Bilateral relations between Armenia and Russia entered a qualitatively new phase of open confrontation and structural rupture, the foundations of which were laid during the pre-election period and intensified in the context of geopolitical contradictions.

Bilateral diplomatic tension has reached a critical point, when the parties are unable to reach an agreement on fundamental economic and political issues.

Moscow demands from Yerevan to decide whether to go to the EU or to maintain membership in the EAEU by holding a referendum in a short period of time, and Yerevan demands from Russia to remove restrictions that contradict the EAEU and bilateral legal treaty base.

Nikoli Pashinyan’s next step after the elections in order to alleviate the economic pressures, the call to Putin, seems to have aggravated the bilateral atmosphere, not leading to any mutual understanding between the parties. After the parliamentary elections, not receiving any response from Russia regarding the elections held in RA, Pashinyan initiated a call to the Russian Prime Minister Mikhail Mishustin, which was followed by his visit to Russia and the meeting with Mishustin there.

Armenian-Russian economic issues were on the agenda of the meeting, but the meeting did not produce any objective results, shortly after that, the Russian Federation already banned the entry of Armenian dairy products into the Russian market.

The Pashinyan-Putin telephone conversation did not seem to change the situation either. judging by reports, Putin repeated Russia’s ultimatum to Armenia, the demand to hold a referendum in a short period of time, and Pashinyan noted that a referendum cannot be held at the moment, because Armenia is not currently applying for EU membership.

According to Pashinyan, such a question does not exist at the moment. Immediately after the unsuccessful negotiations, Nikol Pashinyan made a statement stating that the Eurasian Economic Union is de facto “paralyzed and does not work”.

Pashinyan announced. “The EAEU is a platform where I will raise all the issues related to our agenda. I will say what I said in the briefing. I said in the briefing that the EAEU is paralyzed. If the EAEU contract is not valid, the EAEU is not valid. And the EAEU is de facto paralyzed, and the paralysis shows tendencies to deepen. If this issue is not resolved quickly, I am 100% sure that the Republic of Armenia will overcome this problem, EAEU will not.”

He also said that he cannot say about the feelings of the Russian Federation.

“I can say that Russia sees a problem there. There is an element of exclusivity there too. The question is, either the relationship is exclusive or the relationship shouldn’t be. We do not accept that approach,” he stated. According to Pashinyan, Yerevan has a “legitimate position”, that is, relations with Russia are not exclusive, but there must be relations. “I ask that they approach our position with understanding and respect, especially since in practice its legitimacy is not questioned,” he emphasized.

Pashinyan also hinted that for 30 years many things have been free in Armenia, and it may happen that Armenia starts demanding 2 billion dollars a year. He said this while referring to the controversy over “South Caucasian Railways”.

In the near future, the EAEU intergovernmental session, which takes place at the level of the prime ministers, will probably be quite heated, because the statements of the RA authorities show that, without renouncing the EAEU membership, but describing the EAEU as a paralyzed structure, the RA authorities will try to use the legal and contractual opportunities of the EAEU and publicly raise the issues that concern the RA authorities.

In this context, it is noteworthy to consider Russia’s traditional approach to the interdependence of foreign policy and economy. In Moscow’s political philosophy, bilateral alliance relations and economic privileges are, as a rule, in an inseparable unity, and the tough position of the Russian leadership is due to this fact.

Yerevan’s approach to build reliable political relations with the West and maintain economic partnership with Russia, using preferential regimes, is unacceptable to the Russian leadership.

Pashinyan’s intensified rhetoric after the phone conversation shows that apparently the phone conversation did not work out for the Armenian side, the parties did not even reach an agreement to meet in the near future. At this stage, Moscow seems to expect one thing from Yerevan: to decide whether to leave the EAEU or to maintain its membership.

In this situation, the influence of external actors on the course of Armenian-Russian relations deserves special attention. In recent years, Armenia has consistently deepened its cooperation with the European Union and the United States, both in political, security, and economic directions.

That process is perceived in Moscow not as a multi-vector foreign policy, but as a strategy of gradual withdrawal from Russia’s sphere of influence. It is within the framework of this perception that the economic restrictions are considered, which can serve as a political impulse for the Russian side to show that the strategic partnership cannot be limited only to economic interests.

At the same time, Yerevan’s calculation seems to be based on the belief that EAEU treaty mechanisms and international legal instruments provide an opportunity to protect the interests of the Armenian side without leaving the organization or making a final decision on foreign policy choices.

Therefore, the coming months may become a decisive stage for Armenian-Russian relations. If the economic differences are not resolved and the political rhetoric continues to harden, the bilateral relations may gradually move into the field of a long-term systemic crisis, affecting not only trade and economic cooperation, but also regional security and integration processes.

At the same time, new negotiation attempts cannot be ruled out, as both Armenia and Russia continue to have mutual interests in the fields of energy, transport, migration and trade.

However, it is obvious that the former model of “political differences while maintaining economic cooperation” is increasingly difficult to implement, and both sides are faced with the need for strategic choices, the results of which can significantly transform not only the nature of Armenian-Russian relations, but also the general arrangement of forces in the South Caucasus.

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