We have been witnessing a new round of active Iran-US military operations for almost two weeks now. How is this different from the previous one, the US seems to have a desire to expand operations, moreover, the US armed forces used a B-1 Lancer strategic bomber for the first time since the resumption of strikes against Iran, which indicates a significant escalation and expansion of operations by Washington.

What scenario is Iran ready for, how long will it withstand active military operations? By the way, after the first stage of the war against Iran, there were opinions that Iran won politically, while the military victory belonged to the US.

On these and other issues 168.amthe talked with Aram Shahnazaryan, expert on Iran issues, political analyst.

– This stage differs from the previous one not so much in the intensity of military operations, but in their political and strategic logic. If in the previous stage, the statements of Washington and Tel Aviv actually pointed to broader military and political goals: the destruction of Iran’s military potential, the neutralization of its regional influence, the overthrow of the Islamic Republic system, even the disintegration of Iran as a state unit, now the White House, at least at the public level, is trying to present the actions as limited military confrontations.

President Donald Trump declares that the goal of the United States is not to start a large-scale war, but to weaken Iran’s military infrastructure, missile and anti-aircraft capabilities, naval capabilities, as well as the elimination of Tehran’s control over the Strait of Hormuz.

However, in Iran, these statements are not perceived as a real limitation of goals. Tehran is convinced that the weakening of the key components of Iran’s containment system is a long-term strategic goal in itself, the end result of which could be the reshaping of the regional power balance to the detriment of Iran.

As for the evaluations of the previous round, the wording “the USA won militarily, and Iran won politically”, in my opinion, is too simplified. Undoubtedly, the United States and Israel demonstrated their technological, intelligence, and air superiority by delivering significant strikes on Iranian military infrastructure, separate links of the military-political command system, and strategic facilities. However, it is equally important to note that Iran was also able to deliver targeted and significant strikes to Israel’s military and strategic facilities, as well as to some components of the American military presence in the region.

Although the various sides present vastly different estimates of the actual scale and damage caused by these strikes, it is clear that their military and psychological impact was felt during the conflict itself, forcing the US and Israel to reconsider the organization of air defenses, deployment of forces, and calculations of future operations.

Therefore, if we evaluate the military results not only from the point of view of the damage inflicted, but also from the point of view of the costs imposed on the enemy, the operational limitations and the effect of deterrence, then it is more correct to talk about the relative results achieved at different levels rather than a one-sided military victory. In this context, it is important to take into account the fact that the criterion of victory in Iran’s strategic culture has never been limited to the results of the battlefield.

It is important for Tehran whether the state preserved its independence of political decisions, whether it prevented the strategic changes imposed by the enemy, whether it continued to act as an independent regional power. For this reason, the prevailing perception in Iranian political circles is that maintaining political resistance even in the face of significant military losses can be considered a success.

If the operations expand, Iran will most likely not choose a classic full-scale war, where the military advantage of the United States is obvious. Instead, it will continue the strategy it has developed in recent decades, relying on asymmetric deterrence. We are talking about targeted strikes of missile and ATS systems, use of pressure levers on maritime communications, cyber operations, increasing military and political costs for the enemy through regional partners and allied structures. The key idea in Iran’s strategic thinking is not how to defeat a militarily more powerful adversary, but how to deprive it of the possibility of a quick and low-cost victory by prolonging the conflict until its political and economic cost becomes unacceptable.

How long Iran will withstand active military operations depends not only on its military resources, but also on its internal political stability, economic resilience and external environment. For years, Iran’s leadership has built its national security concept on the logic of resisting prolonged pressure, taking into account the experience of both the eight-year Iran-Iraq war and decades of sanctions. For this reason, the belief prevails in Tehran today that the state can maintain its strategic vitality even in the face of heavy blows.

At the same time, it is obvious that a long-term, high-intensity war, accompanied by the systemic destruction of military infrastructure and the economy, will significantly limit these opportunities. Therefore, Iran’s primary goal will most likely remain not uncontrolled escalation, but maintaining such controlled pressure that will force Washington to return to the field of political and diplomatic calculations.

– Are there changes in Israel’s actions and what?

– Israel’s current behavior may seem passive at first glance, but in fact it is more about a tactical realignment than a decrease in activity. If in the previous stage, Israel acted as the main initiator of military operations and sought to shape the escalation agenda by its own forces, now there is a change in the distribution of roles. a significant part of the heavy military burden was actually shifted to the USA. This allows Israel to conserve its own military resources, restore air defense and missile defense systems capabilities, perform an intelligence reassessment, and at the same time maintain the ability to quickly join operations if the situation demands.

