Georgia’s dominant position was therefore not created solely by superior infrastructure or exceptional logistical performance. It was largely the result of geography combined with the absence of alternative routes. That era is now approaching its end, write Zaur Hasanov and Akbar Ahmadov.

Zaur Hasanov is a U.S. based expert on Eurasia connectivity and security. Akbar Ahmadov is a Eurasia logistics expert

Armenia’s parliamentary elections have concluded with a result that many observers interpret as confirmation of the country’s long-term strategic reorientation toward European institutions and deeper regional economic integration.

According to the official results, the ruling political force led by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan secured approximately half of the popular vote, providing the government with a stable political mandate. At the same time, opposition forces associated with a harder-line and more confrontational regional agenda performed significantly weaker and failed to offer a compelling alternative vision for the country’s future development.

Taken together, the outcome suggests a broader societal demand for stability, economic growth, and Armenia’s gradual integration into both the European and wider Central Eurasian economic space.

This strategic shift raises one of the most important questions for the future of the South Caucasus: could Armenia eventually replace Georgia as the region’s primary transportation hub and challenge three decades of Georgian dominance?

We believe Armenia possesses a more significant strategic advantage than Georgia, and if Yerevan continues to deepen regional integration, the South Caucasus could finally unlock its long-hidden economic potential.

To understand why the United States has shown growing interest in the Zangezur Corridor – and why this route has become increasingly important in discussions surrounding the Middle Corridor – it is necessary to examine the evolution of Eurasian logistics from a broader strategic perspective.

What is today known as the Middle Corridor closely corresponds in many ways to what American military planners previously called the Northern Distribution Network (NDN)—a logistics system that became a crucial supply route for coalition forces operating in Afghanistan.

Beginning in 2009, the United States and NATO increasingly relied on the NDN as an alternative supply route bypassing Pakistan. Before that, the majority of military supplies were transported through Pakistan and entered Afghanistan via the Port of Karachi.

The strategic environment changed dramatically after the 2011 Salala incident, when a NATO airstrike mistakenly targeted a Pakistani border post. In response, Pakistan suspended NATO transit routes through its territory in November 2011, disrupting coalition supply chains and exposing the risks of relying heavily on a single logistical corridor.

This moment became a turning point. The United States and its allies significantly expanded their use of the Northern Distribution Network as an alternative route. Although the northern corridor – running through Europe, Georgia, Azerbaijan, the Caspian Sea, and Central Asia – was longer, more expensive, and operationally more complex, it offered a crucial strategic advantage: it did not depend on one country and instead relied on multiple transit nodes.

According to official U.S. Army data, by June 2013 more than 100,000 containers had been transported through the network, with total cargo volumes exceeding two million tons. The system reached its peak during 2012–2013, when a substantial portion of coalition supplies moved along this route.

After NATO’s main combat mission in Afghanistan ended in 2014, the network was gradually reduced and had effectively ceased operations by 2015.

However, the strategic lesson remained.

The United States and its partners understood that northern connectivity routes could become necessary again under different geopolitical circumstances. Maintaining and expanding such infrastructure was therefore not only a logistical issue but also an element of long-term strategic planning.

American interest in the Middle Corridor intensified following the 2020 Armenia–Azerbaijan war. Washington and other international stakeholders began viewing the Zangezur Corridor – passing through Armenia’s Syunik Province – as a route capable of strengthening the resilience and capacity of the Middle Corridor.

Before the Karabakh war, Georgia effectively maintained a monopoly position within the Middle Corridor system.

This was understandable from a historical and economic perspective. With a population of just over three million people and limited natural resources, Georgia had relatively few opportunities to generate sustainable national revenue. Transit therefore became one of the central foundations of its economic model.

The problem, however, was that Georgia did not invest sufficiently in the infrastructure upon which this advantage depended.

