of Hormuz and did not resolve the competition around it. However, it changed the strategic reality under which new logics of security, influence and power balance of the strait will be formed in the future. For this reason, the real significance of the war should be assessed not so much by its direct military results, but by the political change that took place in the perception of the strategic significance of Hormuz.

In this context, it is necessary to consider Iran’s policy not as an effort to establish exclusive control over the strait, but as an attempt to turn its geographical position into a long-term geopolitical influence. If this process is successful, the importance of Hormuz for Iran will no longer be limited to the function of crisis containment. It can turn into such a strategic platform, where regional security, stability of sea communications and issues of balance of power will practically no longer be possible to consider, ignoring the role of Iran.

However, the significance of this process is much wider than the strategic achievement of any individual state. It reflects a deeper trend in modern international relations, in which geographical location itself is no longer sufficient to ensure strategic influence. The ability of the state to turn its own geographical opportunities into an interconnected system of political, security and diplomatic influence becomes decisive. It is this ability that shapes not only the limits of influence of individual actors, but also the future of the entire regional security architecture.

In this sense, the war of 2025 should be considered not as another military crisis over Hormuz, but as a stage of geopolitical transition. It did not decide who controls the strait, but it changed the strategic environment under which new regional security principles and power relations will be formed in the future. If in the past Hormuz was mainly perceived as a vital route of world trade and energy communications, today it is mostly becoming the geopolitical space around which regional security principles and new power balances are being reshaped.

Therefore, the real legacy of the 2025 war is not a short-term change in the balance of power, but a reinterpretation of the geopolitical significance of Hormuz. The strait can no longer be considered only as a strategic route for the transit of world trade and energy carriers or as a theater of possible military confrontation.

It turns into an independent geopolitical factor of international politics, around which the principles of regional security, new ratios of power balance and strategic calculations of external actors are reshaped. In that sense, the ongoing competition over the future of Hormuz is no longer just a matter of influence over the strait, but an integral component of the formation of a new geopolitical order in the Middle East.

Note:This article is the first part of a three-part analytical article series on Middle East strategic communications and their geopolitical significance.

The next article will discuss the strategic interconnection of the Straits of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb and their role in the deep picture of modern geopolitical realignments, and the final part of the article series will look at the geographical position and geopolitical commonalities of Hormuz and Syunik, analyzing how strategic communications reshape the regional power balance and what is the significance of Syunik from the point of view of ensuring Armenia’s state security.

Aram Shahnazaryan

Political analyst-expert on Iran issues

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