From Iran’s point of view, this relative restraint of Israel is also due to the experience of the last war. Tehran believes that Iran’s missile and anti-aircraft strikes have shown that even multi-layered air defense cannot completely exclude the vulnerability of Israel’s strategic facilities. For this reason, Israel currently prefers to act more calculatedly, avoiding such steps that could lead to new large-scale retaliatory strikes by Iran. However, this does not mean at all that Israel has abandoned the force option. On the contrary, Tel Aviv continues to maintain high combat readiness, active intelligence activities and the ability to immediately engage in military operations at the right moment.

– Is there a change in Turkey’s position if we take into account the ambitions to have positional advantages in NATO? Let’s not forget that one of the key topics of the NATO summit held in Ankara was Iran, moreover, the concluding declaration clearly stated: Iran should never have nuclear weapons։

– In my opinion, there is no significant strategic change in Turkey’s position, but there is an increase in tactical caution. Ankara continues to try to maintain a difficult balance, on the one hand, remaining a key member of NATO and not opposing the general strategic logic of the alliance, on the other hand, avoiding such steps that could involve it directly in the US/Israel-Iran military conflict. The priority for Turkey remains the preservation of its own national security, economic stability and regional influence, rather than unconditional support of any camp. It is for this reason that Ankara criticizes the military escalation in public statements, but in practical politics it tries to maintain communication channels with both Washington and Tehran.

At the same time, Turkey’s special position in NATO gives it an additional strategic maneuver. Ankara realizes that due to its geographical position, its influence on the Black Sea, the Middle East and energy routes, it has a high value for the bloc, which increases its degree of political independence. This circumstance allows Turkey, if necessary, to act as a mediator or communication platform without giving up its own regional ambitions.

If the conflict deepens, Turkey will most likely try to maintain this balancing policy as long as possible. However, if the involvement of the US and NATO expands dramatically, or Turkey’s immediate security environment is threatened, the possibilities of neutrality for Ankara will be limited.

– What changes are still waiting for the South Caucasus, and what role does Iran play now, what kind, what is it striving for? More specifically, is there a change in Iran’s position regarding TRIPP, or does Iran just need the border with Armenia not to be disrupted? In this case, to what extent is Iran today the guarantor of Syunik’s security, does it have the ability to do so? 

– The South Caucasus is currently at a stage when the regional power balance is not yet fully formed. The deepening of the US-Iran conflict, the change in Russia’s role, the activity of Turkey and the competition over various transport projects turn the South Caucasus into an area of ​​not only economic, but also strategic significance.

For Iran, this region is directly related to its own national security, because any changes occurring in the South Caucasus may affect the geopolitical position, security and transit possibilities of Iran’s northern borders.

Tehran’s main goal is to maintain such a balance in the region that will exclude its isolation, will not limit the common border with Armenia and will not allow any extra-regional power/US-West-Israel/ or regional power/Turkey-Azerbaijan/ to form a dominant position in its immediate neighborhood.

In this context, the issue of Syunik and the Armenian-Iranian border has not only bilateral, but also strategic significance for Iran. For this reason, Tehran has repeatedly emphasized that the change of the borders of the region or such solutions that can limit Iran’s physical connection with Armenia are not acceptable for it. However, it should also be understood that Iran is not the “guarantor” of Armenia’s security in the sense that a member state of a military alliance can be. Iran’s opportunities are limited by its own national interests, political, diplomatic, economic and, if necessary, by deterrence tools. Tehran is ready to use these tools if it considers that its vital interests or regional balance are threatened.

 Competition over transportation projects is one of the important components of this conflict. According to the Iranian perception, some initiatives, in particular, “Trump’s Path to International Peace and Prosperity”, may have not only an economic but also a geopolitical purpose to change the communication map of the region and reduce Iran’s role as a transit hub.

Therefore, Tehran is trying to promote such projects that will preserve its participation in regional communications and at the same time will not allow the transportation system of the South Caucasus to be formed at the expense of Iran’s interests. In this sense, the instruments of pressure are not limited to the military dimension, but include diplomatic impulses, economic ties, infrastructural initiatives and strengthening of relations with regional partners.

For Iran, under the current crisis, the South Caucasus is also a matter of security depth. As external pressure on Tehran increases, it becomes more important for it to have a stable and predictable environment along its northern borders. Therefore, Iran’s strategic goal is most likely not to establish hegemony in the region, but to maintain such a multipolar balance, where its communication channels, the border with Armenia and the minimum necessary level of its own influence will be preserved.

From this point of view, the issue of Syunik is considered for Iran as a hub of wide regional competition, where the future geopolitical architecture of the South Caucasus is determined.

—