The two countries face off along the Aras River to the south and the Akhuryan river to the west. Between them, kilometres of barbed wire, a buffer zone and watchtowers. The Christian monasteries of Armenia peer at the distant minarets of the Turkish mosques, in Khor Virap, Ani or Akhurik. On the Armenian side, it seems the muezzin’s call to prayer can sometimes be heard.

The land border between Turkey and Armenia has been sealed for decades, a legacy of past relations between the two peoples, marked by the Ottoman Empire’s genocide of the Armenian people in 1915. In 1993, Turkey imposed a blockade on its neighbour in support of its Azerbaijani ally, in the context of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh (which the Armenians call Artsakh). Since then, the border has remained totally closed. But today there is renewed hope.

“I would describe the present situation between the two countries as a positive development, even though the progress is very modest and symbolic. We observe advances, but they are small and easily reversible”, says Benyamin Poghosyan, research fellow with the Applied Political Research Institute of Armenia (Apri). “At any moment, Turkey can go back on everything it has done over the last two years.

Since the loss of Nagorno-Karabakh and the flight of over 100,000 Armenians towards Yerevan, Nikol Pachinian’s government intends to normalise its relations with its Azerbaijani and Turkish neighbours. A peace agreement was signed with Baku in August 2025 under US auspices in Washington. At the beginning of May, Ankara and Yerevan signed another symbolic agreement for the joint reconstruction of the medieval Ani bridge, connecting the two countries across the Akhuryan river. That same month, they also resumed bilateral trade relations via a third country.

Russian border guards

The victory of the Civil Contract party in the legislative elections of 7 June and the re-election of Nikol Pashinyan as Prime Minister should allow for the continuation of this normalisation process, even if his lack of a constitutional majority1 might limit any rapid changes.

On the Armenian side of the border, opinion is somewhat divided over the question of a possible reopening of the border crossings. In the village of Akhurik, located a few kilometres from Gyumri, the second largest Armenian city, the Russians still guard the border, in a military base overlooking the town.

Despite several media articles announcing their departure in March 2026, the Russian army is still there2. Within 20 minutes of arriving there, we were having our ID checked by a patrol. This doesn’t go down well with the locals: “The Russians did everything wrong; it was Lenin who sold our land to Turkey, and it was they who gave Artsakh to Azerbaijan,” rails Seyran Hrghatyan, an inhabitant of Akhurik, surrounded by his cows. He can’t wait for the border to reopen : “There are good people on both sides. There was a time when we did business with Turks, there was a tourist trade. I hope it will come back.”

Karen Hovhannisyan, 16, agrees. He has never known an open border. “It’s a good thing, trade will develop,” he says, although, like some others, he admits he doesn’t feel very concerned by the issue.

Economic issues

The opening “will be a good thing for the local people, those who live around Gyumri in Armenia, and around Kars and Erzurum on the Turkish side; they’ll be able to do business and engage in trade,“says Bayram Balci, a research fellow with CERI Sciences Po and a Turkey specialist.”But more than that, the interest for Turkey is that this normalisation should go hand in hand with the opening of the Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), since then there will be a trade link between Turkey, Azerbaijan, Central Asia and China,” he stresses.

“I think Ankara wants to have as many links as possible with Azerbaijan and Central Asia”, adds Benyamin Poghosyan of Apri. It’s an economic development which will also serve the interests of Armenia, providing it with a direct channel to the markets of Europe, Asia and the Midde East.

But not everybody here buys the economic argument. These new horizons also raise fears of a massive influx of cheap Turkish goods, undercutting local production. At the same time, historical and geopolitical tensions between the two countries also limit progress.

“We have learned the lessons of the past”

A bit further south along the border, the village of Anipemza also faces Turkey. At the entrance to the township, a huge Armenian flag in front of the Ererouk basilica seems to glower at the border fence. The historic city of Ani, capital of Armenia under the Bagratid dynasty in the 10th century, located today in Turkey, is only a few kilometres away.

In the empty village a mural depicts the flags of Russia and Armenia side by side as a reminder of the friendship between the two countries. Inside a dilapidated building, another image shows the flag of Soviet Armenia beside a portrait of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870-1924).

Henrikh and Gevorg are talking politics as they sit smoking on a bench. Henrikh, 27, works in a quarry. Gevorg, 62, has lost a leg and can no longer work. The two men agree on one thing: they don’t want to see the border with Turkey opened again. “It’s not that we’re afraid, but we’ve learned the lessons of the past. There is no way we can live with those people,” Gevorg explains, leaning on his crutches.

His friend adds: “If a direct connection between the two countries is re-established, we’ll become Turkish. Of course we want peace, but a dignified peace, a good peace. We just don’t trust the Turks”. The wounds of the conflict with Azerbaijan are still raw for Henrikh. He spent several weeks in Nagorno-Karabakh, where his brother was seriously wounded. A tattoo on his neck represents the silhouette of an Armenia with Artsakh still attached to it.

Whereas some people resent the Russians for abandoning Armenia in that war, Henrikh still trusts Moscow : “We’ve been allies for many years, Russia protects us and preserves peace.”

Baku sets the tone

Such anti-Turkish sentiment is still common in Armenian society, but the tendency is gradually turning around. In January 2022, the question “Which of these countries constitutes the biggest political threat to Armenia ?” was put to the population, and 90 % answered “Turkey”. In May 2026, only 58 % gave the same answer, according to the International Republican Institute (IRI). At the same time, the figures for Azerbaijan remained fairly stable at 77 % in 2022 and 73 % in 2026, while those rating the Russian threat greatest increased from 15 in 2022 to 32 % in 2026.

“The normalisation of relations between Turkey and Azerbaijan has made it possible to reduce considerably the danger of a new escalation in the region. Armenia is the weakest player in this threesome”, says analyst Benyamin Poghosyan. Because, over and above economic issues, this normalisation carries with it a plethora of geopolitical factors. And it’s Turkey that is likely to benefit from them.

Ankara might increase its influence in the southern Caucasus, in competition with Russia, whose regional influence is gradually waning, but also with the US which, pushed by President Donald Trump, is increasingly present. However, while opening this border is in the interest of all parties, it is hard to know for sure when the issue will be resolved. “The Turkish diplomatic agenda is very crowded what with Iran, Ukraine and Syria. At the same time, the main difficulty is with Azerbaijan”, says researcher Bayram Balci.

Turkey is dependent for energy resources on Azerbaijan, which invests tens of billions of dollars in its Turkish big brother. Behind the scenes, President Ilhan Aliyev’s regime sets the tone for the discussions and at each session raises new conditions in order to slow the process down. “Turkey will do nothing to move the talks with Armenia forward without the approval of Azerbaijan, even if President Recip Tayyip Erdoğan is deeply appalled by Aliyev’s behaviour,” Balci adds.

That situation was reaffirmed at the Antalya Diplomatic Forum in April, where Erdoğan promised that Ankara would pursue the process of normalisation with Armenia “step by step, in coordination with Azerbaijan.” In May, the Azerbaijani ambassador in Turkey, Rashad Mammadov, declared that the border between the two neighbours would be reopened “after the legislative elections and a referendum” in Yerevan, giving the impression that it was Azerbaijan itself that was dictating the calendar and setting the conditions.