After a long break, the “3 3” regional consultation platform of the South Caucasus has returned to the political agenda. The impetus for the activation of the process was recently given by the President of Azerbaijan, Ilham Aliyev, during the IV Global Media Forum held in Shushi, where he actually presented Baku’s revised ideas about the future of the platform. Aliyev stated that it is important for “3 3” to be a full six-way cooperation.

“Until Georgia joins, at least five-sided, but with a very clear agenda. It is important so that this mechanism does not turn into another Minsk Group, which will deal exclusively with Azerbaijani-Armenian issues. It should include issues related to the entire region, with the participation of Russia, Iran, Turkey, Armenia and Azerbaijan, on the principle of equality,” he said.

Aliyev also emphasized that if this approach is acceptable to other capitals, it will be possible to organize at least a five-way meeting at the level of foreign ministers.

This statement of the President of Azerbaijan almost immediately received a reaction from Moscow. Maria Zakharova, the official representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, reaffirmed that Russia continues to consider “3 3” as a key regional format for the South Caucasus, and reminded that Moscow is waiting for the agreement of Yerevan and Baku on the order of holding future sessions of the platform.

At the same time, he specifically emphasized that during the expert meeting held in St. Petersburg in June 2026, the parties agreed to “focus on specific mutually beneficial economic projects, avoiding politicization of the process”, adding that Russia fully shares this approach.

The theme of “3 3” was also continued by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Russia, Sergey Lavrov, within the framework of the negotiations with the Foreign Minister of Azerbaijan Jeihun Bayramov in Moscow.

Lavrov announced that along with the discussion of the situation in the South Caucasus, the parties will also discuss the regional consultation format, noting: “We record the return and growth of interest in the “3 3″ regional cooperation platform.” Bayramov, for his part, said during the press conference with Lavrov that the format is an important mechanism of regional cooperation.

According to him, that is why, about a month after the last meeting held in 2024, Azerbaijan proposed to hold the next meeting in Azerbaijan. “We believe that this platform is of great importance for the discussion of all issues of mutual interest for the participating states. Based on this approach, we once again reaffirm our readiness to host the next meeting in Azerbaijan,” Bayramov noted.

The recent diplomatic activity around “3 3”, however, does not yet mean that the platform is close to being fully operational. The main obstacle of the process is not so much organizational as it is geopolitical in nature.

The platform was formed with the logic that the issues of security and economic cooperation of the South Caucasus should be solved exclusively with the participation of the states of the region and immediate neighbors, without the involvement of Western actors. At this stage, Russia and Iran are most interested in this perspective, against whose influence the West is actively fighting in the South Caucasus.

It is this principle that makes “3 3” competitive for the West, which in turn has consistently deepened its political and security involvement in the region in recent years, from the European Union’s observation mission to new formats of Armenia-US and Armenia-EU strategic cooperation. Under these conditions, the full operation of “3 3” implies such a change in the regional power balance, in which case the influence of external actors will be minimized, and such conditions have not yet been formed.

No less important factor is the mistrust within the region itself. Georgia continues to refuse to participate in “3 3”, citing the lack of diplomatic relations with Russia and the issue of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Without the participation of Tbilisi, the platform loses its full regional character and actually turns into a “3 2” or “3 2 1” format. Although Georgia has not announced whether it will join this platform officially.

At the same time, the Armenian authorities still have significant reservations about the platform, which are most likely due to the possible attitude of the West. In fact, Azerbaijan also has serious reservations, which are due to the foreign policy of Azerbaijan and the problems that arise regularly with Moscow and Tehran.

Under these conditions, the full operation of “3 3” will be possible only when several prerequisites coincide. First, relative stability and predictability should be established in Armenia-Azerbaijan relations, which will allow economic and transport projects to be removed from the influence of the permanent security crisis.

It is also necessary that the main actors of the region – Russia, Turkey and Iran – maintain the minimum consensus of cooperation. And finally, the effectiveness of the platform will depend on the dynamics of the West-Russia, West-Iran confrontation. the deeper the competition in the South Caucasus, the more “3 3” will remain not a fully functioning regional institution, but a platform for political statements.

On the contrary, if a relative balance of influence zones is formed, “3 3” can gradually turn into a real mechanism of regional cooperation, focusing on transport, energy and economic projects.

It is in this context, perhaps, that Moscow’s and Tehran’s consistent emphasis on the “3 3” format should be considered. Both countries, in fact, try not to allow the platform to be left out of the regional political agenda, regularly reminding about its existence and potential.

Although the “3 3” has not yet been able to turn into a fully functioning regional institution in the current geopolitical realities, Russia and Iran apparently view it as a strategic investment for the future. If a new balance of power is formed in international relations, and the competition of external actors in the South Caucasus weakens to a certain extent, this very platform can become the political and economic mechanism through which the countries of the region will try to regulate interaction.

In that sense, the current activity of Moscow and Tehran is perhaps not so much an expectation of today’s result, as an attempt to preserve the “3 3” as an already ready political base of the future regional architecture, which, if appropriate geopolitical conditions are formed, will be able to be quickly transformed into an effective format of practical cooperation.

—