Investment in railways and ports remained inconsistent, while major improvements occurred mainly through individual projects, particularly at the Port of Poti. For much of the past three decades, Georgia’s annual transport infrastructure spending remained below $500 million – a modest figure for a country whose economic strategy relied heavily on becoming a regional transit hub.

The management philosophy of Georgian Railways was largely reactive rather than strategic. The underlying assumption appeared to be that countries generating cargo volumes—and therefore benefiting from the existence of the corridor – would eventually provide the necessary investments themselves.

To some extent, that assumption proved correct.

Over the past three decades, Azerbaijan invested approximately $3.6 billion in Georgia’s transport infrastructure. It financed the Baku–Tbilisi–Kars railway, developed the Kulevi Oil Terminal, and supported a number of major energy and transportation projects that strengthened Georgia’s position as a regional transit country.

However, despite the scale of these investments, Azerbaijan repeatedly faced difficulties in negotiating competitive tariff conditions with Georgian Railways. This reduced the predictability and commercial attractiveness of the route. In some cases, Azerbaijan had to provide its own locomotives to ensure uninterrupted freight operations across Georgian territory.

The limitations of Georgia’s Black Sea ports further complicated the situation.

The ports of Poti and Batumi played a historic role in connecting the South Caucasus with global maritime trade. However, compared with major Mediterranean ports, they face structural disadvantages. Their relatively limited depth restricts the size of vessels they can accommodate, while expansion opportunities remain constrained by geography and existing urban infrastructure.

For large-scale future trade flows, these limitations become increasingly significant. Global logistics is moving toward larger vessels, greater efficiency, and integrated supply chains capable of handling growing volumes at lower costs.

Among transportation professionals in the region, one episode is frequently discussed.

After 2020, when discussions surrounding the Zangezur Corridor became increasingly serious, a Georgian delegation arrived in Baku with an unexpectedly flexible position. According to those familiar with the negotiations, Georgian representatives indicated that they were prepared to accept highly favorable tariff conditions in order to maintain the competitiveness of the existing route.

For years, Azerbaijan had sought more competitive terms for both its own exports and transit cargo moving through Georgia. Yet once it became clear that an alternative route through Armenia would require several years of development rather than immediate implementation, this flexibility gradually disappeared.

This episode illustrates a broader structural issue: a reactive model of decision-making rather than a long-term strategic approach.

Flexibility often emerges when competition creates pressure, but disappears once that pressure decreases.

Only at the end of 2025 did Georgia announce a new infrastructure investment program valued at approximately $7 billion. After decades of relatively limited investment, however, this initiative appears less like the continuation of a long-term strategy and more like a response to a rapidly changing regional environment.

For many years, the unresolved Armenia–Azerbaijan conflict prevented direct connectivity across the South Caucasus.

As a result, almost all transit flows from Central Asia – including oil, copper, gold, ferroalloys, cotton, and fertilizers – moved through Azerbaijan and Georgia toward the Black Sea ports of Poti and Batumi.

Georgia’s dominant position was therefore not created solely by superior infrastructure or exceptional logistical performance. It was largely the result of geography combined with the absence of alternative routes.

That era is now approaching its end.

The normalization of relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan, together with the potential restoration of transportation links between Armenia and Turkey, creates an entirely new logistical reality for the South Caucasus.

Instead of moving westward through Georgia toward the Black Sea, cargo could increasingly travel through Armenia into Turkey and then directly toward Mediterranean ports—most importantly Mersin, one of the largest and most strategically important ports in the Mediterranean region.

The advantage of this emerging route is not limited simply to distance.

According to transportation specialists, the route through Armenia and Turkey could reduce the journey by approximately 300–350 kilometers compared with the existing Georgian alternative.

More importantly, Mediterranean ports offer deeper waters, the ability to accommodate larger vessels, and more direct access to global maritime networks than the ports of Poti and Batumi.

Before the Karabakh war, Georgia’s Black Sea ports represented the only practical gateway for Central Asian goods seeking access to open seas.

