The recent statements of the Azerbaijani President’s assistant, Hikmet Hajiyev, once again emphasized that Baku not only closely follows the internal political developments of Armenia, but also sometimes formulates clearer and more confident assessments about them than the Yerevan authorities.

In a conversation with Turkish journalists, Hajiyev openly welcomed the “Real Armenia” concept put forward by Nikol Pashinyan, describing it as a positive and fundamental approach. Moreover, he stated that he expects the reflection of this concept in the new Constitution of Armenia. At the same time, formally emphasizing that Azerbaijan does not interfere in Armenia’s internal affairs, Hajiyev reaffirmed Baku’s long-standing precondition, linking the signing of the peace treaty with the amendment of the Armenian Constitution and the removal of the reference to the Declaration of Independence from the preamble.

Another statement of Hajiyev was even more remarkable. according to him, signals were received in Baku that the process of adoption of the new Constitution will start in Armenia in the near future. Jeyhun Bayramov, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, reaffirmed the same demand.

Where does Baku’s confidence come from?

Here the key question arises: where did Baku get that trust?

Naturally, Hajiyev did not reveal the source of his information. However, it is difficult to ignore the fact that immediately after the parliamentary elections, on June 14, Hajiyev arrived in Dilijan, where he held talks with the Secretary of the Security Council of Armenia, Armen Grigoryan. The content of that meeting remains secret to this day. If Baku received “impulses” from that meeting, it means that through a closed diplomatic channel, more concrete impulses were given from Yerevan than what is presented to the public.

Parliamentary Arithmetic as a Major Obstacle

While Azerbaijan confidently talks about the start of the constitutional process, the society of Armenia is still not clearly informed about the content of the new Constitution that the government is going to present. Moreover, the ruling “Civil Contract” party has only 64 seats in the National Assembly.

A constitutional amendment or the initiation of a referendum requires at least two-thirds of the total membership of the National Assembly, about 70 votes. Without the support of the opposition “Strong Armenia” (29 mandates) or the “Armenia” alliance (12 mandates), the process is legally blocked. Baku either ignores this mathematical reality or consciously bypasses it.

Pashinyan’s own schedule and its uncertainty

In July 2026, Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan announced that the draft of the new Constitution would be published by the end of the year. However, until today, the public has neither the content of the project, nor the schedule of public discussion, nor a clear mechanism of how it will be put to a referendum without a constitutional majority.

Baku talks about the “near future”, while Yerevan still doesn’t even have a public road map. This contrast is particularly striking.

Decision of the Constitutional Court

In 2024, the Constitutional Court of Armenia gave a “narrow interpretation” of the preamble to the Constitution, confirming that the reference to the Declaration of Independence does not include all national goals and does not create territorial claims in the existing articles.

Yerevan presented this decision as a legal solution. Baku, however, continues to demand the complete removal of the reference to the Declaration of Independence. Hajiyev’s trust, therefore, is based not on a legal but on a political claim, which ignores the already existing Armenian legal position.

Dual use of the concept of “Real Armenia”.

Pashinyan presents the concept as an internal state-building project, Armenia with internationally recognized borders. Baku interprets it as a political decision that has already been made, which should be enshrined in the Constitution. Hajiyev does not simply “welcome” the concept, but turns it into a proof of fulfillment of Baku’s precondition. This shows how domestic political discourse is shaped by external pressure.

The political risk of the referendum

Even if somehow it succeeds in initiating a referendum, it may fail if the public perceives it as a fulfillment of Azerbaijan’s demand. Baku demands not only the amendment of the Constitution, but also the “approval of the people”. Hajiyev’s trust can be based on the calculation that Pashinyan will try to hold the referendum even at the cost of systemic fraud, or, on the contrary, that the failure will give Baku new leverage.

Regional restrictions

The new regional realities should also be taken into account. In recent months, Iran’s more active involvement in the South Caucasus and Tehran’s clearer position can create serious restrictions on the way to the implementation of Azerbaijan’s more aggressive agenda. That circumstance can also have a significant impact on upcoming developments.

The main question

Today, the main question is not even whether Armenia will change the Constitution or not. The main question is, why does Baku talk about this process with more confidence than the Armenian government does with its own public? If Azerbaijan really possesses information that is not presented to the Armenian society, then we are dealing with a non-standard situation, which requires comprehensive, clear and public clarifications from the Armenian government.

Political scientist Suren Surenyants

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