Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov’s statement actually establishes a new political reality.

In the Putin-Pashinyan telephone conversation held on July 27 at the initiative of the Armenian side, Moscow clearly emphasized the necessity of holding a referendum on Armenia’s membership in the European Union or remaining in the Eurasian Economic Union as soon as possible. Dates have not been specified, but the message is unequivocal. the question is no longer a subject of theoretical discussion.

Thus, the demand to hold a second referendum on the initiative of a foreign actor is actually legitimized in Armenia’s foreign political agenda.

The first is the constitutional referendum. Baku has been presenting it as a key precondition for a peace treaty for years. The text of the agreement initialed in Washington in August 2025 has not been signed for this very reason. Azerbaijan has already succeeded in getting the issue of amending the Constitution to appear on the internal political agenda of Armenia, according to the logic of its demands.

Now, with the same logic, Moscow is publicly promoting the idea of ​​a second referendum. It is important to note, however, that this demand did not arise just like that. The law “On starting the process of accession to the European Union” adopted in Armenia in 2025 has become a proof of legal incompatibility for EAEU partners. With the joint statement of Astana on May 29, Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan had already demanded a referendum and set a deadline for the preparation of a report on the possible consequences of the suspension of the EAEU treaty in December. Peskov’s statement is a reaffirmation of that position, with a higher tone.

Nikol Pashinyan continues to resist, setting a condition that the referendum is possible only after submitting an official application to the European Union and making the issue substantive. However, the fact remains unchanged. the agenda of the two referendums has already been formed outside of Yerevan.

A highly symbolic image is obtained. The government continues to talk about Armenia’s “unprecedented sovereignty”, while in real political processes the country faces the prospect of two externally imposed referendums. One at the request of Baku, the other at the initiative of Moscow and EAEU partners.

All this also indicates a deeper problem. Confidence in Nikol Pashinyan’s political speech and commitments has clearly decreased among external actors. If earlier his assurances were enough, today both Baku and Moscow prefer to fix the issues of vital importance for them not with the Prime Minister’s promises, but through a referendum, with the direct expression of the will of the Armenian people.

This is not only a problem of foreign policy. We are talking about Armenia’s state sovereignty, international subjectivity and the level of external trust in the current government. When the agenda of the country’s strategic decisions is formed in foreign capitals one by one, and Yerevan appears in the role of responding to these agendas, statements about “unprecedented sovereignty” lose their political content.

In the end, if the agenda of the referendums on the future of Armenia is being formulated in Baku and Moscow one by one, then it is no longer about the strengthening of sovereignty. It is the gradual institutionalization of foreign political coercion, the biggest victim of which may be Armenia’s right and ability to make independent decisions.

 Political scientist Suren Surenyants

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