By Dr. Taras Kuzio

Key Takeaways:

• EU and US policies in South Caucasus criticized: The EU is accused of micromanaging Armenia-Azerbaijan issues while the US focuses on trade; both fail to address Armenia’s constitutional territorial claims over Karabakh, which fueled past conflicts. 
• Armenia should follow Ireland’s example: A referendum to amend its constitution and drop claims to Karabakh (similar to Ireland’s Good Friday Agreement) is needed for lasting peace, despite opposition from pro-Russian forces and the Armenian Apostolic Church. 
• Risks of inaction: Leaving territorial claims in Armenia’s constitution risks empowering revanchism and Russian “divide and rule” tactics, perpetuating instability and economic stagnation in the region.

As Russia is fully preoccupied in fighting a losing war in Ukraine its power and influence in Eurasia more broadly and in the South Caucasus is in terminal decline which the European Union (EU) and the Donald Trump Administration are increasingly filling. While the US is focussed on economic growth and expanding trade, the EU is micromanaging questions that are best left to Armenia and Azerbaijan to resolve.

One of these questions is central to peace in the region: the need to introduce mechanisms to prevent the re-emergence of Armenian revanchism and irredentism. After all, in the late 1980s and early 1990s nationalist claims to a greater Armenia led to the occupation of one fifth of Azerbaijan territory for nearly three decades which was not reversed by diplomatic negotiations through the amorphous OSCE Minsk Group, which was closed last year, but by two wars in 2020 and 2023.

Armenia’s claim to Karabakh rests on how its constitution incorporates the country’s 1990 Declaration of Independence that explicitly endorses the 1989 joint decision by Armenia’s Supreme Soviet and the Karabakh Armenian National Council to “reunify” Karabakh with Armenia. The constitution’s preamble references the Declaration of Independence as a foundational document which therefore indirectly embeds an Armenian claim to Karabakh.

In 1991, Karabakh held an illegal referendum on its status which it used to declare independence and “reunify” with Armenia. Azerbaijan, the Unted Nations (UN) and the international community rejected this step, citing territorial integrity and uti possidetis; that is, the recognition of Soviet-era republican boundaries as international borders. On 21 December 1991 Armenia signed the Alma Ata Declaration at the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) summit which recognised republican boundaries as international borders.

Four UN Security Council resolutions which affirmed Azerbaijani sovereignty over Karabakh were each adopted unanimously in April (Resolution 822), July (Resolution 853), October (Resolution 874) and November (Resolution 884) 1993. Resolution 853 reaffirmed “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Azerbaijan and of all other States in the region” and demanded “the immediate, complete and unconditional withdrawal of the occupying forces” from Azerbaijani territories. Resolution 874 reaffirmed “the inviolability of international borders and the inadmissibility of the use of force for the acquisition of territory.” 

None of the four UN resolutions mention “Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence” or granted the region a separate status. Each resolution consistently framed Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan’s sovereign territory and condemned the occupation of other Azerbaijani lands.

The self-declared “Republic of Artsakh” (Armenian name for Karabakh) was formally dissolved by Azerbaijan in January 2024.

The EU demanded, at the insistence of Greece, that Macedonia change its name to North Macedonia. Why is the EU therefore insisting that Azerbaijan drop its demand for Armenia to remove its territorial claims to Karabakh from its constitution? 

EU and US weakness on Georgia, as seen after Russia’s 2008 invasion and recognition of the “independence” of South Ossetia and Abkhazia, has led to Tbilisi’s de facto belief these territories have been lost because of Western duplicity. This has led to despondency in Georgia about support for Georgia’s Western orientation and a gradual drifting back to Russia’s sphere of influence.

The EU should encourage Armenia to look tothe example of Ireland. The three-decade long sectarian conflict (dubbed “The Troubles”) ended with the 1998 Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement and Ireland holding a referendum change the constitution so that the Irish republic no longer laid territorial claim to Northern Ireland. The EU should assist Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan to hold a similar referendum that would ask Armenians whether they supported changing their constitution as a step towards finalising a peace agreement with Azerbaijan. 

The victory of Pashinyan’s Civil Contract party in the June parliamentary elections did not give him a two thirds majority in parliament and therefore his political force cannot unilaterally change the constitution. Nevertheless, Pashinyan was given a popular mandate to push ahead with a referendum.

Undoubtedly, a referendum in Armenia would face greater resistance than it did in Ireland. Pro-Russian Armenian parties, oligarchs like Samvel Karapetyan who made billions in Russia, and hierarchs in the Armenian Apostolic national Church are hostile to this constitutional change because they oppose any peace agreement with Azerbaijan. Vladimir Putin’s Russia is also happy for Armenia and Azerbaijan to continue their conflict as this would allow the Kremlin to implement its old strategy of “divide and rule.”

On 22 May 1998, voters in Ireland were asked whether they agreed to amend Articles 2 and 3 of the Irish Constitution. These two clauses had, since 1937, laid claim to the “national territory” of the whole island, thus including Northern Ireland. The referendum was held simultaneously with a parallel vote in Northern Ireland on the ratification of the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement signed the previous month.

The referendum question asked Irish voters whether they agreed to drop the constitutional assertion of sovereignty over the whole island and replace it with a more conciliatory aspiration to a united Ireland to be achieved only “by peaceful means, with the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in the island.” Unionists in Northern Ireland had long regarded the constitutional claim as provocative and giving ideological sustenance to nationalists and the IRA (Irish Republican Army).

The Irish referendum passed with a very large majority of 94.4 percent with only 5.6 percent opposed. In North Ireland, the Good Friday (Belfast) Agreement was supported by 71 percent of voters.

High support for changing the Irish constitution cut across party lines and was supportive of peace and reconciliation taking precedence over what had been in effect a symbolic territorial claim; after all the Republic of Ireland had never intended to go to war with Britain over Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin and some Fianna Fáil “traditionalists” expressed reservations about the constitutional change; nevertheless, organised opposition was minimal and far less intense than in Irish referendums on abortion and same sex marriage.

The EU is mistaken in opposing the holding of a referendum on changing Armenia’s constitution. Leaving a territorial claim to Karabakh in Armenia’s constitution would embolden pro-Russian nationalist revanchism and irredentism and allow the Kremlin to continue its three decades long meddling in the South Caucasus which only brought bloodshed and economic stagnation. Only by removing the territorial claim will there emerge the chance of a sustained and durable peace in the South Caucasus.