The Zangezur Corridor has the potential to fundamentally transform this geography.

The future Middle Corridor may not necessarily depend on the Black Sea route as it has in the past. Transportation, however, represents only the first stage of a much broader regional transformation.

The transformation of regional connectivity is not limited to transportation. Energy and digital infrastructure are becoming equally important components of the emerging South Caucasus economic architecture.

Experts and government representatives discussing the creation of an integrated energy corridor between Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Turkey have pointed to a potential transmission capacity of approximately 3–3.5 gigawatts.

Within this framework, Azerbaijan would serve as one of the region’s primary electricity suppliers, supported by its existing generation capacity and rapidly expanding renewable energy sector.

Armenia would become a critical connecting link within this emerging network. In certain scenarios, the modernization and safe operation of the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant could also contribute to Armenia’s future electricity export potential.

At the same time, the development of high-capacity fiber-optic networks across the Caspian region is creating a new dimension of connectivity.

Projects such as the first subsea cable connection between Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan are opening alternative digital routes between Central Asia and Europe, creating opportunities for Armenia to become part of a broader Eurasian data infrastructure network.

After reaching the South Caucasus, these digital flows could continue through Armenia and Turkey toward Istanbul, which is increasingly positioning itself as one of the region’s leading digital and commercial hubs.

Transportation, energy, and digital networks are gradually converging into a single strategic ecosystem.

The underlying logic is straightforward: investment in Armenia, deeper integration with Turkey, and access to Mediterranean maritime infrastructure could generate additional economic value not only for individual countries but for the entire South Caucasus region.

There are several important implications.

First, the emergence of alternative routes would break the structural monopoly that for nearly three decades limited competition and increased transit costs.

More competitive logistics would benefit exporters from Central Asia, European importers, and producers throughout the wider region. A diversified transportation system is ultimately more efficient and economically resilient.

Second, route diversification reduces geopolitical vulnerability.

When international trade depends entirely on a single corridor controlled by one state, that state inevitably gains significant leverage. Multiple routes create a more balanced system, reducing risks for all participants.

Third, economic integration can become a powerful instrument of conflict prevention.

Countries whose railways, energy networks, pipelines, and ports are interconnected acquire a practical interest in preserving stability. Economic interdependence does not eliminate political disagreements, but it creates incentives to resolve them peacefully.

The infrastructure being built today therefore represents more than an economic investment. It is also a long-term investment in regional security.

For three decades, the South Caucasus was defined by what it could not achieve: closed borders, blocked transportation routes, and unresolved conflicts that prevented the region from reaching its full potential.

A different regional model is now beginning to emerge – one based on connectivity rather than isolation, integration rather than fragmentation, and participation in global economic networks rather than dependence on limited transit options.

Armenia has made its choice at the ballot box.

The electorate has supported a political direction centered on stability, economic development, and deeper engagement with European and Eurasian economic structures.

But the most difficult work begins after elections.

Building infrastructure, negotiating complex regional agreements, attracting investment, and transforming geography into economic advantage will require long-term vision, institutional capacity, and political determination.

The coming years will determine whether Armenia can successfully convert its strategic location into sustainable economic influence.

Unlike previous decades, Armenia is no longer necessarily destined to remain a landlocked country isolated by closed borders and regional disputes. If normalization continues, it has the potential to become a connecting bridge linking Central Asia, the Caspian region, Turkey, and Europe.

For Georgia, this emerging environment should not be viewed only as a challenge but also as an opportunity. Competition between transit routes can encourage modernisation, reduce costs, and create stronger incentives for regional cooperation.

The South Caucasus is entering a new historical phase. The expectations and intentions remain positive. The real test, however, begins now.

Caption: A handout photo made available by the Armenian Prime Minister’s press service shows Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan (R) attending a meeting with European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen in Yerevan, Armenia, 2 July 2026. EPA/ARMENIAN PRIME MINISTER PRESS SERVICE/HANDOUT

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